The title of the land in suit had passed on to the State
after the donation and transfer of possession and after
construction, the hospital continued for more than
four decades before filing of the suit. The plaintiff, son
of the donor, also waited for 20 years despite admitted
knowledge of the hospital running over the land in
suit and did not take any action. {Para 26}
27. Article 65 under the Schedule to the Limitation Act
provides limitation of 12 years for filing a suit for
possession based on title. In the present case, merely
because the name of the plaintiff continued in the
revenue records (Jama Bandis), it would not confer
any title upon him. Revenue records (Jama Bandis)
are only entries for the purpose of realising tax by the
Municipal Corporations or land revenue by Gram
Sabhas. The plaintiff having failed to claim relief of
declaration, the suit itself would not be maintainable.
Further, for a suit for declaration, period of limitation
would be three years under Article 58 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act, which in the present case was
long lost.
28. There is nothing on record available from the cross-examination of defendants 1 and 2 that the documents which they proved were either incorrect, doubtful or suspicious. The documents exhibited by the defendants could not be ignored as they were
public documents, copies of which were filed and duly
proved. Even if the deed was not placed on record but
due explanation was given, the facts of the case and
the evidence on record clearly established the case of
the defendant-appellant that the land in suit had been
donated by Sri Inder Singh, father of the plaintiff way
back in 1958. The lethargy/carelessness on the part
of the State in not getting the revenue records
corrected on the basis of the gift deed would not take
away the rights conferred on the State under the gift
deed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO…………OF 2024
Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.................of 2024
(@ Diary No.17885 of 2020)
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. Vs BHAGWANTPAL SINGH ALIAS BHAGWANT SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.
Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.
Citation: 2024 INSC 518.
Dated: JULY 10, 2024.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. This appeal, by the State of Punjab assails the
correctness of the judgment and order dated
14.09.2018 passed in RSA No.447 of 2004 (O & M),
whereby the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at
Chandigarh allowed the second appeal of the plaintiffrespondent, set aside the judgment and decree of the
First Appellate Court, and restored the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court decreeing the suit for
possession.
4. The dispute relates to land admeasuring 2176.6 sq.
yards located in Khewat No.702/1146/Khasra
No.116/26/2/15 situated at Samana, Tehsil-Samana,
District-Patiala (hereinafter referred to as the “land in
suit”). According to the appellant, the land in suit
belonged to one Shri Inder Singh, predecessor in
interest of the respondents. Shri Inder Singh had
donated the land in suit to the appellants for the
construction of a Veterinary Hospital in 1958 and had
also handed over the possession of the same. The
appellant-State constructed a veterinary hospital over
the land in suit in 1958-1959. The Veterinary Hospital
has been existing and is functional over the land in
suit ever since. During his lifetime, Shri Inder Singh
never objected or filed any suit alleging trespass or
unauthorized occupation by the State. However, after
the death of Shri Inder Singh, his son Shri
Bhagwantpal Singh (since deceased) filed a suit for
possession of the land in suit in the year 2001, that is
after almost 43 years of it being donated to the State.
The suit was registered as Civil Suit No.98 of 2001
before the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division),
Samana.
5. The appellant filed written statement denying the
plaint allegations and also raising plea regarding the
suit being barred by limitation and also urged that
since no relief for declaration had been sought and the
suit was only for relief for possession, it was not
maintainable. It was specifically averred in the written
statement that the land in suit had been donated by
Shri Inder Singh for the purpose of establishing a
Veterinary Hospital in the year 1958, and possession
was also delivered. The State thereafter, from the
funds of the State Government, constructed a
Veterinary Hospital soon thereafter in the year 1958-
59, and since then, the same has been functional.
6. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court framed
the following issues: -
“1. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the suit
land? OPP
2. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff
is entitled to the decree for possession of the
suit land? OPP
3. Whether the suit as framed is not
maintainable? OPD
4. Whether the suit is within time ? OPP
5. Relief.”
7. The parties led evidence based on which the Trial
Court decreed the suit vide order dated 20.05.2003.
The findings recorded by the Trial Court are as follows:
(i) As the defendant had raised the plea of adverse
possession, therefore, they admitted the ownership
of the plaintiffs;
(ii)There being no document regarding the alleged gift,
the same does not stand proved;
(iii) The mere resolutions of the Municipal Council are
not sufficient to prove that the land had been
donated by the father of the plaintiff.
8. The Appellant-State preferred an appeal which was
registered as C.A. No.44 of 2003. The Additional
District Judge allowed the appeal of the appellantState setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court and
dismissed the suit. The findings recorded by the
Appellate Court are as follows:
(i) The fact that the Veterinary Hospital had been
established in 1958-59 and it was being run ever
since then, the filing of the suit after more than
four decades was barred by time.
(ii) The owner of the property having allowed the State
to take possession, construct the Veterinary
Hospital, and run the same over the land in suit
since 1958-59 itself proves that the land had been
actually donated by Shri Inder Singh, father of the
original plaintiff.
(iii) Shri Inder Singh, during his lifetime, having never
agitated about the construction of the hospital or
the existence of the hospital building over the land
in suit, also reflects that he had, in fact, donated
the land in suit.
(iv)The plaintiff, having admitted that, he had been
witnessing the Veterinary Hospital being run over
the land in suit since 1981 but did not take any
steps thereafter also proves that, in fact,
ownership had been transferred to the State in
1958 itself.
9. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff-respondent
preferred a second appeal before the High Court
registered as RSA No.447 of 2004. By the impugned
order, the High Court has allowed the appeal, set
aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court, and
restored that of the Trial Court. The findings recorded
by the High Court are as follows:
(i) The Appellant-State failed to establish possession
over the land in suit.
(ii) The basic ingredients for claiming adverse
possession were neither pleaded nor any evidence
led in that regard.
(iii) The pleadings in the written statement filed by the
appellant-State did not mention the details
regarding the date of possession, date of
knowledge to the whole world, duration of
possession, and much less Animus Possidendi.
10. It is this judgment of the High Court which is under
challenge in the present appeal.
11. Sri Sanjay R. Hegde, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellant made the following
submissions:-
(i) The suit for possession filed by the respondents,
was clearly barred by time in view of Article 65 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides the
limitation for a suit for possession of an immovable
property based on title to be 12 years. In the
present case, the possession of the appellants was
since 1958, even the admitted position by the
respondents to their knowledge was from 1981. As
such, the suit filed in the year 2001 was hopelessly
barred by time from both the dates i.e. 1958 as
also 1981.
(ii) The burden to prove ownership would lie on the
person challenging the ownership of the person in
possession in view of Section 110 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. In the present case, the
respondents admitted the possession of the
appellants and were only challenging the
ownership of the appellants. As such, the burden
was cast upon the respondents to prove their
ownership.
(iii) The appellants had claimed to be in possession of
the land in suit since 1958 and had also asserted
that it had constructed a Veterinary Hospital soon
thereafter, for which it had also filed documentary
evidence. Sri Inder Singh, the predecessor in
interest of the plaintiff-respondent, who had
donated the land in suit for construction of
Veterinary Hospital, never challenged the same nor
ever objected to the constructions being raised
over it. He was the owner in possession of the suit
land. The appellants, being in clear and
continuous possession of the suit land since 1958,
had perfected its rights as owners.
(iv) In support of his submission, Sri Hegde, relied
upon the following judgments:-
(1) Chuharmal Vs. CIT1
;
(2) Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan
Vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale
(D)2
;
(3) Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi
1
(1988) 3 SCC 588
2
(2007) 6 SCC 737
SLP (CIVIL) D. NO. 17885 OF 2020 Page 10 of 27
Reddy3
;
(4) T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. M.
Mallappa4
;
(5) Guru Amarjit Singh Vs. Rattan
Chand5
;
(6) Sawarni Vs. Inder Kaur6
;
(7) Jattu Ram Vs. Hakam Singh7
;
12. Mr. Hegde, thus, submitted that the impugned
judgment of the High Court deserves to be set-aside.
13. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondents made the following
submissions:-
(i) The impugned judgment of the High Court did not
suffer from any perversity, as such, did not
warrant any interference by this Court.
(ii) The plea of adverse possession was neither pleaded
nor proved, as such the High Court rightly set
3
(2008) 4 SCC 594
4
(2021) 13 SCC 135
5
(1993) 4 SCC 349
6
(1996) 6 SCC 223
7
(1993) 4 SCC 403
aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court
which was based on the plea of adverse possession.
(iii) The State Government cannot claim adverse
possession for which reliance was placed upon the
following judgments:-
(1) State of Kerala Vs. Joseph8
;
(2) State of Haryana Vs. Mukesh
Kumar and Ors.9
;
(3) Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs.
Government of India10;
(iv) No written deed of gift, much less registered, was
placed on record by the appellants to support its
claim of donation/gift by Sri Inder Singh.
(v) The suit is not barred by limitation, in as much as,
the respondents came to know of the construction
only in September, 2000 and, thereafter, they
immediately gave legal notice and filed the suit for
possession.
8
(2023) SCC Online SC 961
9
(2011) 10 SCC 404
10 (2004) 10 SCC 779
(vi)The revenue records (Jama bandis) established the
ownership rights of the respondents. The
submission to the contrary by the appellants is
contrary to law. The revenue records carried
presumption of correctness unless rebutted. In the
present case, the appellants failed to rebut the said
presumption. He relied upon the following
judgments in support of the said submission: -
(1) Partap Singh Vs. Shiv Ram11;
(2) Vishwa Vijai Bharti Vs. Fakhrul
Hasan and Ors12;
(vii). Lastly, it was submitted by Sri Luthra that the
appeal was filed with a delay of 492 days without
any satisfactory explanation. As such, the appeal
was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay
itself. In support of the said submission, he relied
upon the following two judgments:-
(1) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
11 (2020) 11 SCC 242
12 AIR 1976 SC 1485
Bherulal13;
(2) Office of the Chief Post Master
General and Others Vs. Living Media India
Ltd. & Anr.14;
14. Having considered the submissions and having
perused the material available on record, our analysis
runs as under.
15. A copy of the plaint filed by the respondents is filed as
Annexure (P-18). It is as vague as possible and is very
brief running into ten paragraphs. Its contents are
briefly referred to hereunder:-
(a) The plaint schedule property is described in the
beginning of the plaint. Paragraph-1 states that
plaintiff is owner of the land in dispute, for which,
Jama Bandi of the year 1996-97 is filed.
Paragraph-2 states that defendants without
consent of plaintiff have constructed a veterinary
13 (2020) 10 SCC 654
14 (2012) 3 SCC 563
SLP (CIVIL) D. NO. 17885 OF 2020 Page 14 of 27
hospital illegally and unauthorizedly over the suit
land. Paragraph-3 states that the defendants
neither purchased the said land from the plaintiff
nor paid any compensation to the plaintiff, as such,
their possession is unauthorized and illegal. The
plaintiff being its owner is entitled to vacant
possession. Paragraph 4 states that despite
repeated request to hand over vacant possession
by removing the debris (malba), no heed has been
paid to the said request. Paragraph-5 mentions
that a registered notice dated 09.11.2000 was
served upon the defendants calling upon them to
hand over possession, but no reply was received in
response to the same. Copy of the notice and
acknowledgement of receipt were attached with the
plaint. Paragraph-6 states that cause of action
arose on 1st March, 2001 as the defendants did not
give any reply to the notice. Paragraph-7 states
that suit property was situated within the
jurisdiction of the Court. Paragraph-8 mentions
regarding the valuation and the court fee paid.
Paragraph-9 mentions that there was no prior
litigation pending between the parties regarding
the subject matter. Paragraph-10 is the relief
clause wherein it was prayed that suit of plaintiff
for possession of the suit property be decreed.
16. The plaint, to our opinion ought to have been rejected
on the ground of being vague and not carrying
necessary and material particulars. The plaintiff very
conveniently avoided stating in the plaint as to when
the defendants constructed the Veterinary Hospital;
they also did not mention any details of the period
when request was said to have been made for
delivering vacant possession; the first date and
document mentioned in the plaint is of the legal notice
dated 09.11.2000.
17. In the case of Ram Singh Vs. Gram Panchayat Mehal
Kalan15, this Court observed and held that when the
suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be
allowed to circumvent that provision by means of
clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those
circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of
limitation.
18. Herein, it is evident that the plaintiff purposely
drafted/filed a vague plaint which lacked the essential
details of when the hospital was constructed, when
the plaintiff became aware of such construction, when
the right of ownership devolved upon the plaintiff,
when his father passed away, his letter of 24.04.1981
to the Tehsildar etc. It is nothing but a clear attempt
by Respondent at surpassing the bar under limitation
law for filing the suit since the existence of the
hospital was a fact well known to him since long ago.
19. The appellants filed their written statement denying
15 (1986) 4 SCC 364
the plaint allegations; three preliminary objections
were also raised to the effect that suit was not
maintainable in its form; the appellants were in
continuous possession over the suit land and; the suit
was time barred. It was further specifically stated that
the land in suit was donated by Sri Inder Singh in
1958 for construction of Government Veterinary
Hospital and, further, Municipal Council, Samana
and the State of Punjab had made financial
contribution for construction of the building of the
hospital in the year 1959 and since then, the hospital
is functioning, which is well known to the public of
Samana as also to the plaintiff. In support of the fact
that the hospital was constructed and that the
possession was with the State-appellant, various
resolutions of 1958-59, other revenue records were
filed. It was also specifically stated that as the land
had been donated, there was no question of payment
of consideration or compensation to the plaintiff.
20. A replication was filed by the plaintiff-respondent.
21. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.-1 and filed
documentary evidence which were exhibited. On the
other hand, the State examined Dr. Rajendra Kumar
Goyal as D.W-1 and Jagdish Chand as D.W.-2 and
had also filed several documents relating to
resolutions passed by the Municipal Council in the
year 1958-59, also the correspondence between the
Veterinary Officer and the Executive Officer of the
Municipal Council sometimes in 1981, as also the
documents to show that the plaintiff was aware of the
existence of the Veterinary Hospital in the year 1981
as he had made an enquiry from the concerned
Tehsildar regarding the exact location of the
Veterinary Hospital.
22. A perusal of all such documents (Ex's- DW2/C,
DW2/B, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-5) filed by the
SLP (CIVIL) D. NO. 17885 OF 2020 Page 19 of 27
defendant-State clearly establishes that the land had
been donated by Sri Inder Singh, father of the plaintiff
in the year 1958-1959 and, thereafter, after arranging
for funds from various sources, the hospital had been
constructed in 1959 and has, eversince then, been
functional. The above documents are resolutions of
the Municipal Council of 1958-59 and also Utilization
Certificates of funds utilized for construction of the
hospital. The document (Ex.DW2/A) also goes to
prove that there was a communication from the
Executive Officer of the Municipal Council dated
01.07.1981 giving details of the allotment, the
construction, the finances and also the functionality
of the hospital. This communication further mentions
that somebody had destroyed the file of the gift and
the construction of the hospital for which an enquiry
was pending. Nevertheless, the facts stated therein
clearly reflect that there was a hospital in existence
much before 1981. Another document filed by the
defendant-appellant was Ext.-D (8), which is a letter
written by the plaintiff dated 24.04.1981 requiring the
Tehsildar, Samana to verify and give a report
regarding location of the Veterinary Hospital. The said
letter also bears endorsement of the Tehsildar and
other Revenue Officials and also contains the
signature of the plaintiff. This letter clearly shows that
the plaintiff was aware of the existence of the
Veterinary Hospital in 1981. Thus, he had made a
false and incorrect statement in his deposition that
the hospital was constructed only two years ago.
Another fact worth mentioning here would be that,
during cross examination, the plaintiff stated that he
did not remember as to whether the hospital was in
existence since 1958-59 or not.
23. Considering this letter dated 24.04.1981, even if we
assume that the Respondent became aware of the
hospital’s existence on this date for the very first time,
yet the suit filed by him shall not fall within the
limitation period. Article 65 of the Limitation Act
clearly stipulates that in a suit for possession of
immovable property, the period of limitation will be
twelve years from when the possession of the
defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, the Respondent plaintiff’s suit is clearly barred by limitation.
24. The argument that State could not claim adverse
possession is not germane to the present case. Fact
remains and has been duly established from the
record that the hospital had been constructed on the
land belonging to the predecessor in interest of the
plaintiff sometime in the year 1958-59. At that time,
Sri Inder Singh, father of the plaintiff who was the
owner of the said land was alive and he did not object
to it, which clearly indicates that he had donated the
land for construction of Veterinary Hospital in Tehsil,
Samana. In those good old times, it used to be a usual
practice of big landlords donating their lands for
public cause. It is unfortunate that after 43 years, his
son filed the suit for possession without seeking
declaration, as in case, he would have sought relief of
declaration, the suit would have been further barred
by time for the said relief also. The defendant having
been in possession without any hindrance since 1958,
the suit filed would only be a mockery of justice if
decreed. If the plaintiff's case was that it was never
donated but still the hospital had been constructed,
then the plaintiff should have instituted a suit for
possession within 12 years. Having not done so, the
suit was clearly barred by time for the relief of
possession.
25. As already discussed above, various documents were
filed and proved by the defendant-appellant regarding
the donation, the transfer of possession, the
construction of the Veterinary Hospital and its
functionality since more than 40 years before the suit
was filed. In fact, the evidence establishes that the
donation was documented, and possession
transferred and acted upon and for the very purpose,
for which the donation was made.
26. The title of the land in suit had passed on to the State
after the donation and transfer of possession and after
construction, the hospital continued for more than
four decades before filing of the suit. The plaintiff, son
of the donor, also waited for 20 years despite admitted
knowledge of the hospital running over the land in
suit and did not take any action.
27. Article 65 under the Schedule to the Limitation Act
provides limitation of 12 years for filing a suit for
possession based on title. In the present case, merely
because the name of the plaintiff continued in the
revenue records (Jama Bandis), it would not confer
any title upon him. Revenue records (Jama Bandis)
are only entries for the purpose of realising tax by the
Municipal Corporations or land revenue by Gram
Sabhas. The plaintiff having failed to claim relief of
declaration, the suit itself would not be maintainable.
Further, for a suit for declaration, period of limitation
would be three years under Article 58 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act, which in the present case was
long lost.
28. There is nothing on record available from the cross-examination of defendants 1 and 2 that the documents which they proved were either incorrect, doubtful or suspicious. The documents exhibited by the defendants could not be ignored as they were
public documents, copies of which were filed and duly
proved. Even if the deed was not placed on record but
due explanation was given, the facts of the case and
the evidence on record clearly established the case of
the defendant-appellant that the land in suit had been
donated by Sri Inder Singh, father of the plaintiff way
back in 1958. The lethargy/carelessness on the part
of the State in not getting the revenue records
corrected on the basis of the gift deed would not take
away the rights conferred on the State under the gift
deed.
29. The case-laws relied upon by Sri Luthra on the
question of State not being entitled to claim adverse
possession as also the presumption of revenue
records being correct, have no application and are of
no help to the respondents in the light of the
discussion made above.
30. It is settled law that in a suit for possession, the
burden of proof lies on the plaintiff. As per Section 110
of the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof as to
ownership of a property lies on the person challenging
the ownership of the person in possession. Section
110 of Evidence Act is produced as follows:
“110.Burden of proof as to
ownership- When the question is
whether any person is owner of anything
of which he is shown to be in possession,
the burden of proving that he is not the
owner is on the person who affirms that
he is not the owner.”
31. This Court had summarized the provision in
Chuharmal v. CIT (supra) as follows:
“6. …Section 110 of the Evidence Act is
material in this respect and the High
Court relied on the same which stipulates
that when the question is whether any
person is owner of anything of which he is
shown to be in possession, the onus of
proving that he is not the owner, is on the
person who affirms that he is not the
owner. In other words, it follows from well
settled principle of law that normally,
unless contrary is established, title
always follows possession.”
32. In view of the clear finding that the hospital is
functioning on the suit land since 1958, the Trial
Court as well as the High Court have wrongly shifted
the proof of ownership on the Appellant, whereas it
lay on the Respondent by virtue of Section 110 of the
Evidence Act.
33. In view of the above discussion, the appeal deserves
to be allowed and is, accordingly, allowed.
34. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside
and that of the First Appellate Court dismissing the
suit of the plaintiff-respondent is confirmed.
……………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
……………………………………J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI
JULY 10, 2024
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