Learned counsel seeks to contend that a procedure prescribed for enforcement of process against land must be understood as a procedure that causes an interdict against attachment through enforcement provided under the Civil Procedure Code. This argument, in my view, is fallacious. for there are no means by which the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be incorporated in a procedure, which is independently prescribed under the Land Revenue Act. They operate in two distinct fields and certain special privileges which Civil Procedure Code provides for enforcement of decrees cannot be applied to enforcement of awards. The Motor Vehicles Act itself is a complete Code and the extent to which Civil Procedure Code provisions are applicable are brought through the Motor Vehicles Act itself. Such procedure and powers are set out under section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act. The references to civil and criminal procedures are available only in so far as taking of evidence on oath, enforcement of attendance of witnesses and compelling the party for production of documents. Power under section 174 is independent of any power to recover under the Civil Procedure Code itself by attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor. If the decree holder seeks to resort to attachment of the property enforcing the award as a decree of civil court, he shall be perfectly at liberty to do so but if the recovery of money is sought from any person under an award after securing a certificate for amount from the Collector then the procedure that the Collector will follow shall only be what is provided under the Land Revenue Act itself. {Para 2}
3. The issue of whether the exceptions provided under the Civil Procedure Code for properties that cannot be attached could be invoked in proceedings for recoveries under the Land Revenue Act has come for consideration before the Supreme Court itself in State of Punjab v. Dina Nath, 1986 RRR 490. The point which was directly at issue was whether an attachment and sale of property for recovery of revenue due to State was barred in respect of building used for residential purpose and whether the provisions of section 60(ccc) would be applicable was taken up and the court held that exemption was only for properties specified under the Act. The court held that Punjab Land Revenue Act was a complete Code providing for modes and machinery for recovery of arrears of revenue and the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to attachment and sale in revenue recovery proceedings. The award which is passed by Tribunal, which obtains a status through a certificate issued by the Collector as land revenue payable, ought to therefore obtain a different treatment and the trappings of the Civil Procedure Code and limitations contained therein cannot, therefore, be attracted. This point was also subsequently decided under the Motor Vehicles Act itself by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Vorghese v. Sunny, 2009 ACJ 2704 (Kerala), where the court held that execution of award by Tribunal after issuance of a certificate to the land recovery authority cannot avail to a judgment-debtor to plead for the benefit of section 60(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
C.R. No. 2000 of 2012
Decided On: 04.02.2013
Prem Chand Vs. Akashdeep
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Kannan, J.
Citation: MANU/PH/4481/2013,2014 ACJ 1467 (P&H).
1. The civil revision is at the instance of the judgment-debtor whose residential property is sought to be proceeded against towards execution of the award in a motor accident claim. It appears that the judgment-debtor paid a portion of the amount and for remaining part of the amount, the decree holder has sought for arrest and the judgment-debtor had been detained in civil prison for some time. Now recovery by sale of the property is sought through a resort to the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. The Motor Vehicles Act provides in section 174 that reads as follows:
174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue.--Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
The power of the Collector is to proceed to recover the award as though it were an arrear of land revenue. When a certificate was, therefore, sent to the Collector for enforcement of the award and for recovery under the Land Revenue Act, the contention taken by the judgment-debtor is that the property, which is sought to be proceeded against, is the only residential property which is exempted from attachment in terms of section 60(ccc) of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-judgment-debtor seeks to contend that the provision for recovery provided under the Land Revenue Act admits of several modes of recoveries and the power to proceed against any immovable property is the last mode, which is prescribed under section 77 of the Land Revenue Act. Sub-clause (5) is relevant for us and the same is reproduced as under:
(5) In proceedings against property under this section the Collector shall follow, as nearly as the nature of the property will admit, the procedure prescribed for the enforcement of process against land on which an arrear of land revenue is due.
2. Learned counsel seeks to contend that a procedure prescribed for enforcement of process against land must be understood as a procedure that causes an interdict against attachment through enforcement provided under the Civil Procedure Code. This argument, in my view, is fallacious. for there are no means by which the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be incorporated in a procedure, which is independently prescribed under the Land Revenue Act. They operate in two distinct fields and certain special privileges which Civil Procedure Code provides for enforcement of decrees cannot be applied to enforcement of awards. The Motor Vehicles Act itself is a complete Code and the extent to which Civil Procedure Code provisions are applicable are brought through the Motor Vehicles Act itself. Such procedure and powers are set out under section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act. The references to civil and criminal procedures are available only in so far as taking of evidence on oath, enforcement of attendance of witnesses and compelling the party for production of documents. Power under section 174 is independent of any power to recover under the Civil Procedure Code itself by attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor. If the decree holder seeks to resort to attachment of the property enforcing the award as a decree of civil court, he shall be perfectly at liberty to do so but if the recovery of money is sought from any person under an award after securing a certificate for amount from the Collector then the procedure that the Collector will follow shall only be what is provided under the Land Revenue Act itself.
3. All this becomes only academic, for in respect of recovery of amount under the very same award, it appears that the same objection appears to have been taken before the executing court and the court has rejected such a contention at an earlier point of time in Execution Petition No. 13 dated 19.7.2004; decided on 3.10.2006. Explanation VII to section 11, Civil Procedure Code enacts a rule of public policy that the principle of res judicata shall apply to proceeding for execution of decree and references made under section 11 to any suit or former suit would apply such references to a proceeding for execution of a decree and the question arising in such proceeding and former proceeding for execution of that decree. Though I have stated that the provisions under section 60(ccc) are not applicable since there are express provisions under Motor Vehicles Act itself, I still referred to section 11, Civil Procedure Code, for the principle of res judicata as brought under section 11 is to be applied even in cases where Civil Procedure Code is not applicable on grounds of public policy. I would, therefore, hold that an earlier adjudication made by the executing court on the same matter that became final will conclude the issue for judgment-debtor and bar him from taking up the very same defence in a subsequent stage at execution for realization of further sums in the very same decree. The issue of whether the exceptions provided under the Civil Procedure Code for properties that cannot be attached could be invoked in proceedings for recoveries under the Land Revenue Act has come for consideration before the Supreme Court itself in State of Punjab v. Dina Nath, 1986 RRR 490. The point which was directly at issue was whether an attachment and sale of property for recovery of revenue due to State was barred in respect of building used for residential purpose and whether the provisions of section 60(ccc) would be applicable was taken up and the court held that exemption was only for properties specified under the Act. The court held that Punjab Land Revenue Act was a complete Code providing for modes and machinery for recovery of arrears of revenue and the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to attachment and sale in revenue recovery proceedings. The award which is passed by Tribunal, which obtains a status through a certificate issued by the Collector as land revenue payable, ought to therefore obtain a different treatment and the trappings of the Civil Procedure Code and limitations contained therein cannot, therefore, be attracted. This point was also subsequently decided under the Motor Vehicles Act itself by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Vorghese v. Sunny, 2009 ACJ 2704 (Kerala), where the court held that execution of award by Tribunal after issuance of a certificate to the land recovery authority cannot avail to a judgment-debtor to plead for the benefit of section 60(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code. The said provision contained a similar provision relating to certain exemptions. The order passed by the executing court is under the circumstances perfectly justified and challenge to the same in revision cannot survive for favourable consideration. The civil revision is consequently dismissed.
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