In the present case, at the outset, we must note that the
Applicant, a Judicial Officer, was never involved in the pending
lis, as the suit property was purchased by his brother
exclusively and only he was party to the litigation. There is no
reason for the deceased to have implicated the Applicant, as he
was not connected with the dispute at all. The material in the
charge-sheet in form of statements implicating the Applicant,
are too far fetched and definitely fall short of any instigation/
incitement and a bare reference to his presence in Miraj in the
month of May, where he is alleged to have threatened the
deceased and asked him to vacate the subject property is not
sufficient to attract instigation/incitement, as the offence is
registered on 24/06/2016. In any case, even it is not the
allegation of the prosecution that the Applicant abetted the
suicide by instigating or inciting the deceased in any manner,
as abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person
or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without
a positive act on part of the Applicant to instigate or aid in
commission of suicide by the deceased, he cannot be convicted
for an offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC.
In order to attract the offence under Section 306, clear
mens rea to commit the offence has to be established, as it
requires active/direct act, leading the deceased to commit
suicide left with no other option, but in the present case, the
material in the charge-sheet falls short of proving the
ingredients of Section 306 and, hence, in our view, by
exercising the inherent power conferred under Section 482,
the purpose of it being to prevent the abuse of process or to
secure the ends of justice, we deem it appropriate to safeguard
the interest of the Applicant.
In absence of we exercising the power, the Applicant will
have to unnecessarily face the rigmarole of trial, which
ultimately would result in acquittal, as no material in the
charge-sheet collected by the prosecution attract the
ingredients of Section 306 of IPC and we would be failing in
discharge of our duty, if we do not step in and save the
Applicant from undergoing the long drawn process of trial, as
the material in the charge-sheet through close scrutiny, do not
in any manner, establish the ingredients of abetment of suicide
under Section 306 of IPC against him.
For the reasons recorded above, we are satisfied that
human liberty, which is the most cherished constitutional
value, must be protected by us, by exercising the inherent
power conferred under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. {Para 20}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.959 OF 2016
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2060 OF 2024
Nasirhusen Mohiddin Jamadar Vs The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE & MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, JJ.
DATED : 18 th NOVEMBER, 2024
ORDER (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J.) :-
1. The present Application filed by the Applicant, seek relief
of quashing and setting aside of C.R.No.53 of 2016, registered
with Mahatma Gandhi Chowk Police Station, Miraj on
24/06/2016 against the Applicant, invoking Sections 306 and
34 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), on the ground that on
taking into consideration the nature of the accusations levelled
against him and the law that has evolved around Section 306
of IPC, no case of whatsoever nature is made out against him
and, therefore, continuation of the proceedings against him
would be nothing short of abuse of process of court.
2. We have heard learned senior counsel Mr.Kumbhakoni
alongwith Mr.A.M.Kulkarni and Mr.Manoj Badgujar for the
Applicant.
Despite service of notice, none is present on behalf of
Respondent No.2.
Respondent No.1 is represented by learned Additional
Public Prosecutor Mr.Yagnik.
3. The subject FIR was registered on the complaint filed by
Respondent No.2, son of deceased Bhupal Ramu @
Ramchandra Mali, who left his residence on 20/06/2016 and
was to return on the next day, but on his failure to return
home, a missing complaint was lodged on 21/06/2016. On
22/06/2016, body of Bhupal was found on the boundary of an
agricultural land and on search at his residence, a two page
note and from the spot, three written chits were seized. These
chits/notes were alleged to be suicide notes, which made
reference to the Applicant and his brother Jakirhusain
Mohiddin Jamadar.
4. The genesis of the note/chit lied in Regular Civil Suit
No.384 of 1986 filed between the members of Hirgude family at
Miraj, seeking partition and separate possession of the suit
properties. The suit was decreed vide judgment dated
01/10/1992 and the decree for partition and separate
possession was passed.
Regular Civil Appeal No.632 of 1992 was filed against it
and though the same was dismissed, decree came to be
modified on 8/11/2020 by the Appellate Court.
Final decree proceedings for preparation of final decree,
in terms of the preliminary decree for partition was taken out
by the decree-holders, by preferring Final Decree Application
No.10 of 2004 and the Court Commissioner appointed towards
execution of the decree, suggested partition of the suit
property in terms of the plan.
5. The brother of the Applicant, Jakirhusain purchased the
undivided share allotted to some of the parties to the aforesaid
decree, with the consent of the co-sharers vide registered Sale
Deed dated 07/12/2010. Worth it to note that the Sale Deed is
exclusively in the name of Jakirhusain Mohiddin Jamadar, as
the purchaser and member of Hirgude family as the vendors.
The Applicant, in no way, is connected with the said
transaction.
6. The Executing Court, on 16/07/2015, passed an order
acting upon the report of the Court Commissioner for
division/partition of the property in terms of the partition
decree and on 03/08/2015, the Executing Court, passed an
order, directing issuance of possession warrant in terms of the
report of the Court Commissioner.
Jakirhusain was impleaded as Decree Holder No.4 in the
final decree proceedings and on 08/01/2016, an order was
passed by the Executing Court, by issuing possession warrant
in terms of the decree and the report of the Court
Commissioner in his favour, in the execution proceedings in
the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Miraj. The said order
clearly directed handing over of the possession of the piece of
land mentioned in City Survey No.6267, which was purchased
by Jakirhusain vide registered Sale Deed and the Bailiff was
directed to implement the order, by executing the possession
warrant.
Being aggrieved by the said order, a writ petition was
instituted in this Court (Writ Petition No.12598 of 2015) and
by order dated 04/02/2016, this Court confirmed the order of
the Executing Court, in particular, the order issuing
possession warrant.
In compliance, on 26/04/2016, Jakirhusain was handed
over the actual/physical possession of the property purchased
by him under the registered Sale Deed and allotted to the
share of his vendors, in terms of the execution of partition
decree.
7. As far as the Applicant is concerned, he had no role to
play in the entire episode, but to continue the narration, when
Jakirhusain was handed over the possession of the property,
Bhupal Mali, the father of the Complainant, was harassing the
two brothers, as he staked his claim in the said portion of the
suit property, which was purchased by the brother of the
Applicant, with which he had no concern and the entitlement
of Jakirhusain was established through the series of orders
passed by the competent court, pursuant to which, he came in
possession of the said piece of land.
8. Special Civil Suit No.73 of 2014 was filed by some family
members of the Complainant in which Jakirhusain alone was
impleaded as a respondent and the Applicant was never a
party to the said proceedings. The plaint in the suit came to be
rejected on 01/12/2014.
However, the deceased carried a grudge against the
family of Jakirhusain and despite recognition of his rights
through legally adopted proceedings, he was not ready to
accept the verdict.
9. The Applicant, being a law graduate, was engaged in
private practice and he shifted to Miraj from Sangli. The
Applicant had performed inter-religion marriage against the
wishes of his family members and in fact, it is the specific
assertion of the Applicant that the relationship with his family
members alongwith his brother, Jakirhusain, was severed to
such an extent that they were not even on talking terms. In
the year 2004, the Applicant got selected in the judicial
service and, thereafter, was posted at distinct places and at the
time when the subject C.R. is registered, he was serving as
Judge, Small Causes Court at Nagpur.
The Applicant had purchased his own house in the year
2011-12 at Sangli, with an intention that he shall be able to
reside independent of his family in the same area, where he
had his roots.
10. According to the learned senior counsel Mr.Kumbhakoni,
the Applicant had no concern with the deceased, Bhupal Mali
or the Complainant, as only during his vacations and that too
for a brief span, he used to visit Miraj, but he is implicated with
malafide intention and ulterior motive, despite the fact that he
has no connect with the property that was subject matter of
the litigation or with the persons involved in the Civil Suits,
which is the genesis of event, giving rise to the complaint in
issue.
The suicide note also only make reference to
Jakirhusain Mohiddin Jamadar, where the deceased had
written that he was responsible for finishing him and his
sacrifice will not go waste and even he will finish him. Near the
place where the body of Bhupal was found, it was surrounded
by bottles containing poisonous medicine and three chits were
found lying. The Complainant, therefore, alleged that
Jakirhusain and his brother Nasirhusen are responsible for his
death and being fed up with the harassment caused to his
father, he had committed suicide.
11. When the Applicant approached this Court, by filing the
present Application, on the first date of hearing i.e. on
12/08/2016, by way of ad-interim relief, this Court directed
that though the investigation in the subject C.R. shall continue,
no coercive action shall be taken against the Applicant and
this order continue to operate till date.
On completion of investigation, the charge-sheet has been
filed and by amending the Application, the same is placed on
record.
When the material in the charge-sheet is carefully
perused, it is the case of the Complainant that the possession
of two and half gunthas of land from City Survey No.6267 was
taken by Jamadar Vakil, without their permission.
According to the Complainant, after taking possession,
Jakirhusain had arranged Kanduri in the cowshed and after
feeding people, pieces of mutton and bones were thrown there,
which had caused mental harassment to his entire family and
from that time, his father was annoyed. As per the
Complainant, some time in past, his father was also assaulted
by Jamadar Vakil and he is alleged to have threatened him by
saying, “in my house, there are four lawyers and two Judges
and, therefore, he can do anything, anytime, anywhere”.
A statement of Jayendra Balasaheb Patil, which forms
part of the charge-sheet, is with reference to Bhupal Ramu
Mali, who was providing necessary instructions for the court
cases to be conducted and according to him, the mother-in-law
of Bhupal Mali as well his wife and other relatives were
required to attend the court proceedings and whenever they
used to cross-path, Jakirhusain used to threaten by saying
that in his house, there are four lawyers and two Judges and
he will see to it that they do not even get service of lawyer and
this was told by Bhupal Mali to Jayendra Patil. In his
statement, it is also stated that Nasirhusen had visited the
house in the month of May and he had also threatened Bhupal
to vacate the place and remove the cowshed and from this
time, Bhupal was under tremendous pressure and was unable
to focus on anything.
The statement of Jayendra Patil is recorded under
Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, where he referred
to his last conversation with the deceased and has narrated
that he was frustrated on account of his failure in the legal
proceedings as well as the threats given by Jakirhusain
Jamadar.
Jayendra Patil do not even refer to the present Applicant
in his 164 statement, recorded by Magistrate.
12. The material in the charge-sheet placed before us, will
have to be appreciated in the light of the provision, which
punishes abetment of suicide under Section 306 of IPC.
Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been
subject matter of interpretation of various decisions and it is
well settled, that to attract the offence of abetment of suicide ,
proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of
suicide by the accused and that too proximate to the time of
occurrence must be necessarily established. The cardinal
principle is identified to be mens rea to abet the suicide and
despite a suicide note, prima facie, revealing harassment,
unless the proof of instigation to commit suicide is offered, it is
held that a person cannot held guilty of having abated suicide
within the meaning of Section 306.
It is equally well settled that the charge under Section
306 of IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment,
without there being any positive act, proximate to the time of
occurrence of the incident on part of the accused, which led or
compelled the person to commit suicide.
13. The three segments of Section 107 of IPC, which
prescribe as to what would amount to ‘abetment’ defines
abetment as instigation of a person to do a particular thing. Its
second limb define it with reference to engaging in a
conspiracy, with one or more other persons, whereas under
the third segment, abetment is founded on intentionally aiding
the doing of thing, either by act or commission.
To convict a person under Section 306 of IPC, it
necessarily require a proof of direct or indirect acts of
incitement to the commission of suicide and it is a well
received interpretation that abetment involves a mental
process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person
in doing of a thing.
In Madan Mohan Singh Vs. State of Gujarat
1
, a case
which arise in the context of a petition under Section 482 of
CrPC, where the High Court dismissed the Petition for
quashing an FIR registered for offences under Sections 306
and 249(b) of IPC, where the FIR was registered on the
complaint of the spouse of the deceased, who was working as a
driver with the accused. The driver had been rebuked by the
employer and later was found dead, as he had committed
suicide. A suicide note was relied upon in the FIR, where the
driver had alleged that he had not been given a fixed vehicle
like the other drivers and in addition, there was deduction of
15 days wages from his salary. The suicide note named the
appellant/accused and in this background, the Apex Court
observed thus :-
“10. We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in this
suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an
offence muchless under Section 306 IPC. We could not find
anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note which could be
suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there
must be an allegation that the accused had instrigated the deceased
to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person
1 (2010) 8 SCC 628
in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided
any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide.
11. In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the
suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a
rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It
also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased
which he himself describes as depression In the so-called suicide
note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the
driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and
did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused
changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to
take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office
itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the
driver should commit suicide because of this.
12. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific
abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC On the part of the
accused with an intention tobring about the suicide of the person
concerned as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of
the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit
suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 IPC.
We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being
any material for offence under Section 306 IPC either in the FIR or
in the so-called suicide note.”
14. In M.Arjunan Vs. State
2
, the Apex Court elucidated the
essential ingredients of Section 306 in the following words :-
“7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC
are; (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or
instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the
accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language
will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should
be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such
act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the
ingredients of instigation/ abetment to commit suicide are satisfied
the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC.”
15. In Ude Singh Vs. State of Haryana
3
, the relevant factors
to be taken into consideration, whether a case would fall
within the ambit of Section 306, were expressed in the
following words :-
2 (2019) 3 SCC 315
3 (2019) 17 SCC 301
“16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a
proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of
suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a
suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of
suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex
attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the
case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be
looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement
to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation
of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice
unless there be such action on the part of the accused which
compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action
ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person
has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could
only be gathered from the fact and circumstances of each case.
16.1 For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted
commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the
accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As
explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions
abovereferred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke,
incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed
suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is
otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly
circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold
the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if
the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct
creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other
option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the fourcorners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in
tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which
eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be
held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the
part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference
to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds
are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more
than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall
short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused
kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until
the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be
that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate
analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined
on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors
having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the
deceased”
16. In Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of Maharashtra
& Ors.
4
, by taking review of the entire law revolving around
Section 306 of IPC, in the backdrop of the fact where the FIR
4 (2021) 2 SC 427
recited that the spouse of the informant had a company,
carrying on the business of architecture, interior design and
engineering consultancy and according to the informant, her
husband was under pressure, as he did not receive money for
the work carried out by him. The FIR recited that the
deceased was called at the office of the appellant and spoken to
his Accountant for payment of money. The deceased left
behind the suicide note stating that his money is stuck and he
named the persons, the owners of the respective companies,
who are not paying his legitimate dues.
17. Recording a prima facie case, on the application of the
test, which has been laid down by the Court in a consistent line
of authorities of which note was taken, it was concluded that it
cannot be said that the appellant was guilty of having abated
the suicide, within the meaning of Section 306 of IPC. The
Apex Court specifically observed thus :-
“62. ….Prima facie, on the application of the test which has
been laid down by this Court in a consistent line of authority which
has been noted above, it cannot be said that the appellant was guilty
of having abetted the suicide within the meaning of Section 306 IPC.
These observations, we must note, are prima facie at this stage
since the High Court is still to take up the petition for quashing.
Clearly however, the High Court in failing to notice the contents of
the FIR and to make a prima facie evaluation abdicated its role,
functions and jurisdiction when seized of a petition under Section
482 CrPC. The High Court recited the legal position that the
jurisdiction to quash under Section 482 has to be exercised
sparingly. These words, however, are not meaningless incantations,
but have to be assessed with reference to the contents of the
particular FIR before the High Court. If the High Court were to
carry out a prima facie evaluation, it would have been impossible
for it not to notice the disconnect between the FIR and the
provisions of Section 306 IP. The failure of the High Court to do so
has led it to adopting a position where it left the appellant to pursue
his remedies for regular bail under Section 439. The High Court
was clearly in error in failing to perform a duty which is entrusted
to it while evaluating a petition under Section 482 albeit at the
interim stage.
63. The petition before the High Court was instituted under Article
226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC. While dealing with
the petition under Section 482 for quashing the FIR, the High Court
has not considered whether prima facie the ingredients of the
offence have been made out in the FIR. If the High Court were to
have carried out this exercise, it would (as we have held in this
judgment) have been apparent that the ingredients of the offence
have not prima facie been established. As a consequence of its
failure to perform its function under Section 482, the High Court
has disabled itself from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226
to consider the appellant’s application for bail. In considering such
an application under Article 226, the High Court must be
circumspect in exercising its powers on the basis of the facts of each
case. However, the High Court should not foreclose itself from the
exercise of the power when a citizen has been arbitrarily deprived
of their personal liberty in an excess of State power.”
18. In a comparatively recent decision delivered on
03/10/2024 by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nipun
Aneja & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
5
, once again the legal
position revolving around Section 306 of IPC was reiterated in
the backdrop of the fact that the deceased, who was an
employee of Hindustan Lever Limited and serving in the
company for past 23 years, committed suicide in his hotel
room in Lucknow. His brother lodged a first information
report and attributed that for last one year, his brother was
tensed because of wrong behaviour of some of his officers and
he was informed by his brother that the Company was offering
VRS scheme and he was being compelled to accept the same.
The complainant, therefore, alleged that the officers of
the Company were responsible for instigating his brother to
take such a weak step, as he was being pressurised to accept
the VRS scheme, which was being made applicable as CRS
(Compulsory Retirement Scheme). Upon the charge-sheet
5 2024 INSC 767
being filed, culminating into the criminal proceedings and
when the High Court declined to quash the proceedings, the
Apex Court noted thus :-
“12. Prima facie, it appears that two things weighed with the
High Court. First, the two police statements of the colleagues of the
deceased referred to above & secondly, the act on the part of the
appellants in handing over the letter to all the salesman present in
the meeting including the deceased containing instructions therein
to do the work of mechandising. This according to the High Court
amounted to demotion.”
Gainfully reproducing the observations made in Geo Varghese
Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.
6
, as well as the observations in
M.Arjunan (supra), it was concluded that for the purpose of
finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by
another; the consideration wold be if the accused is guilty of
the act of instigation of the act of suicide. The observations of
Their Lordships in paragraph 21 deserve a reproduction :-
“21. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section
306 of the IPC (abetment of suicide) would stand fulfilled if the
suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming
encouragement/incitement by the accused leaving no option but to
commit suicide. Further, as the extreme action of committing
suicide is also on account of great disturbance to the psychological
imbalance of the deceased such incitement can be divided into two
broad categories. First, where the deceased is having sentimental
ties or physical relations with the accused and the second category
would be where the deceased is having relations with the accused in
his or her official capacity. In the case of former category
sometimes a normal quarrel or the hot exchange of words may
result into immediate psychological imbalance, consequently
creating a situation of depression, loss of charm in life and if the
person is unable to control sentiments of expectations, it may give
temptations to the person to commit suicide, e.g., when there is
relation of husband and wife, mother and son, brother and sister,
sister and sister and other relations of such type, where
sentimental tie is by blood or due to physical relations. In the case
of second category the tie is on account of official relations, where
the expectations would be to discharge the obligations as provided
for such duty in law and to receive the considerations as provided in
law. In normal circumstances, relationships by sentimental tie
6 (2021) 19 SCC 144
cannot be equated with the official relationship. The reason being
different nature of conduct to maintain that relationship. The
former category leaves more expectations, whereas in the latter
category, by and large, the expectations and obligations are
prescribed by law, rules, policies and regulations.”
19. The term ‘instigation’, in Section 107 is assigned a
definite meaning to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do an act. If a person who has committed suicide
is hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not
ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced
person to commit suicide, it is not safe to hold him guilty of
abetment of suicide. It is only when an accused plays an active
role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the
victim, which eventually draws him to commit suicide, he may
be guilty of abetment of suicide because of presence of
instigation and mens rea. Since two persons may possess
different mental capacity to deal with a situation, the
yardstick to be applied shall vary as human behaviour is a
complex phenomenon and what may apply to one may not
apply to the other.
20. In the present case, at the outset, we must note that the
Applicant, a Judicial Officer, was never involved in the pending
lis, as the suit property was purchased by his brother
exclusively and only he was party to the litigation. There is no
reason for the deceased to have implicated the Applicant, as he
was not connected with the dispute at all. The material in the
charge-sheet in form of statements implicating the Applicant,
are too far fetched and definitely fall short of any instigation/
incitement and a bare reference to his presence in Miraj in the
month of May, where he is alleged to have threatened the
deceased and asked him to vacate the subject property is not
sufficient to attract instigation/incitement, as the offence is
registered on 24/06/2016. In any case, even it is not the
allegation of the prosecution that the Applicant abetted the
suicide by instigating or inciting the deceased in any manner,
as abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person
or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without
a positive act on part of the Applicant to instigate or aid in
commission of suicide by the deceased, he cannot be convicted
for an offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC.
In order to attract the offence under Section 306, clear
mens rea to commit the offence has to be established, as it
requires active/direct act, leading the deceased to commit
suicide left with no other option, but in the present case, the
material in the charge-sheet falls short of proving the
ingredients of Section 306 and, hence, in our view, by
exercising the inherent power conferred under Section 482,
the purpose of it being to prevent the abuse of process or to
secure the ends of justice, we deem it appropriate to safeguard
the interest of the Applicant.
In absence of we exercising the power, the Applicant will
have to unnecessarily face the rigmarole of trial, which
ultimately would result in acquittal, as no material in the
charge-sheet collected by the prosecution attract the
ingredients of Section 306 of IPC and we would be failing in
discharge of our duty, if we do not step in and save the
Applicant from undergoing the long drawn process of trial, as
the material in the charge-sheet through close scrutiny, do not
in any manner, establish the ingredients of abetment of suicide
under Section 306 of IPC against him.
For the reasons recorded above, we are satisfied that
human liberty, which is the most cherished constitutional
value, must be protected by us, by exercising the inherent
power conferred under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.
For the reasons above, we quash and set aside FIR
bearing C.R.No.53 of 2016 dated 24/06/2016 registered
against the Applicant with Mahatma Gandhi Chowk Police
Station, Miraj for the offences punishable under Section 306
and 34 of IPC.
21. Criminal Application No.959 of 2016 is allowed in the
aforestated terms.
In view of disposal of the Application, nothing survives in
the Interim Application and it also stands disposed off.
(MANJUSHA DESHPANDE,J.) (BHARATI DANGRE, J.)
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