Law Web: How doctrine of res Judicata is applicable to execution of decree?

Conclusion

37. The appellants cannot be allowed to raise the issue relating to

the breach of Order XXI, Rule 64 for the following reasons:(

i) A judgmentdebtor cannot be allowed to raise objections as to

the method of execution in instalments. After having failed to raise the issue in four earlier rounds of litigation, the appellants cannot be permitted to raise it now;

(ii) As we have pointed out elsewhere, the original judgmentdebtor himself filed a petition under Section 47, way back on 02.09.1975. What is on hand is a second petition under Section 47 and, hence, it is barred by res judicata. It must be pointed out at this stage that before Act 104 of 1976 came into force, there was one view that the provisions of Section 11 of the Code had no application to execution proceedings. But under Act 104 of 1976 Explanation VII was inserted under Section 11 and it says that the provisions of this Section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this Section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree;

(iii) Even in the 5th round, the appellants have not pointed out the lay of the property, its dimensions on all sides and the possibility of dividing the same into two or more pieces, with a view to sell one or more of those pieces for the realisation of the decree debt;

(iv) The observations in paragraph 4 of the order of the High Court

dated 20.12.1990 in C.O.No.2487 of 1987 that, “none of the parties

shall have any claim whatsoever as against the applicant in respect

of the purchased property which shall be deemed to be his absolute

property on and from the expiry of 15th December, 1980”, has

attained finality;

(v) Section 65 of the Code says that, “where immovable property is

sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the

property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the

time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale

becomes absolute”. The sale of a property becomes absolute under

Order XXI, Rule 92(1) after an application made under Rule 89,

Rule 90 or Rule 91 is disallowed and the court passes an order

confirming the same. After the sale of an immovable property

becomes absolute in terms of Order XXI, Rule 92(1), the Court has

to grant a certificate under Rule 94. The certificate has to bear the

date and the day on which the sale became absolute. Thus a

conjoint reading of Section 65, Order XXI, Rule 92 and Order XXI,

Rule 94 would show that it passes through three important stages

(other than certain intervening stages). They are, (i) conduct of sale;

(ii) sale becoming absolute; and (iii) issue of sale certificate. After all

these three stages are crossed, the 4th stage of delivery of possession

comes under Rule 95 of Order XXI. It is at this 4th stage that the

appellants have raised the objection relating to Order XXI, Rule 64.

It is not as if the appellants were not aware of the fact that the

property in entirety was included in the proclamation of sale.

Therefore, the claim on the basis of Order XXI, Rule 64 was rightly

rejected by the High Court.

38. In view of the above, the appeal is devoid of merits and, hence,

it is dismissed.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4557 OF 2012

DIPALI BISWAS Vs NIRMALENDU MUKHERJEE

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Dated: October 05, 2021

1. Challenging the order of the High Court confirming the order

of the Executing Court dismissing their application under Section

47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as

the ‘Code’), the legal representatives of the judgmentdebtor

have

come up with the above appeal. Incidentally, this litigation is

exactly half a century old (it started with a suit filed in 1971) and

this appeal arises out of the fifth round of litigation at the stage of

execution of a simple money decree and we wish that it is the knock

out round.

2. We have heard Mr. Rauf Rahim, learned counsel for the

appellants, and Mr. Raja Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for

the respondent nos.17/

auction purchasers.

3. One Ms. Rama Rani Devi, filed a simple suit for recovery of

money in Money Suit No.16 of 1971 on the file of the District

Munsif Court, Bongaon, District 24 Parganas, West Bengal, against

one Sasadhar Biswas, for recovery of a sum of Rs.3000/.

The suit

was decreed ex parte on 25.07.1974, directing the defendant to pay

the decretal amount in six equal instalments with a default clause.

4. Since the decree was not honoured, the decree holder filed an

execution petition in Execution Case No.2 of 1975, praying for the

attachment and sale of 17 decimal of land (approximately about

7450 Sq.ft.) in Plot No.26/159 under Khatian No.2555 of Mouza

Bongaon. It appears that a sale proclamation was issued by the

executing court on 16.07.1975 after which Sasadhar Biswas, the

Judgmentdebtor

filed an application in Miscellaneous Case No.151

of 1975 assailing the sale proclamation issued by the executing

court, on the ground of material irregularity and fraud. But the

same was dismissed on 03.09.1975.

5. An auction sale was held on 30.05.1979, in which two

brothers by name, Sachindra Nath Mukherjee and Dulal Kanti

Mukherjee became the highest bidders, they having offered a sum

of Rs.5500/,

as the highest bid amount. The highest bidders also

deposited the money into court.

First round

6. Mr. Sasadhar Biswas, the judgmentdebtor

then filed an

application on 27.06.1979 under Order XXI, Rule 90 read with

Section 152 of the Code praying for setting aside the auction sale on

the ground of irregularities in the sale proclamation. During the

pendency of this petition in Miscellaneous Case No.47 of 1979, the

judgmentdebtor

Sasadhar Biswas entered into a compromise on

19.07.1980, not with the decree holder but with the auction

purchasers. The memo of compromise reads as follows:“

The petitioner and the auction purchaser Opp. party do

settle the suit mutually in the following manner.

1) If the petitioner debtor pays the entire money due to the

auction purchaser opposite part in cash within 15th December

or if he deposits it in their credit in the court and the auction

shall be revoked and the original execution case shall be

disposed on full satisfaction.

2) Otherwise that is if the petitioner debtor does not pay the

entire money due to the auction purchaser opposite party in

cash within 15th December on deposits that amount in court

within that date then the said auction shall remain effective

and this present suit shall be dismissed with costs.

Hence it is prayed that according to the contents of this

solenama and for compliance with the conditions of the

solenama the final date of this suit may be kept on 16.12.80

on the expiry of the 15th December.”

7. It is relevant to point out that the amount of money deposited

by the auction purchasers into court was Rs.5500/,

but the decree

debt was around Rs.3360/.

Though the compromise memo entered

into by the judgmentdebtor

with the auction purchasers did not

refer to the decree debt, but repeatedly mentioned the words,

“entire money due to the auction purchasers”, the judgmentdebtor

admittedly deposited on 15.12.1980, only a sum of Rs.3700/,

purportedly on the basis of the calculation provided by the court

officer in terms of Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code.

8. Since the deadline for payment of the entire money due to the

auction purchasers expired on 15.12.1980 and also since the

judgmentdebtor

deposited only a sum of Rs.3700/,

as against the

amount of Rs.5500/deposited

by the auction purchasers, the

executing court dismissed the application under Order XXI, Rule 90

in Miscellaneous Case No.47 of 1979.

9. But within four days, the executing court again passed an

order on 20.12.1980 recalling the order dated 16.12.1980 and

recording full satisfaction in the execution. Shocked at this order,

the auction purchasers filed an application on 22.12.1980 for

recalling the order dated 20.12.1980, passed purportedly behind

their back. This application was dismissed by the executing court

on 12.09.1981. Challenging the said order dated 12.09.1981,

passed by the executing court, the auction purchasers filed a

revision in C.R.No.3577 of 1981 on the file of the High Court. The

High Court allowed the revision by an order dated 21.06.1983 and

remanded the matter back to the executing court, for rehearing

the

application of the auction purchasers for recall of the order dated

20.12.1980.

10. The executing court passed a fresh order dated 11.07.1987

rejecting the application of the auction purchasers on merits, but

this order was set aside by the High Court in a revision in

C.O.No.2487 of 1987, by an order dated 20.12.1990. By this order

the High Court held that the judgmentdebtor

failed to honour the

commitment made in the compromise memo to deposit the entire

amount due to the auction purchasers and that therefore the

auction sale should be confirmed in favour of the auction

purchasers. It may be relevant to extract Clause No.4 of the

operative portion of the order of the High Court in C.O. No.2487 of

1987 dated 20.12.1990. It reads as follows:“

xxx xxx xxx xxx

4. None of the parties shall have any claim whatsoever as

against the applicant in respect of the purchased property

which shall be deemed to be his absolute property on and

from the expiry of 15th December, 1980.”

11. Thereafter, a mention was made before the learned judge, on

behalf of the counsel for the judgmentdebtor

seeking recall of the

order in C.O.No.2487 of 1987 on the ground that the counsel was

not present at the time of disposal of the revision petition.

Therefore, the leaned Judge again heard the matter and passed a

detailed order dated 08.08.1991, reiterating his earlier order. A

special leave petition filed against the order dated 08.08.1991, in

SLP(C)No.18092 of 1991 was dismissed by this Court on

24.02.1992. The judgmentdebtor

moved a petition for review before

this Court but the same was also dismissed on 12.08.1992. Thus,

the 1st round of litigation kicked off with an application under Order

XXI, Rule 90, in the year 1979, came to an end in 1992.

Second Round

12. The judgmentdebtor

then started the 2nd round by filing a suit

in suit No.249 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif, Bongaon,

for a declaration that the auction sale is void but the said suit was

dismissed as abated, on 02.12.1992.

Third Round

13. In the meantime, the auction purchasers filed petitions for the

issue of sale certificate and the judgmentdebtor

filed a petition

under Order XXI, Rule 29 for stay of execution proceedings. But the

application of the judgmentdebtor

was dismissed and the

applications of the auction purchasers were allowed by the

executing court by an order dated 31.01.1994. A direction was

given for the issue of a sale certificate to the auction purchasers in

terms of Order XXI, Rule 94. Accordingly, a sale certificate was

issued on 08.02.1994. The sale certificate was also duly registered.

14. Challenging the order dated 31.01.1994 passed by the

executing court directing the issue of sale certificate, the judgmentdebtor

filed a revision in C.O.No.1232 of 1994 on the file of the High

Court. Though the High Court entertained the revision and initially

granted a stay of further proceedings in the execution, the High

Court eventually dismissed the revision petition by an order dated

05.09.2001 holding that the earlier order in C.O.No.2487 of 1987

dated 08.08.1991 had already clinched the issue. With this order,

the third round came to an end.

Fourth Round

15. The 4th round began with an application by the auction

purchasers seeking delivery of possession. This application was

allowed by the executing court on 15.03.2002, directing delivery to

be effected by 16.04.2002. Since the judgmentdebtor

had, in the

meantime, constructed a building on the land sold in execution of

the decree, the executing court directed the building so constructed

illegally, to be demolished.

16. The order of the executing court for delivery of possession was

challenged by the appellants herein (the legal representatives of the

judgmentdebtor)

in a Civil Petition No.106 of 2002 before the

Additional District Judge, Barasat. The same was dismissed on

26.02.2003. This order was challenged before the High Court in

C.O.No.1276 of 2003, but the same was dismissed by the High

Court by an order dated 11.02.2005 pointing out that the issue has

already been clinched by the previous orders. The special leave

petition SLP(C) No.12925 of 2005 filed against the said order, was

dismissed by this Court on 18.07.2005. The petition seeking review

of the said order was also dismissed by this Court on 10.01.2006.

Thus, the fourth round of litigation came to a close.

Fifth Round (present round)

17. Not to be put off by repeated failures, the appellants herein,

like the tireless Vikramaditya, (who made repeated attempts to

capture ‘Betal’) started the present round (hopefully the final

round), by moving a petition in Miscellaneous Case No.15 of 2006

before the executing court under Section 47 of the Code, on the

ground that the mandate of Order XXI Rule 64 was not followed in

the auction and that therefore a jurisdictional error has crept in

and that the same could be corrected at any point of time and at

any stage of the proceeding. This petition filed on 10.02.2006 was

dismissed by the executing court by an order dated 20.01.2007.

18. Challenging the said order dismissing their application under

Section 47, the appellants filed a revision in C.O. No.1115 of 2007

on the file of the High Court. This revision was dismissed by the

High Court by an order dated 28.03.2008, on the ground that the

issue, never having been raised earlier, cannot be allowed to be

raised at this distance of time. It is against the said order of the

High Court dated 28.03.2008, in C.O.No.1115 of 2007 that the legal

representatives of the judgmentdebtor

have come up with the

above appeal.

Contentions and our analysis

19. The only mantra, by the recitation of which, the appellants

hope to succeed in this halfacentury

old litigation, is Order XXI,

Rule 64 of the Code. This provision enables an executing court to

order “that any property attached by it and liable to sale or such

portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be

sold and that the proceeds of such sale or a sufficient portion thereof

shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive the

same”.

20. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants

that Order XXI, Rule 64 casts not a discretion, but an obligation, to

sell only such portion of the property as may be sufficient to satisfy

the decree. In support of this proposition, the learned counsel for

the appellants cited a few decisions, which we shall now deal with.

In Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi vs. Pujari Padmavathamma

& Ors1, this Court held that the, “executing court derives

jurisdiction to sell properties attached, only to the point at which the

decree is fully satisfied”, and that the words, “necessary to satisfy

the decree”, clearly indicate that no sale can be allowed beyond the

decretal amount mentioned in the sale proclamation. This Court

went further to hold that the issue flowing out of Order XXI, Rule

64 goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the executing court

and that therefore the fact that an objection in this regard was not

raised before the executing court is not sufficient to put him out of

court.

1 (1977) 3 SCC 337

21. But the aforesaid decision arose out of a case where the

decretal amount for which the properties were to be sold was

mentioned in the warrant of sale and sale proclamation as

Rs.16,715/.

The lands in two villages namely Devanoor and

Gudipadu were brought to sale. The sale of lands in one village

alone fetched Rs.16,880/.

Yet the executing court proceeded to sell

the lands in Gudipadu also. It is in that context that this Court held

as aforesaid.

22. The decision in Ambati Narasayya vs M. Subha Rao &

Anr2, while following T.P. Subba Reddi (supra), went a step further

and held that if the property is large and the decree to be satisfied

is small, the court must bring only such portion of the property, the

proceeds of which would be sufficient to satisfy the decree debt and

that it is immaterial whether the property is one or several.

23. But the decision in Ambati Narasayya (supra) also arose out

of a particular context. The land that was sold in Ambati

Narasayya (supra) was of the extent of 10 acres and it was sold for

Rs.17,000/for

the satisfaction of a claim of Rs.2400/.

The land of

2 (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 693

the extent of 10 acres is certainly large enough and is capable of

division. But in the case on hand, the extent of land is only 17

decimals, working out to (7450 Sq.ft.).

24. It must be pointed out at this stage that under Order XXI,

Rule 66 (1) the executing court should cause proclamation of the

intended sale to be drawn up in the language of the court. Under

sub rule (2) of Rule 66 of Order XXI, such proclamation should be

drawn up after notice to the decree holder and the judgmentdebtor.

Order XXI, Rule 66 reads as follows:66.

Proclamation of sales by public auction.(

1) Where any

property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution of

a decree, the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended

sale to be made in the language of such Court.

(2) Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the

decreeholder

and the judgmentdebtor

and shall state the

time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately as

possible—

(a) the property to be sold, or, where a part of the property

would be sufficient to satisfy the decree, such part;

(b) the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate,

where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in

part of an estate paying revenue to the Government;

(d) the amount for the recovery of which the sale is ordered;

and

(e) every other thing which the Court considers material for a

purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of

the property:

Provided that where notice of the date for settling the

terms of the proclamation has been given to the judgmentdebtor

by means of an order under rule 54, it shall not be

necessary to give notice under this rule to the judgmentdebtor

unless the Court otherwise directs:

Provided further that nothing in this rule shall be

construed as requiring the Court to enter in the proclamation

of sale its own estimate of the value of the property, but the

proclamation shall include the estimate, if any, given, by

either or both of the parties.

(3) Every application for an order for sale under this rule shall

be accompanied by a statement signed and verified in the

manner hereinbefore prescribed for the signing and

verification of pleadings and containing, so far as they are

known to or can be ascertained by the person making the

verification, the matters required by subrule

(2) to be

specified in the proclamation.

(4) For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified

in the proclamation, the Court may summon any person

whom it thinks necessary to summon and may examine him

in respect to any such matters and require him to produce

any document in his possession or power relating thereto.

25. It is important to note here that two significant changes were

made to Order XXI, Rule 66 by Act 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977.

Both these changes were made to sub rule (2) of Rule 66. One of the

changes was the insertion of the words “or where a part of the

property would be sufficient to satisfy the decree, such part”

in clause (a) of sub rule (2). The second change was the insertion of

two provisos under sub rule (2).

26. As an aside, it may be noted that the second proviso to sub

rule (2) inserted by Central Act 104 of 1976, was redundant in so

far as Calcutta is concerned, since Calcutta already had a similar

proviso inserted through a local amendment.

27. The first proviso under sub rule (2) of Rule 66 of Order XXI

gives a discretion to the court not to give notice under Order XXI,

Rule 66 to the judgmentdebtor,

if a notice for settling the terms of

the proclamation had been given to the judgmentdebtor

by means

of an order under Rule 54.

28. Rule 54 of Order XXI prescribes the method of attachment of

immovable property. Sub rule (1A) of Rule 54, also inserted by Act

104 of 1976, mandates that the prohibitory order under sub rule(1)

shall require the judgmentdebtor

to attend court on a specified

date to take notice of the date to be fixed for settling the terms of

the proclamation of sale. This is why the first proviso to sub rule (2)

of Rule 66 gives a discretion to the court to dispense with a second

notice under Order XXI, Rule 66(2).

29. Keeping in mind the above statutory prescriptions, if we come

to the facts of the case, it is seen that the appellants have filed as

additional document in Annexure A3,

the copy of the extract of

relevant orders passed in Money Execution Case No.2 of 1975 by

the District Munsif Court, Bongaon. This document reveals that on

10.01.1975, the executing court ordered the issue of notice of

attachment under Order XXI, Rule 54 of the Code. It was only

thereafter that the court directed on 16.07.1975, the issue of sale

proclamation under Order XXI, Rule 66.

30. Thereafter, the judgmentdebtor

filed a petition under Section

47 of the Code on 02.09.1975 (this was the first petition under

Section 47, while the appeal on hand arises out of the second petition

under Section 47).

31. The executing court, at the instance of the judgmentdebtor

also granted stay of further proceedings on 26.09.1975. But it is not

clear from Annexure A3

of the additional documents filed by the

appellants, as to when the said petition under Section 47 was

disposed of. However it is clear from the order passed on

22.04.1978 that the decree holder was directed to take further

steps.

32. Even after directing the publication of the sale proclamation in

the newspaper, the executing court was more than fair to the

judgmentdebtor,

as could be seen from the order passed on

16.03.1979. On the said date the executing court found that in the

newspaper publication, the case number was wrongly mentioned.

Therefore, the court directed the issue of fresh sale proclamation

and fresh publication. It is only thereafter that the judgmentdebtor

moved a petition on 30.05.1979 for postponement of the auction. It

was rejected and the court proceeded with the auction. The decree

holder himself participated in the auction after getting permission

from the court. However, it is only the third parties who succeeded

in getting the sale confirmed.

33. The above sequence of events would show that the judgmentdebtor

had sufficient opportunity to object to the inclusion of the

entire property when an order was passed under Order XXI, Rule

54. Subsequently he had an opportunity to object to the inclusion

of the whole of the property, by taking advantage of the amended

clause (a) of sub rule (2) of Rule 66 of Order XXI, which speaks

about a part of the property that would be sufficient to satisfy the

decree. But the judgmentdebtor

despite filing a petition under

Section 47 on 02.09.1975, did not point out how the property being

a vacant land of an extent of 17 decimals could have been divided.

It must be pointed out at the cost of repetition that the notice of

attachment under Order XXI, Rule 54 was ordered on 10.01.1975

and the sale proclamation under Order XXI, Rule 66 was directed to

be issued on 16.07.1975. It is only thereafter that the first petition

under Section 47 was filed on 02.09.1975. Therefore, the appellants

cannot compare themselves to the judgmentdebtors

in T.P. Subba

Reddi or Ambati Narasayya (supra).

34. As we have pointed out elsewhere, the objection relating to

Order XXI, Rule 64 has been raised by the appellants for the first

time in the 5th round of litigation in execution. In the 1st round, the

appellants exhausted the gunpowder

available under Order XXI,

Rule 90, by taking recourse to a compromise with the auction

purchasers, after alleging material irregularity in the conduct of the

auction. The 1st round which commenced in 1979 came to an end in

1992 with the dismissal of SLP(C) No.18092 of 1991. In the order of

the High Court dated 20.12.1990 that was under challenge in the

said SLP, the High Court made it clear that none of the parties shall

have any claim whatsoever as against the auction purchaser in

respect of the purchased property (we have extracted this in Para

10 above).

35. The 2nd round was kickstarted

with a suit in Suit No.249 of

1992 for a declaration that the auction sale was void. This is

despite the express bar of a separate suit, under Section 47(1) of

the Code. But the 2nd round got aborted with the dismissal of the

suit due to abatement.

36. The 3rd round started with objections to the issue of sale

certificate and it came to an end in the year 2001. The 4th round

commenced when the auction purchasers moved the executing

court for delivery of possession. Delivery was ordered by the

executing court on 15.03.2002. This round came to a close with the

dismissal of a SLP in the year 2005 and a review petition in the year

2006, arising out of the dismissal of a revision petition challenging

the order of the executing court for delivery of possession. It is only

thereafter that the 5th round of litigation was started by the

appellants by filing a petition under Section 47 and raising the

bogey of “jurisdictional error” on account of noncompliance

with the

mandate of Order XXI, Rule 64. In other words, the appellants have

now exhausted almost all provisions available to a judgmentdebtor

to stall execution and the case on hand is fit to be included in the

syllabus of a law school as a study material for students to get

equipped with the various provisions of the Code relating to

execution.

Conclusion

37. The appellants cannot be allowed to raise the issue relating to

the breach of Order XXI, Rule 64 for the following reasons:(

i) A judgmentdebtor cannot be allowed to raise objections as to

the method of execution in instalments. After having failed to raise

the issue in four earlier rounds of litigation, the appellants cannot

be permitted to raise it now;

(ii) As we have pointed out elsewhere, the original judgmentdebtor

himself filed a petition under Section 47, way back on

02.09.1975. What is on hand is a second petition under Section 47

and, hence, it is barred by res judicata. It must be pointed out at

this stage that before Act 104 of 1976 came into force, there was

one view that the provisions of Section 11 of the Code had no

application to execution proceedings. But under Act 104 of 1976

Explanation VII was inserted under Section 11 and it says that the

provisions of this Section shall apply to a proceeding for the

execution of a decree and reference in this Section to any suit, issue

or former suit shall be construed as references to a proceeding for

the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and

a former proceeding for the execution of that decree;

(iii) Even in the 5th round, the appellants have not pointed out the

lay of the property, its dimensions on all sides and the possibility of

dividing the same into two or more pieces, with a view to sell one or

more of those pieces for the realisation of the decree debt;