In view of the evidence thus obtained and taking
into account the decision in Shanti Prasad Devi’s case
(supra) the High Court held that mere acceptance of the
rent by the landlord after the expiry of the period of
lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of
lease.
12. In view of the above conclusion this Special Leave
Petition must fail as it is devoid of merits.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO.10700 OF 2022
SRI K.M. MANJUNATH Vs SRI ERAPPA. G DEAD THROUGH LRS.
Dated: June 24, 2022.
1. This Special Leave Petition has been filed assailing
the Judgment and final order dated 19-4-2022 in Civil
Revision Petition No.500/2013 passed by the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru.
2. The Revision Petition was filed challenging the
dismissal of the suit for ejectment passed by the XVth
Additional Judge and Court of Small Causes, Bengaluru.
The schedule property was the Shop bearing No.12 in the
ground floor bearing Khata No.6/1 situated at Erappa
Layout, Banaswadi Main Road, Bengaluru, measuring 13
feet X 24 feet.
3. The petitioner herein, viz., defendant therein, took
up a contention that there was no valid termination of
tenancy as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (for short ‘TP Act’). The Trial Court upheld
the said contention after analysing the evidence on
record and dismissed the suit on the sole ground that
there was no valid termination of tenancy and hence,
suit for ejectment was not maintainable.
4. Essentially, the contention of the respondents
herein, viz., the legal representatives of the deceased
plaintiff before the High Court in the Revision
Petition, was that in view of Exts. D1 to D7 lease
agreements, which are though unregistered documents, the
period of lease ought to have been held as 11 months. As
per Section 111(a) of the Act, such a lease would
determine by the efflux of time and under such
circumstances notice of termination under Section 106 of
the Act was not required. After taking into
consideration the rival contentions with reference to
the provisions under the Act and the decisions
specifically referred to in the impugned judgment, the
High Court came to a positive finding that it is a case
where tenancy got terminated by efflux of time by
operation of Section 111(a) of the Act and in such
circumstances, in view of the law laid down in the
decision in Shanti Prasad Devi & Anr. Vs. Shankar Mahto
& Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 2905 = (2005) 5 SCC 543,
mere acceptance of the landlord after the expiry of the
period of lease would not amount to waiver of the
termination of lease. Obviously, the High Court took
into account lease deeds Exts.D1 to D7 produced in
evidence by the petitioner himself (the defendant in the
suit) and found that they were unregistered and would
reveal that every calendar year the parties went on
executing lease agreements. Ultimately, accepting the
contentions of the respondents herein based on the
evidence on record the High Court set aside the judgment
and decree passed by the Trial Court and partly decreed
the suit. Thereafter, the High Court directed the
petitioner herein to pay arrears of rent at the rate of
Rs.1400/- per month from 01-01-2017 till possession of
the property is handed over and also to handover the
possession of the property to the petitioners therein,
viz., respondents herein, within 60 days from the date
of receipt of copy of the order. It is the said order
passed in revision that is under challenge before us.
5. Heard the Learned Counsel for the petitioner.
6. As noted above, the impugned order was passed by the
High Court in exercise of its power of revision under
Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act. As
relates the scope of revisional power there can be no
two views that the High Court is empowered to interfere
with findings of fact only if the findings are perverse
or based on no evidence or suffering from error of law
or there has been non-appreciation or non-consideration
of a material on record by the court(s) below. It needs
no reiteration that another view is possible based on
the evidence on record can be no ground for the High
Court to interfere with an order of court(s) below in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
7. In the case on hand, the suit for ejectment filed by
the landlord was dismissed by the Trial Court on the
ground that there was no valid termination of the tenancy
under Section 106 of the TP Act. During the pendency of
the revisional petition filed against the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court, the original revisionist
petitioner – landlord died. Thereupon, the respondents
herein who are his legal representatives prosecuted the
matter and it culminated in the impugned order dated
19.4.2022. The tenant herein was the respondent –
defendant.
8. The High Court rightly observed that in a suit for
ejectment filed by the landlord the material questions
would be whether there was jural relationship of
landlord – tenant between the parties and whether tenancy
was validly terminated. Obviously, the High Court found
that initially the petitioner herein had denied the jural
relationship, but then he himself had set up Ex. D1 to D7
lease agreements. As a matter of fact, there is now
concurrent findings on the question of jural relationship
against the petitioner herein. That apart, that question
need not be taken forward in view of the further
contention take up by the petitioner herein in this
petition, at paragraph 5.4, to the effect that he was
originally inducted as a tenant as per lease agreement
dated 15.2.1989 (Ex. D1) and after the expiry of the
period of the last lease agreement he has been continuing
as a tenant in sufferance and had paid rent till the date
of filing of the suit.
9. In the decision in Smt. Shanti Devi Vs. Amal Kumar
Banerjee (AIR 1981 SC 1550) this court held that before
deciding the validity of notice under Section 106 of the
TP Act the court should first decide whether Section 106
is applicable or not. Further it was held that where a
lease was for a fixed term the court could not take the
pleadings of the parties for determining the nature of
the lease and that the parties could not by their
pleadings alter intrinsic character of lease.
In the case on hand, the obligation to decide on the
aforesaid question unfailingly, was discharged by the
trial court. This has resulted in perverse appreciation
of evidence which led to a conclusion against the weight
of evidence further leading to error of law. In such
circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the
High Court was right and justified in re-appreciating the
evidence in exercise of its revisional power.
10. To consider the question whether the issue as to the
requirement or otherwise of issuance of a notice in terms
of Section 106 of the TP Act was available for
consideration by the High Court indisputable facts
obtained from the evidence on record are worthy of
reference. As noticed hereinbefore initially the
petitioner herein and taken up the contention that no
jural relationship of landlord-tenant exits between
himself and the plaintiff viz. the predecessor of the
respondents herein. The fact is that, he himself belied
the said contention by setting up Ext.D1 to D7 lease
agreements. Ext.D1 to D7 agreements are of the years
1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994 and 1995.
11. A scanning of the impugned order passed by the High
Court would reveal that the High Court had appreciated
the contentions as also the evidence on record to decide
on the question of applicability or otherwise of Section
106 of the TP Act. Various decisions of this Court were
also referred to, during that exercise. The trial court
itself took note of the factual contention of the
petitioner herein viz., the tenant that on expiry of
period of lease under Ext.D1 dated 15.02.1989 as per
Ext.D2 lease agreement dated 26.08.1990 the lease was
extended for a period of 11 months upto 25.07.1991. Vide
Ext.D3 lease agreement dated 31.10.1990 it was extended
with effect from 01.11.1990 to 30.09.1991 and as per Ext.
D4 lease agreement dated 31.12.1991 it was extended with
effect from 01.01.1992 upto 30.11.1992. Taking note of
Ext. D1 to D7 and the execution of lease agreement every
year and that the parties have agreed to go by the
provisions of the TP Act the High Court found that the
lease could be taken as lease for a period of eleven
months. In view of the evidence thus obtained and taking
into account the decision in Shanti Prasad Devi’s case
(supra) the High Court held that mere acceptance of the
rent by the landlord after the expiry of the period of
lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of
lease. Relying on a Division Bench decision of the High
Court in M.C. Mohammed Vs. Smt. Gowramma (AIR 2007 KAR
46) rendered relying on the decision in Pooran Chand Vs.
Motilal & Ors. (AIR 1964 SC 461), held that on expiry of
the term fixed under the deed the tenant would not be
entitled to statutory notice under Section 106 of the TP
Act. It was found that on determination of the lease by
efflux of time no further termination of the tenancy by
issuing a statutory notice to bring termination of a
lease already terminated is necessary. Taking into
account the evidence on record the said conclusions the
consequential reversal of the judgment and decree of the
Civil Court cannot be held as perverse or illegal
warranting interference. As the judgment and decree of
the Civil Court was not ‘according to law,’ the High
Court was certainly within its rights to set aside the
decree in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The
stated consequential directions by the High Court are
nothing but a necessary sequel of such conclusions and
findings.
12. In view of the above conclusion this Special Leave
Petition must fail as it is devoid of merits.
13. At this juncture learned counsel for the petitioner
requested for grant of sometime for the petitioner to
vacate the premises in question. We grant the petitioners
a reasonable period of six (6) months from today to
handover its vacant and peaceful possession to the
respondents provided the petitioner shall file an
undertaking on affidavit in that regard to this Court,
within three weeks from today. He shall also undertake
thereunder to pay arrears of rent, at the rate of
Rs.1400/- per month and further to pay an amount of
Rs.1400/- on the 7th day of every month during the
extended period. Needless to say that in case of nonfiling
of such an undertaking within the above stipulated
time the benefit granted by this order would cease to
exist and the decree would become executable forthwith
without further reference to the Court.
14. This Special Leave Petition is dismissed as above.
……………………………………………J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
……………………………………………J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
June 24, 2022;
New Delhi.
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