Merely because the sim-card of real brother was used by the sister i.e. the present petitioner, that by itself will not constitute or amount to commission of the offence. The fact remains that to infer misuse of sim-card by the petitioner, there is no iota of evidence to infer such act. It is an admitted fact that the sim-card is duly received by the complainant from the petitioner before the date of lodging of the complaint. {Para 7}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1871 OF 2022
Heena Afrin Huzaifa Shaikh Vs The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
CORAM : NITIN W. SAMBRE & R. N. LADDHA, JJ.
DATE : 17th AUGUST, 2023
1. The present petitioner is sister of deceased Ashfaque.
The deceased Ashfaque expired on 23rd April, 2020 having suffered
covid infection. Complainant Mrs. Rumana, wife of deceased
Ashfaque on 2nd October, 2020, lodged a complaint alleging that the
petitioner along with other co-accused with common intention
committed an offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The
nature of allegations are, while the complainant was following
Iddat, she has instructed Afsar Shah to dispose of movables which
were owned by her and her husband jointly. Sale proceeds of the
same were not handed over to the complainant. As far as the
petitioner is concerned, allegations are, taking illegal custody of the
postpaid sim-card and use of the same and handing it over to the
complainant after having blocked the same. Contentions of counsel
for the petitioner are, even if the prosecution case is presumed to be
true at its face value, as has been stated in the FIR, no offence could
be inferred against the petitioner. According to him, only role
attributed to the petitioner is that of taking custody (illegally) of the
sim-card of deceased, using the same, which was subsequently
found to be blocked.
2. It is further claimed that as far as non return of the sale
proceeds after disposal of movables is concerned, there are no
specific attributions against the petitioner to infer the alleged
offence under Section 406 viz. Criminal breach of trust and Section
420 viz. Cheating. Counsel for the petitioner would urge that
neither the property was entrusted to the petitioner by the
complainant viz. movables, as reflected in the FIR nor the petitioner
is said to be instrumental in disposal of the property i.e. movables.
He would draw support from the contents of the FIR and submits
that even the sim-card was returned to the complainant before the
date of lodging of the complaint. In this background, it is claimed
that necessary ingredients of offence punishable under Sections 406,
420 and 34 of IPC cannot be inferred.
3. Learned counsel for the complainant assisted by learned
APP would urge that the offence is committed by the petitioner at
two stages; (i) that she having common intention with the other co-
accused instrumental in disposing of the movables and not returning
the amount of sale proceeds to the complainant; and (ii) illegal use
of sim-card and returning the same which was found to be blocked.
It is claimed that there is prima-facie evidence to infer involvement
of the petitioner in the offence in question.
4. The offence alleged against the petitioner taking custody
of sim-card of deceased, use of same as could be noticed from the
contents of the FIR. As far as the sale of movables, like Air
Conditioners, Oven, Refrigerator, Fibre Chimney, Fibre Gas, Heater
and Sofa-cum-bed etc. is concerned, the petitioner is not shown to
be personally involved in disposal of the said property. It is upon
instructions of the complainant, Afsar Shah, brother of the deceased
Ashfaque and brother-in-law of the complainant appears to have
sold the said movables and the involvement of the present petitioner
in the said transactions is not demonstrated or alleged.
5. In this background, as far as sale of movables is
concerned, no role is attributed nor could be inferred as that of the
petitioner in the commission of said offence.
6. As far as use of sim-card is concerned, the fact remains
that after the death of Ashfaque, who was brother of the petitioner,
the sim-card was allegedly used by the petitioner and subsequent
thereof handed over to the complainant. The respondent/
complainant in categorical terms admitted the receipt of the sim-
card, however, same is claimed to be blocked.
7. Merely because the sim-card of real brother was used by
the sister i.e. the present petitioner, that by itself will not constitute
or amount to commission of the offence. The fact remains that to
infer misuse of sim-card by the petitioner, there is no iota of
evidence to infer such act. It is an admitted fact that the sim-card is
duly received by the complainant from the petitioner before the date
of lodging of the complaint.
8. In this background, having regard to the fact that an
offence punishable under Section 34 of the IPC cannot be termed as
an independent offence and having regard to aforesaid
observations, ingredients of the offence punishable under Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC cannot be inferred against the petitioner.
That being so, we deem it appropriate to allow the present petition
thereby quashing FIR and consequential charge-sheet registered
against the petitioner.
9. In State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa reported in
(2002) 3 SCC 89, the Apex Court has held that the authority of the
Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made
to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has
power to prevent abuse. It is also held that in aforesaid situation,
the Court can be said to be justified to quash the proceedings, if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the
ends of justice. Paragraph 6 of the aforesaid judgment reads thus :-
“6......All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the
right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of
justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest
(when the law gives a person anything it gives him that
without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers
under the section, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the
tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and
if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would
be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process
of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by
the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible
to look into the materials to assess what the complainant
has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.”
10. Apart from above, if we draw support from the judgment
of Apex Court in the matter of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal
reported in 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335, what can be noticed is, the
narration in the FIR, in our opinion, does not constitute any offence
against the petitioner. Once the FIR does not disclose any offence
against the petitioner, the continuance of the criminal proceedings
against the petitioner who is a doctor would amount to abuse of
process. Prima-facie, it appears that the criminal proceedings are
initiated by the complainant against the petitioner solely out of
family differences as could be inferred from the relationship
between the complainant and the petitioner.
11. As such, the present petition stands allowed in terms of
prayer clause (a).
[R. N. LADDHA, J.] [NITIN W. SAMBRE, J.]
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