Even otherwise, the statute confers authority to grant
authorisation for retaining the documents beyond the order of
assessment only till the proceedings under the Act is completed.
The word “proceedings under this Act” is a clear indication that
the power of the officers empowered to grant authorisation is
available only till the statutory proceedings are completed. Once
the statutory proceedings are completed, the authorities under
the statute are denuded of the power to grant further
authorisation. {Para 20}
21. The word proceeding is a term of wide importance and
it includes the original proceedings as well as the appellate
proceedings as it is trite law that an appeal is a continuation of
the original proceedings (see the decision in State of Tamil
Nadu and Others v. S. Subramaniam [(1996) 7 SCC 509]. In
the context in which the word ‘proceedings’ appear in section
132(8), it can be held to be used in a very comprehensive sense
to include even revisional proceedings, provided the same is
invoked under the statutory provisions of the Income Tax Act.
Thus an assessment proceeding, appellate proceeding, and even
revisional proceeding are all “proceedings under this Act”.
22. The proceedings under this Act expired by the disposal
of the appeal by this Court, as evidenced by Ext.P4 judgment
dated 08-01-2010. Thereafter, no proceedings under this Act are
in existence. On the contrary, the special leave petition having
been filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India cannot
be regarded as a proceeding under this Act. As a taxing statute,
strict interpretation is to be adopted and that being so, recourse
by the assessee to the provisions of the Constitution by filing a
special leave petition before the Supreme Court cannot be
regarded as 'a proceeding under this Act'. Thus by the disposal
of the appeal filed before the High Court in I.T.A. No.819 of 2009
and I.T.A. No.1326 of 2009, the statutory authority lost its power
to grant further authorisation to retain the documents.
Therefore, even on this count, the respondents are not
authorised or justified in retaining the documents of title seized
by them under section 132 of the Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C) NO. 12849 OF 2021
UDAYA SOUNDS Vs THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
PRESENT
MR. JUSTICE BECHU KURIAN THOMAS
24TH DAY OF MARCH 2022
Title deeds of the petitioner are retained by the Income
Tax department under the colour of a search and seizure for the
last more than twenty-two years. Alleging that the retention of
the said documents are contrary to law, petitioner has
approached this Court seeking directions to return the originals
of seven documents of title.
2. On 19-12-2001, a search was conducted in the business
place as well as in the residence of the Managing Partner of the
petitioner under section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for
short, 'the Act'). During the search, title deeds were seized by
the Income Tax Officers. Consequent to the search and seizure,
block assessment proceedings for the period 01-04-1995 to
19-12-2001 were launched against the petitioner as per section
158BC of the Act. On 31-12-2003, the assessment proceedings
were completed reckoning undisclosed income in the hands of
the assessee. On appeal, the quantum of undisclosed income
was reduced, thereby allowing the appeal in part. The second
appeal preferred by the revenue ended in dismissal, while that
filed by the assessee was partly allowed. On appeal to this Court,
in I.T.A. No.819 of 2009 and I.T.A. No. 1326 of 2009, this Court
directed the assessing officer to refix the undisclosed income at
25% of the originally assessed figure. Petitioner has preferred a
Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and it is still
pending.
3. In the meantime, petitioner alleges that though no order
has been recorded by any of the officers as contemplated under
section 132(8) of the Act, still, the respondents are retaining the
seized documents of title for periods beyond 30 days without
authority of law. Despite repeated requests of the petitioner and
even after several representations, no response could be elicited
from the respondents and the documents of title continued to
remain with the respondents. In such circumstances, a petition
was filed as Ext.P7, seeking a direction to release the originals of
the seven documents. Thereafter, an application was filed under
the Right to Information Act, 2005, in which a reply was given
that the documents are retained due to proceedings pending
before the Supreme Court. Since petitioner could not obtain
release of the title deeds, this writ petition was preferred seeking
a direction to release/return the originals of the seized
documents or to compel the respondents to take a decision on
the representations filed by the petitioner seeking release of the
documents.
4. A statement was filed by the respondents contending
that as per the provisions of section 132(8) of the Act, the
documents seized by the Department can be retained beyond 30
days, if the reasons for retaining the documents are recorded by
the assessing officer and the same is approved by the Principal
Chief Commissioner/Chief Commissioner or other officers
mentioned in the said provision. It was further pleaded that as
per order dated 26-02-2021, the Principal Commissioner of
Income Tax had accorded permission to retain the seized
material till 28-02-2022 and that the special leave petition
preferred by the petitioner is still pending before the Supreme
Court and hence the assessment proceedings had not become
final.
5. After the statement was filed by the respondents,
petitioner amended the writ petition and challenge was raised
against the order permitting retention of documents up to
28-02-2022. Petitioner pleaded that the order permitting
retention of documents were never communicated and no
proceedings under the Act are pending, warranting continued
retention of the documents by the respondents. It was also
pleaded that the mandatory DIN (Document Identification
Number) is glaringly absent in the records produced by the
respondent which rendered such communication invalid.
6. Subsequent to the amendment, an additional statement
was filed by the second respondent pleading that the orders
directing retention of the documents were communicated to the
petitioner and also that the tax liability of the petitioner has not
attained finality.
7. I have heard Adv.Uthara Asokan, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri.Jose Joseph, learned Standing Counsel for the
respondents.
8. Adv.Uthara Ashokan contended that, as per the
provisions of section 132(8) of the Act, the documents seized
during a search and seizure can be retained by the Department
only for a period beyond 30 days from the date of order of
assessment under section 158BC of the Act, unless, the reasons
for retaining the same are recorded in writing and the approval
of any of the officers mentioned in the sub-section is obtained.
According to the learned counsel, since the order of assessment
is dated 31-12-2003, the seized documents could not have been
retained by the respondents beyond 31-01-2004. The learned
counsel further pointed out that, the authorisation to retain
documents cannot under any circumstances continue beyond 30
days after all proceedings under the Act are completed as
specified in the proviso to section 138(8) of the Act.
9. According to Adv.Uthara Asokan, none of the orders
permitting retention of the documents beyond the period
specified in section 132(8) of the Act were ever communicated to
the petitioner and further, that, even if Ext.P13 is assumed to be
issued, the same was beyond the jurisdiction of the Principal
Commissioner of Income Tax. The learned counsel contended
that the impugned order Ext.P13 does not even bear the
signature of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax apart
from it having never been communicated to the petitioner. The
learned counsel further argued that the document produced as
Ext.P13 is issued 17 years after the date prescribed under
section 132(8) of the Act and the authenticity of the document is
doubted due to the absence of the document identification
number (DIN), which is mandatory as per Ext.P10 Circular dated
14-08-2019. The learned counsel further contended that the
seized documents were never utilised or even referred to in the
block assessment proceedings and indicating that the said
documents were not required for the department to pursue any
further proceedings against the assessee. She relied upon the
decision in Joshi P. Mathew v. Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax, Ernakulam and Another (2013 (1) KHC 288).
10. Sri.Jose Joseph, the learned Standing Counsel for the
respondents contended that approval for detention of documents
was granted by the authorised officer and hence the contention
to the contrary had no basis. The learned Standing Counsel
further submitted that, though proceedings under the Act had
already been completed, since the assessee had preferred
Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, the
respondents were justified in authorising the retention of
documents.
11. While appreciating the rival contentions, it is necessary
to advert to the statutory provisions. Section 132(8) of the Act
reads as below:
“S.132(8). The books of account or other documents
seized under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) shall
not be retained by the authorised officer for a period
exceeding 30 days from the date of the order of
assessment under section 153A or clause (c) of section
158BC unless the reasons for retaining the same are
recorded by him in writing and the approval of the
Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner,
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, Principal
Director-General or Director-General or Principal Director
or Director for such retention is obtained:
Provided that the Principal Chief Commissioner or
Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner, Principal Director-General or Director-
General or Principal Director or Director shall not
authorise the retention of the books of account and other
documents for a period exceeding 30 days after all the
proceedings under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11
of 1922) or this Act in respect of the years for which the
books of account or other documents are relevant are
completed.”
12. The above statutory provision mandates that the books
of accounts or other documents seized during a search and
seizure cannot be retained beyond 30 days from the date of the
order of assessment under section 153A or section 158BC of the
Act, without recording reasons in writing by the officers specified
therein. The statute further mandates that retention of the
documents shall not be authorised beyond 30 days after
proceedings under the Income Tax Act, 1961 are completed.
13. Title deeds are the choicest of possessions of an
owner since ownership of property and its absolute dominion are
reflected in the possession of such deeds. When the owner is
denuded of its choicest possession, under the facade of statutory
prescriptions, such provisions must scrupulously be adhered to.
14. Section 158BC of the Act provides for the procedure
for block assessment. In the instant case, admittedly the order
under section 158BC was issued on 31-12-2003. Therefore, the
respondents are bound to adhere to the provisions strictly and
substantiate that, reasons were recorded by the authorised
officer to retain the documents and the approval for such
retention was also obtained from the officers mentioned in the
sub-section.
15. However except for a statement that as per the
impugned order dated 26-02-2021, the Principal Commissioner
of Income Tax-I, Kochi had approved the continued retention of
the books of account and other documents impounded/seized up
to 28-02-2022, and further that on earlier occasions, the
Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Kochi approved the
continued retention of books of account and other documents
from time to time, nothing is produced to substantiate that
orders were issued permitting continued retention. Though
details of earlier orders passed under section 132(8) were
mentioned in a tabular column as below, the same does not
satisfy the requirment of strict adherence to the statutory
prescriptions. The tabular column provided was as follows:
Item No. Order u/s. Dated Retention upto
1 132(8) 31-03-2017 28-02-2018
2 132(8) 26-02-2018 28-02-2018
3 132(8) 27-02-2017 28-02-2020
4 132(8) 26-02-2020 28-02-2021
16. Further, except for mentioning that the copies of the
earlier orders under section 132 have all been duly dispatched to
the assessee either through the office of the Principal
Commissioner of Income Tax or through the assessing officer,
there is nothing on record to substantiate such an averment.
The manner in which the orders were dispatched to the assessee
has not been specified nor has the acknowledgements produced
for consideration of this Court. Thus there is nothing on record
to assume that orders were issued directing continued retention
of the documents from the date of the order under section 158-
BC of the Act, till 2018.
17. There is an added obligation upon the Department to
communicate the orders to the assessee to enable retention of
documents beyond 30 days’ period specified in section 132(8) of
the Act. In the decision in CIT, West Bengal-III and Others v.
Oriental Rubber Works [(1984) 1 SCC 700], the Supreme
Court held that though sub-section (8) of Section 132 of the Act
does not in terms provide that the approval or the recorded
reasons on which the retention is based should be communicated
to the concerned person, since the person concerned is bound to
be materially prejudiced in the enforcement of his right to have
such books and documents returned to him being kept ignorant
about the factum of fulfillment of either of the conditions, it was
obligatory upon the revenue to communicate the Commissioner’s
approval as also the recorded reasons to the person concerned.
It was further held that in the absence of such communication,
the order granting approval will not become effective.
18. A learned Single Judge of this Court also had, in the
decision in Joshi P. Mathew v. Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax, Ernakulam and Another (2013 (1) KHC 288),
held that non-communication of the orders recording the reasons
and the grant of approval to the assessee renders the retention
of the documents beyond 30 days of completion of the
assessment as illegal.
19. Thus, there was a bounden duty upon the Department
to establish that the orders recording the reasons and grant of
approval were communicated to the assessee. No such
communication has been produced for consideration of this
Court. Except for vague averments, that too, in the form of a
statement instead of an affidavit, that orders were
communicated to the assessee, nothing has been produced to
convincingly prove that the orders for retention were
communicated to the petitioner. In such a view of the matter,
retention of documents beyond 30 days of the order of
assessment is illegal.
20. Even otherwise, the statute confers authority to grant
authorisation for retaining the documents beyond the order of
assessment only till the proceedings under the Act is completed.
The word “proceedings under this Act” is a clear indication that
the power of the officers empowered to grant authorisation is
available only till the statutory proceedings are completed. Once
the statutory proceedings are completed, the authorities under
the statute are denuded of the power to grant further
authorisation.
21. The word proceeding is a term of wide importance and
it includes the original proceedings as well as the appellate
proceedings as it is trite law that an appeal is a continuation of
the original proceedings (see the decision in State of Tamil
Nadu and Others v. S. Subramaniam [(1996) 7 SCC 509]. In
the context in which the word ‘proceedings’ appear in section
132(8), it can be held to be used in a very comprehensive sense
to include even revisional proceedings, provided the same is
invoked under the statutory provisions of the Income Tax Act.
Thus an assessment proceeding, appellate proceeding, and even
revisional proceeding are all “proceedings under this Act”.
22. The proceedings under this Act expired by the disposal
of the appeal by this Court, as evidenced by Ext.P4 judgment
dated 08-01-2010. Thereafter, no proceedings under this Act are
in existence. On the contrary, the special leave petition having
been filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India cannot
be regarded as a proceeding under this Act. As a taxing statute,
strict interpretation is to be adopted and that being so, recourse
by the assessee to the provisions of the Constitution by filing a
special leave petition before the Supreme Court cannot be
regarded as 'a proceeding under this Act'. Thus by the disposal
of the appeal filed before the High Court in I.T.A. No.819 of 2009
and I.T.A. No.1326 of 2009, the statutory authority lost its power
to grant further authorisation to retain the documents.
Therefore, even on this count, the respondents are not
authorised or justified in retaining the documents of title seized
by them under section 132 of the Act.
23. In view of the above, the petitioner is entitled to
succeed in this writ petition. Accordingly, while quashing Ext.P13
proceedings issued by the first respondent, this Court directs the
first and second respondents to return to the petitioner the
originals of document No. 2126/2000, document No. 2498/2000,
document No.1152/2000, document No.1689/1997, document
No.1688/1997, document No.1242/1997 and document
No.432/1997, all executed before the Sub-Registrar’s Office,
Ernakulam, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a
period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this
judgment.
The writ petition is allowed as above.
Sd/-
BECHU KURIAN THOMAS
JUDGE
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