Law Web: Supreme Court: Whether the court can convict accused on the basis of afterthought statement of witnesses recorded by police?

Therefore, the version of PW-6 in her statements recorded on2nd April 1998 and 6th April 1998 regarding providing dowry and regarding demands of dowry are omissions. She also stated that she told the police that the accused had fled from their house. However, she admitted that even this fact is not mentioned in any of the three statements. She claimed that she has stated some of the instances of demand of dowry in her statement dated 23rd June 1998. The statement was recorded more than two and half months after the incident; and therefore, what is stated therein is an afterthought. {Para 13}

14. There is something fundamental which goes to the root of the

matter. While deposing about the demand of dowry, she has not

deposed to any particular act of cruelty or harassment by the

appellant. This is an essential ingredient of Section 304-B. It is not

made out from the evidence of PW-6.

15. Now, we come to evidence of PW-7. Following are the

allegations made by him:

a) The accused used to taunt her sister by saying that she

had brought insufficient dowry in the marriage;

b) They used to taunt her by stating that she had brought

broken furniture;

c) Three months after the marriage when he had visited

the matrimonial home of his sister, all the three accused

told him to bring a motorcycle, a refrigerator and a mixi;

d) When the deceased, along with the appellant came to

their house nine to ten days before the incident, the

appellant disclosed that his parents were putting

pressure upon him that he should bring a sum of

Rs.60,000/- from PW-6 for purchasing a jeep; and

e) The accused used to give a beating to the deceased.

16. In the cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had

recorded his statements on 3rd April 1998 and 7th April 1998,

which were marked as exhibits DG and DH, respectively. He

accepted that the allegation that the accused used to maltreat his

sister on account of insufficient dowry given in the marriage and

having brought broken furniture is not found in both the police

statements. He also stated that the demand for a refrigerator, a

motorcycle, and a mixi does not find place in both statements.

Therefore, the version of PW-7 in his examination-in-chief about

the demands of dowry is a significant and relevant omission.

Hence, this amounts to a contradiction. The public prosecutor

claimed that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a

mixi was mentioned in his third statement, which was recorded on 23rd June 1998. The third statement, recorded belatedly, obviously appears to be an afterthought. As regards his statement that the accused used to give a beating to his sister, it seems that he got this information when he visited the matrimonial home of his sister three months after the marriage. It is a very vague allegation. Moreover, the witness has not stated that this was disclosed to him by his deceased sister. Assuming that what he has said is correct, this incident of beating must have taken place between 25th June 1996 till end of September 1996. Therefore, this incident did not happen soon before the death. It is not his case that when the deceased allegedly visited his house nine to ten days before the incident, she complained about any cruelty or any harassment. Thus, none of the three statements of the witnesses contain any specific instances of cruelty or harassment.

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014 Page 1 of 11

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1076 OF 2014

KARAN SINGH Vs STATE OF HARYANA

ABHAY S OKA, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 133.

Dated: January 31, 2025.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

1. The appellant and his parents were tried for the offences

punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34

of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’). While his parents were

acquitted, the Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the

offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC. For

the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC, the appellant

was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years.

For the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC, he was

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. He was

also sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500/- and, in default of payment

of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. By

the impugned judgment, the High Court has confirmed the

conviction and sentence.

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014 Page 2 of 11

2. Appellant married to deceased Asha Rani on 25th June 1996.

On 2nd April 1998, the deceased committed suicide. After the

postmortem, the doctors opined that the death was due to

asphyxia as a result of hanging. There were three main witnesses.

PW-6 - Inder Kala (the mother of the deceased), PW-7 - Parvinder

Kumar (brother of the deceased) and PW-8 - Ram Singh (maternal

uncle of the deceased). Both the Courts have believed the

testimony of PW-6 and PW-7.

SUBMISSIONS

3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken

us through the notes of evidence of material prosecution

witnesses. He submitted that all the allegations made by the

witnesses regarding the demand of dowry are omissions.

Therefore, there is no legal evidence to show that the appellant

demanded dowry. Moreover, there is no evidence that the appellant

subjected the deceased to cruelty. Learned counsel relied upon a

decision of this court in the case of Charan Singh alias

Charanjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand1 and submitted that

there is no evidence to show that soon before her death, the

deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant

for or in connection with demand for dowry. He would, therefore,

submit that in the absence of legal evidence against the appellant,

the Courts ought to have acquitted him.

4. Learned counsel for the State submitted that there is more

than sufficient evidence on record in the form of evidence of PW-6

and PW-7 to establish the demand for dowry. In fact, nine to ten

1 2023 SCC OnLine SC 454

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days before the incident, the deceased had met PW-6 and PW-7

and stated about the demand of Rs.60,000/- by the appellant for

purchasing a jeep. The appellant himself made the said demand to

the witnesses. Learned counsel submitted that presumption under

Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, 'the

Evidence Act’) will apply in this case and the Court will have to

presume that the appellant has caused the dowry death of his wife.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS

5. Sections 498-A and 304-B read thus:

“498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a

woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever,

being the husband or the relative of the husband of

a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be

punished with imprisonment for a term which may

extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,

“cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a

nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit

suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,

limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the

woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such

harassment is with a view to coercing her or any

person related to her to meet any unlawful demand

for any property or valuable security or is on

account of failure by her or any person related to

her to meet such demand.”

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a

woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances

within seven years of her marriage and it is shown

that soon before her death she was subjected to

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cruelty or harassment by her husband or any

relative of her husband for, or in connection with,

any demand for dowry, such death shall be called

“dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall

be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,

“dowry” shall have the same meaning as in

Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of

1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished

with imprisonment for a term which shall not be

less than seven years but which may extend to

imprisonment for life.”

6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:

a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any

burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise

than under normal circumstances;

b) The death must have been caused within seven years of

her marriage;

c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to

cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of

her husband; and

d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection

with, any demand for dowry.

7. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death

can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband's

relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the

dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides

that dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed

to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014 Page 5 of 11

to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party

to a marriage or by any other person, to the other party to the

marriage or to any other person. The dowry must be given or

agreed to be given at or before or any time after the marriage in

connection with the marriage of the said parties. The term valuable

security used in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has

the same meaning as in Section 30 of IPC.

8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the

appellant's wife occurred within seven years of the marriage.

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads thus:

"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When

the question is whether a person has committed

the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that

soon before her death such woman had been

subjected by such person to cruelty or

harassment for, or in connection with, any

demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that

such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,

"dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in

Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is

established that soon before her death, the woman has been

subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for

attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the

deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment

for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her

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death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked.

9. We have carefully perused the evidence of PW-6 and PW-7.

PW-6, the mother of the deceased, stated that her three statements

were recorded by the police. The first was exhibit PD, on the basis

of which the first information report was recognised. The second

was exhibit DA recorded on 6th April 1998 and the third one was

exhibit DB dated 23rd June 1998. According to PW-6, sufficient

dowry was given in the marriage to the appellant. Her evidence in

the examination-in-chief can be summarised as under:

a) The deceased was taunted and maltreated as dowry

given at the time of marriage was not sufficient;

b) The deceased was taunted on the ground that at the

time of marriage, a black and white television set was

given and not a colour television;

c) There was a demand for a motorcycle, a refrigerator and

a mixi by the accused;

d) There was also a demand for a buffalo and a sum of

Rs.10,000/- was paid to the appellant’s father in his

presence for the said purpose;

e) There was a demand for furniture on the ground that at

the time of marriage, only old furniture was given;

f) She gave a tape recorder and walkman to the appellant;

g) Nine to ten days prior to the death of the deceased, the

appellant and the deceased had come to her village

when the deceased informed her that she was forced by

the accused to bring a sum of Rs.60,000/- from her for

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purchase of a jeep. This demand was made in presence

of PW-7; and

h) Later on, even the appellant demanded a cash amount

of Rs.60,000/- from her for the purchase of a jeep. The

appellant disclosed that his parents were putting

pressure on him to bring the cash amount of

Rs.60,000/-.

10. PW-6 was confronted by showing her prior statements at

exhibit PD and DA. All the aforesaid demands stated by her in her

examination-in-chief are omissions as far as both the statements

are concerned. Even the payment of Rs.10,000/- is an omission.

These omissions are significant and relevant and, therefore, by

virtue of explanation to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the CrPC’), the same amounts to

contradictions.

11. PW-6 claimed that the demand for a colour television,

motorcycle, refrigerator and mixi had been mentioned in the

supplementary statement dated 23rd June 1998 (exhibit DB). She

stated that even demand for new furniture and a buffalo has been

mentioned in exhibit DB. She further stated that she had stated

that she had given a tape recorder and a walkman to the appellant

in her police statements at exhibit DA and DB. However, the same

does not find place in both statements. She stated that she had

told the police while recording statements at exhibit PD and DA

that she had given an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to the appellant’s

father in the presence of the appellant for the purchase of a buffalo.

However, she admitted that the allegation does not find a place in

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014 Page 8 of 11

statements at exhibit PD and DA. She stated that this allegation

finds place in her statement at exhibit DB. However, the payment

of Rs.10,000/- by PW-6 to the appellant’s father is irrelevant as

the Trial Court acquitted him, and his acquittal has become final.

12. PW-6 admitted that though she had stated while recording

her statement at exhibit PD that when nine or ten days before the

incident, the deceased and the appellant had come to her house,

both of them gave information regarding the demand of

Rs.60,000/-. However, she accepted that this statement does not

find place in the statement at exhibit PD. She was shown a

notebook at exhibit DC, allegedly maintained by the deceased.

However, PW-6 stated that she could not tell whether it was in the

handwriting of the deceased.

13. Therefore, the version of PW-6 in her statements recorded on

2nd April 1998 and 6th April 1998 regarding providing dowry and

regarding demands of dowry are omissions. She also stated that

she told the police that the accused had fled from their house.

However, she admitted that even this fact is not mentioned in any

of the three statements. She claimed that she has stated some of

the instances of demand of dowry in her statement dated 23rd June

1998. The statement was recorded more than two and half months

after the incident; and therefore, what is stated therein is an

afterthought.