Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it
would reveal that what is alleged is that when the complainant
was in his office the accused came there; enquired with the
complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him in the
name of his caste; and insulted him. Thereafter, three
colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused
and took him away. {Para 13}
14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has
taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the
complainant. The other colleagues of the complainant arrived
at the scene after the occurrence of the incident.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the
incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to
be a place within public view, the offence would not come
under the provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s)
of the SC-ST Act.
18. We find, as already observed herein, that the allegations
made in the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute an
offence either under Section 3(1)(r) or under Section 3(1)(s) of
the SC-ST Act. We are of the considered view that the case
would fall under the first category, listed by this Court in
Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.____________ OF 2025
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.8778-
8779 of 2024]
KARUPPUDAYAR Vs STATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LALGUDI
TRICHY & ORS.
Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.
Dated: JANUARY 31, 2025.
Citation: 2025 INSC 132.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals challenge the judgment and final
order dated 28th February 2024 in Criminal Original Petition
(MD) No. 6676 of 2022 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition
(MD) No.4621 of 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Madras at Madurai.
3. By way of the impugned order, the High Court dismissed
the petitions filed by the Appellant under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”)
wherein the Appellant has prayed to call for records relating to
proceedings in Spl.S.C.No.7 of 2022 pending before the IAdditional District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli
and to quash the same.
4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are
as under:
4.1 The prosecution story is that on 2nd September 2021 the
Appellant approached the Respondent No. 3 (Mr. Ravikumar,
Revenue Inspector) in order to inquire regarding the status of
a petition filed in the name of Appellant’s father concerning
inclusion of Appellant’s father’s name in the patta1 for the land
situated in Natham UDR, Sembarai village.
4.2 A quarrel developed between Appellant and Respondent
No. 3 whereby the Appellant abused Respondent No.3 by using
his caste name in the Revenue Divisional Office, Lalgudi,
Tiruchirappalli.
4.3 Consequently, Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint before
the Respondent No. 2 (Sub-Inspector of Police, Lalgudi Police
1 ‘Patta’ is a government issued document which contains various details such as
landowner’s name, land survey number, type of land, location of land, etc. that validates
the ownership of land.
3
Station, Trichy) and case being Crime No. 676 of 2021 was
registered against the Appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 294(b) and 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter, “IPC”) read with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, “SC-ST Act”).
4.4 After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was
filed by the Respondent No.1 (Investigating Officer/Deputy
Superintendent of Police) in the court of Judicial Magistrate,
Lalgudi, Tiruchirappalli and the case was committed to the
Sessions Court.
4.5 As a result of the same, a case being Spl. S.C. No. 7 of
2022 was initiated against the Appellant before the IAdditional District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli
(hereinafter, “trial court”).
4.6 Aggrieved by the initiation of criminal proceedings so also
the trial, the Appellant filed petitions under Section 482 of
CrPC before the High Court to call for the records relating to
Spl. S.C. No. 7 of 2022 and to quash the same.
4.7 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the
impugned judgment and final order, held that no prejudice
4
would be caused to Appellant if he is subjected to trial and
dismissed his petitions.
4.8 Aggrieved thereby, the present appeals arise by way of
special leave.
5. We have heard Smt. Vanshaja Shukla, the leaned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Appellant and Shri Sabarish
Subramanian, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents.
6. Smt. Vanshaja Shukla submitted that the learned Single
Judge of the High Court has grossly erred in rejecting the
petition of the Appellant. She submits that even taking the
allegations in the FIR at its face value, the ingredients to
constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
SC-ST Act are not made out. She, therefore, submits that the
learned Single Judge of the High Court ought to have exercised
his jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and quashed
the proceedings.
7. As against this, Shri Sabarish Subramanian, learned
counsel for the Respondents submits that upon detailed
investigation a charge-sheet was filed by the then Investigating
Officer (Respondent No.1 herein). Learned Single Judge of the
5
High Court, on a perusal of the charge-sheet, found that no
case for quashing of the proceedings was made out. He,
therefore, submits that no interference is warranted in the
facts and circumstances of the present case.
8. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite
to refer to the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
SC-ST Act, which read thus:
“3. Punishments for offences of
atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe,--
(a) ………………………………………………
(b) ………………………………………………
xxx xxx xxx
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates
with intent to humiliate a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste
name in any place within public
view;”
9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal
that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be
established that the accused intentionally insults or
intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled
6
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.
Similarly, for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of
the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuses
any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by
caste name in any place within public view.
10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up
for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran
Singh and others v. State through Standing Counsel and
another2. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of
Uttarakhand and another3 referred to Swaran Singh
(supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:
“14. Another key ingredient of the
provision is insult or intimidation in “any
place within public view”. What is to be
regarded as “place in public view” had
come up for consideration before this
Court in the judgment reported as Swaran
Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State,
(2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
527] . The Court had drawn distinction
between the expression “public place” and
“in any place within public view”. It was
held that if an offence is committed
outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside
a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the
boundary wall, then the lawn would
2
(2008) 8 SCC 435
3
(2020) 10 SCC 710
7
certainly be a place within the public view.
On the contrary, if the remark is made
inside a building, but some members of
the public are there (not merely relatives
or friends) then it would not be an offence
since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. :
This sentence appears to be contrary to
what is stated below in the extract
from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at
p. 736d-e, and in the application of this
principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if
the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it
would be an offence since it is in the public
view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC
pp. 443-44, para 28)
“28. It has been alleged in the
FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first
informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling
him a “chamar”) when he stood
near the car which was parked
at the gate of the premises. In
our opinion, this was certainly a
place within public view, since
the gate of a house is certainly a
place within public view. It
could have been a different
matter had the alleged offence
been committed inside a
building, and also was not in
the public view. However, if the
offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a
house, and the lawn can be
seen by someone from the road
or lane outside the boundary
wall, the lawn would certainly
be a place within the public
8
view. Also, even if the remark is
made inside a building, but
some members of the public are
there (not merely relatives or
friends) then also it would be an
offence since it is in the public
view. We must, therefore, not
confuse the expression “place
within public view” with the
expression “public place”. A
place can be a private place but
yet within the public view. On
the other hand, a public place
would ordinarily mean a place
which is owned or leased by the
Government or the municipality
(or other local body) or gaon
sabha or an instrumentality of
the State, and not by private
persons or private bodies.”
(emphasis in original)”
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public
view’, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused
to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four
corners of the wall where members of the public are not
present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a
place within public view.
12. If we take the averments/allegations in the FIR at its face
value, what is alleged is as under:
That on 2nd September 2021, while the complainant
was engaged in his office doing his duty, the accused
came to the office in the morning in order to enquire
about the petition given by him already to the Revenue
Divisional Officer regarding entering the name of his
father in the ‘patta’. On such enquiry being made, the
complainant informed the accused that the said petition
has been sent to the Taluk office, Lalgudi and that
appropriate action would be taken after receipt of the
reply from the Taluk Office, Lalgudi. It is alleged that at
that stage, the accused asked the complainant as to what
caste he belongs to and stated that the complainant
belongs to ‘Parayan’ caste. Thereafter, the accused stated
that, “if you people are appointed in Government service
you all will do like this only…”. Thereafter, he scolded the
complainant calling his caste name and insulted him
using vulgar words. The further allegation is that
thereafter the colleagues of the complainant came there,
pacified the accused and took him away.
13. Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it
would reveal that what is alleged is that when the complainant
was in his office the accused came there; enquired with the
complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him in the
name of his caste; and insulted him. Thereafter, three
colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused
and took him away.
14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has
taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the
complainant. The other colleagues of the complainant arrived
at the scene after the occurrence of the incident.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the
incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to
be a place within public view, the offence would not come
under the provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s)
of the SC-ST Act.
16. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of
this Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v.
Bhajan Lal and others4. The law as laid down therein by this
4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
11
Court has been consistently followed.
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation
of the various relevant provisions of the
Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give
the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds
of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in
the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
12
(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but
constitute only a noncognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of
a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal
bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the
effect that the power of quashing a
criminal proceeding should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases;
that the court will not be justified in
embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of
the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint and that the extraordinary or
inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the court to act according
to its whim or caprice.”
17. No doubt, that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC
is required to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It is equally settled
that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. However, the
court would be justified in exercising its discretion if the case
falls under any of the clauses carved out by this Court in
Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra)
18. We find, as already observed herein, that the allegations
made in the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute an
offence either under Section 3(1)(r) or under Section 3(1)(s) of
the SC-ST Act. We are of the considered view that the case
would fall under the first category, listed by this Court in
Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
19. On a perusal of the order of the High Court, we find that
the High Court has not at all considered this aspect of the
matter though it was strenuously argued on behalf of the
petitioner before the High Court (Appellant herein) that the
allegations made in the FIR do not make out a case that the
offence is committed in public view. The High Court did not
even deal with the said contention, leave aside considering the
same.
20. In that view of the matter, we find that the present
appeals deserve to be allowed.
21. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeals are allowed.
(ii) The judgment and final order dated 28th February
2024 in Criminal Original Petition (MD) No. 6676 of
15
2022 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (MD)
No.4621 of 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court of Madras at Madurai is quashed
and set aside.
(iii) The charge-sheet in Special S.C. No. 7 of 2022 on
the file of I Additional District and Sessions Judge
(PCR), Tiruchirappalli and all proceedings pursuant
thereto shall stand quashed and set aside.
22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
..............................J
(B.R. GAVAI)
……………..............................J
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 31, 2025
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