Supreme Court: Admission Of Claim By Resolution Professional Does Not Amount To Acknowledgment Of Debt as per S 18 of limitation Act

The third issue pertains to legal character of the admission of a claim by the IRP/RP and whether such admission can be construed as admission of liability so as to extend the period of limitation Under Section 18 of the 1963 Act. At the outset, it must be noted that scope and ambit of Section 18 of the 1963 Act are well-settled. For a writing to constitute a valid acknowledgment, it must be made by the party against whom the right is claimed, or by a person duly authorized on its behalf; it must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation; and, most importantly, it must evince a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship and an existing liability. A mere reference to a past transaction or a bald recital of a debt, without an intention to admit liability, would not suffice. The said principle has been authoritatively enunciated by this Court6. The provisions of the Code and the Regulations were considered by this Court7 and it has been held that RP has no adjudicatory powers and his role involves collation of claims. RP performs its administrative duties Under Section 18 of the Code. The admission of a claim by RP is merely an administrative/clerical task performed as part of its statutory duties Under Section 18 of the Code8 and, therefore, admission of claim by RP only means induction/entry of a claim. An admission of a claim by RP is akin to mere recital/reference of debt, which does not amount to an acknowledgment Under Section 18 of the 1963 Act9. Therefore, IRP's admission of secured financial creditors debt in first CIRP was not an acknowledgement Under Section 18 of 1963 Act. Accordingly, third issue is answered. {Para 16}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 13158-13159 of 2025

Decided On: 29.04.2026

Shankar Khandelwal Vs. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.

Author: Alok Aradhe, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 429,MANU/SC/0421/2026

Print Page

Supreme Court: Credibility of injured witness becomes doubtful if injury caused to them is not proved

 The credibility of an injured eyewitness, as has been held by this Court is a tad higher than an eyewitness who has just seen the incident. The very fact that the witness suffered an injury in the same transaction adds to its credibility. On the other hand, when the prosecution fails to prove the very injuries projected as sustained in the same transaction, not only are we unable to concede a greater credibility than that available to a chance witness, but it also makes doubtful their very presence in the P.O. {Para 16}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 558 of 2021, 

Decided On: 28.04.2026

Sadek Ali and Ors. Vs. The State of Assam and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 421,MANU/SC/0412/2026

Print Page

Supreme Court: Magistrate Doesn't Require Prior Sanction To Direct FIR Registration Under S.156(3) CrPC

 Part IV

Our Conclusions

164. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, our conclusions are summarised as follows:

V. The statutory framework under the Code of Criminal Procedure (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), provides a comprehensive and layered mechanism to set the criminal law in motion. The duty of the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence is mandatory, as settled in Lalita Kumari (supra).

VI. In cases of non-registration of FIR, the Code of Criminal Procedure/BNSS provide efficacious remedies. An aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police Under Section 154(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure or corresponding Section 173(4) of BNSS and thereafter invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 175 of BNSS) or proceed by way of a complaint Under Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 223 of BNSS). These remedies constitute a complete statutory architecture.

VII. The availability of such remedies, coupled with the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional Courts Under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution demonstrates that no legislative vacuum exists warranting the intervention sought. The appropriate course lies in ensuring faithful and even-handed enforcement of existing law.

VIII. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure or corresponding Section 175 of BNSS is of wide amplitude and includes supervisory oversight over the investigation at appropriate stages. This power is intended to ensure that the investigation is conducted in a fair, impartial, and lawful manner, and may be exercised simultaneously during the stage of investigation, where the material on record discloses any deficiency, inaction, or taint in the investigative process.

IX. The requirement of prior sanction Under Sections 196 and 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Sections 217 and 218 of BNSS) operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage of registration of FIR or investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 175(3) of BNSS). An order directing investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure does not amount to taking cognizance within the meaning of Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 210 of BNSS).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 943 of 2021, 

Decided On: 29.04.2026

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0419/2026,

Print Page

Supreme Court: The Appellate Court can always frame an issue to determine any question of fact based on subsequent event

Yet another factor that impelled the High Court to interfere was the direction of the Appellate Bench in remanding the issue of bonafide requirement and hardship to the Trial Court for recording evidence and returning a finding in that regard. According to the High Court, the Trial Court had neither omitted to frame such issue nor had failed to try the same when it decided the suit. Hence, exercise of power by the Appellate Bench under provisions of Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083 was uncalled for. While it is true that the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue with regard to bonafide requirement of the landlord, the Appellate Court could always exercise power Under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code and frame an issue so as to "determine any question of fact which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits." Such power can be exercised by the Appellate Court if it appears to it essential to the right decision of the suit on merits. It has to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of the case when found necessary by the Appellate Court for arriving at a right decision in the suit. {Para 18} 

In the facts of the present case, we do not find that the Appellate Bench committed an error when it exercised its jurisdiction Under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code and referred the issue of bonafide requirement to the Trial Court pursuant to the plaint being amended. Liberty had been granted to the Defendants to amend the written statement and thereafter to both parties to lead evidence. Hence, even on this count the order of the Appellate Bench was not liable to be interfered with.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6677 of 2026

Decided On: 24.04.2026

Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh Vs. Natwarlal Shamji Gada and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 416,MANU/SC/0405/2026

Print Page