Tuesday, 19 October 2021

Whether court can condone delay in filing of a election petition?

 The free and

fair elections are a guarantee of the

democratic polity and for achieving such

an objective various provisions are made

applicable to the election laws, most

important of which is the remedy of

challenging the elections on the grounds

specified under the statute. In the

absence of the applicability of Section 5

of the Limitation Act, the rights of the

aggrieved person, intended to challenge

an election, can be defeated by the

executive of the State by not appointing

the Election Tribunal as is shown to have

been done in the instant cases. In the

appeal filed by the Gogineni Sujatha, it

is not disputed that the Election

Tribunal was constituted after the expiry

of period of limitation prescribed for

filing an election petition. Similarly

in the case of Shaikh Saidulu alias Saida

sufficient time was allowed to lapse

preventing the filing of the election

petition for no fault of the appellant.

Can an interpretation be accepted which

facilitates the defeating of purpose of

the Act? The answer is emphatically,

No."

18. These observations of the Supreme Court

while dealing with identical provisions are

binding upon me. No decision of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has been brought to my notice

taking a contrary view. In fact, the Supreme

Court decision applies with full force.

Although, the learned Judge while passing the

impugned order has not referred to this decision,

this decision is squarely applicable. The

Supreme Court has observed that the word

"application" appearing in relevant provisions of

the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act so also

the provisions which are pari materia to section

435 would make Limitation Act applicable. In

such circumstances, by resorting to section 5,

the delay should have been condoned is the

conclusion of the Supreme Court.

19. It is not proper to ignore this

authoritative pronouncement as suggested by

Mr.Godbole. This decision fully covers the

controversy before me. Merely because there are

several headings under Chapter 26 does not mean

that the Supreme Court decision or section 435 of

B.P.M.C. Act would become inapplicable. It is

not necessary to enter into any larger

controversy as to whether to all proceedings


contemplated under Chapter 26, the Indian

Limitation Act and the provisions referred to in

section 435 or C.P.C. would be applicable.

Suffice it to state that insofar as election

petitions contemplated by section 16 are

concerned, the same are squarely covered and fall

within sub-section 1 of section 435 of the Act.

20. In this view of the matter, learned Judge

was fully empowered to take cognisance of the

application preferred by the first respondent,

seeking condonation of delay of 32 days in filing

election petition. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.8170 OF 2007

Yogesh Mangalsen Bahal  Vs  Rajesh Chimanrao Wable 

CORAM : S.C.DHARMADHIKARI, J.

DATE : 10th January 2008

Citation: 2008(5) Bom CR 243

Rule. Respondents waive service. By

consent rule made returnable forthwith. Heard

Counsel for respective parties.

2. By this petition under Article 226 and

227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner

original opponent No.1 is challenging the order

passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior


Division, Pune on 1st October 2007 allowing

Miscellaneous Application No.277 of 2007. By the

order under challenge the Misc.Application

seeking condonation of delay has been allowed and

delay in filing of the election petition has been

condoned.

3. Respondent No.1 filed Election Petition

against the petitioner in the Court of Civil

Judge, Senior Division, Pune invoking his

jurisdiction under section 16 of the Bombay

Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (for

short "BPMC Act"). The first respondent

challenged the election of the petitioner as a

Councillor from Ward No.32 to the

Pimpri-Chinchwad Municipal Corporation. The

Election Petition was filed on 13th March 2007.

The election, on the own showing of parties

concluded by the Declaration of result on 2nd

February 2007. The election results were

published on 8th February 2007. According to


respondent No.1, the results came to the

knowledge of public on 8th February 2007 and the

election petition was filed on 13th March 2007.

Aware of the provisions contained in section 16

of the B.P.M.C.Act, the Misc.Application was

filed seeking condonation of delay of 32 days in

filing election petition.

4. The only contention raised before me in

this petition is that the learned Judge had no

power to condone the delay in filing of this

election petition. It needs to be clarified that

the parties have not addressed me on the question

as to whether sufficient cause was made out for

condoning the delay or not. They have proceeded

on the basis that sufficient cause was made out

for condoning the delay. The issue is lack of

power in the learned Judge.

5. Mr.Godbole, learned Counsel appearing for

petitioner questions this order on the ground

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that the learned Judge had no power to condone

the delay. He submits that the B.P.M.C. Act

provides for an election petition. That election

petition is contemplated by section 16 which is

entitled "Election Petitions". That election

petition can be submitted to the "Judge". The

word "Judge" is defined in section 2(29) of the

B.P.M.C. Act. Mr.Godbole urges that Chapter 26

of the B.P.M.C. Act is a chapter which

exclusively deals with the proceedings before a

Judge, Dist.Judge and Magistrate. There are

several sub-headings in this chapter. Election

Enquiry is one sub-heading, References to the

Judge is another sub-heading so also Appeals

against valuation and tax. He submits that if

the sub-headings are perused, then, it is clear

that the Legislature has not provided for

condonation of delay in filing an election

petition. He submits that section 435 which

appears under the sub-heading "Miscellaneous" in

this Chapter would take within its import, only

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the appeals or applications referred to in the

chapter which are maintainable before the Judge

or the appellate authority. The election

petition is a distinct remedy. That is advisedly

kept out of the purview of this Chapter.

Therefore, with the aid of section 435, the delay

could not have been condoned. Mr.Godbole was at

pains to point out that sections 434 and 435 will

have to be seen in the background of the various

sub-headings under Chapter 426. He submits that

there is nothing in section 16 which would enable

the Judge to condone the delay. In such

circumstances, the order under challenge suffers

from a patent illegality and is wholly without

jurisdiction. The same, therefore, requires to

be quashed and set aside.

6. On the other hand, Mr.Joshi appearing for

the original election petitioner submits that the

learned Judge has rightly condoned the delay. He

submits that the learned Judge was right in

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taking recourse to and aid of section 435. Once

the election petition is nothing but an

application and that the same is before the Judge

of a Court specified in Section 2(29), then, the

provisions of Limitation Act would apply. The

provisions of Limitation Act and more

particularly those referred in section 435 would,

therefore, apply. Section 5 is one of them.

Section 5 enables a Judge to condone the delay in

filing of an application. In such circumstances,

the delay has rightly been condoned. Mr.Joshi in

support of his contentions relies upon a Decision

of the Supreme Court in the case of Shaikh

Saidulu @ Saida Vs. Chukka Yesu Ratnam and Ors.

reported in A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 749.

7. Mr.Godbole has sought to distinguish this

decision by urging that the decision will have to

be seen in the backdrop of the facts before the

Supreme Court, inasmuch as in the case before the

Supreme Court, the election tribunal was not

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constituted within the period of limitation

prescribed for filing of election petition. The

Tribunal was constituted later on. In these

circumstances, the delay of 18 days was rightly

condoned by the Supreme Court. That judgement

will have no application to the facts of the

present case. Further, section 435 and the

provisions of the Supreme Court are not pari

materia. Similarly, the distinction between the

provisions contained in Chapter 26 of the

B.P.M.C. Act and its several sub-headings was

not an issue before the Supreme Court. In such

circumstances, the Supreme Court judgement is

distinguishable.

8. Mr.Godbole sought to urge that the

application is before a Judge. The Judge is,

therefore, persona designata. That is not an

application to the Court. In any event,

therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act

would not apply.

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9. Before dealing with the rival

contentions, it will be appropriate to reproduce

Sections 16 and 435 of B.P.M.C. Act so also

section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

"16: Election Petitions:

(1) If the qualification of any

person declared to be elected a

Councillor is disputed, or if the

validity of any election is questioned,

whether by reason of the improper

rejection by the State Election

Commissioner of a nomination, or of the

improper reception or refusal of a vote,

or by reason of a material irregularity

in the election proceedings corrupt

practice, or any other thing materially

affecting the result of the election, any

person enrolled in the municipal election

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roll may at any time within ten days

after the result of the election has been

declared submit an application to the

Judge for the determination of the

dispute or question;

(2) The State Election Commissioner

may, if it has reason to believe that an

election has not been a free election by

reason of the large number of cases in

which undue influence or bribery has been

exercised or committed by order in

writing, authorise any officer of the

Commission to make an application to the

Judge at any time within one month after

the result of the election has been

declared for a declaration that the

election of the returned candidate or

candidates is void;

(2A) No election to any Corporation

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shall be called in question except by an

election petition presented to the Judge

referred to in sub-section (1) and no

Judge other than the Judge referred to in

sub-section (1) shall entertain any

dispute in respect of such election;

(3) The Judge shall decide the

applications made under sub-section (1)

or (2) after holding an inquiry in the

manner provided by or under this Act."

"435: Limitation:

(1) In computing the period of

limitation prescribed for an appeal or

application referred to in this Chapter,

the provisions of section 5, 12 and 14 of

the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall, so

far as may be, apply;

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(2) When no time is prescribed by

this Act for the presentation of an

appeal, application or reference, such

appeal or application shall be presented

or reference shall be made within thirty

days from the date of the order in

respect of or against which the appeal,

application or reference is presented or

made".

"Section 5 : (Limitation Act):

"Extention of prescribed period in

certain cases:- Any appeal or any

application, other than an application

under any of the provisions of Order XXI

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may

be admitted after the prescribed period,

if the appellant or the applicant

satisfies the Court that he had

sufficient cause for not preferring the

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appeal or making the application within

such period."

Explanation:- The fact that the

appellant or the applicant was misled by

any order, practice or judgement of the

High Court in ascertaining or computing

the prescribed period may be sufficient

cause within the meaning of this

section."

10. The last contention of Mr.Godbole, that

need not detain me. In the case reported in

1998(3) Mh.L.J. 829, (Dayaram Tulshiram Rajguru

Vs.Mamasaheb @ Balasaheb Bhimrao Janrao) a

Division Bench of this Court was concerned with

an issue as to whether the Judge who has been

named for deciding election petitions, is a

persona designata or not. After referring to

section 2(29) of the B.P.M.C. Act, this is what

is observed by the Division Bench:-

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"7. Section 2(29) of the Bombay

Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,

1949, defines the word "Judge" and it

reads as follows:-

"(29) "The Judge" means in the (city of

Pune) the Judge of the Court of Small

Causes, and in any other city the Civil

Judges (Senior Division) having

jurisdiction in the City."

It is relevant to bear in mind the

guideline laid down by the Supreme Court

while considering the issue as to whether

an authority is a persona designata or

otherwise. This guideline has been laid

down in the case of Central Talkies Ltd.

Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad reported in

A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 606 and it reads as

under:-

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". A persona designata is a "person

who is pointed out or described as an

individual, as opposed to a person

ascertained as a member of a class or as

filling a particular character".

This guideline is based on the definition

of persona designata as found in the 4th

Edition of Law Dictionary by P.G.Osborn.

It, therefore, becomes apparent that when

a person is referred to, maintaining his

individuality in the office as

distinguished from general class, he

should be styled as persona designata.

Now, in this context let us examine the

definition of the word "Judge" as

appearing in section 2(29). Two

authorities are included in the said

definition. For City in Pune, the Judge

of Court of Small Causes and in any other

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City, the Civil Judge (Senior Division)

having jurisdiction in the City. There

is nothing that we can read in this

definition to specify the individuality

of an office or a person manning such

post. Whenever an authority is referred

to as persona designata, the

individuality of that office is

specifically emphasised and maintained.

To give a few instances, we can refer to

the decisions cited by Mr.Apte. While

dealing with the provisions of Hyderabad

Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control

Act, the Division Bench was concerned

with Section 25 thereof containing a

provision of an Appeal. Section 25,

inter alia, provided that an appeal from

an order made by the Controller shall lie

to the Dist.Judge. When reference is

made to the District Judge, it is obvious

that it is made as an authority

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identifiable and in that context, the

Division Bench has held that reference to

the District Judge would be as persona

designata. Similarly, reference could be

made to few other provisions in Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised

Occupants) Act, 1971. Section 9 of the

said Act specifically refers that "An

appeal shall lie from every order of the

Estate Officer made in respect of any

public premises under (Section 5 or

Section 5-B) (or section 5-C) or Section

7 to an appellate officer who shall be

the district judge of the district in

which the public premises are situate or

such other judicial officer in that

district of not less than ten years’

standing as the district judge may

designate in this behalf. "Sub-section

(6) of section 9, while dealing with the

presidency-town, prescribes as follows:-

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(6) For the purposes of this section,

a presidency-town shall be deemed to be a

district and the chief judge or the

principal judge of the city civil court

therein shall be deemed to be the

district judge of the district."

When an appeal is provided against an

order, it is specifically referred that

it should be heard by the "Principal

Judge". Under the Bombay Municipal

Corporation Act, filing and hearing of

Election Petitions is as per the

provisions of Section 33 and it

specifically refers to filing of Election

Petitions and disposal thereof by "Chief

Judge of Small Cause Court". Similarly,

an appeal in a tax matter is provided

under section 217 of the Bombay Municipal

Corporation Act and it specifically

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refers that appeals against any rateable

value or tax fixed or charged under this

Act shall be heard and determined by the

Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court.

While providing for an appeal relating to

eviction of persons regulated by Chapter

V-A, Section 105F specifically states as

under:-

"105F. An appeal shall lie from every

order of the Commissioner, made in

respect of any Corporation premises,

under section 105B or section 105C, to an

appellate officer who shall be the

principal Judge of the City Civil Court

of Bombay or such other judicial officer

in Greater Bombay of less than ten years

standing as the Principal Judge may

designate in this behalf."

In all the abovereferred clauses, while

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in reference individuality is maintained,

Courts have interpreted such reference to

be as persona designata. In proceedings

for eviction under the Bombay Municipal

Corporation Act, when an appeal is

provided under section 105, it is

referred to the "Principal Judge" of the

City Civil Court. Even under the

provisions of the City of Bombay

Municipal Act, when the Election

Petitions were to be filed, the Chief

Judge of the Small Cause Court, Bombay

was required to entertain these petitions

and whenever such a reference is made to

an individual Designated Officer, the

Courts have always interpreted to mean as

reference to persona designata. In the

case of reference to the Chief Judge of

Small Causes Court, as appearing in the

provisions of City of Bombay Municipal

Act, this Court in the case of

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R.S.Navalkar Vs. Mrs.Sarojini Naidu

reported in (1923) 25 BLR 463 has held

such reference to be a persona designata.

In the instant case, the definition with

which we are concerned, makes a reference

to a Judge for the City of Pune and a

Civil Judge, Senior Division having

jurisdiction in any other city. This is

obviously a reference to a person

ascertained as a member of a class of

Judges. Same is the case in respect of

the reference to Civil Judge, Senior

Division. The individuality of a person

manning the office is conspicuously

absent. If that be so, it is not

possible to interpret and hold that the

reference to the word "Judge" is a

persona designata. In this view of the

matter, we see nothing wrong in the view

taken by the learned Trial Judge in

holding that the Judge, Small Causes

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Court, Pune, is not a persona designata

for the purpose of deciding Municipal

Appeals and Election Petitions under the

provisions of Bombay Provincial Municipal

Corporations Act, 1949 and the Additional

Judge of Court of Small Causes, Pune, has

jurisdiction to try such Appeals and

Petitions.

"8. One more indication must be

referred to. An appeal against the

decision is provided under Section 411

and the forum as described is District

Court. It is apparent and needs no

emphasis that the Court is different than

the Judge as held by the Supreme Court in

the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid

Committee Representing Undertrial

Prisoners Vs. Union of India reported in

(1994) 6 S.C.C. 731. If the proceedings

at the trial stage were to be intended

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before the persona designata, the

provision of Appeal would have been

worded in a different fashion. When an

appeal lies to the Court, it is obviously

indicated that the same shall be governed

and conducted by the procedure applicable

to the ordinary civil proceedings. If

that be so, a person who has rendered the

impugned decision, has to be a person

amenable to ordinary civil jurisdiction.

". Further the trial Court has

rightly relied upon section 403(4)(a) of

the Bombay Provincial Municipal

Corporation Act, which pertains to the

procedure in election inquiries and

provides "All applications received under

section 16 in which the validity of the

election of Councillors elected to

represent the same ward is in question

shall be heard by the same Judge". This

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reveals the legislative intent that

applications can be entertained and tried

by all the Judges of the Small Causes

Court. However, in case of validity of

election of councillors elected to

represent the same ward, it shall be

heard by the same Judge. Therefore, the

contention of the learned Counsel for the

petitioners that "Judge" means only Chief

or Principal Judge of the Small Causes

Court is without any substance."

." The intention, therefore, is

clear and it is to eliminate his status

as persona designata. We see no reason

to take a different view than the one

taken by the learned trial Judge in the

order impugned in these petitions."

11. In another decision in the case of Thakur

Das (dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

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and Anr. reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1, the

Supreme Court was concerned with the concept of

"persona designata". The Supreme Court in the

said decision has observed thus:-

"11. We are accordingly of the opinion

that even though the State Government is

authorised to appoint an appellate

authority under Section 6C, the

legislature clearly indicated that such

appellate authority must of necessity be

a judicial authority. Since under the

Constitution the Courts being the

repository of the judicial power and the

officer presiding over the court derives

his designation from the nomenclature of

the court, even if the appointment is

made by the designation of the judicial

officer the appellate authority indicated

is the Court over which he presides

discharging functions under the relevant

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Code and placed in the hierarchy of

courts for the purposes of appeal and

revision. Viewed from this angle, the

Sessions Judge, though appointed an

appellate authority by the notification,

what the State Government did was to

constitute an appellate authority in

Sessions Court over which the Sessions

Judge presides. The Sessions Court is

constituted under the Code of Criminal

Procedure and indisputably it is an

inferior criminal court in relation to

High Court. Therefore, against the order

made in exercise of powers conferred by

Section 6C a revision application would

lie to the High Court and the High Court

would be entitled to entertain a revision

application under sections 435 and 439 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which

was in force at the relevant time and

such revision application would be

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competent."

12. In the light of the clear pronouncement

of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of

this Court, there is no substance in the

contentions of Mr.Godbole that the Judge deciding

election petition is persona designata.

13. In the light of the clear pronouncement

of this Court, whether the Limitation Act is

applicable to all proceedings before a Judge is

the larger issue that need not be considered.

The only question now remains is whether it would

apply to the election petitions under section 16

or not?

14. A bare perusal of Section 16 would show

that the said provision is inserted to question

qualification of any person declared to be

elected as a Councillor or validity of the

election itself. Various grounds on which the

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election petition can be filed are enunciated in

the provision itself. The election petition can

be filed by any person enrolled in the Municipal

Electoral Roll at any time within 10 days after

the election results are declared. Although,

marginal heading is election petition, in

sub-section 1 of section 16 itself, the

Legislature has taken care to word the proceeding

as an "application" to the Judge for

determination of the dispute or question

contemplated by sub-section 1 of section 16. In

sub-section 2 earlier, even the State Government

could have filed an application to a Judge within

one month after the result of the election has

been declared for declaration that the election

of returned candidate is void. Now the word

"State Government" in sub-section 2 has been

substituted by the word "State Election

Commissioner". Thus, not only the person

enrolled in the election roll but the Chief

Election Commissioner can question the election

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by resorting to subsection 1 or subsection 2 of

Section 16. The election cannot be questioned by

any other mode, except an election petition.

Sub-section 3 of section 16 states that the Judge

shall decide the application made under

sub-section 1 or 2 after holding an enquiry in

the manner provided by or under the B.P.M.C.

Act. It is not necessary to refer to the

explanation in Section 16 or the grounds on which

the elections could be questioned.

15. Chapter 26 of the B.P.M.C. Act is

entitled "Proceedings before the Judge,

Dist.Judge and Magistrate". Sub-heading 1

thereunder is "Election Enquiries". Section 403

and 404 following thereunder read thus:-

"403: Procedure in election inquiries:-

(1) If an application is made under

section 16 for a declaration that any

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particular candidate shall be deemed to

have been elected, the applicant shall

make parties to his application all the

candidates who were duly nominated for

the seat or seats in the ward in

question, whether or not the said

candidates have been declared elected,

and shall proceed against the candidate

or candidates declared elected;

(2) The applicant shall, whenever so

required by the Judge, deposit in the

Court a sum of five hundred rupees in

cash or Government Securities of

equivalent value at the market rate of

the day as security for any costs which

the applicant may be ordered to pay to

other parties to the said application;

(3) If, after making such inquiry as

he deems necessary, the Judge finds that

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the election of a returned candidate has

been procured or induced or the result of

the election has been materially affected

by any corrupt practice, or any corrupt

practice has been committed in the

interests of a returned candidate or the

result of the election has been

materially affected by the improper

acceptance or rejection of any nomination

or by reason of the fact that any person

nominated was not qualified or was

disqualified for election, or by the

improper reception or refusal of a vote,

or by the reception of a vote which is

void, or by any non-compliance with the

provisions of this Act or any rules made

thereunder relating to the election, or

by any mistake in the use of any

prescribed form, or the election has not

been a free election by reason of the

large number of cases in which bribery or

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undue influence has been exercised or

committed, he shall declare the election

of the returned candidate to be void and

if he does not so find he shall confirm

the election of the returned candidate.

(4) All applications received under

section 16 -

(a) In which the validity of the

election of councillors elected to

represent the same ward is in question

shall be heard by the same Judge, and

(b) in which the validity of the

election of the same councillor elected

to represent the same ward is in question

shall be heard together;

(5) If an application is made under

section 16 that any particular candidate

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(other than the candidate declared to

have been elected) shall be deemed to

have been elected, then the returned

candidate or any other party may give

evidence to prove that the election of

the person in whose favour such

declaration is sought would have been

void, if he had been declared elected and

an application had been presented calling

in question his election;

If the Judge is of opinion:-

(i) that in fact any candidate in

whose favour the declaration is sought

has received a majority of the valid

votes, or

(ii) that but for the votes obtained

by the returned candidate by corrupt

practices, such candidate would have

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obtained a majority of the valid votes;

the judge shall after declaring the

election of the returned candidate to be

void declare the candidate in whose

favour the declaration is sought, to have

been duly elected;

(6) The Judge’s order under this

section shall be conclusive;

(7) Every election not called in

question in accordance with the foregoing

provisions shall be deemed to have been

to all intents a good and valid election"

"404:- Disqualification for election as

councillor for certain election

offences:-

(1) If the Judge sets aside an

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election of a candidate on the ground

that a corrupt practice has been

committed in the interest of such

candidate, he shall declare such

candidate to be disqualified for the

purpose of any fresh election which may

be held under this Act;

(2) If in any proceedings under

section 16 the Judge finds that a corrupt

practice has been committed within the

meaning of that section by any person he

may, if he thinks fit, declare such

person to be disqualified for being

elected and for being a councillor for

such term of years not exceeding seven as

he may fix;"

16. A combined reading of section 16 and 403

and 404 leaves me in no manner of doubt that the

Legislature with a view to protect and preserve


purity of elections and democratic process has

inserted the provision providing for election

petition. The election process should be free

and impartial is the anxiety. Further, merely

because the election is over does not mean that

the results thereof cannot be questioned or

disputed. A person who has enrolled himself in

the Municipal Election Roll can call in question

the election itself or dispute qualifications of

person who has contested and is elected. It is

with this anxiety that in section 435, the

Legislature has taken care to provide that in

computing the period of limitation prescribed for

an appeal or application referred in Chapter 26,

the provisions of section 5, 12 and 14 of the

Limitation Act shall sofar as may be applied.

The word "referred to" appearing in section

435(1) demonstrates that the intent was to make

section 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act

Applicable sofar as may be to the proceedings and

enquiries contemplated in the Chapter. Even

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36

section 434 and 436 are indicative of the

Legislature Intent. In such circumstances, it is

not proper to urge that section 5 of the Indian

Limitation Act would not apply to the election

petitions. Upon a plain reading of section 16

and sections 403 and 404 along with section 435

would make it clear that the Legislature did not

exclude applicability of sections 5, 12 and 14 of

the Limitation Act.

17. In the decision relied upon by Mr.Joshi,

The Supreme Court was considering an identical

controversy. Mr.Joshi’s reliance upon this

decision is appropriate. While referring to the

facts and the provisions in the Andhra Pradesh

Act, the Supreme Court in para 8, 11, 12 and 13

of this decision observed thus:-

"8. In this specific case, the High

Court, vide impugned order, made a

distinction between application and

petition to hold that the election

petition, under the Act, was not an

application referred to in Section 671 of

the Act. Neither the application, nor

the election petition is defined under

the Act. The dictionary meaning of the

word "application" is : (1) a formal

request to an authority, (2) the action

of putting something into operation,

practical use or relevance, (3) the

action of applying something to a

surface, (4) sustained effort (5)

computing a program or piece of software

designed to fulfil a particular purpose".

The word "application" could be

understood in a generic sense as a prayer

made to an authority for some relief to

set aside an order of another authority."

"9. This Court in Prem Raj Vs. Ram

Charan (A.I.R. 1974 S.C.968) observed

that the plaint, which makes a request to

the Court, is an application. However,

written statement was held not to be an

application because it does not include

any request to the Court."

"11. We have no doubt in holding that

the word "application", as used in

Section 671 of the Act, would include

within its ambit an election petition

wherein a voter or the candidate makes

the prayer to the Court and seeks the

redressal of his grievances regarding the

conduct of the elections. Holding

election petition not to be covered

within the term "application" would

amount to adopting a hyper-technical

approach which would defeat the very

purpose of the Act and the provisions

made therein for disputing the

authenticity and the conduct of the

election. To overcome the confusion

regarding the definition between the

application and the petition, a new

definition of an application was inserted

in the Limitation Act, 1963 which defined

it to include a petition. The object of

the new definition is to provide a period

of limitation for original applications,

interlocutory applications and petitions

under special law, to which the Act has

been made applicable."

"12. In our considered opinion the

High Court was not justified in holding

that the election petition was not an

application within the meaning of Section

671 of the Act. Sub-section 2 of Section

71 of the Act specifically provides the

period of limitation for filing the

election petition for which sub-section 1

of section 671 of the Act would be

applicable to attract the sub-section (2)

of Section 71 thereby applying the

provisions of section 5 of the Limitation

Act to the election petitions filed under

the Act."

"13. We do not agree with the

submissions made on behalf of the

respondent that no period of limitation

is prescribed for the election petition

and that the provisions of sub-section

(2) of Section 671 would be attracted

excluding the applicability of Section 5

of the Limitation Act. The harmonious

interpretation of various provisions of

the Act would clearly show that the

election petition was intended to be

taken, by the Legislature, as an

application for the purposes of

limitation in terms of Section 671.

Taking any other view would defeat the

very purpose of the enactment providing

for filing of an election petition

calling in question any elections on the

grounds specified under the Act. The

remedy provided under a statute cannot be

defeated under the cloak of

technicalities by adopting a

hyper-technical approach. The free and

fair elections are a guarantee of the

democratic polity and for achieving such

an objective various provisions are made

applicable to the election laws, most

important of which is the remedy of

challenging the elections on the grounds

specified under the statute. In the

absence of the applicability of Section 5

of the Limitation Act, the rights of the

aggrieved person, intended to challenge

an election, can be defeated by the

executive of the State by not appointing

the Election Tribunal as is shown to have

been done in the instant cases. In the

appeal filed by the Gogineni Sujatha, it

is not disputed that the Election

Tribunal was constituted after the expiry

of period of limitation prescribed for

filing an election petition. Similarly

in the case of Shaikh Saidulu alias Saida

sufficient time was allowed to lapse

preventing the filing of the election

petition for no fault of the appellant.

Can an interpretation be accepted which

facilitates the defeating of purpose of

the Act? The answer is emphatically,

No."

18. These observations of the Supreme Court

while dealing with identical provisions are

binding upon me. No decision of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has been brought to my notice

taking a contrary view. In fact, the Supreme

Court decision applies with full force.

Although, the learned Judge while passing the

impugned order has not referred to this decision,

this decision is squarely applicable. The

Supreme Court has observed that the word

"application" appearing in relevant provisions of

the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act so also

the provisions which are pari materia to section

435 would make Limitation Act applicable. In

such circumstances, by resorting to section 5,

the delay should have been condoned is the

conclusion of the Supreme Court.

19. It is not proper to ignore this

authoritative pronouncement as suggested by

Mr.Godbole. This decision fully covers the

controversy before me. Merely because there are

several headings under Chapter 26 does not mean

that the Supreme Court decision or section 435 of

B.P.M.C. Act would become inapplicable. It is

not necessary to enter into any larger

controversy as to whether to all proceedings


contemplated under Chapter 26, the Indian

Limitation Act and the provisions referred to in

section 435 or C.P.C. would be applicable.

Suffice it to state that insofar as election

petitions contemplated by section 16 are

concerned, the same are squarely covered and fall

within sub-section 1 of section 435 of the Act.

20. In this view of the matter, learned Judge

was fully empowered to take cognisance of the

application preferred by the first respondent,

seeking condonation of delay of 32 days in filing

election petition. As set out above, it is not

the contention of Mr.Godbole that no sufficient

cause was made out. Thus, on facts the impugned

order has not been questioned. It is only the

lack of power that was put in issue. That being

squarely and fully covered by the decision of the

Supreme Court (supra), there is no substance in

the writ petition.


21. Rule is accordingly discharged. However,

there shall be no costs. Ad-interim order passed

by this Court on 1st November 2007 stands

vacated.

22. At this stage Mr.Arjunwadkar for

petitioner prays for continuation of the

ad-interim order. The said request is opposed by

the first respondent. However, since a pure

legal issue is involved, it would be in the

interest of justice to continue the ad-interim

order for a period of eight weeks from today.

Ad-interim order is continued for twelve weeks

from today Needless to state that no extention

would be granted. Learned Judge to thereafter

proceed with the election petition on merits and

in accordance with law. Petition dismissed. No

costs.


(S.C.Dharmadhikari, J)


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