Admittedly, another woman namely, Chando Devi (sister of Ram Chabila Singh) was also residing in the same portion of the
house. The High Court did take note of this fact but explained it
away by observing that since Chando Devi was a widow, the
make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no
need for her to put on make-up being a widow. In our opinion,
the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable
but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this
nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality
expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not
made out from any evidence on record.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1031 OF 2015
VIJAY SINGH@VIJAY KR. SHARMA Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR
Author: SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.
Citation: 2024 INSC 735,
1. On 30.08.1985, Neelam breathed her last in Simaltalla, PS
Sikandra, District Munger, Bihar. The factum of her death was
discovered in furtherance of the written report lodged by the
informant and brother-in-law of the deceased, namely,
Ramanand Singh (examined as PW18 before the Trial Court )
wherein he alleged that Neelam was abducted by seven persons
from their house in an incident which occurred at around 10:00
PM on the said day. On the basis of this information, an FIR
bearing no. 127 of 1985 was lodged at PS Sikandra and
investigation was commenced which led to the filing of a
chargesheet against the seven accused persons, namely –
Krishna Nandan Singh (Accused No. 1), Ram Nandan Singh
(Accused No. 2), Raj Nandan Singh (Accused No. 3), Shyam
Nandan Singh (Accused No. 4), Bhagwan Singh (Accused No.
5), Vijay Singh (Accused No. 6) and Tanik Singh (Accused No.
7).
2. The Trial Court charged all seven accused persons for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 302, 364,
449, 450, 380/34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Later, accused nos. 6 and 7 were distinctly charged for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 342, 506 read
with Section 34 of IPC. After trial, the Trial Court, vide order
dated 05.06.1992, convicted the accused persons listed as
accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the commission of offences
under Section 302/34 and 364/34 of IPC. They were acquitted of
all other charges, and accused nos. 6 and 7 were acquitted of all
the charges.
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 3 of 26
3. The convicts preferred an appeal before the Patna High
Court against the order of conviction and the State preferred an
appeal before the High Court against the order of acquittal of the
two accused persons. The Patna High Court, vide a common
judgment dated 26.03.2015, upheld the conviction of the five
convicts and set aside the acquittal of accused nos. 6 and 7 by
finding them guilty of the commission of offences under
Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of IPC. Accordingly, accused nos. 6
and 7 were also convicted and were sentenced to undergo
rigorous life imprisonment on each count. The present batch of
appeals assail the order/judgment dated 26.03.2015 of the Patna
High Court.
BRIEF FACTS
4. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts reveal that deceased
Neelam was the wife of one Ashok Kumar who happened to be
the son of PW3/Ganesh Prasad Singh, and the informant
PW18/Ramanand Singh was the brother of Ashok Kumar. The
informant’s case was that at the relevant point of time, the
deceased was residing with her husband and the informant in
the house belonging to her late father Jang Bahadur Singh, who
belonged to Simaltalla. The house was partially occupied by the
deceased, her husband and her brother-in-law and the remaining
portion was rented out and tenants were residing in those
portions.
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 4 of 26
5. As per the prosecution case, on 30.08.1985 at about 10:00
PM, PW18 was sitting outside the house on a rickshaw along
with one Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas, and Neelam
was sleeping inside the house. Her husband, Ashok Kumar, had
gone to his native place Ghogsha. Suddenly, the seven accused
persons, including the appellants before us, came from north
direction along with 15 other unknown assailants. Accused Vijay
Singh/A-6 caught hold of the informant/PW18 and as soon as he
raised alarm and started shouting, two unknown persons pointed
out pistols towards him and directed him to maintain silence.
Thereafter, the accused persons who had caught the informant,
assaulted him with fists and slaps, and confined him near the well
situated on the north side of the house. Meanwhile, A-1 entered
the house with 5-7 other accused persons by getting the house
unlatched through a resident namely Kumud Ranjan Singh and
dragged Neelam out of the house. As soon as they dragged her
out, four persons caught hold of Neelam by her arms and legs,
lifted her and started moving towards Lohanda. As per the
informant, the accused persons also picked up two sarees, two
blouses, two petticoats and a pair of slippers from Neelam’s room
while going out.
6. As the informant raised alarm, other people of the mohalla
also gathered around including PW2 Vinay Kumar Singh, PW4
Chandra Shekhar Prasad Singh and PW5 Ram Naresh Singh. The
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 5 of 26
said three witnesses witnessed the accused persons taking away
Neelam but could not stop them. The informant explained that no
one dared to follow the accused persons as they had pointed
pistols and had threatened of dire consequences. The informant
also explained the motive behind the commission of the crime. It
transpires from his statement that Neelam’s late father Jang
Bahadur Singh had no son and his house was in possession of his
daughter Neelam. She was abducted in order to forcefully obtain
the possession of the house belonging to her father. The second
limb of motive stems from the pending litigation between A-1 to
A-5 (appellants) on one side and deceased Neelam, her maternal
grandfather and her two sisters on the other side. The accused
persons had obtained letters of administration and probate of the
Will left by late Jang Bahadur Singh from the competent court
and the said order came to be challenged before the Patna High
Court by the deceased, her maternal grandfather and younger
sisters. In the said appeal, the Patna High Court had injuncted the
accused persons from alienating any part of the property. The
High Court also restrained the execution of the probate of the
Will by restraining the delivery of possession of the property to
the accused persons. Thus, deceased Neelam was residing in
her father’s house along with her husband and brother-in-law in
order to retain the possession of the property. In this backdrop,
the matter went for trial.
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 6 of 26
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
7. The Trial Court, while acquitting A-6 and A-7, observed
that the motive attributed for the commission of the crime was
not attributable to the said two accused persons as no interest of
theirs could be disclosed in the pending litigation. Further, it also
found that A-6 was not named in the FIR registered upon the
information supplied by PW18 and in his oral testimony, no
statement of assault by A-6 and A-7 was given by him. It
further held that no evidence sur-faced during the trial to indicate
the participation of A-6 and A-7 in the acts of abduction and
commission of murder.
8. While convicting A-1 to A-5 on the charges under Sections
302/34 and 364/34 of IPC, the Trial Court primarily relied upon
the oral testimonies of PW18/informant, PW2, PW4 and PW5.
The motive for the commission of the offence was supplied by
the pending legal dispute relating to the property belonging to
late Jang Bahadur Singh. The Court also replied upon
circumstantial evidence borne out from the testimonies of PW7
(maternal uncle of the de-ceased), PW3 (father-in-law of the
deceased), PW23 (sister of the deceased) and PW13 (doctor) to
arrive at the finding of guilt.
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 7 of 26
BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
9. A reading of the impugned judgment passed by the High
Court suggests that the High Court carried out a fresh
appreciation of evidence. The High Court firstly examined the
question whether Neelam was actually residing in the house from
which she was abducted. Relying upon the testimonies of PW7
(maternal uncle of deceased), PW18 (broth-er-in-law of deceased
and informant) and PW21 (Investigating Officer), the Court
concluded that Neelam was indeed re-siding in the said house. In
doing so, the Court discarded the fact that the other independent
occupants of the house such as Ram Chabila Singh, his son,
Kumud Ranjan Singh etc. did not come in support of the said fact.
To overcome this deficiency, the Court relied upon the statements
of PW21 and PW23 (sister of deceased) that some make-up
articles were found in a bag lying in the room, which was
suggestive of the fact that a woman was residing in the said room.
10. In further consideration, the High Court excluded the
evidence of PW5 for the reason that his presence at the place of
incident was doubtful. For, PW5 deposed that he was heading
towards his home from Deoghar and on the way from Lakhisarai
to Simaltalla, he stopped at Sikandra Chowk along with PW2 and
PW4. It was at this point that they heard the hulla and ended up
witnessing the commission of offence. The High Court took note
of the fact that while going from Deoghar to Simaltalla,
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 8 of 26
Lakhisarai and Ghogsha would come first and thus, there was no
reason for PW5 to come all the way to Sikandra Chowk if he was
going to his home in Ghogsha as he could have directly
proceeded from Lakhisarai to Ghogsha. Nevertheless, the High
Court duly relied upon the evidence of PW2, PW4 and PW18 as
well as on circumstantial evidence comprising of the testimonies
of PW23, PW13 (doctor) and absence of suitable explanation in
the statements of accused persons under Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as regards the fatal injuries suffered
by the deceased. Thus, the High Court upheld the finding of guilt
of A-1 to A-5.
11. As regards A-6 and A-7, the High Court reversed the
finding of acquittal of the Trial Court into that of conviction.
Primarily, the High Court observed that the said two accused
persons were acquitted on the basis of the exonerating testimony
of PW5 and the same cannot be sustained as the testimony of
PW5 has been excluded by the High Court in appeal. Further, the
Court held that the testimonies of PW2, PW4 and PW18 were
consistent regarding the participation of A-6 and A-7 and thus,
they were convicted for the commission of the offences under
Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC. The
applicability of Section 34 IPC was based on the fact that A-6 and
A-7 had confined PW18 near the well in order to eliminate any
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 9 of 26
chances of resistance in the acts committed by the other five
accused per-sons.
SUBMISSIONS
12. On behalf of A-6 and A-7, it is submitted that there was no
motive for the said accused persons to have indulged in the
commission of the offence in question. The motive, if any,
existed only for the remaining five accused persons who were
interested in the outcome of the pending litigation between the
parties. It is further contended that the High Court ought not to
have entered into the exercise of re-appreciation of the entire
evidence without finding any infirmity in the view taken by the
Trial Court. To buttress this submission, it is submitted that since
the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, it could
not have been disturbed by the High Court in appeal. In this
regard, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this Court
in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran , Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka , Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana , Kashiram v.
State of M.P. , Labh Singh v. State of Punjab and Suratlal v.
State of M.P. .
13. It is further submitted that no reliance could be placed
upon the testimonies of PW2 and PW4 as their presence at the
spot was doubtful. Further, if they were 400 yards away when
hue and cry was raised, they could not have seen A-6 taking away
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 10 of 26
PW18 towards the well as the said fact took place prior to the hue
and cry. It is further submitted that in the FIR, no pistol was
assigned to A-6, whereas, the said fact was brought forward at
the time of evidence. The appellants have also raised a question
regarding the time of incident on the basis of medical evidence.
It is stated that the post-mortem report indicated that halfdigested food was found in the stomach of the deceased, whereas,
the informant PW18 deposed that the incident took place
immediately after dinner. If such was the case, the death ought to
have occurred around 1-2 AM in the intervening night of
30.08.1985-31.08.1985, but the post-mortem report, based on the
post-mortem conducted at around 05:30 PM on 31.08.1985,
indicated that death took place about 24 hours ago and thus, the
time of death was around 05:00 PM on 30.08.1985 and not 10:00
PM, as alleged.
14. The appellants have also submitted that the prosecution
has not proved that the deceased was actually residing in the
concerned house at Simaltalla.
15. Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of the State that mere
non-examination of some independent witnesses shall not be
fatal to the case of the prosecution. Reliance has been placed
upon the decision of this Court in Rai Saheb & ors. v. State of
Haryana to contend that at times, independent witnesses may
not come forward due to fear. It is further submitted that the High
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 11 of 26
Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in order to arrive at
the finding of guilt of the accused persons. It is further submitted
that the testimonies of PW2, PW4 and PW18 are consistent and
the High Court has correctly placed reliance upon their
testimonies. As regards motive as well, it is submitted that the
evidence is sufficient to reveal motive for the commission of the
crime.
16. We have heard learned counsels for the appellants as well
as for the State. We have also carefully examined the record.
DISCUSSION
17. In light of the rival contentions raised by the parties, the
principal issue that arises before the Court is whether the finding
of guilt of the appellants arrived at by the High Court is
sustainable in light of the evidence on record. As a corollary of
this issue, it also needs to be examined whether the approach of
the High Court was in line with the settled law for reversing an
acquittal into conviction in a criminal appeal.
18. After two rounds of litigation before the Trial Court and
the High Court, it is fairly certain the case is to be examined only
with respect to the offences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC
read with Section 34 IPC. With respect to the offence under
Section 364 IPC, the case of the prosecution is based on direct
oral evidence, and with respect to the offence under Section 302
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 12 of 26
IPC, the case of the prosecution is essentially based on
circumstantial evidence as no direct evidence of the commission
of murder could be collected. However, it is quite evident that the
offence of murder was committed after the commission of the
offence of abduction. There is a sequential relationship between
the two offences and thus, in order to set up a case for the
commission of the offence of murder, it is necessary to prove the
commission of the offence of abduction by the accused
persons/appellants. For, the chain, in a case based on
circumstantial evidence, must be complete and consistent.
19. In order to prove the offence under Section 364 IPC, the
prosecution has relied upon the oral testimonies of four eye
witnesses – PW-2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-18. Their testimonies
have been assailed on various counts. The appellants have termed
the said witnesses as interested and chance witnesses. The former
charge originates from the fact that the witnesses were related to
the deceased, and the latter charge originates from the fact that
the witnesses had no rea-son to be present at the place of offence
and they just appeared unexpectedly as a matter of chance. Let us
examine both the aspects. We may first examine the testimonies
of the witnesses independently, without going into their
relationship with the deceased.
20. The informant PW18 has deposed that he was standing
near a rickshaw outside his house and the deceased was sleeping
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 13 of 26
inside the house. PW18 was standing along with three
independent persons namely, Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and
Soordas. The seven accused persons came along with 15 other
persons. A-6 and A-7, along with unknown persons, first came to
PW18 and took him away towards the well and confined him
there. Thereafter, the remaining accused persons, along with
other unknown assailants, entered the house wherein the
deceased was sleeping. Interestingly, as per the version of the
informant, the house was bolted from inside and was opened by
a tenant namely Ku-mud Ranjan Singh. The problem with the
informant’s version begins from this point itself. As per his
version, the first eye witnesses of the incident ought to have been
Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas and Kumud Ranjan Singh.
One person, namely Soordas, was stated to be blind and thus, he
may be excluded. Nevertheless, the prosecution ought to have
examined the three natural witnesses of the incident namely,
Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Kumud Ranjan Singh. There is
no explanation for non-examination of the natural eye witnesses.
The version becomes more doubtful when it is examined in light
of his statement that he could not prevent the accused persons as
A-6 had threatened him with a pistol. In the FIR, no pistol has
been attributed to A-6, whereas in the statement recorded before
the Trial Court, this fact was introduced for the first time, which
is indicative of improvement. Furthermore, PW18 got it recorded
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 14 of 26
in the FIR that A-6 and others had assaulted him with fists and
slaps, but the said fact was not deposed before the Trial Court in
his examination in chief. The discrepancy assumes greater
seriousness in light of the fact that no pistol has been recovered
from any of the accused persons and if the factum of branding of
pistol is un-der the cloud of doubt, the entire conduct of PW18
becomes doubtful and unnatural, as he did not try to prevent the
accused persons from entering the premises or from abducting
the deceased or from taking away the deceased on their shoulders
in front of his eyes as he was the brother-in-law of the deceased.
21. The other eye witnesses, PW2, PW4 and PW5, de-posed
collectively in favour of the prosecution as they had arrived at the
scene of crime together. At around 10:00 PM on the fateful night,
the said eye witnesses happened to be present at Sikandra Chowk
and they heard some hue and cry at the house of the deceased.
The witnesses were coming together in a jeep from Lakhisarai
and were going towards their home in Ghogsha village, the
village wherein the deceased was married and also the native
village of PW18/informant. PW2 was the driver of PW4. The
testimo-nies of the said PWs have made it clear that while coming
from Lakhisarai to Sikandra Chowk, Ghogsha came first,
followed by Lohanda and Simaltalla. In such circumstances, their
presence at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM must be explained to
the satisfaction of the Court. For, if they were going to their
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 15 of 26
village, there was no occasion for them to come to Simaltalla as
it did not fall on their way. But no such ex-planation is
forthcoming from the material on record.
22. Interestingly, this lacuna was duly noted by the High Court
with respect to PW5 as there was no reason for him to be present
at Sikandra Chowk at the time of incident and his testimony was
excluded. However, the same logic was not extended to the
testimony of PW4 as well, as it was equally improbable for him
to be present at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM on the date of
incident. His visit to Sikandra Chowk was not necessitated for
going to his village. Even otherwise, since the three eye witnesses
were similarly placed as per their own version, the rejection of
testimony of one witness ought to have raised a natural doubt on
the testimonies of the other two witnesses unless they had a better
explanation. However, no such doubt was entertained by the High
Court and the impugned judgment offers no explanation for the
same. In light of their own testimonies, none of the three eye
witnesses were required to visit Sikandra Chowk or Simaltalla
for going to their village.
23. The testimonies of the eye witnesses are also impeachable
in light of the other evidence on record. PW21 was the
investigating officer in the case and he had examined the
aforesaid PWs as eye witnesses of the incident. The version put
forth by the eye witnesses meets a serious doubt when examined
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 16 of 26
in light of the evidence of DW3 and DW4, the concerned Deputy
Superintendent and Superintendent of Police respectively who
had supervised the investigation of the present case. Both these
officers were examined as defence witnesses on behalf of the
appellants. As per the supervision notes prepared by DW3 during
the course of investigation, PW2 and PW4 got to know about the
incident only when PW18 came running to them after the
incident. PW2, at that time, was sitting in a hotel with Umesh
Singh to have ‘prasad’. Similarly, the evidence of DW4
indicates that on the date of incident, at around 10:00 PM, PW4
was coming from Lakhisarai in his jeep and he saw six-seven
persons fleeing away in a jeep and he identified them as the
accused persons. Thus, PW4 entered the scene after the
commission of offence and he did not witness the act of
abduction. The testimony of PW2 strengthens the doubt as he
deposed that when they reached the police station after the
incident with PW18, neither him nor PW4 in-formed the IO that
they had directly seen the incident. The stark difference between
the versions put forth by the PW21 and DW3/DW4 raises serious
concerns regarding the fairness of investigation conducted by
PW21 and it is a reasonable possibility that the eye witnesses
were brought in to create a fool proof case. The evidence of DW3
and DW4, both senior officers who had exercised supervision
over the investigation conducted by PW21, indicates that the so-
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 17 of 26
called eye witnesses of the incident were actually accessories
after the fact and not accessories to the fact.
24. The second limb of the objection against the testimonies
of the eye witnesses is that none of the eye witnesses is an
independent witness of fact. Ordinarily, there is no rule of law to
discard the testimonies of the witnesses merely be-cause they
were known to the victim or belonged to her family. For, an
offence may be committed in circumstances that only the family
members are present at the place of occurrence in natural course.
However, the present case does not fall in such category. In the
facts of the present case, the natural presence of the eye witnesses
at the place of occurrence is under serious doubt, as discussed
above, and for unexplained reasons, the naturally present public
persons were not examined as witnesses in the matter. The nonexamination of natural witnesses such as Doman Tenti, Daso
Mistry, Soordas, Kumud Ranjan Singh and many other
neighbours who admittedly came out of their houses to witness
the offence, coupled with the fact that the projected eye witnesses
failed to explain their presence at the place of occurrence,
renders the entire version of the prosecution as improbable and
unreliable. The eye witnesses, being family members, were
apparently approached by PW18 who in-formed them about the
incident and later, their versions were fabricated to make the case
credible. Notably, when the version put forth by the interested
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 18 of 26
witnesses comes under a shadow of doubt, the rule of prudence
demands that the independent public witnesses must be examined
and corroborating material must be gathered. More so, when
public witnesses were readily available and the offence has not
taken place in the bounds of closed walls.
25. Pertinently, the conduct of the eye witnesses also ap-pears
to be unnatural considering that they were all relatives of the
deceased. Firstly, PW18 did not try to prevent the ab-duction.
Even if it is believed that he was held against a pistol, the
statement regarding the existence of pistol comes as an
improvement from his first information given to the police, as
already noted above. Nonetheless, it is admitted that PW2, PW4
and PW5 came in a jeep and they saw the accused persons
leaving with Neelam after abducting her. It is also admitted that
they had identified the accused persons, who were essentially the
relatives of the eye witnesses. In such circumstances, as per
natural human conduct, the least that they could have done was
to follow the accused persons in their jeep. They admittedly had
a ready vehicle with them. Despite so, there was no such attempt
on their part, so much so that the dead body of Neelam was not
even discovered until the following morning as none of the eye
witnesses had any clue as to where the accused persons had taken
away the deceased after abducting her.
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 19 of 26
26. One crucial foundational fact in the present case is that the
deceased was residing in her father’s house at Simaltalla.
Although, the Trial Court and High Court have not doubted the
said fact, we have our reservations regarding the same. In
addition to the statements of PW18 (informant), PW23 (sister of
deceased) and PW7 (maternal uncle of deceased), no other
witness has deposed to prove the factum of residence. The
admitted evidence on record sufficiently indicates that various
other tenants were residing in the same house, including Kumud
Ranjan Singh, Education Officer Ram Chabila Singh along with
his daughter and son.
27. The investigating officer PW21 had inspected the house
and no direct material, except some make-up articles, could be
gathered so as to indicate that Neelam was actually residing there.
Admittedly, another woman namely, Chando Devi (sister of Ram
Chabila Singh) was also residing in the same portion of the
house. The High Court did take note of this fact but explained it
away by observing that since Chando Devi was a widow, the
make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no
need for her to put on make-up being a widow. In our opinion,
the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable
but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this
nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality
expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not
made out from any evidence on record.
28. Be that as it may, mere presence of certain make-up
articles cannot be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased
was residing in the said house, especially when another woman
was admittedly residing there. Furthermore, if Neelam was
indeed residing there, her other belongings such as clothes etc.
ought to have been found in the house and even if not so, the
other residents of the same house could have come forward to
depose in support of the said fact.
29. Notably, certain clothes such as two sarees, two blouses
and two petticoats were recovered along with the dead body of
the deceased. The prosecution version is that the accused
persons had taken away the said clothes from the house of the
deceased while abducting her. There is absolutely no explanation
for the said conduct on the part of the accused persons. It is
difficult to understand as to why the accused persons would take
her clothes along while abducting her. On the contrary, this fact
actually serves the case of the prosecution in proving that the deceased was actually residing at the house in Simaltalla. The
clothes appear to have been planted along with the dead body in
order to support the fact of actual residence of the deceased at her
father’s house in Simaltalla. In light of the material on record, it
could be concluded that no material whatsoever could be found
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 21 of 26
at the house of Jang Bahadur Singh to directly indicate that the
deceased was residing there. The make-up articles were linked
with the deceased on the basis of a completely unacceptable
reasoning and without any corroborative material. The
prosecution has failed to examine even one cohabitant to prove
the said fact. Furthermore, no personal belongings of the
deceased, such as clothes, footwear, utensils etc., could be found
in the entire house. Therefore, we are not inclined to believe that
the deceased was actually residing in the house at Simaltalla. In
the same breath, we may also note that even for PW18, no
material was found in the said house to indicate that he was in
fact residing there. Apart from his own statement, no witness has
come forward to depose that the informant was a resident of the
said house. The prosecution has not spotted any room in the
entire house wherein PW18 was residing and thus, his own
presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful.
30. The appellants have also raised certain objections with
respect to the time of death. The discrepancy has been flagged in
light of the post mortem report, based on the post-mortem
conducted at around 5:30 PM on 31.08.1985, which indicates that
death took place around 24 hours ago. It indicates that the time
of death must have been around 5:00 PM on 30.08.1985, which
is contrary to the evidence of PW18 that the incident took place
around 10:00 PM on 30.08.1985. A post mortem report is
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 22 of 26
generally not considered as conclusive evidence of the facts
mentioned in the re-port regarding the cause of death, time of
death etc. It could always be corroborated with other direct
evidence on record such as ocular evidence of the eye witnesses.
However, when there is no other credible evidence on record to
contradict the report, the facts stated in the post mortem report
are generally taken as true. In the present matter, the evidence of
the eye witnesses has been declared as wholly unreliable
including on the aspect of time of death. Thus, there is no rea-son
to doubt the post mortem report and the findings there-in.
31. At this stage, we may also note that the approach of the
High Court in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 was not in
line with the settled law pertaining to reversal of acquittals. The
Trial Court had acquitted the said two accused persons on the
basis of a thorough appreciation of evidence and the High Court
merely observed that their acquittal was based on the improbable
statement of PW5 and since the evidence of PW5 stood excluded
from the record, there was no reason left for the acquittal of A-6
and A-7. Pertinently, the High Court did not arrive at any finding
of illegality or perversity in the opinion of the Trial Court on that
count. Furthermore, it did not arrive at any positive finding of
involvement of the said two accused persons within the sphere of
common intention with the remaining accused persons. Equally,
the exclusion of the evidence of PW5, without explaining as to
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 23 of 26
how the evidence of PW2 and PW4 was not liable to be excluded
in the same manner, was in-correct and erroneous.
32. We do not intend to say that the High Court could not have
appreciated the evidence on record in its exercise of appellate
powers. No doubt, the High Court was well within its powers to
do so. However, in order to reverse a finding of acquittal, a
higher threshold is required. For, the presumption of innocence
operating in favour of an accused through-out the trial gets
concretized with a finding of acquittal by the Trial Court. Thus,
such a finding could not be reversed merely because the
possibility of an alternate view was alive. Rather, the view taken
by the Trial Court must be held to be completely unsustainable
and not a probable view. The High Court, in the impugned
judgment, took a cursory view of the matter and reversed the
acquittal of A-6 and A-7 without arriving at any finding of
illegality or perversity or impossibility of the Trial Court’s view
or non-appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court.
33. We may usefully refer to the exposition of law in Sanjeev
v. State of H.P., wherein this Court summarized the position in
this regard and observed as follows:
“7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal, the reasons which had weighed
with the trial court in acquitting the
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 24 of 26
accused must be dealt with, in case the
appellate court is of the view that the
acquittal rendered by the trial court
deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan
Singh v. State of Karnataka , Anwar Ali
v. State of H.P. )
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial
court, the normal presumption of
innocence in a criminal matter gets
reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. )
7.3. If two views are possible from the
evidence on record, the appellate court
must be extremely slow in interfering with
the appeal against acquittal (see
Sambasivan v. State of Kerala )”
34. Having observed that the case of the prosecution is full of
glaring doubts as regards the offence of abduction, we may
briefly note and reiterate that the offence of murder is entirely
dependent on circumstantial evidence. Although, the post
mortem report indicates that the death of the deceased was
unnatural and the commission of murder can-not be ruled out.
But there is no direct evidence on record to prove the
commission of murder by the accused per-sons. The link of
causation between the accused persons and the alleged offence is
conspicuously missing. The circumstantial evidence emanating
from the facts sur-rounding the offence of abduction, such as the
testimonies of eye witnesses, has failed to meet the test of proof
and cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law. Therefore, the
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 25 of 26
foundation of circumstantial evidence having fallen down, no
inference could be drawn from it to infer the commission of the
offence under Section 302 IPC by the accused persons. It is trite
law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of
evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable
conclusion of guilt. In the pre-sent case, the prosecution case is
far from meeting that standard.
35. As regards motive, we may suffice to say that motive has
a bearing only when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove
the ingredients of the offences under consideration. Without the
proof of foundational facts, the case of the prosecution cannot
succeed on the presence of motive alone. Moreover, the motive
in the present matter could operate both ways. The accused
persons and the eyewitnesses belong to the same family and the
presence of a property related dispute is evident. In a hypothetical
sense, both the sides could benefit from implicating the other. In
such circumstances, placing reliance upon motive alone could be
a double-edged sword. We say no more.
36. The above analysis indicates that the prosecution has failed
to discharge its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt. The reasonable doubts, indicated above, are irreconcilable
and strike at the foundation of the prosecution’s case. Thus, the
appellants are liable to be acquitted of all the charges.
Criminal Appeal No. 1031/2015 and others Page 26 of 26
37. In light of the foregoing discussion, we hereby conclude
that the findings of conviction arrived at by the Trial Court and
the High Court are not sustainable. Moreover, the High Court
erred in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Accordingly, the
impugned judgment as well as the judgment rendered by the Trial
Court (to the extent of conviction of A-1 to A-5) are set aside, and
all seven accused persons (appellants) are hereby acquitted of
all the charges levelled upon them. The appellants are directed to
be released forthwith, if lying in custody.
38. The captioned appeals stand disposed of in terms of this
judgment. Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of. No costs.
……………………………………J.
[BELA M. TRIVEDI]
……………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 25, 2024
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