Mr. Ojha, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the constitutional right of the petitioner to have a
copy of the judgment of conviction and challenge the order of
conviction is infringed. An endeavor was made to impress upon the
Court that there are two distinct parts in the judgment of conviction
and sentence. The judgment of conviction precedes the proceedings
which are conducted by trial Court to impose the sentence. At the
stage of delivery of judgment itself, a right to prefer an appeal
there against arises to the accused. The denial of the opportunity to
prefer an appeal against the order of conviction causes grave
prejudice to the right of the accused, urged Mr. Ojha.
Sub Section (1) of Section 363 envisages that the copy of the judgment shall immediately after the pronouncement of judgment be given to the accused free of cost, when the accused is sentenced to imprisonment. Had it been the intention of the legislature that a copy of the judgment be made available to the accused the moment the judgment of conviction, meaning thereby holding the accused guilty of a particular offence, is pronounced, the legislature would not have used in Sub Section (4) of Section 353 of the Code the expression that ‘the copy thereof shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of costs.’
25. In view of the aforesaid provisions contained in the Code,
we are afraid to accede to the submission on behalf of the petitioner that there is either a constitutional or statutory right to prefer an appeal against the order holding the person guilty of offence. The provisions contained in Section 235 of the Code cannot be stretched to hold that there is an independent right to assail the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, apart from right to prefer an appeal against the order of conviction and sentence.
27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different
perspective. If we accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that in every matter, where the accused is held guilty of a particular offence, he has a right to prefer an appeal against the said finding of holding him guilty, then there is a clear and present risk of destroying the integrity of trial. It would entail a two stage consideration by the appellate Court. First, after the accused is held guilty of the offence. Second, consequent to imposition of sentence on the accused. Such proposition cannot be countenanced, especially in the absence of a statutory prescription.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3214 OF 2021
Pankaj Arjunbhai Koli Vs The State of Maharashtra
CORAM : S. S. SHINDE &
N. J. JAMADAR, JJ.
DATE : 17th SEPTEMBER, 2021.
1. The Petitioner who is convicted for the offences
punishable under Section 376 (1), 376(2)(n) and 506(II) of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (‘Penal Code’) has preferred this petition for the
following relief:-
(a) this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to
direct the Ld. Sessions Judge to pronounce and
upload the judgment of conviction dated
18.08.2021 and permit the petitioner/accused
to avail the remedy of appeal fle of Ld.
Additional Sessions (Special Judge POCSO Act),
Mumbai, Court Room No. 39, arising out of C.R.
No. 128/2015 registered with the J.J. Marg
Police Station, Mumbai.
2. The background facts which are necessary for
determining the limited controversy raised in this petition can be
stated as under:-
The petitioner was sent for trial in a proceedings arising
out of C.R. No. 128/2015 registered with J.J. Marg Police Station,
Mumbai, for the offences punishable under Section 376(1), 376(2)
(n), 506(II), 354 of the Penal Code and Section 4 and 6 of Protection
of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Post conclusion of trail,
the learned Sessions Judge by an order dated 18th August, 2021,
held the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 376(2)
(n) and 506 (II) of the Penal Code. It is the contention of the
petitioner that the petitioner has applied for a copy of judgment of
conviction. However, the learned Sessions Judge was persuaded to
reject the application without assigning any reason. The petitioner
was taken in custody. Bail application preferred by the petitioner
came to be rejected. Sentence has yet not been pronounced.
The substance of the claim of the petitioner is that the
petitioner must have been provided with a copy of judgment
whereby the petitioner was held guilty for the offences punishable
under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 (II) of the Penal Code as the
petitioner has a fundamental right to prefer an appeal against the
very order of conviction, as distinct from the judgment of conviction
and sentence.
3. In the light of submissions which were canvased
yesterday to the effect that the judgment of conviction has not yet
been pronounced and it was noted in the ordersheet only that the
petitioner was held guilty of aforesaid offences, we thought it
appropriate to call a report from the learned Sessions Judge to
ascertain the true state of affairs.
4. The learned Sessions Judge has submitted a report
dated 16th September, 2021 and informed that the entire judgment
was already typed and made ready in all respects on 18th August,
2021 itself. The learned Sessions Judge has also adverted to the
developments which took place in the intervening period. We do not
propose to delve into those details except recording that in the
intervening period six applications were filed on behalf of the
accused and the matter was required to be adjourned on twelve
occasions. Mr. Ojha did not dispute that six applications were filed
on behalf of the petitioner.
5. Mr. Ojha, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the constitutional right of the petitioner to have a
copy of the judgment of conviction and challenge the order of
conviction is infringed. An endeavor was made to impress upon the
Court that there are two distinct parts in the judgment of conviction
and sentence. The judgment of conviction precedes the proceedings
which are conducted by trial Court to impose the sentence. At the
stage of delivery of judgment itself, a right to prefer an appeal
there against arises to the accused. The denial of the opportunity to
prefer an appeal against the order of conviction causes grave
prejudice to the right of the accused, urged Mr. Ojha.
6. In order to lend support to the aforesaid submissions,
Mr. Ojha invited our attention to the provisions contained in Section
235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’) and
interpretation put thereon by the Supreme Court in the case of
Santa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab1, and the subsequent
judgments which followed the proposition in the case of Santa Singh
(supra). Mr. Ojha laid special emphasis on the following
observations of Supreme Court in Para 2 of the judgment in the
case of Santa Singh (supra):
2. The appeal is limited to the
question of sentence and the principal
argument advanced on behalf of the
appellant is that I no not giving an
1 (1976) 4 SCC 190
opportunity to the appellant to be
heard in regard to the sentence to be
imposed on him after the judgment was
pronounced convicting him, the
learned Sessions Judge committed a
breach of Section 235(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 and that
vitiated the sentence of death imposed
on the appellant. This argument is a
substantial one and it rests on the true
interpretation of Section 235(2). This
is a new provision and it occurs in
Section 235 of the Code of Criminal
Proceudre, 1973 which reads as
follows:
235. (1) After hearing arguments and
points of law (if any), the Judge shall
give a judgment in the case.
(2) If the accused is convicted, the
Judge shall, unless he proceeds in
accordance with the provisions of
Section 360, hear the accused on the
question of sentence, and then pass
sentence on him according to law.
This provision is clear and explicit and
does not admit of any doubt. It requires
that in very trial before a court of
sessions, there must be a decision as
to the guilt of the accused. The court
must, in the fst instance, deliver a
judgment convicting or acquitting the
accused. If the accused is acquitted, no
further question arises. But if he is
convicted, then the court has to “hear
the accused on the question of
sentence, and then pass sentence on
him according to law”. When a
judgment is rendered convicting the
accused, he is, at at that state, to be
given an opportunity to be heard in
regard to the sentence and it is only
after hearing him that the court can
proceed to pass the sentence.
7. Laying stress on the observations that “The Court, must,
in the frst instance deliver a judgment convicting or acquitting the
accused. --------. But if he is convicted, then the court has to hear
the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on
him according to law”, Mr. Ojha strenuously urged that the delivery
of a judgment of conviction is the requirement law fowing from
Section 235 of the Code.
8. Mr. Ojha, placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Modi Telefbers Ltd. & Others Vs.
Sujit Kumar Choudhary and Others2, wherein in the context of an
order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, holding
the appellant therein guilty of contempt of Court, the Supreme
Court held that the fndings recorded by the learned Single Judge
could not have been treated to be an interlocutory order and the
appellant could not have been denied the right to challenge the said
order by preferring an appeal. Reliance was placed on the
observations contained in para 4 and 5 of the said judgment.
4. After hearing the learned counsel
for the parties and perusing the
impugned order, we fnd that the
Division Bench has committed gross
error in overlooking the contents of the
order of the learned Single Judge in
2 (2005) 7 SCC 40
which the fnding has been recorded
that the employer has committed
contempt by not paying full dues of the
workmen under the award.
5. Such an order of the learned
Single Judge could not have been
treated to be an interlocutory order and
the right of appeal denied to the
appellant employer merely because the
learned Single Judge had adjourned the
contempt proceedings to enable the
alleged contemnor to purge the
contempt or else for deciding the
quantum of punishment.
9. Our attention was also invited to the observations of
learned Single Judge of Chattisgarh High Court in the case of Kiran
Singh Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Another3, wherein, in the context
of the allegations that the learned trial Judge had merely recorded
in the order sheet that the judgment is written, signed and dated
separately, but the enquiry revealed that the said judgments were
not forthcoming on the record of the Court, the learned Single
Judge held that the order sheets cannot be construed as judgment.
Reliance was placed on para 26 to 29 of the said judgment.
26. The Division Bench of Patna High
Court in Ramautar Thakur V. State of
Bihar, held thus:
18. The Criminal Procedure Code,
unlike the Civil Procedure Code does not
defne ‘Judgment’ A judgment means the
expression of the opinion of the Court
arrived at after, a due consideration of the
3 2016 SCC OnLine Chh 2123
evidence and all the arguments. The above
meaning of the word ‘Judgment’, as is to
be found in Full Bench decisions of the
Madras High Court in Re Chinna Kaliappa
Goundan, of the Bombay High Court in
Emperor V. Nan-dial Chunt Lal and of the
Calcutta High Court in Damu Senapati V.
Shridhar Rajwar, was approved by their
Lordships Bhagwati and Imam JJ., in the
Supreme Court case just mentioned.
Their Lordships mentioned that the
observations of the Madras High Court in
its Full Bench decision, just referred to,
were quoted with approval by Sulaiman, J.,
in Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor: AIR
1939 FC 43 (T). in which his Lordships
Sulaiman, J., observed that the Criminal
Procedure Code did not defne a
‘judgment’, but various sections of the
Code suggested what it meant His
Lordships then discussed those sections
and concluded that ‘judgment’ in the Code
meant a judgment of conviction or
acquittal.
19. The question, therefore, for our
consideration is, is the order of dismissal
for default a ‘judgment’?
20. In the case of AIR 1928 Rang 238 (G),
it has been held that an order of dismissal
for default is not a ‘judgment’ within the
meaning of section 369, Criminal P.C.
21. In this connection the observation of
Sulaiman, J., in ‘Dr. Hori Ram Singh (T)’,
above mentioned, which was held by the
Supreme Court to be sound, may be
reproduced below:
“It will be seen that an order under section
435 can with diffculty be called a
‘judgment’. All that a judge does at his
preliminary stage is either to send for the
records of the lower Court with it a view to
examining them under section 439(1), or
to refuse to do so it is difficult to see how
the later can possibly be called, a
judgment of conviction. When such an
order consists of the one word “Dismissed”
can it necessarily be taken as a judicial
pronouncement that in the opinion of the
Judge the respondent was rightly
convicted upon the evidence? It seems to
me that all that it means is that the Judge
sees no adequate ground disclosed in the
petition or on the face of the judgment for
proceeding further.”
22. His Lordship Bhagwati, J. in the
Supreme Court case in delivering his own
‘judgment and that of His Lordship Imam,
J. observed thus:
“The “order dismissing the appeal or
criminal revision summarily or in limine
would no doubt be a fnal order of the High
Court not subject to review or revision even
by the High Court itself but would not
tantamount to a judgment replacing that
of the lower Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27.Thus, by now it is fairly settled that to
constitute a judgment rendered by a
Criminal Court, it is not the operative part
written in the order sheet which would
constitute the judgment but it is the
discussion on the merits of the
prosecution evidence, the arguments of
both the sides and the fndings based on
reasons to conclude the trial in conviction
or acquittal, which would constitute a
judgment.
28. If the orders in the order sheet
pasised in the present case would
constitute a judgment, then there is
nothing to be appealed against because
there is no discussion at all of the
prosecution case and the reasons for
recording of such fnding which entitles
the accused to be acquitted.
29. In view of the authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court in
Jagdev Singh Talwandi (supra) and Yakub
Abdul Razak Memon (supra), the order
passed in order sheet in favour of each of
the petitioner acquitting them of the
charges by a two line order would not
constitute judgment, therefore, the trial
has not come to an end on the basis of
such order. Moreover, the trial Judge has
mentioned in the order sheet that the
judgment is signed and dated in the open
Court, however, there is no judgment
available in the record of the Court,
therefore, the Judge himself had construed
that there is a separate document which
he has referred as judgment, which is
distinct and separate than the order in the
order sheet wherein the acquittal is
recorded.
10. Lastly, Mr. Ojha, invited our attention to the observations
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade
and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others4, wherein the
Supreme Court did not approve the practice of pronouncing the
fnal orders without a reasoned judgment. Emphasis was laid on the
observations of the Supreme Court in Para 11 and 12 of the said
judgment, which read as under:-
11. We must note with regret
that the counsel extended through
various judicial pronouncements
including the one referred to aforesaid
appear to have been ignored, more
importantly where oral orders are
pronounced. In case of such orders, it
is expected that they are either
4 2020 SCC OnLine SC 893
dictated in the Court or at least must
follow immediately thereafter, to
facilitate any aggrieved party to seek
redressal from the higher Court. The
delay in delivery of judgments has
been observed to be a violation of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India
in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as
stated aforesaid, the problem gets
aggravated when the operative portion
is made available early and the
reasons follow much later.
12.It cannot be countenanced that
between the date of the operative
portion of the order and the reasons
disclosed, there is a hiatus period of
nine months! This is much more than
what has been observed to be the
maximum time period for even
pronouncement of reserved judgment
as per Anil Rai’s case (supra).
11. In opposition to this, Mrs. Shinde, the learned APP
would urge that there is no material irregularity in the proceedings
of the learned Sessions Judge. Mrs. Shinde, invited our attention to
the provisions contained in Section 354 and Section 363 of the
Code to buttress the submission that the right of the accused to
have a copy of the judgment crystallizes only upon the
pronouncement of the sentence. The thrust of submission of Mrs.
Shinde was that the sentence forms an integral part of the
judgment and till the sentence is pronounced there is no right of
appeal against the order holding the accused guilty of the offences
charged.
12. We have given our careful consideration to the
submissions canvased across the bar. We have also perused the
material on record including the copies of ordersheets, which are
annexed to the petition. We have carefully perused the judgments
cited across the bar by Mr. Ojha.
13. The moot question, which is sought to be urged on behalf
of the petitioner, is whether the accused has a right to have the copy
of the judgment the moment the judgment of conviction is
pronounced and a further right to assail the judgment of conviction
eo instanti. The edifce of the challenge is sought to be built around
the provisions contained in Section 235 of the Code. Section 235 of
the Code reads as under:-
235. Judgment of acquittal or
conviction.- (1) After hearing
arguments and point of law (if any),
the Judge shall give a judgment in the
cae.
(2) If the accused is convicted, the
Judge shall, unless he proceeds in
accordance with the provisions of
section 360, hear the accused on the
question of sentence, and then pass
sentence on him according to law.
14. In our view the reliance sought to be placed on the
aforesaid provisions does not advance the cause of the petitioner.
On a proper construction of the said provision, especially sub
section (2)of Section 235 of the Code, it becomes abundantly clear that an important and, in a sense, inviolable right of the accused to be heard on the point of sentence is secured thereby. The said provision, in our view, cannot be construed in such a fashion as to provide right to the accused to prefer an appeal against the order of conviction only. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Santa Singh (supra) especially the portion extracted above that ‘the Court must, in the first instance, deliver the judgment convicting or acquitting the accused’, do not imply that there is a distinct judgment of conviction followed by the judgment of sentence.
15. The aforesaid position becomes abundantly clear, if we
consider the relevant provisions in the Code. Section 353 of the
Code prescribes the manner in which the judgment shall be
pronounced. Section 354 of the Code deals with the language and
contents of the judgment. The relevant part of Section 354 reads as
under:-
354. Language and contents of
judgment.-(1) Except as otherwise
expressly provided by this Code, every
judgment referred to in section 353,-
(a) -------
b) -------
c) shall specify the offence (if any) of
which, and the section of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) of other law
under which, the accused is
convicted and the punishment to which
he is sentenced;
(d) -----
Section 372 of the Code declares that there is no right of
appeal unless expressly provided by the Code or any other law.
Section 372 of the Code reads as under:
372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise
provided.- No appeal shall lie from any
judgment or order of Criminal Court
except as provided for by this Code or by
any other law for the time being in force:
1 [Provided that the victim shall have a
right to prefer an appeal against any
order passed by the Court acquitting the
accused or convicting for a lesser offence
or imposing inadequate compensation,
and such appeal shall lie to the Court to
which an appeal ordinarily lies against
the order of conviction of such Court].
16. Section 374 of the Code provides for appeal from
conviction. Sub Section (2) and (3) of Section 374 are material,
which read as under:-
374. Appeals from convictions.
(1) --------
(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by
a Sessions Judge or an Additional
Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any
other Court in which a sentence of
imprisonment for more than seven years
has been passed against him or against
any other person convicted at the same
trial], may appeal to the High Court.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in subsection
(2), any person,-
(a) convicted on a trial held by a
Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant
Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the frst
class, or of the second class, or
(b) sentenced under section 325, or
(c) in respect of whom an order has been
made or a sentence has been passed
under section 360 by any Magistrate, may
appeal to the Court of Session.
17. Section 386 of the Code describes the power of appellate
Court. Clause (b) of Section 386 of the Code is relevant for
determining the controversy at hand. It reads as under:-
386. Powers of the Appellate Court.-
After perusing such record and hearing
the appellant or his pleader, if he appears
and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears,
and in case of an appeal under section
377 or section 378, the accused, if he
appears, the Appellate Court may, if it
considers that there is no suffcient
ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal,
of may-
(a) xxxx
(b) in an appeal from a conviction-
(i) reverse the fnding and sentence and
acquit or discharge the accused, or order
him to be re-tried by a Court of contempt
jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate
Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the fnding, maintaining the
sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the fnding,
alter the nature or the extent, or the
nature and extent, of the sentence, but
not so as to enhance the same;
18. A bare perusal of aforesaid provisions would indicate
that the clause ‘c’ of Sub Section (1) of Section 354 indicates that
the Court should specify the offence of which and Section of the
particular enactment under which the accused is convicted and the
punishment to which he is sentenced. The legislature has taken
care to provide that the conviction and sentence or consequential
orders form an integral part of the judgment whereby a person is
convicted. A judgment cannot be said to be complete unless the
punishment to which the accused is sentenced is set out therein.
This position is further clarifed by Sub Section (2) and (3) of
Section 374 of the Code. The forum before which the appeal may lie
is made dependent upon the quantum of sentence imposed by the
trial Court. Thus, what is appealable under Section 374 is a complete
judgment of conviction and not a mere finding of holding an
accused guilty of a particular offence. Section 386 of the Code,
extracted above, indicates that in a appeal from conviction the
appellate Court may (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit
or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of
competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate Court or (ii)
alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without
altering the finding alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same. The
aforesaid text of Section 386 makes it crystal clear that the finding
and sentence form an inseparable part of judgment of conviction.
19. A useful reference, in this context, can be made to the a
3 judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama
Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang5. Para No. 13 and 15 are instructive.
They read as under:-
13. Chapter XXVII deals with
judgment. Section 35 sets out the
contends of judgment. It says that every
judgment referred to in Section 353
shall, inter alia, specify the offence (if
any) of which and the Section of the
Indian Penal Code or other law under
which, the accused is con- victed and
the punishment to which he is
5 (1995) 2 SCC 513
sentenced. Thus a judgment is not
complete unless the punishment to
which the accused person is sentenced
is set out therein. Section 356 refers to
the making of an order for notifying
address of previously convicted offender.
Section 357 refers to an order in regard
to the payment of compensation. Section
359 provides for an order in regard to
the payment of costs in non-cognizable
cases and Section 360 refers to release
on probation of good conduct. It will
thus be seen from the above provisions
that after the court records a conviction,
the accused has to be heard on the
question of sentence and it is only after
the sentence is awarded that the
judgment becomes complete and can be
appealed against under Section 374 of
the Code.
14. -----------
15. Under the provisions of the Code to
which we have already referred there are
two stages in a criminal trial before a
Sessions Court, the stage upto the
recording of a conviction and the stage
post conviction upto the imposition of
sentence. A judgment becomes complete
after both these stages are covered.
[emphasis supplied]
20. The aforesaid pronouncement settles the controversy
sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner.
21. This leads us to the grievance of the petitioner that the
copy of the judgment of conviction ought to have been made
available to the petitioner immediately after the order of conviction
was pronounced.
22. The provisions contained in Section 353 of the Code
provide an answer to the controversy sought to be raised on behalf
of the petitioner. Sub Section (1) of Section 353 provides three
modes of pronouncement of judgment: (a) by delivering the whole of
the judgment; or (b) by reading out the whole of the judgment; or (c)
by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining
the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by
the accused or his pleader.
23. Section 353 (4) of the Code reads as under:-
353. Judgment.-
(1) ------
(2)------
(3)------
(4) Where the judgment is pronounced in
the manner specifed in clause (c) of
sub-section (1), the whole judgment or a
copy thereof shall be immediately made
available for the perusal of the parties or
their pleaders free of cost.
24. Evidently, Sub Section (4) of Section 353 enjoins the
Court to immediately make available for the perusal of the parties or
the pleader free of cost the whole judgment or copy thereof where
the judgment is pronounced in the manner specified in clause (c) to
sub section (1). If this provision is compared and contrasted with
Section 363 of the Code which provides for furnishing a copy of the
judgment to the accused, the position becomes clear. Sub Section
(1) of Section 363 envisages that the copy of the judgment shall
immediately after the pronouncement of judgment be given to the
accused free of cost, when the accused is sentenced to
imprisonment. Had it been the intention of the legislature that a
copy of the judgment be made available to the accused the moment
the judgment of conviction, meaning thereby holding the accused
guilty of a particular offence, is pronounced, the legislature would
not have used in Sub Section (4) of Section 353 of the Code the
expression that ‘the copy thereof shall be made available for the
perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of costs.’
25. In view of the aforesaid provisions contained in the Code,
we are afraid to accede to the submission on behalf of the petitioner that there is either a constitutional or statutory right to prefer an appeal against the order holding the person guilty of offence. The provisions contained in Section 235 of the Code cannot be stretched to hold that there is an independent right to assail the findingsrecorded by the learned Sessions Judge, apart from right to prefer an appeal against the order of conviction and sentence.
26. Reliance sought to be placed on the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Modi Telefbers Ltd. & Ors.(surpa),
does not seem to be well founded, as the said decision was rendered
in the peculiar facts of the case where the Division Bench had held
that the order holding the person guilty of contempt was an
interlocutory order.
27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different
perspective. If we accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that in every matter, where the accused is held guilty of a particular offence, he has a right to prefer an appeal against the said finding of holding him guilty, then there is a clear and present risk of destroying the integrity of trial. It would entail a two stage consideration by the appellate Court. First, after the accused is held guilty of the offence. Second, consequent to imposition of sentence on the accused. Such proposition cannot be countenanced, especially in the absence of a statutory prescription.
28. For the foregoing reasons we do not find any merit in the
petition. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
29. The petition thus stands dismissed.
30. The learned Sessions Judge shall proceed to pass an
appropriate sentence in accordance with law.
31. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this
order.
32. Registry to send an authenticated copy of this order to
the Court of learned Sessions Judge.
( N. J. JAMADAR, J.) (S. S. SHINDE, J.)
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