It is discernible that in Section 250 of BNSS, Sub-section (1) provides that the accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232.
Sub-section (1) of Section 250 of BNSS is a new provision
which prescribes a period of sixty days to prefer an application
by the accused for discharge from the date of committal of the
case. In fact, no such time limit fixed in Section 227 of Cr.P.C.
But it is noticed that there is lack of clarity or legislative
vacuum in the matter of starting point of sixty days in Section
250(1) of BNSS. It is true that in cases where the procedure of
committal is necessary, the statutory wordings in Section
250(1) of BNSS regarding the starting point of sixty days, is so
clear. But, now a days many Special Courts, viz., Special Court
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, Special Court under the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, etc., proceedings are going before
the Special Court during the crime stage itself where committal
doesn't arise. In relation to such cases, the starting point to
count sixty days period to file discharge petition as provided in
Section 250(1) of BNSS lacks clarity or the same is a legislative
vacuum. In this context, it is relevant to refer Section 330 of
BNSS, a pari materia provision to Section 294 of Cr.P.C. Section
330(1) provides that where any document is filed before any
Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of
every such document shall be included in a list and the
prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution
or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the
genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such
documents and in no case later than thirty days after such
supply. First proviso to Section 330(1) stipulates that the Court
may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be
recorded in writing. The notable distinction is that in Section
330(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the word 'shall'
and in Section 250(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the
word 'may'. Thus, it is perceivable that when the legislature
uses the word 'shall', the same is mandatory and when the
word 'may' is used, the same is discretionary. The First proviso
to Section 330(1) of BNSS has been engrafted by the legislature
and the time limit of thirty days is preceded by the word 'shall'
makes the provision mandatory. Thus proviso to relax time
also was incorporated. In Section 250(1) of BNSS, the
legislature used the word 'may' which gives discretion to the
court to relax the time limit and therefore, no proviso to relax
the time limit was engrafted by the legislature. Therefore, even
after expiry of sixty days, a petition for discharge can be
considered by the court since the time limit is not mandatory
and is only directory. If so, the intent of the legislature to avoid
filing of discharge petition even at a belated stage in the strict
sense could not be achieved. {Para 9}
10. But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.
Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,
because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special
Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of
BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting
point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate
amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the
starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of
supply of copies of documents.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024
SAJITH Vs STATE OF KERALA
Coram: MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
Citation: 2024:KER:67663
Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024
This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed under
Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS' for short hereinafter) by the
petitioner/sole accused in S.C No.1236/2023 on the files of
the Fast Track Special Court Court, Kollam, challenging the
order in Crl.M.P.No.292/2024 dated 24.07.2024, whereby the
application for discharge moved by the petitioner was
dismissed by the learned Special Judge.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner
and the learned Public Prosecutor on admission. Perused the
order impugned.
3. The prosecution allegation herein is that the
accused offered to marry the victim after maintaining a love
affair. Thereafter, the accused took the victim at a rental
house at Vavakunnu, Parippally and subjected her to sexual
intercourse on 21.03.2023 promising to marry her. Again, she
was subjected to sexual intercourse on 05.03.2023, repeating
the promise of marriage. On this premise, prosecution alleges
commission of offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of
the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short hereinafter).
4. In this matter, FIR was registered vide Crime
No.321/2023 of Parippally Police Station. On investigation,
final report filed justifying the allegation and now the matter
has been pending as S.C.No.1236/2023 on the files of the Fast
Track Special Court, Kollam. Before start of trial, the
petitioner filed an application under Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure ('Cr.P.C.' for short hereinafter) seeking
discharge. The learned Special Judge, after analysing the
prosecution materials, found that going by the statements
given by the victim as CW1, the house owner as CW2 and
other witnesses cited in the final report filed under Section
173(2) of Cr.P.C., there are materials to go for trial and
accordingly, the discharge petition was dismissed.
5. While assailing the order, the learned counsel
for the petitioner/accused reiterated the contention before
the trial court affirming that no materials prima facie
available to find commission of offence punishable under
Section 376(2)(n) by the accused and therefore, the order
impugned would require reversal.
6. The learned Public Prosecutor fervently
opposed the prayer, pointing out prosecution materials,
which would prima facie suggest offence under Section
376(2)(n) of IPC, warranting trial of the accused.
7. The materials to be considered at the time of
discharge have been stated in Section 227 of Cr.P.C. The same
reads as under;
227. Discharge - If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the
accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the
Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing.
8. Section 250(2) is the pari materia provision in
the BNSS corresponding to Section 227 of Cr.P.C. Section 250(1)
is a new provision introduced in the BNSS. Sections 250(1) and
(2) read as under;
250. Discharge - (1) The accused may prefer an
application for discharge within a period of sixty
days from the date of commitment of the case
under section 232.
(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers
that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.
9. It is discernible that in Section 250 of BNSS,
Sub-section (1) provides that the accused may prefer an
application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the
date of commitment of the case under Section 232.
Sub-section (1) of Section 250 of BNSS is a new provision
which prescribes a period of sixty days to prefer an application
by the accused for discharge from the date of committal of the
case. In fact, no such time limit fixed in Section 227 of Cr.P.C.
But it is noticed that there is lack of clarity or legislative
vacuum in the matter of starting point of sixty days in Section
250(1) of BNSS. It is true that in cases where the procedure of
committal is necessary, the statutory wordings in Section
250(1) of BNSS regarding the starting point of sixty days, is so
clear. But, now a days many Special Courts, viz., Special Court
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, Special Court under the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, etc., proceedings are going before
the Special Court during the crime stage itself where committal
doesn't arise. In relation to such cases, the starting point to
count sixty days period to file discharge petition as provided in
Section 250(1) of BNSS lacks clarity or the same is a legislative
vacuum. In this context, it is relevant to refer Section 330 of
BNSS, a pari materia provision to Section 294 of Cr.P.C. Section
330(1) provides that where any document is filed before any
Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of
every such document shall be included in a list and the
prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution
or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the
genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such
documents and in no case later than thirty days after such
supply. First proviso to Section 330(1) stipulates that the Court
may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be
recorded in writing. The notable distinction is that in Section
330(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the word 'shall'
and in Section 250(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the
word 'may'. Thus, it is perceivable that when the legislature
uses the word 'shall', the same is mandatory and when the
word 'may' is used, the same is discretionary. The First proviso
to Section 330(1) of BNSS has been engrafted by the legislature
and the time limit of thirty days is preceded by the word 'shall'
makes the provision mandatory. Thus proviso to relax time
also was incorporated. In Section 250(1) of BNSS, the
legislature used the word 'may' which gives discretion to the
court to relax the time limit and therefore, no proviso to relax
the time limit was engrafted by the legislature. Therefore, even
after expiry of sixty days, a petition for discharge can be
considered by the court since the time limit is not mandatory
and is only directory. If so, the intent of the legislature to avoid
filing of discharge petition even at a belated stage in the strict
sense could not be achieved.
10. But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or
legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty
days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in
sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this
connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals
with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is
pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new
provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section
262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer
an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from
the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.
Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,
because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special
Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of
BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting
point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate
amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the
starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of
supply of copies of documents.
11. In so far as Section 250(2) of BNSS is
concerned, the wordings in Section 227 Cr.P.C. is copied in
Section 250(2) of BNSS. Thus, under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. as
well as under Section 250(2) of BNSS, in order to discharge an
accused, the Judge after considering the materials, should find
that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. The necessary corollary is that if the Judge finds
sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused,
discharge cannot be considered and plea of discharge must fail.
Thus crucial aspect to be considered when considering
discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. as well as under Section
250(2) of BNSS indubitably is nothing but as to whether
sufficient ground to proceed against the accused is made out
from prosecution records. If sufficient materials are available
to go for trial, discharge cannot be considered.
12. In the instant case, the specific case of the
prosecution is that the accused herein maintained a love affair
with the victim on the promise of marriage and he subjected
her to sexual intercourse twice repeating the said promise.
Thus, prima facie, the prosecution materials would show that
the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC is made out
warranting trial of the matter with liberty to the prosecution to
adduce evidence. Whether the sexual intercourse is the
outcome of consent or the same is vitiated by misconception of
fact is matter of evidence and the same can only by addressed
after trial. Therefore, dismissal of the plea of discharge raised by
the petitioner, as per the order impugned, is perfectly justifiable
and accordingly, this revision must fail.
13. In the result, this Criminal Revision Petition
stands dismissed.
14. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order
to the Secretary, Department of Home Affairs and Department of
Law and Justice to consider the legislative vacuum for
application of Section 250(1) of BNSS pointed out herein above
in sessions cases where committal is not possible.
Registry also is directed to forward a copy of this order
to the Subordinate Criminal Courts for information.
Sd/-
A. BADHARUDEEN
JUDGE
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