Section 28(2) of the DV Act provides that the court can
formulate its own procedure for disposal of an application under
Sections 12 or 23(2) of the DV Act. The flexibility has been given
to the court as the proceedings under Sections 12 and 18 to 23
provide civil remedies whereas S.31 provides a criminal offence.
The Apex Court in Kunapareddy (supra) considered the nature
of proceedings under the DV Act and held that S.28(2) empowers
the court to lay down its own procedure and the Magistrate
dealing with the DV Act is empowered to allow the amendment of the application. Thus, it is clear that even though S.28(1) of the
DV Act provides that all proceedings under Ss.12 and 18 to 23
and for the offence under Section 31 shall be governed by the
provisions of Cr.P.C., the court can still lay down its own
procedure while dealing with the applications under sub-section
(1) of Section 12 or while considering the grant of interim or ex
parte ad interim relief orders under sub-section (2) of Section 23.
In view of the nature of the proceedings under the DV Act and the procedural flexibility provided under sub-section (2) of Section 28 in deciding the applications under Sections 12 or 23(2), it cannot be said that Court is bound to strictly abide by the provisions of Cr.P.C in all cases. In appropriate cases, it would be open to the court to formulate its own procedure as may be found necessary in the interest of justice, in which event, the court may not have to rely upon Cr.P.C. Thus, the court below went wrong in holding that it has no power to strike off the defence for the reason that the procedure to be followed in the proceedings under Sections 12 and 18 to 23 is that provided under Cr.P.C. {Para 11}
12. The Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another
(2020 (6) KHC 1) referring to the judgments of the High Court on the point upheld the power of the court to strike off the defence if there was non-compliance with the order of payment of maintenance. It was, however, held that striking off the defence
is an order which ought to be passed in the last resort, if the
court finds default to be wilful and contumacious, particularly to a
dependent unemployed wife and minor child. The Division Bench
of this Court recently in Shyju v. Nadeera (2021(5) KLT 693) has
held that the Family Court can strike off the defence on failure to
pay interim maintenance ordered by the court where the default
is found to be wilful. For all these reasons, I hold that in a
proceeding under the DV Act, the defence can be struck off for
non-compliance with an order of payment of pendente lite
maintenance if the default is found to be deliberate and wilful.
However, such an order ought to be passed only as a last resort
as held in Rajnesh (supra).
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH
OP(CRL.) NO. 226 OF 2022
NEETHU Vs TRIJO JOSEPH,
Dated this the 16th day of June, 2022
What is the nature of proceedings under the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – civil or
criminal?
Does the Court/Magistrate dealing with the complaint
filed under the provisions of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 have the power to
strike off the defence for non-compliance with the
order to pay pendente lite maintenance?
These are the important questions that arise for consideration in
the above original petition.
2. The petitioner in OP (Crl) No. 226/2022 is the wife of
the respondent therein. She filed MC No.34/2018 at the Judicial
First-Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal (for short ‘trial court’) u/s
12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(for short, the DV Act) seeking various reliefs including
maintenance. She has also moved an application for interim
maintenance u/s 23(2) as CMP No.1087/2018. It was allowed ex
parte and interim maintenance of `15,000/- was awarded to the
petitioner. The said order was challenged by the respondent at
the Sessions Court-II, North Paravur (for short ‘appellate court’) in
Crl.Appeal No.97/2019. The respondent sought a stay of the
interim order passed by the trial court. The appellate court
dismissed the stay petition as per Ext.P1 order with an
observation that the Magistrate shall consider the contentions of
the respondent and pass final order in the application for interim
maintenance. Thereafter, the respondent was given an
opportunity to file an objection to CMP No.1087/2018. After
considering the objection, the trial court confirmed the ad interim
order and directed the respondent to pay all the arrears of
maintenance within two weeks as per Ext.P3 order. The said order
was challenged by the respondent before this Court in OP (Crl)
No.286/2019. This court after hearing both sides disposed of the
original petition setting aside Ext.P3 order passed by the trial
court and directing the respondent to pay `2,00,000/- towards
arrears of maintenance within a period of one month. The trial
court was directed to dispose of MC No.34/2018 itself within a
period of three months. Ext.P4 is the said order. Since the
respondent failed to comply with the direction in Ext.P4 that he
shall pay `2,00,000/- within a period of one month, the petitioner
filed an application at the trial Court to strike off the defence of
the respondent in MC No.34/2018. Ext.P5 is the said application.
After hearing both sides, the trial court dismissed the application
as per Ext.P6 order. Aggrieved by Ext.P6 order, the petitioner
preferred OP (Crl) No. 226/2022.
3. The respondent in OP(Crl) No.226/2022 has filed
Crl.M.A.No.1/2022 in OP(Crl) No.286/2019 seeking 6 months’ time
to comply with the direction in Ext.P4 judgment to deposit
`2,00,000/-.
4. I have heard Smt. Dhanya P.Ashokan, the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner/wife and Smt. D.Leema Rosy,
the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/husband.
5. The marital status of the parties is not in dispute. The
ex parte interim order of maintenance was confirmed as per
Ext.P3 order after hearing both sides. However, this court set
aside Ext.P3 order with a specific direction to the respondent to
pay `2,00,000/- within a period of one month towards arrears of
maintenance due. The said order was passed on 3/2/2022.
Admittedly, the direction in the said order has not been complied
with so far. MC is of the year 2018. The trial court passed the
interim order directing the respondent to pay maintenance at the
rate of `15,000/- per month, as early as on 1/12/2018. Even
today, admittedly, the respondent has not paid a single pie
towards maintenance. It is in these circumstances, that the
petitioner/wife filed Ext. P5 application at the trial court to strike
off the defence.
6. Ext.P5 application was dismissed by the trial court vide
Ext.P6 order mainly holding that as per S.28(1) of the DV Act, all
proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and
the offence u/s 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no provision in the Code
to strike off the defence.
7. The DV Act was enacted by the Parliament based on
the larger interest of human rights concomitant with various
declarations made in international conventions. The very
objective of the Act is to protect the women against the violence
that occurs within the family and for matters connected
therewith. The Act, therefore, conceives a scheme of protective
measures with the object to protect women. The statement of
objects and reasons of the DV Act record that the civil law does
not address the phenomenon of domestic violence and therefore,
a law be enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for the
protection of women from being victims of domestic violence.
Thus, the purpose of enacting the law was to provide civil
remedies to a woman who is subjected to domestic violence.
8. Apart from the statement of object and reasons,
various provisions contained in the Act make it clear that
predominantly the rights and remedies created under the Act are
of civil nature. Except for Sections 31 and 33, there is no penal
provision in the Act. The Magistrate is empowered, under Section
18, to pass protection order. Section 19 of the DV Act authorizes
the Magistrate to pass residence order which may include
restraining the respondent from dispossessing or disturbing the
possession of the aggrieved person or directing the respondent to
remove himself from the shared household or even restraining
the respondent or his relatives from entering the portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved person resides etc.
Monetary reliefs which can be granted by the Magistrate
under Section 20 of the DV Act include granting the relief in
respect of the loss of earnings, the medical expenses, the loss
caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property
from the control of the aggrieved person and the maintenance for
the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any. Section
21 deals with the orders of custody of any child or children to the
aggrieved person. Section 22 empowers the Magistrate to grant
compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental
torture and emotional distress, caused by the domestic violence
committed by the respondent. The reliefs under Sections 18 to 22
can be sought in any legal proceedings pending before a civil
court, a family court or a criminal court (Section 26). All these
reliefs that can be granted by the Magistrate/court are meant for
the welfare and well-being of the women. When the welfare
Statute is made with the single focus of the protection of women,
such Act has to be treated as remedial to protect the women. It
is, thus, clear that various kinds of reliefs which can be obtained
by the aggrieved person are of civil nature. At the same time,
when there is breach of such orders passed by the Magistrate,
Section 31 terms such a breach to be a punishable offence.
9. The Apex Court in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V.Sarma
(2013 (14) SCALE 448) examined the scope of the DV Act and
held that it was enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for the
protection of women from being victims of domestic violence. The
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Nidhi Kaushik v.
Union of India [(2013) 203 DLT 722] has held that the
proceedings under Sections 12 and 18 to 23 of the DV Act are
purely civil in nature. In Vijaya Baskar v. Suganya Devi
(Crl.O.P.(MD).No.10280/2010 decided on 28/10/2010), the Madras
High Court examined the scope of the DV Act and held that the
term civil law used in the statement of object and reasons of the
Act is not an empty formality and would exemplify and
demonstrate that the proceedings in the first instance should be
civil in nature. In Naorem Shamungou Singh v. Moirangthem
Guni Devi (AIR 2014 Mani.25), the Manipur High Court held that
the DV Act provides the remedies available under civil law. In
Narayan Babi Salgaonkar v. Jayshree @Manasi Narayan
Salgaonkar (2017 SCC OnLine Bom 723), the Bombay High
Court considered the question whether the application u/s 26 of
the DV Act is maintainable in the divorce proceedings and held
that an application u/s 26 of the DV Act is very much
maintainable in a suit for divorce which is purely a civil
proceeding. The Gujarat High Court in Suo Motu v. Ushaben
Kishorbhai Mistry (2015(4) KLT Online 3520) has held that the
provisions of the Act provide for remedial measures for the civil
rights of women but the machinery provided is through criminal
court. Recently, the Delhi High Court in S v. J. (2018 SCC OnLine
Delhi 8421) has held that DV Act provides a remedy in civil law
for the protection of victims of domestic violence as noted in the
statement of objects and reasons. This Court in
Dr.V.K.Vijayalekshmi Amma and Another v. Bindu V. and
Others (2010 (1) KHC 57) has held that the proceedings under
the DV Act are of civil nature. This Court again in Saramma
Shyju v. Shyju Varghees and Others (2011 (3) KHC 235) has
held that since the proceedings under the DV Act are civil in
nature, an application for amendment of petition is maintainable.
The Apex Court in Kunapareddy @Nookala Shanka Balaji v.
Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Another (2016 KHC 6400)
observed that the purpose of enacting the DV Act was to provide
a remedy in the civil law for the protection of women from being
victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of
domestic violence in the society. It is further observed that it is
for this reason, that the scheme of the Act provides that in the
first instance, the order that would be passed by the Magistrate,
on a complaint by the aggrieved person, would be of a civil
nature and if the said order is violated, it assumes the character
of criminality.
10. Upon consideration of the provisions under the DV Act
and the principles in the aforesaid decisions, it becomes manifest
that Act, in general, is of civil kind and the reliefs available
thereunder are of civil nature, but the forum prescribed to secure
the reliefs is criminal court. Merely because the jurisdiction is
exercised by the criminal court/Magistrate and the provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed, it does not change
the character of the proceedings as criminal proceedings. The
character of the proceedings depends not upon the nature of the
forum which is invested with authority to grant relief, but upon
the nature of the relief sought to be enforced. A proceeding that
deals with the right of civil nature does not cease to be so just
because the forum for its enforcement prescribed by the statute
is the criminal court.
11. Section 28(2) of the DV Act provides that the court can
formulate its own procedure for disposal of an application under
Sections 12 or 23(2) of the DV Act. The flexibility has been given
to the court as the proceedings under Sections 12 and 18 to 23
provide civil remedies whereas S.31 provides a criminal offence.
The Apex Court in Kunapareddy (supra) considered the nature
of proceedings under the DV Act and held that S.28(2) empowers
the court to lay down its own procedure and the Magistrate
dealing with the DV Act is empowered to allow the amendment of
the application. Thus, it is clear that even though S.28(1) of the
DV Act provides that all proceedings under Ss.12 and 18 to 23
and for the offence under Section 31 shall be governed by the
provisions of Cr.P.C., the court can still lay down its own
procedure while dealing with the applications under sub-section
(1) of Section 12 or while considering the grant of interim or ex
parte ad interim relief orders under sub-section (2) of Section 23.
In view of the nature of the proceedings under the DV Act and the
procedural flexibility provided under sub-section (2) of Section 28
in deciding the applications under Sections 12 or 23(2), it cannot
be said that Court is bound to strictly abide by the provisions of
Cr.P.C in all cases. In appropriate cases, it would be open to the
court to formulate its own procedure as may be found necessary
in the interest of justice, in which event, the court may not have
to rely upon Cr.P.C. Thus, the court below went wrong in holding
that it has no power to strike off the defence for the reason that
the procedure to be followed in the proceedings under Sections
12 and 18 to 23 is that provided under Cr.P.C.
12. The Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another
(2020 (6) KHC 1) referring to the judgments of the High Court on
the point upheld the power of the court to strike off the defence if
there was non-compliance with the order of payment of
maintenance. It was, however, held that striking off the defence
is an order which ought to be passed in the last resort, if the
court finds default to be wilful and contumacious, particularly to a
dependent unemployed wife and minor child. The Division Bench
of this Court recently in Shyju v. Nadeera (2021(5) KLT 693) has
held that the Family Court can strike off the defence on failure to
pay interim maintenance ordered by the court where the default
is found to be wilful. For all these reasons, I hold that in a
proceeding under the DV Act, the defence can be struck off for
non-compliance with an order of payment of pendente lite
maintenance if the default is found to be deliberate and wilful.
However, such an order ought to be passed only as a last resort
as held in Rajnesh (supra).
13. Coming to the facts of the case, it has come out in
evidence that the petitioner is a dependent unemployed wife. It
has also come out in evidence that the respondent has the ability
to maintain the petitioner. Even though interim maintenance was
awarded by the trial court as early as in 2018, not a single
month’s maintenance is paid so far. A specific direction of this
court to deposit `2,00,000/- towards arrears of maintenance has
been flouted without assigning any valid reason. In these
circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the failure on the
part of the husband to pay interim maintenance ordered by the
learned Magistrate as well as this court is wilful and
contumacious. Thus, the court below ought to have allowed the
prayer for striking off the defence. However, considering the
entire facts and circumstances of the case, before striking off the
defence, I am of the view that a last opportunity can be given to
the respondent to comply with the order of this court.
In the light of the above findings, Ext.P6 order in OP(Crl)
No.226/2022 is hereby set aside. The petitioner shall deposit
`1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh only) out of `2,00,000/- (Rupees
Two lakhs only) directed to be paid by this court as per the
judgment in OP(Crl) No. 286/2019 dated 3rd February 2022 within
a period of fifteen days from today. The balance amount of
`1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh only) shall be deposited within a
period of fifteen days thereafter. On such deposit, the wife is
entitled to withdraw the same. If the deposit is made as above,
the trial court shall dispose of the MC itself within a period of two
months. If the amounts as mentioned above are not paid, the
defence of the respondent shall stand struck off and the trial
court shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
OP(Crl) No.226/2022 as well as Crl.M.A.1/2022 in OP(Crl)
No.286/2019 are disposed of as above.
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