Supreme Court: Punishment Must Be In Proportion To Gravity Of Offence

This Court, while enhancing the sentence observed, after characterising the punishment as unconscionably lenient or a ‘flea-bite’ sentence, that consideration of undue sympathy in

such cases will lead to miscarriage of justice and

undermine confidence of the public in the efficacy of the

criminal justice system. In short, there cannot be any

doubt with respect to the position that in imposing

sentence the Court is to take into consideration the

nature of the offence, circumstances under which it was

committed, degree of deliberation shown by the

offender, antecedents of the offender upto the time of

sentence, etc., and, in the absence of any exceptional

circumstances, impose sentence in tune with the rule of

proportionality in providing punishment though it falls

within the realm of judicial discretion.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. of 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11461 of 2022)

Baba Natarajan Prasad  Vs M. Revathi

Author: C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.

Dated: July 15, 2024.

Citation: 2024 INSC 523.

1. Leave granted.

2. Salmond defined ‘crime’ as an act deemed by law

to be harmful for society as a whole although its

immediate victim may be an individual. Long-long ago,

Kautilya said: “it is the power of punishment alone which

when exercised impartially in proportion to guilt and

irrespective of whether the person punished is the king’s

son or the enemy, that protects this world and the next”. In

the decision in State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh1

, this Court

held that it is the duty of every court to award proper

sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and

the manner in which it was executed or committed. The

sentencing courts are expected to consider all the

relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question

of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence

commensurate with the gravity of the offence. The court

must not only keep in view the rights of the victim but

also the society at large while considering the imposition

of appropriate punishment. Meagre sentence imposed

solely on account of lapse of time without considering the

degree of the offence will be counterproductive in the

long run and against the interest of the society, it was

further held. In Bawa Singh’s case (supra), this Court

referred to the earlier decisions in Hazara Singh v. Raj

Kumar & Ors.2

, and Shailesh Jasvantbhai & Anr. v. State

of Gujarat & Ors.3

, with agreement, in paragraphs 13

and 14 thereof, as under:-

“13. In Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, this Court has

observed that:

1

(2015) 3 SCC 441

2

(2013) 9 SCC 516

3

(2006) 2 SCC 359

“10. … it is the duty of the courts to

consider all the relevant factors to impose an

appropriate sentence. The legislature has

bestowed upon the judiciary this enormous

discretion in the sentencing policy, which

must be exercised with utmost care and

caution. The punishment awarded should be

directly proportionate to the nature and the

magnitude of the offence. The benchmark of

proportionate sentencing can assist the

Judges in arriving at a fair and impartial

verdict.”

This Court further observed that:

“11. … The cardinal principle of

sentencing policy is that the sentence

imposed on an offender should reflect the

crime he has committed and it should be

proportionate to the gravity of the offence.

This Court has repeatedly stressed the central

role of proportionality in sentencing of

offenders in numerous cases.”

14. In Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, the

Apex Court opined that:

“7. The law regulates social interests,

arbitrates conflicting claims and demands.

Security of persons and property of the

people is an essential function of the State. It

could be achieved through instrumentality of

criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a crosscultural conflict where living law must find

answer to the new challenges and the courts

are required to mould the sentencing system

to meet the challenges. The contagion of

lawlessness would undermine social order

and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and

stamping out criminal proclivity must be the

object of law which must be achieved by

imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore,

law as a cornerstone of the edifice of ‘order’

should meet the challenges confronting the

society. Friedman in his Law in Changing

Society stated that: ‘State of criminal law

continues to be–as it should be–a decisive

reflection of social consciousness of society.’

Therefore, in operating the sentencing

system, law should adopt the corrective

machinery or deterrence based on factual

matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing

process be stern where it should be, and

tempered with mercy where it warrants to be.

The facts and given circumstances in each

case, the nature of the crime, the manner in

which it was planned and committed, the

motive for commission of the crime, the

conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons

used and all other attending circumstances

are relevant facts which would enter into the

area of consideration.

8. Therefore, undue sympathy to

impose inadequate sentence would do more

harm to the justice system to undermine the

public confidence in the efficacy of law and

society could not long endure under such

serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of

every court to award proper sentence having

regard to the nature of the offence and the

manner in which it was executed or

committed, etc.”

3. Besides the decisions in Hazara Singh and

Shailesh Jasvantbhai’s cases (supra), this Court also

referred to the decisions in Ahmed Hussein Vali

Mohammed Saiyed & Anr. v. State of Gujarat4

, State of

Madhya Pradesh v. Bablu5

, and State of Madhya

Pradesh v. Surendra Singh6

therein. Thereupon, in

4

(2009) 7 SCC 254

5

(2014) 9 SCC 281

6

(2015) 1 SCC 222

Page 6 of 22

paragraph 17 of Bawa Singh’s case (supra) this Court

held thus:-

“17. Recently, in State of M.P. v. Bablu and

State of M.P. v. Surendra Singh, after considering

and following the earlier decisions, this Court

reiterated the settled proposition of law that one of

the prime objectives of criminal law is the

imposition of adequate, just, proportionate

punishment which commensurate with gravity,

nature of crime and the manner in which the

offence is committed. One should keep in mind the

social interest and conscience of the society while

considering the determinative factor of sentence

with gravity of crime. The punishment should not

be so lenient that it shocks the conscience of the

society. It is, therefore, solemn duty of the court to

strike a proper balance while awarding the

sentence as awarding lesser sentence encourages

any criminal and, as a result of the same, the

society suffers.”

4. Thus, the clamour or claim for comeuppance viz.,

deserved punishment proportionate to the gravity of the

offence is a continuous and continuing demand based on

civic sense and unfailing in categories of serious

offences where more than individual interest is also

Page 7 of 22

involved, the above rule of proportionality in providing

punishment is not failed as otherwise it will impact the

society. At the same time, we may hasten to add that we

shall not be understood to have held that imposition of

sentence on such offenders shall be to satisfy the society

and we are only on the point that following the rule of

proportionality in imposing punishment would promote

and bring order and orderliness in society.

5. The case on hand unfolds as grievance of grave

deviation of the principle of sentencing thus laid down

by this Court and it carries a consequential prayer for

enhancement of punishment for conviction for the

offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(for short, ‘I.P.C.’). The appellant-complainant assails

the common judgment passed in Crl. Appeal

Nos.647/2021 and 635/2021 respectively in the

captioned appeals dated 26.08.2022 of the High Court of

Judicature at Madras to the extent it imposed only a fleabite sentence for the conviction of the respondentaccused for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., and

confirmed the acquittal of the co-accused of the said

respondents. The fact is that despite the restoration of

the conviction entered against them by the trial Court

after reversing their acquittal by the First Appellate

Page 8 of 22

Court and the consequential imposition of sentence, the

respondents in both the appeals who were accused

Nos.1 and 2 have not chosen to challenge the common

judgment dated 26.08.2022.

Facts leading to the appeals

6. The appellant herein is the husband of the

respondent in the former appeal and he filed a private

complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’) against the said

respondent and the respondent in the latter appeal, for

having committed offence punishable under Section 494

I.P.C. In fact, on the ground of abetting them for

committing the said offence the parents of the

respondent in the former appeal were also arraigned as

accused. For the sake of convenience, hereafter in this

judgment, the respondent in the former appeal and the

respondent in the latter appeal are referred to only as

accused No.1 and 2 respectively, viz., their respective

order of status before the trial Court.

7. The allegation in the complaint was that the first

accused who is his wife, pending the proceedings for

dissolution of their marriage between them before the

Family Court, Coimbatore, and during subsistence of

Page 9 of 22

their nuptial bond, married the second accused and that

in the wedlock of the first accused with the second

accused a child was born. Therefore, the appellant

accused them of committing bigamous marriage and the

parents of the first accused were accused of abetting

them for committing the said offence. After the

culmination of the trial, the trial Court acquitted the

parents of the first accused who were accused Nos.3 and

4, and convicted the first and second accused, under

Section 494 I.P.C., and sentenced them to undergo oneyear rigorous imprisonment each and imposed a fine of

Rs. 2,000/- each. In default of payment of fine they were

ordered to suffer three months simple imprisonment.

Aggrieved by the conviction and the consequently

imposed sentence, first and second accused filed Crl.

Appeal Nos.249/2019 and 250/2019 respectively. The

appellant herein filed appeal as Crl. Appeal

No.273/2019 against the acquittal of the parents of the

first accused, viz., accused Nos.3 and 4 before the trial

Court and filed Crl. Appeal No.304/2019 seeking

enhancement of the sentence given to the first and

second accused. As per common judgment dated

19.04.2021, the court of Additional District and Sessions

Judge-III, Coimbatore, dismissed the Appeal

Page 10 of 22

Nos.273/2019 and 304/2019 filed by the appellant herein

and allowed Crl. Appeal Nos.249/2019 and 250/2019

filed by the accused Nos.1 and 2 and acquitted them.

Aggrieved by the said common judgment, the appellant

filed Crl. Appeal Nos.635/2021 and 647/2021 against the

acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and a common appeal

viz., Crl. Appeal No.648/2021 against the dismissal of his

appeals viz., Crl. Appeal Nos.273/2019 and 304/2019. In

and vide the said appeals the appellant prayed to set

aside the common order dated 19.04.2021 reversing the

conviction of accused Nos.1 and 2 and confirming the

acquittal of accused Nos.3 and 4. The appellant also

sought for enhancement of the sentence of one-year

rigorous imprisonment imposed on accused Nos.1 and 2

contending that it is too inadequate.

8. We have already noted that despite the restoration

of the conviction for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C.,

entered against accused Nos.1 and 2 they have not

chosen to challenge the same and at the same time they

preferred to undergo the sentence imposed therefor.

Naturally, in the said circumstances, against the

conviction no argument was advanced on behalf of

accused Nos.1 and 2 and their contention was that no

Page 11 of 22

interference with the impugned order is invited in the

captioned appeals.

9. Heard Sh. R. Basanth, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellant, and Sh. Ratnakar Das,

learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the

judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court

had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record

and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself

that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable

under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the

appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare

perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the

High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the

appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction

by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on

surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered

view that no more narrative on the correctness of the

reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by

the High Court under the impugned judgment is

required as the indisputable and undisputed position is

that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2

and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the

Page 12 of 22

High Court consequent to the reversal of the First

Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the

learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit

that the appellant had not accepted any compensation

and in the same breath, would further submit that the

appellant did not want any such compensation.

11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question

surviving for consideration is whether the High Court

was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the

conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court

when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and

reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and

restored the conviction entered on them by the trial

Court. In other words, the question is whether the High

Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to

accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have

committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable

under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off

with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of

sentence is invited?

12. In this context, we may say that we are not oblivious

of the position of law laid down by this Court in Dalbir

Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab7

. In the said decision this

7

(1979) 3 SCC 745

Page 13 of 22

Court held that decision on question of sentence could

never be regarded as precedent. Bearing in mind the

said decision, we will proceed to consider the question

based on the rule of proportionality in providing

punishment followed by this Court. In this context, it is

to be noted that under the impugned common judgment

the High Court after restoring conviction for the offence

under Section 494 I.P.C., sentenced accused Nos.1 and 2

to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and

to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- each with default sentence to

undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three

months. It was also ordered that out of the total fine

amount paid, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- shall be paid to the

appellant as compensation.

13. We will consider the requirement or otherwise of

enhancement of the corporeal sentence imposed on

accused Nos.1 and 2 based on the settled principle of

sentencing being followed by this Court that it is the

solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance

awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the

offence committed by the accused concerned upon his

conviction for serious offence(s). For considering the

said question, it is only appropriate to look into the

question whether the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., is

Page 14 of 22

regarded as a serious offence. The appellant herein

contended that a reading of Section 494 I.P.C., would

reveal that the said offence, if proved to have been

committed, the offender deserves no leniency as it is a

serious offence. To buttress the said contention, the

learned senior counsel relied on the decision of this

Court in Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan8

, wherein this

Court held that where the offence of bigamy is proved,

the Court could not take a lenient view.

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would

reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy

as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is

prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum

sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a

conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of

either description. It is also to be noted that the said

offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of

the person so marrying with the permission of the Court.

The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with

concealment of former marriage from person with whom

subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the

offender with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This

8

(1979) 2 SCC 170

Page 15 of 22

offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is noncompoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case

(supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal

sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,

would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under

Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.

15. When once it is found that an offence under Section

494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances

obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the

imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is

not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of

proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned

hereinbefore.

16. It is a fact that earlier certain High Courts

maintained a view that sentencing an accused to

undergo ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ would

be no sentence at all, according to law. (See the

decisions in Shew Shankar Singh v. The State and Ors.9

,

Assan Musaliarakath Kunhi Bava In Re.

10

, and The

Public Prosecutor v. Kanniappan11). In the said

decisions of the Madras High Court, it was held that a

sentence of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is an

9 MANU/WB/0349/1968

10 AIR 1929 Mad 226

11 AIR 1955 Mad 424

Page 16 of 22

evasion of the statutory provision. In this context, it is

also to be noted that a contra view was taken by a

Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Muthu

Nadar, In Re.

12. The Division Bench held that unless the

penal provision provides any fixed term as the minimum,

the court has full discretion to pass a sentence of

imprisonment for any period if it would be fit. In the

decision in Prahlad Dnyanoba Gajbhiye v. State of

Maharashtra and Anr.13, the High Court of Bombay held

that every confinement of person and every restraint of

liberty of free men is imprisonment. It is to be noted that

taking into account the proviso to Section 418(1), Cr.P.C.,

in the decision in Raveendran v. Food Inspector,

Pinarayi Panchayat14

, the High Court of Kerala held that

the proviso to Section 418(1), Cr.P.C., recognises

sentence of detention till the rising of court is

imprisonment of the description simple imprisonment.

We refer to the aforesaid decisions and provisions to say

that now it cannot be said that imposing a sentence of

‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is impermissible

or an action amounting to evasion of statutory

12 AIR 1945 Mad 313

13 (1994) Cri LJ 2555

14 1977 KLT 155

Page 17 of 22

provision(s). The said provision viz., Section 418(1),

Cr.P.C., and its proviso reads thus:-

“418. Execution of sentence of imprisonment. —

(1) Where the accused is sentenced to

imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a term

in cases other than those provided for by section

413, the Court passing the sentence shall forthwith

forward a warrant to the jail or other place in which

he is, or is to be, confined, and, unless the accused

is already confined in such jail or other place, shall

forward him to such jail or other place, with the

warrant:

Provided that where the accused is sentenced

to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, it shall

not be necessary to prepare or forward a warrant

to a jail, and the accused may be confined in such

place as the Court may direct.”

17. The proviso to Section 418(1), Cr.P.C., together

with the penal provision under Section 494 I.P.C.,

prescribing no minimum imprisonment, but only the

maximum, would definitely make imposition of

‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ intra vires.

18. This will take us to the next question as to whether

such a flea-bite sentence is sufficient when a conviction

is entered under Section 494 I.P.C., only because no

minimum sentence is prescribed thereunder. We have

already noted that in the matter of awarding sentence for

conviction of an offence which may impact the society, it

is not advisable to let off an accused after conviction with

a flea-bite sentence. We may hasten to add that we are

not oblivious of the decision of this Court in Adamji

Umar Dalal v. State of Bombay AIR 1952 SC 14 , wherein this Court held that zeal to crush the evil should not carry the Court

away from its judicial mind, and the sentence should not

be so unduly harsh as to defeat the ends of justice. But

then, the decision in State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias

Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538is also equally relevant. This Court, while

enhancing the sentence observed, after characterising

the punishment as unconscionably lenient or a ‘flea-bite’

sentence, that consideration of undue sympathy in

such cases will lead to miscarriage of justice and

undermine confidence of the public in the efficacy of the

criminal justice system. In short, there cannot be any

doubt with respect to the position that in imposing

sentence the Court is to take into consideration the

nature of the offence, circumstances under which it was

committed, degree of deliberation shown by the

offender, antecedents of the offender upto the time of

sentence, etc., and, in the absence of any exceptional

circumstances, impose sentence in tune with the rule of

proportionality in providing punishment though it falls

within the realm of judicial discretion.

19. Now bearing in mind all the aforesaid provisions

and decisions, if the question whether accused Nos.1 and

2 are granted a proper sentence or what was granted

was only a flea-bite sentence, we have no option but to

hold that imposition of sentence of ‘imprisonment till the

rising of the court’ upon conviction for an offence under

Section 494 I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient

or a flea-bite sentence.

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence

on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the

question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant

herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court,

Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the

trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was

noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking

interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a

petition in that regard the Court had ordered the

appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused

and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017.

The evidence would further show that a child was born

to the first and second accused in their wedlock in

November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal

that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP

No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with

the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that

the first accused married the second accused while the

marriage between the appellant and the first accused

was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence,

she had also begotten a child through the second

accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can

be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case

on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the

child born to the first and second accused was aged less

than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence

and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed

for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the

maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder

is seven years, we are of the considered view that the

trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the

term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then,

taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only

about six years and the sentence for the conviction under

Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think

it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the

sentence imposed under the impugned judgment.

Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence

awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under

Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature

of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said

period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing

the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as

originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say,

that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial

Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three

months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned

judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited

Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the

sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance

amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the

law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall

surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the

unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this

judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of

accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we

further order that firstly the second accused shall

surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3

weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence.

Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence,

the first accused shall surrender before the Court to

serve her remaining period of sentence and such

surrender shall be made by the first accused within a

period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused

from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a

precedent as it was ordered in these special

circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not

surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial

Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance

with law to place them in custody and make them suffer

the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals

are allowed as above.

21. Pending application(s) are disposed of.

……………………, J.

 (C.T. Ravikumar)

……………………, J.

 (Sanjay Kumar)

New Delhi;

July 15, 2024

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