Supreme Court: Accused can be permitted to go abroad for his business or professional work

We are called upon to decide only whether the Appellant should be permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks. In evaluating this issue, we must have regard to the nature of the allegations, the conduct of the Appellant and above all, the need to ensure that he does not pose a risk of evading the prosecution. The details which have been furnished to the Court by the Appellant, indicate that he has regularly travelled between the US and India on as many as sixteen occasions between 2015 and 2020. He has maintained a close contact with India. The view of the High Court that he has no contact with India is contrary to the material on record. The lodging of an FIR should not in the facts of the present case be a bar on the travel of the Appellant to the US for eight weeks to attend to the business of revalidating his Green Card. The conditions which a court imposes for the grant of bail - in this case temporary bail - have to balance the public interest in the enforcement of criminal justice with the rights of the Accused. The human right to dignity and the protection of constitutional safeguards should not become illusory by the imposition of conditions which are disproportionate to the need to secure the presence of the Accused, the proper course of investigation and eventually to ensure a fair trial. The conditions which are imposed by the court must bear a proportional relationship to the purpose of imposing the conditions. The nature of the risk which is posed by the grant of permission as sought in this case must be carefully evaluated in each case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 648 of 2020 

Decided On: 01.10.2020

Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

Author:Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: 2020 INSC 573, MANU/SC/0743/2020.

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Medical Facilities In India Comparable To Any Foreign Country', Supreme Court Restrains Accused From Travelling To USA For Treatment

The "exigencies of medical treatment to be undergone" by the Respondent no.2 and that "he has appeared before the Magistrate Court on the last 12 occasions" coupled with his undertaking to return to India within 6 (six) months were considered good enough reasons by the High Court to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Having regard to the trajectory of the proceedings right from the date the FIR was registered, the conduct of the Respondent no.2, the nature of his ailment, and the medical facilities available in India (which, we believe, are comparable with any facility available in any foreign country), we have no doubt in our mind that the High Court instead of exercising judicial restraint was indulgent towards the Respondent no.2 and permitted him to travel to the USA even though all medical facilities exist domestically. {Para 9}

10. An argument has been advanced on behalf of the Respondent no. 2 that imposing a condition requiring deposit of his passport or mandating prior permission of the Court before travelling abroad would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right Under Article 21 of the Constitution. Suffice it to observe that the right to a speedy trial is equally an integral facet of Article 21. While Article 21 undoubtedly guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, which includes the right to travel abroad, such right cannot be viewed in isolation. A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the Respondent no. 2 on the one hand and the right of the Appellant to a speedy trial together with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice, on the other. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3048 of 2026

Decided On: 04.06.2026

Seesa Santosh Vs. The State of Telangana and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and S.C. Sharma, JJ.

Author: Dipankar Datta, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 628,MANU/SC/0616/2026

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Supreme Court: Whether accused involved in matrimonial offence can be permitted to accept Job Abroad?

 After hearing learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the permission sought by the appellant to travel abroad to join as Cyber Security Architect with a company in Belgium should not be denied, merely on account of pendency of the aforesaid case against him. It is not in dispute that the appellant is in India for the last more than one year, still the investigation has not been completed. In case the appellant is not allowed to go abroad to join the service, as has been offered to him, his career prospects may be affected. However, we grant permission to the appellant subject to the following conditions:

(i) The appellant will deposit a sum of ` 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) with the Trial Court within two weeks which shall be kept in a fixed deposit in any nationalized bank initially for a period of one year and shall be renewed automatically thereafter, till either the appellant comes back or the trial is over. Specific order of the Trial Court shall be required to release that FDR;

(ii) The appellant shall furnish an undertaking before the Trial Court within two weeks that he will attend each and every hearing of the case, as and when chargesheet, if any, is filed and also attend the hearing personally in case the Court so requires; and

(iii) In case of his failure to comply with the undertaking given by him, the amount of ` 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) shall stand forfeited to the State, on passing of order by the Trial Court. {Para 5}

6. The order dated 24th September, 2024 passed by the High Court stands modified to the extent mentioned above.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2025

Date of Order: 09.12.2025

A.Mohammed Zaheer Vs. The State Rep . By The Inspector Of Police and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/94504/2025

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Supreme Court: Non- stamping or inadequate stamping of an arbitration agreement is merely a curable defect

Thereafter, the Constitution Bench recorded its conclusions in paragraph 224 as under:

224. The conclusions reached in this judgment are summarised below:

a. Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible in evidence Under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable;

b. Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect;

c. An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination Under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act. The Court concerned must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists;

d. Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal; and

e. The decision in N.N. Global (2)10 and SMS Tea Estates11 are overruled. Paras 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes12 are overruled to that extent.

21. The learned Senior Advocate for the mine owner also urged that relegating the stamping objection to the post- award stage Under Section 34 of the A and C Act would compel the mine owner to endure prolonged and expensive arbitral proceedings merely to vindicate what he characterises as a mandatory fiscal objection going to the root of the agreement, while the remedy available Under Section 34 is too circumscribed to adequately address such a fundamental defect. This Court is unable to accept this submission, as it derives its force only if non-stamping or inadequate stamping of an agreement is treated as a fatal, jurisdictional infirmity that vitiates the agreement at its inception. That premise, however, no longer holds good in law. The Constitution Bench in Re: Interplay (supra), has unequivocally held that non- stamping or inadequate stamping of an arbitration agreement is merely a curable defect. In paragraph 48, it was held as under:

48. Section 35 of the Stamp Act is unambiguous. It stipulates, "No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence..." The term "admitted in evidence" refers to the admissibility of the instrument. Sub-section (2) of Section 42, too, states that an instrument in respect of which stamp-duty is paid and which is endorsed as such will be "admissible in evidence." The effect of not paying duty or paying an inadequate amount renders an instrument inadmissible and not void. Non-stamping or improper stamping does not result in the instrument becoming invalid. The Stamp Act does not render such an instrument void. The non-payment of stamp duty is accurately characterised as a curable defect. The Stamp Act itself provides for the manner in which the defect may be cured and sets out a detailed procedure for it. It bears mentioning that there is no procedure by which a void agreement can be 'cured'.

Hence, this Court drew a careful and fundamental distinction between the admissibility of an instrument in evidence and its validity and enforceability in law, holding that the scheme of the Stamp Act is concerned only with admissibility and mere non-stamping or inadequate stamping does not render an agreement void. The agreement survives non-stamping or insufficient stamping, and the defect can be cured by getting the agreement sufficiently stamped at any stage, whereupon it becomes admissible in the eyes of law. It is the arbitral tribunal that is empowered to deal with this issue in the first instance. The remedy of having the Tribunal satisfy itself on the question of stamping Under Section 16, with the award remaining open to challenge Under Section 34 at a later stage, is not inadequate. The apprehension of the mine owner, therefore, rests on a legal position that stands overruled.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8218 of 2026 

Decided On: 27.05.2026

Tarini Prasad Mohanty Vs. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.K. Maheshwari and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 566,MANU/SC/0573/2026

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