Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of the FIR it is nowhere reflected that on extortion made by the petitioner, complainant/respondent No.5 has delivered any valuable property to the petitioner, as such, he has not committed offence under Section 384 of IPC. Even from perusal of the final report, it is clear that the documents submitted by the investigating agency regarding statements of the witnesses, none of the witnesses has stated that on extortion made by the
petitioner by demanding Rs.25,00,000/- from respondent No.5. The respondent No. 5 has given Rs.25,00,000/- to the petitioner, as such, there is no ingredient of offence under Section 384 of IPC is made out.
16) It would be evident from the reading of Section 383 of the IPC that the
ingredients of 'extortion' are; (i) the accused must put any person in fear of
injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such
fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person
so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or
anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security;
(iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms 'dishonestly',
'illegally' and 'injury' used in "Section 383 of the IPC and in " Sections 24, 43
and 44 of the IPC respectively. On a careful consideration of the above
definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others
intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that
person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or
valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted
into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for 'extortion'.
17). Thus, what is necessary for constituting an offence of 'extortion' is that
the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury,
the victim has voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man
putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most
important ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be
available. Further, if a person voluntarily delivers any property without there
being any fear of injury, an offence of 'extortion' cannot be said to have been committed.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
WPCR No. 133 of 2017
Shatrughan Singh Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh
Pronounced on 07-09-2021
1) The petitioner, who is an Advocate by profession, has filed the present writ
petition (cr.) challenging the registration of First Information Report against
him under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC on the basis of complaint filed by
respondent No.5 Kuleshwar Chandrakar before the Police Station Rudri in
connection with Crime No. 106 of 2015 on 9-10-2015 and subsequently, the Police has submitted the final report before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dhamtari, now the case has been transferred to learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari, bearing Criminal Case No. 1405
of 2015 (State vs. Shatrughan Saho).
2) Brief facts, as projected by the petitioner in the present petition are that the
Government of Chhattisgarh has enacted the Shakambhari (Nal-Jal)
Scheme for benefit of agriculturists by granting subsidy. The beneficiary
farmers applied for irrigation instrument in the Department of Agriculture. As
per scheme, the State Government is giving them instrument and subsidy
after following certain procedure. The Rural Agricultural Extension Officer,
Village and Post Bhatgaon, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Agricultural
Development Officer, Village and Post Charmudiya, Tahsil Kurud, District
Dhamtari, Agriculture Sub Divisional Officer, Colllectorate Dhamtari, Deputy
Director Agricultural Collectorate, Dhamtari and respondent
No.5/complainant Kuleshwar Chandrakar and Roshan Chandrakar,
Proprietor of Shri Ram Bore-wells have committed gross embezzlement at
the time of granting subsidy to the concerned agriculturists, therefore, the
petitioner made a complaint before the Collector, Dhamtari on 3-3-2015 and
24-4-2015 with regard to corruption done by them.
3) On 18-3-2015 the petitioner made a complaint before the Superintendent of
Police, Dhamtari for registration of FIR against the corrupt
employee/officers. Again, the petitioner along with other person namely
Naresh Kumar has also filed a complaint before the Superintendent of
Police, Dhamtari stating that the persons involved in the embezzlement
under the Shakambhari (Nal Jal) Scheme threatened them to cause death.
But the respondent authorities i.e., Collector and Superintendent of Police,
District Dhamtari and Director of Agriculture Department Raipur did not take
any action against the corrupt persons including the respondent No.5.
4) The Superintendent of Police has directed Rudri Police Station to enquire
into the matter. Though the statements of persons namely Manik Ram,
Tomar Sahu, Abhimanyu and Devendra Kumar have been recorded and all
have supported the case, still Police has not taken any action against the
erring officials. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed complaint under
Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C before the learned District and Sessions Court,
Dhamtari for registration of offence under Prevention of Corruption Act. On
9-10-2015, the complainant Kuleshwar Chandrakar lodged FIR against the
petitioner contending that the petitioner has demanded Rs.25,00,000/- by
way of extortion. Police has registered the FIR without conducting any
preliminary enquiry. Though the petitioner was present at his office along
with other advocates on 9-10-2015, still he has been roped in crime number
106 of 2015 for committing alleged offence under Sections 384 and 388 of
IPC.
5) On 20-12-2015 the petitioner has submitted an application before the Police
Station Rudri and prayed for an opportunity of defence and also submitted
the representation on 24-12-2015 along with documents, but the same has
not been considered. On 31-12-2015 when the petitioner was going to
court, at that time four persons came in motorcycle and threatened the
petitioner by pressing and compelled him to do compromise and withdraw
the complaint. On 31-12-2015 the petitioner made a complaint before the
Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari but no action has been taken. The
Police on the strength of the FIR lodged by respondent No. 5, after
investigation, registered the offence and final report has been submitted
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari. Now the case is transferred
to the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari and learned
Magistrate registered the case bearing Criminal Case No. 1405 of 2015.
6) On the above factual matrix of the case, the petitioner prayed for quashing
of FIR registered against the petitioner in connection with Crime No. 106 of
2015 at Police Station Rudri, District Dhamtari for offence under Sections
384 and 388 of IPC.
7) This Court issued notice to the respondents and in pursuance of notice,
respondent No.5 has entered his appearance and filed his return. The State
counsel has also filed their return in which they have stated that on the
basis of complaint made by the petitioner, an enquiry has been conducted
by the Additional Collector & Inquiry Officer, Dhamtari has submitted his
report on 28-11-2016 wherein charges levelled against respondent No.5
and other Government officials have been found false and baseless. It has
also been stated that the petitioner being an Advocate indulged in making
complaint with regard to corruption under the scheme of the State
Government and requesting for registration of FIR. It is further contended
that the petitioner made another complaint before the Superintendent of
Police, District Dhamtari, regarding corruption being made in the Rajya
Poshit Sukshma Sichai Yojna by one Roshan Chandrakar which was
enquired into and upon enquiry no incriminating was found for taking
cognizance and the complaint of the petitioner was found to be false and
baseless and copy of the report has been forwarded by the Incharge of
Police Station, Dhamtari to the Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari on 7-2-
2015. He would further submit that the charges leveled against respondent
No.5 are false and baseless, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner
deserves to be dismissed by this court.
8) Complainant/respondent No.5 has also filed his return in which he denied
the allegations made by the petitioner and would submit that as per material
collected by the Investigating Officer case under Section 384 and 388 of
IPC is made out. It has been further contended that the petitioner is a
habitual complainer and blackmailing the people and he has filed a
complaint against the Officer of the Agriculture Deportment alleging certain
irregularities and thereafter vide letter dated 24-10-2015 has withdrawn the
same which clearly shows the conduct of the petitioner itself. He would
further submit that prima facie the allegations leveled against him are made
out, therefore, the writ petition, at this juncture is not maintainable and is
liable to be dismissed by this court.
9) The petitioner has filed his rejoinder on 24-6-2021 and would submit that at
the time of incident, the petitioner was in the court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate to argue the criminal case and in this regard a copy of the order
sheet thereof has also been annexed. He would further submit that he has
been falsely implicated in this case as he was not present at the time of
alleged incident, therefore, the story projected by the complainant is false,
baseless and cannot be accepted at this juncture and would pray that the
petition filed by him be allowed and the criminal proceeding be quashed.
In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the judgments rendered by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs Bhajanlal reported in
1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335.
10) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents.
11) Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is necessary to examine
the provisions of Sections 24, 43, 44, 383, 384 and 388 of IPC which are
extracted as under as well as contents of the FIR.
Section 24 in The Indian Penal Code. 24.
“Dishonestly”. —Whoever does anything with the
intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or
wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that
thing “dishonestly”.
Section 43 of the IPC lays down the word 'illegal' is
applicable to everything which is an offence or
which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes
ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be
'legally bound to do' whatever it is illegal in him to
omit.
Section 44 of the IPC lays down that the word
'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused
to any person, in body, mind, reputation or
property.
"383. Extortion --
Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of
any injury to that person, or to any other, and
thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in
fear to deliver to any person any property or
valuable security, or anything signed or sealed
which may be converted into a valuable security,
commits "extortion"."
“Section 384- Punishment for extortion- Whoever
commits extortion shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
Section 388- Extortion by threat of accusation of
an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, etc. - Whoever commits
extortion by putting any person in fear of an
accusation against that person or any other, of
having committed or attempted to commit any
offence punishable with death, or with
(imprisonment for life), or with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to ten years or of having
attempted to induce any other person to commit
such offence, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term be
one punishable under Section 377 of this Code,
may be punished with imprisonment for life”.
FIR
{Vernaculars omitted}
12) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal vs. Committee
for Protection of Democratic Rights West Bengal, reported in 2010(3) SCC
571 has observed in para 57 which is extracted as under:
“57.As regards the power of judicial review conferred
on the High Court, undoubtedly they are, in a
way, wider in scope. The High Courts are
authorised under Article 226 of the Constitution, to
issue directions, orders or writs to any person or
authority, including any government to enforce
fundamental rights and, "for any other purpose". It
is manifest from the difference in the phraseology
of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution that
there is a marked difference in the nature and
purpose of the right conferred by these two
Articles. Whereas the right guaranteed by Article
32 can be exercised only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution, the right conferred by Article 226 can
be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but "for any other purpose" as
well, i.e. for enforcement of any legal right
conferred by a Statute etc.”
13) Learned counsel for the respondent No.5 has filed his written
synopsis reiterating the stand which he has already taken in the petition.
He has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh
in Sudha Tripathi vs State of MP and another passed in M.Cr..No.11871
of 2019 decided on 2-5-2019, Satvir Singh and others vs. State of
Punjab and another, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 633, Abhyanand vs.
State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1961 SCC 1698 and would submit that
the prima facie offence for extortion is made out even from judgment
referred to above, it is evident that offence under Section 511 for
punishment of attempting to commit offence is made out and he would
submit that since the petitioner has attempted to commit an offence, as
such, charges are prima facie made out. He would further submit that the
petitioner was not present at the place of occurrence of the offence by
saying that he was before the Court, is his defence, this cannot be
examined by this Court. To substantiate this submission, he would rely
upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Vinod Raghuvanshi
v. Ajay Arora and others, reported in 2013 (10) SCC 581 and in State
of Bihar vs. PP Sharma and another, reported in 1991 (AIR) SC. In
State of A.P. vs. Goloconda Lingaswamy and another reported in 2004
AIR SC 3967, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:
“It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The
allegations of malafides against the informant
are of no consequence and cannot by
themselves be the basis for quashing the
proceeding”.
14) He would further relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme
Court in State of Orrisa Vs. Devendra Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1
SCC 568 and would pray that the writ petition may finally dismissed.
15) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of
the FIR it is nowhere reflected that on extortion made by the petitioner,
complainant/respondent No.5 has delivered any valuable property to the
petitioner, as such, he has not committed offence under Section 384 of
IPC. Even from perusal of the final report, it is clear that the documents
submitted by the investigating agency regarding statements of the
witnesses, none of the witnesses has stated that on extortion made by the
petitioner by demanding Rs.25,00,000/- from respondent No.5. The
respondent No. 5 has given Rs.25,00,000/- to the petitioner, as such, there
is no ingredient of offence under Section 384 of IPC is made out.
16) It would be evident from the reading of Section 383 of the IPC that the
ingredients of 'extortion' are; (i) the accused must put any person in fear of
injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such
fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person
so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or
anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security;
(iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms 'dishonestly',
'illegally' and 'injury' used in "Section 383 of the IPC and in " Sections 24, 43
and 44 of the IPC respectively. On a careful consideration of the above
definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others
intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that
person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or
valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted
into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for 'extortion'.
17). Thus, what is necessary for constituting an offence of 'extortion' is that
the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury,
the victim was voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man
putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most
important ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be
available. Further, if a person voluntarily delivers any property without there
being any fear of injury, an offence of 'extortion' cannot be said to have
been committed.
18) Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.N. Antulay and
another, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 716, has held in para 60 and relevant
portion thereof is extracted as under:
“60. Before a person can be said to put any person
to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear
that he has held out some threat to do or omit to
do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all
that a man does is to promise to do a thing which
he is not legally bound to do and says that if
money is not paid to him he would not do that
thing, such act would not amount to an offence of
extortion. We agree with this view which has been
indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, A.I.R.
1924 All 197. There is no evidence at all in this
case that the managements of the sugar cooperatives
had been put in any fear and the
contributions had been paid in response to threats.
Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister
at the relevant time and the sugar co-operatives
had some of their grievances pending
consideration before the Government and
pressure was brought about to make the donations
promising consideration of such grievances,
possibly by way of reciprocity, we do not think the
appellant is justified in his contention that the
ingredients of the offence of extortion have been
made out. The evidence led by the prosecution
falls short of the requirements of law in regard to
the alleged offence of extortion. We see, therefore,
no justification in the claim of Mr. Jethmalani that a
charge for the offence of extortion should have
been framed”.
19) Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that from bare
perusal of FIR it is crystal clear that since the offence under Section 383 of
IPC for extortion is not made out, then the offence under Section 388 of
IPC will also not be made out. He would rely upon the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in case Isaac Isanga Musumba and others vs. State of
Maharashtra and others, reported in 2014(15) 357, wherein Hon'ble the
Supreme Court has held in para 3 and 4 which are extracted as under:
“3. We have read the FIR which has been annexed
to the writ petition as Annexure P-7 and we find
therefrom that the complainants have alleged that
the accused persons have shown copies of
international warrants issued against the
complainants by the Ugandan Court and letters
written by Uganda Ministry of Justice &
Constitutional Affairs and the accused have
threatened to extort 20 million dollars (equivalent
to Rs.110 crores). In the complaint, there is no
mention whatsoever that pursuant to the
demands made by the accused, any amount was
delivered to the accused by the complainants. If
that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence of
extortion as defined in Section 383, IPC is made
out. Section 383, IPC states that whoever
intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury
to that person, or to any other, and thereby
dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to
deliver to any person any property, or valuable
security or anything signed or sealed which may
be converted into a valuable security, commits
'extortion'. Hence, unless property is delivered to
the accused person pursuant to the threat, no
offence of extortion is made out and an FIR for
the offence under Section 384 could not have
been registered by the police.
4. We also find on the reading of the FIR, there is
also an allegation that on 18th April, 2013
between 1 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. the accused
persons illegally entered into the Head Office of
the Company at Fort and demanded 20 million
dollars (equivalent to Rs.110 crores) saying that
they have international arrest warrants against
the complainants and upon failure to pay the said
sum the complainants will have to face dire
consequences. It is because of this allegation in
the FIR, the offence under Section 441, IPC is
alleged to have been committed by the accused
persons. On reading Section 441, IPC we find
that intent to commit an offence or to intimidate,
insult or annoy any person in possession of
property is a necessary ingredient of the offence
of criminal trespass. It is not disputed that there
was a business transaction between the accused
persons and the complainants. Hence, if the
accused persons have visited the premises of the
complainants to make a demand towards their
dues, we do not think a case of 'criminal trespass'
as defined in Section 441, IPC is made out
against the accused persons”.
20) On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.5 would
submit that Hon'ble the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has occasion to
consider the provisions of Section 384 of IPC and held that prima facie to
establish the offence under Section 384 of IPC, the ingredient namely the
accused should perpetuate the offence by extortion but the last subject of
delivery of valuable assets was not taken by the complainant. It is clearly
established that the petitioner had taken all possible steps of extortion,
fear in the mind of the complainant to pursue/induce the victim. The case of
the petitioner clearly demonstrates that the demand was made by the
petitioner to commit extortion. He would refer to the judgment of Hon’ble
Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sudha Tripathi vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh (MCRC No 1187 of 2019 and another decided on 2-5-
2019 wherein it has been held in paras 6, 7 & 8 which are extracted as
under:
“6. Testing the attending factual matrix on the anvil
of legal provision and the analysis made (supra), it
is seen that charge-sheet reveals that the first two
foundational ingredients of extortion i.e. putting the
victim/complainant to fear and thereby to induce
her/her father to part with property/valuable
security are very much alleged. However, the fact
remains that the victim and her father who were
subjected to fear and inducement did not deliver
Rs.20,00,000/- as demanded by the petitioner and
other co-accused. Thus, the allegations prima facie
reveal satisfaction of the first stage of extortion
where all possible steps were taken by petitioner to
perpetuate the offence of extortion but the last step
of delivery of valuables was not taken by the
complainant. This clearly reveals that petitioner had
taken all possible steps of instilling fear in the mind
of complainant to persuade/induce the victim. This
positive overt act of petitioner clearly demonstrate
that attempt was made by petitioner to commit
extortion.
7. In the conspectus of the discussion supra, this
Court is of the considered view that allegation in
the charge-sheet spell out prima facie offence
punishable under Sec.385 (attempt to extortion) of
IPC and not Sec.384 of IPC.
8. Consequently, this Court deems it appropriate to
exercise its inherent powers to dispose of the
present petition in the following terms:-
1. The impugned prosecution against the petitioner
alleges an offence punishable u/S.385 (attempt to
extortion) of IPC and therefore, the charge-sheet as
impugned herein is sustained but should be treated
as alleging offence punishable u/S.385 and not
u/S.384 of IPC.
21) From perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is apparent that the
alleged offence under Section 384 of IPC has been quashed on the
ground that no valuable assets have been delivered because of extortion,
threaten, pressure created by the accused. In the present case also
respondent No.5 has not delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner,
therefore, the judgment referred to by respondent No.5 also support the
contention of the petitioner and in that case also Madhya Pradesh High
Court held that offence under Section 384 of IPC is not made out.
Therefore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for respondent No.5 are
distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
22) From bare perusal of the FIR it can be very visualized that if we take
the face value of the allegation made in the complaint, then also it can be
very well seen that no offence under Section 388 of IPC is made out as
respondent No.5 in his complaint has nowhere stated that on the basis of
extortion made by the petitioner, respondent No.5 was put in fear of an
accusation by the petitioner or he committed or attempted to commit any
offence punishable with death and has delivered any valuable assets to the
petitioner. When prima facie provisions of Section 383 of IPC is not made
out, then the offence under Section 388 of IPC cannot be made out,
because unless and until the ingredient of extortion is established, then
only the alleged offence, prima facie, is said to have been committed by the
petitioner. Since the ingredients of Sections 383 of IPC are not made out,
the ingredient of Section 388 of IPC cannot be, prima facie, established,
therefore, registration of FIR, prima facie, is nothing, but an abuse of
process of law.
23) The learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 has referred the
judgment to prima facie establish that the petitioner has made an attempt
for extortion, or committed an offence, but this judgments are not
applicable to the facts of the present case as Chapter 17 deals with offence
against the property is itself a complete Chapter and Section 383 defines
extortion whereas the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the
respondent deals with Section 511 and offence related to cheating,
therefore, they are distinguishable from the facts and preposition of law
also.
24) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.
Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 1918
has considered the power of High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for quashing of the FIR in exercise of power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and
has held in para 10(iii) which is extracted as under
“10 (iii) However, in cases where no cognizable
offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the
first information report the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on;”
25) Similarly, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of
Punjab reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569, has held as under.
“ The power given to High Court under Article 226 is
an extraordinary power not only to correct the
manifest error but also to exercise it for sake of
justice. Under the scheme of the Constitution a
High Court is the highest court for purposes of exercising
civil, appellate, criminal or even constitutional
jurisdiction so far that State is concerned.
The jurisdiction possessed by it before coming
into force of the Constitution was preserved by Article
225 and by Articles 226 and 227 an extraordinary
jurisdiction was conferred on it to ensure
that the subordinate authorities act not only in accordance
with law but they also function within
the framework of law. That jurisdiction of the High
Court has not been taken away and in fact could
not be taken away by legislation. In England even
in absence of Constitution whenever an attempt
was made by Parliament to provide that the order
was final and no writ of certiorari would lie the
High Court always struck down the provision.
Since the High Court under the Constitution is a
forum for enforcement of fundamental right of a
citizen it cannot be denied the power to entertain
a petition by a citizen claiming that the State machinery
was abusing its power and was acting in
violation of the constitutional guarantee. Rather it
has a constitutional duty and responsibility to ensure
that the State machinery was acting fairly
and not on extraneous considerations. In State of
Maharashtra Vs. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, this
Court after examining the principle laid down in
Kharak Singh Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, and
Paras Ram Vs. State of Haryana, held that the High
Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under
Article 226 in extreme cases. What are such extreme
cases cannot be put in a strait-jacket. But
the few on which there can be hardly any dispute
are if the High Court is of opinion that the proceedings
under TADA were an abuse of process
of court or taken for extraneous considerations or
there was no material on record that a case under
TADA was made out. If it be so then there is no
reason why should the High Court not exercise its
jurisdiction and grant bail to the accused in those
cases where one or the other exceptional ground
is made out”
26) From bare perusal of FIR it is crystal clear that no case of extortion is
made out, therefore, offence under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC against the
petitioner is not made out. The proceeding initiated by the complainant is
nothing, but an abuse of process of law and on this count alone this court is
quashing the FIR, therefore, no other ground is required to be dealt by this
court.
27) In view of above legal provisions, considering the facts of the case
and from perusal of FIR, prima facie, no case is made out against the
petitioner and criminal proceedings is manifestly attended against the
petitioner with malafide, therefore, initiation of criminal proceeding is
nothing, but an abuse of process of law.. Considering overall the facts and
circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner has made out
strong case for quashing of FIR. Accordingly, FIR No. 106 of 2015
registered at Police Station - Dhamtari on 9-10-2015 for alleged offence said
to have been committed under Section 384 and 388 of IPC is quashed.
Consequently, the criminal proceeding pending before the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari is also quashed.
28) Accordingly, the instant petition is allowed. No order as to costs.
29) A copy of this order be sent to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, for closure of the proceedings.
Sd/-
(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
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