Exception 2: Self defense
In Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat AIR 1980 SCC 660, the Supreme Court dealt with the extent to which the private defense can be used as hereunder,
“12. Before considering this question in the light of the evidential material on record,it will be worthwhile to remind ourselves of the general principles embodied in the Penal Code, governing the exercise of the right of private defence.
13. The Code excepts from the operation of its penal clauses large classes of acts done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression but this right has been regulated and circumscribed by several principles and limitations. The most salient of them concerned the defence of body are as under? Firstly, there is no right of private defence against an act which is not in itself an offence under the Code; Secondly, the right commences as soon as and not before a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit some offence although the offence may not have been committed and it is conterminous with the duration of such apprehension (Section 102). That is to say, right avails only against a danger imminent, present and real; Thirdly, it is a defensive and not & punitive or retributive right. Consequently, in no case the right extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of the defence. (Section 99). In other words, the injury which is inflicted by the person exercising the right should be commensurate with the injury with which he is threatened. At the same time, it is difficult to expect from a person exercising this right in good faith, to weigh "with golden scales" what maximum amount of force is necessary to keep within the right Every reasonable allowance should be made for the bona fide defender "if he with the instinct of self-preservation strong upon him, pursues his defence a little further than may be strictly necessary in the circumstances to avert the attack." It would be wholly unrealistic to expect of a person under assault, to modulate his defence step by step according to the attack; Fourthly, the right extends to the killing of the actual or potential assailant when there is] a reasonable and imminent apprehension of the atrocious crimes enumerated in the six clauses of Section 100. For our purpose, only the first two clauses of Section 100 are relevant The combined effect of these two clauses is that taking the life of the assailant would be justified on the plea of private defence; if the assault causes reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the person exercising the right. In other words, a person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in the exercise of right of self-defence inflict any harm, even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened. This principle is also subject to the preceding rule that the harm or death inflicted to avert the danger is not substantially disproportionate to and incommensurate with the quality and character of the perilous act or threat intended to be repelled; Fifthly, there must be no safe or
reasonable mode of escape by retreat, for the person confronted with an impending peril to life or of grave bodily harm, except by inflicting death on the assailant; Sixthly; the right being, in essence, a defensive right, does not accrue and avail where there is "time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities." (Section 99).”
Exception 3: Act of Public Servant
The essential ingredients of the Exception 3 of Section 300 are as follows:
(i) The offence must be committed by a public servant or by a person aiding a public servant;
(ii) The act alleged must have been committed by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties;
(iii) He should have exceeded the powers given to him by law;
(iv) The act should be done in good faith;
(v) The public servant should have believed that his act was lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duties;
(vi) He should not have borne any ill-will towards the person whose death was caused.
Exception 3 of Section 300 gives protection so long as the public servant acts in good faith, but if his act is illegal and unauthorized by law, or if he glaringly exceeds the powers entrusted to him by law, the Exception 3 will not protect him.
Exception 4: Without Premeditation
The Apex court in Surendar Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1989) 2 SCC 217 summarized the principles as follows,
“To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely,
(i) it was a sudden fight;
(ii) there was no premeditation;
(iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and
(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advan- tage or acted in a cruel manner.
The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly”
Comparison of Exception 1 and Exception 4:
While comparing Exception 1 and Exception 4, the Hon’ble Apex court in Thankachan v. State of Kerala AIR 2008 SC 406, observed as follows,
“10. The Fourth Exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the First Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrelmay have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused ( a ) without premeditation; ( b ) in a sudden fight; ( c ) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and ( d ) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and that there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage".
11. The above position is highlighted in Sandhya Jadhav v. State of
Maharashtra (2006) 4 SCC 653)”.
Exception 5: Consensual Homicide/ Suicide pacts
According to Exception 5 of Section 300, culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused being above the age of 18 years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
The points to be proved are:
1) The death was caused with the consent of the deceased;
2) The deceased was then above 18 years of age;
3) That such consent was free and voluntary and not given through fear or misconception of facts.
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