In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, pointing out the
distinction in the matter of impleadment of a party in a suit relating to property and a matter involving a declaration as regards the status or legal character, the Supreme Court observed that, in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subjectmatter of the litigation. It was further observed what makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved in the suit. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 and 14 are instructive and, thus,
extracted below :“
13 A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating
to property and those in which the subject matter of litigation is
a declaration as regards status or legal character. In the
former category, the rule of present interest as distinguished
from the Commercial interest is required to be shown before
a person may be added as a party.
14 It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to
prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally
have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable
consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The
person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary
as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not
merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the
questions involved that would only make him a necessary
witness and not merely that he has an interest in the correct
solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant
arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it
necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he
should be bound by the result of the action and the question to
be settled therefore, must be a question in the action which
cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a
party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the
rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and
commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that person
must be directly or legally interested in the action in the
answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result
which will affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal
rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as
a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own
cause of action." (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at hand, the petitioners do not claim any proprietary interest in the land on which the unauthorized constructions are allegedly erected. The petitioners, on the contrary, desire to ensure a favourable outcome of C.S. No. 94 of 2017 so as to advance their commercial interest. This pure commercial interest separates the petitioners from the class litigants who have an abiding interest in the orderly and planned development and thus approach the Court to compel the planning authority to perform its duty.
29. The learned Judge was justified in observing that the
impleadment of the petitioners would change the nature of adjudication. If the petitioners are impleaded as party defendants, inevitably, the questions as to whether the building permission was lawfully granted, whether access as per norms was available at the time of grant of building permission and whether the Corporation can now withheld the permission for want of access as per norms would be urged for consideration and adjudication. These aspects are not germane for the adjudication of the dispute between the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 and respondent No.11. There is a clear and present danger of the trial of the suit taking the turn of a distinct trial between the petitioners and Planning Authority.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 6563 OF 2017
Mr.Ashok Bansidhar Agarwal Vs The State of Maharashtra
CORAM : N.J. JAMADAR, J.
Dated: 22nd July 2019
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of the
learned counsels for the parties, heard finally.
2. These petitions take exception to the orders dated 9th May 2017 in
Chamber Summons No. 72 of 2017 and 192 of 2017, taken out by the
petitioners in the respective petitions, to implead them as party
defendants in Suit No. 94 of 2017 instituted by the respondent Nos. 2 to
10 herein against the respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation, whereby
the learned Judge, City Civil Court rejected both the chamber summons.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts can be stated
as under :M/
s.Rajeshwari Land Developer Private Limitedpetitionerapplicant
in Chamber Summons No.192 of 2017 in L.C. Suit No.94 of
2017 is a company. It deals in the business of development of land and
construction of buildings. The petitioners had developed a plot bearing
No.1363/1364 situated at Village : Malwani, Malad Marve Road, Malad
(W), Mumbai. The petitioners have erected a 21 storied building
thereon. Mr.Ashok Agarwal, (Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6563 of
2017) has purchased a flat in the building constructed by the petitioner.
The respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation had sanctioned the
necessary building plan on being satisfied that there is a road having
width of 9.10 mtrs. available for access to the said building. After
completion of the construction, the respondent No.11 has withheld the
occupation certificate on the premise that there is no access to the said building. It transpired that some encroachers have erected unauthorized
construction on the road leading to the said premises. The respondent
No.11Municipal
Corporation has initiated action for removal of
unauthorized construction on the road leading to the said building.
4. The respondent Nos.2 to 10 herein have, however, challenged the
notice, issued by the respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation, under
Section 354A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888
(hereinafter referred as 'the Act'), by instituting Suit No. 94 of 2017. The
petitioners alleged that the officers of the respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation are hand in glove with the plaintiffs in said suit. The
defendants therein have not passed a reasoned order on the reply
furnished by the encroachers to the notice under Section 354A.
In
contrast, the petitioners are in a position to produce relevant material on
record and demonstrate that the structures erected by the plaintiffs in
Suit No. 94 of 2017 are unauthorized. In the event, the Court comes to
the conclusion that the notice under Section 354A
issued by the
respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation is bad in law and thereby
quashes the action initiated by the respondent No.11, it would cause a
serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioner as occupation certificate
would be denied on the premise that there is no access to the said
building constructed by the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner took out
chamber summons bearing No.192 of 2017 to implead it as party
defendant to the said suit, being a necessary party thereto.
5. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6563 of 2017 has taken out
chamber summons No. 72 of 2017 to implead him as a party defendant
by making similar averments, with the change that the petitioner's'
character is that of a purchaser of a flat in the said building constructed
by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6564 of 2017.
6. The learned Judge, City Civil Court, was persuaded to reject both
the chamber summons by passing the impugned order as the learned
Judge was of the view that the petitioners were not the necessary
parties, and that their impleadment would change the nature and scope
of the proceedings in Suit No. 94 of 2017, as, in that event, the question
as to whether the respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation can withheld
the occupation certificate to the building in question would be in issue.
7. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid orders of
rejection of chamber summons Nos.72 of 2017 and 192 of 2017, the
petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
8. I have heard Shri Sushil Upadhaya, the learned counsel for the
petitioner, Shri A.B.Kadam, the learned AGP for for respondent No.1Shraddha
State, Mr. R.A.Thorat, the learned Senior Advocate for respondent Nos.
8 and 9 and Shri Santosh Parad, the learned counsel for the respondent
No.11Municipal
Corporation.
9. Shri Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously
urged that the learned Judge committed a grave error in declining to
permit the petitioners to be impleaded themselves as party defendant to
Suit No. 94 of 2017. It was urged that the fact that the petitioners have
a direct interest in the subject matter of Suit No. 94 of 2017 was
completely lost sight of by the learned Judge. The learned counsel
would further submit that the learned Judge ought to have given due
weight to the fact that at the instance of the petitioners, the action
leading to the issue of notice under Section 354A,
which has been
challenged by the respondent Nos.2 to 10, has been initiated. Moreover,
serious prejudice is caused to the petitioners on account of withholding
of the occupation certificate to the building erected by M/s. Rajeshwari
Land Developer Private Limited for the sole reason that in view of the
unauthorized construction erected by the respondent Nos. 2 to 10, there
is no access thereto as per norms.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged with tenacity that
the adverse and prejudicial consequences, the determination of Suit No.
94 of 2017 would have, on the rights of the petitioners, cannot be
simply ignored. Viewed through this prism, according to the learned
counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners are the necessary parties to
the said suit and in their absence no effective decree can be passed
therein.
11. In opposition to this, Shri R.A. Thorat, the learned Senior Counsel
for respondent Nos. 8 and 9 stoutly submitted that the petitioners have
no interest in the subject matter of the dispute raised in Suit No. 94 of
2017, much less direct. The petitioners do not claim any proprietary title
over the land bearing city survey No.1491, in respect of which the
respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation has issued notice under
Section 354A
of the Act. The petitioners are total strangers to the said
dispute between the plaintiffs and the Planning Authority. An effective
decree can be passed in Suit No.94 of 2017 in the absence of the
petitioners. Nor their presence is necessary to assist the Court for an
effective adjudication. Thus, the petitioners are neither necessary nor
proper parties to the said suit.
12. Evidently, the petitioners sought their impleadment as party
defendants to Suit No. 94 of 2017 in accordance with the provisions
contained in Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
('CPC'). It is trite that under the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC, the Court is empowered to direct that a person may be added as a party to the suit if presence of such person before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to adjudicate all the questions involved in the suit effectively and completely. The true test to determine whether a party is a necessary party to the suit is whether in the absence of the
person, sought to be impleaded as a party to the suit, the controversy
raised in the suit can be effectively and completely adjudicated.
13. The first and foremost principle which governs the power of the
Court in the matter of addition of a party is that the question of addition
of a party under Order I, Rule 10(2) is not one of the initial jurisdiction
of the Court but a judicial discretion which has to be exercised keeping
in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case. A profitable
reference in this context can be made to a judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs.
Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited & Ors. (2010) 7 Supreme Court Cases 417,
wherein the scope and ambit of Order I, Rule 10(2) was propounded as
under :“
22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order I of Rule 10(2)
CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said subrule
is
not about the right of a nonparty
to be impleaded as a party,
but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add
parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the
sub rule
can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of
the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person
who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party
who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff
or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper
party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or
subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In
exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the
Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair
play and not according to whims and caprice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In the backdrop of the aforesaid enunciation of the legal position,
it has to be seen whether, in the instant case, the learned Judge was
justified in exercising the discretion not to implead the petitioners as
party defendants to the suit. The question needs to be addressed from
two perspectives. One, the nature of the suit instituted by the
respondent Nos.2 to 10 against the respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation. Two, the nature of the interest claimed by the petitioners
in the subject matter of the suit. Thereafter, the test as to whether in the
absence of the petitioners an effective decree can be passed, needs to be
applied.
15. The respondent Nos. 2 to 10 the
plaintiffs claimed that their
respective constructions are situated at Survey No.1491, 1502 and 1503.
The respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation has issued a notice under Section 354A
of the Act on 5th May 2017 to demolish the said structure.
Though proper reply has been furnished by the plaintiffs, the officers of
the respondent No.11 have not passed a reasoned order.
16. The said notice is also stated to be vague and invalid. Thus, the
plaintiffs have sought a declaration that the said notice is illegal, bad in
law and inoperative. They have also sought injunction restraining the
Municipal Corporation from taking any action pursuant thereto.
17. In this backdrop, reverting to the case of the petitioners, it
becomes abundantly clear that the petitioners do not claim any title over
the land on which the alleged unauthorized structures stand, in respect
of which notice under Section 354A
was issued by the respondent
No.11. The petitioners, on the other hand, assert that those structures
are located on the road, which provides the access to the building
erected by M/s. Rajeshwari Land Developer Private Limited. Unless the
said unauthorized structures are removed, the requirement of 9.10 mtrs.
wide access to the said building can not be met. Resultantly, the
occupation certificate to the said building would be withheld, on the
premise that there is no access. Thus the presence of the petitioners in Suit No.94 of 2017 is warranted.
18. From the aforesaid nature of interest in the subject matter of the
dispute, in Suit No. 94 of 2017, it becomes evidently clear that the
petitioners have rested their claims for impleadment on the following
counts :
Firstly, the action in question is initiated by the respondent no.11Municipal
Corporation at the instance of the petitioners. Secondly, the
petitioners have necessary material to lend support to the action of the
Municipal Corporation; which has been challenged by the plaintiffs in
Suit No. 94 of 2017. Thirdly, the petitioners would suffer serious
prejudice in the event the proposed action of the respondent No.11Municipal
Corporation is declared as bad in law and the unauthorized
constructions are not demolished and, consequently, the occupation
certificate is not granted to the petitioners.
19. The learned counsel for the petitioners also drew attention of the
Court to the fact that the petitioners have, in fact, instituted petitions in
this Court seeking writ against the Municipal Corporation to forthwith
clear all the encroachments on the road leading to the building and,
thereafter, grant the occupation certificate to the building constructed by
M/s. Rajeshwari Land Developer Private Limited. A specific attention
was invited to an order passed by this Court on 1st July 2017 in Writ
Petition (O.S.) No.2407 of 2016, whereby the Municipal Corporation
was directed to take all possible steps to remove all the encroachments,
after following due process of law.
20. In the circumstances, according to the learned counsel for the
petitioners, the presence of the petitioners is absolutely necessary for an
effectual and complete adjudication of Suit No. 94 of 2017.
21. I find it rather difficult to accede to the aforesaid submission. The
very nature of the suit instituted by the respondent Nos. 2 to 10, against
the Planning Authority, calling in question the notice under Section 354A
of the Act, indicates that the fate of the said suit would revolve
around the legality and validity of the said notice and the actions
proposed to be taken by the Planning Authority pursuant thereto.
Indisputably, the petitioners do not claim proprietary title over the land
on which the alleged unauthorized constructions have been erected. The
petitioners, thus, have no direct interest in the property which is the
subject matter of the dispute in Suit No. 94 of 2017. What the
petitioners claim is that non removal of those unauthorized
constructions would have consequences on their entitlement to get the occupation certificate for the building in question. This circumstance is of no consequence in determining the question as to whether the petitioners are the necessary parties to the said suit.
22. A useful reference in this context can be made to a judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors.2. In the said case,
the Municipal Corporation had issued a notice under Section 351 of the
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act to the appellant for demolition of
two chattels on the terrace on the ground that those were unauthorized
constructions. The appellant had challenged the validity of the said
notice. The respondent No.2 therein, being the original lessee, had
applied for being impleaded as a defendant in the suit on the ground
that it had material to show that the constructions were unauthorized.
The trial Court took a view that the lessee had right, title and interest in
the suit premises and, therefore, a necessary party. Before the Supreme
Court, it was urged on behalf of the respondents that though the
respondent No.2 was not a necessary party, yet, it was a proper party,
whose presence was necessary for a complete adjudication of the
controversy.
2 (1992) 2 Supreme Court Cases 524
23. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, pointing out the
distinction in the matter of impleadment of a party in a suit relating to property and a matter involving a declaration as regards the status or legal character, the Supreme Court observed that, in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subjectmatter of the litigation. It was further observed what makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved in the suit. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 and 14 are instructive and, thus,
extracted below :“
13 A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating
to property and those in which the subjectmatter
of litigation is
a declaration as regards status or legal character. In the
former category, the rule of present interest as distinguished
from the Commercial interest is required to be shown before
a person may be added as a party.
14 It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to
prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally
have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable
consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The
person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary
as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not
merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the
questions involved that would only make him a necessary
witness and not merely that he has an interest in the correct
solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant
arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it
necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he
should be bound by the result of the action and the question to
be settled therefore, must be a question in the action which
cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a
party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the
rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and
commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that person
must be directly or legally interested in the action in the
answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result
which will affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal
rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as
a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own
cause of action.
..................”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In the context of the nature of adjudication warranted on a notice
issued by the Planning Authority alleging unauthorized development
and the interest which a third party may have in the outcome of suit, the
Supreme Court further expounded the legal position in the following
words :“
15 It has been strenuously contended before us that the second
respondent has no interest in the subjectmatter
of the litigation and
the presence of the respondent is not required to adjudicate upon the
issue involved in the suit or for the purpose of deciding the real matter
involved. It is pointed out that the subjectmatter
in the suit is the
notice issued by the Municipal Corporation to the appellant and the
issue is whether it is justified or not. The Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limited is interested in supporting the Municipal
Corporation and sustaining the action taken against the appellant. But
that does not amount to any legal interest in the subjectmatter
in the
sense that the order, if any, either in favour of the appellant or against
the appellant would be binding on this respondent. It is true that being
lessee of the premises, the Hindustan Petroleum corporation Limited
has an answer for the action proposed by the Municipal Corporation
against the appellant, but for the purpose of granting the relief sought
for by the appellant by examining the justification of the notice issued
by the Municipal Corporation, it is not necessary for the Court to
consider that answer. If that be so, the presence of the respondent
cannot be considered as necessary for the purpose of enabling the
Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the
questions involved in the suit. The appellant is proceeded against by
the municipal Corporation for the alleged action in violation of the
municipal laws. The grievance of the respondent against the appellant,
if any, could only be for violation of the agreement and that is based
on a different cause of action. The consolidation of these two in the
same suit is neither contemplated nor permissible.”
25. The aforesaid pronouncement appears to be on all four with the
facts of the instant case. The only interest the petitioners have in the
outcome of C.S. No. 94 of 2017 is that in the event, the validity of the notice under Section 354A is upheld and consequent action of
demolition of unauthorized structure is taken, they would have the
benefit of the alleged access to the building with requisite width and
may get the occupation certificate. That outcome does not make them either necessary or proper party to the suit.
26. The reliance placed by Shri Thorat on a recent judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Mohamed Hussain Gulam Ali Shariffi Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors. 2017 (6) All.M.R. 420 (SC) also appears to be well founded.
27. In the said case, the appellant therein had instituted a suit
challenging a notice issued under Section 351 of the Bombay Municipal Act, by the Municipal Corporation. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein sought to implead themselves as defendants in the said suit on the premise that they had an interest in the suit house, for which they had instituted a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale executed in their favour. The City Civil Court impleaded the respondent
Nos.2 and 3 as proper party to the said suit. The appellant's writ petition
was dismissed by this Court. In an appeal to the Supreme Court, it was
held that in the backdrop of the notice issued under Section 351 of the
Act, by the Municipal Corporation, the only question which fell for
adjudication was whether the notice under Section 351 of the Act is
legally valid or not? The Supreme Court went on to observe as :“
14. To decide this question, in our considered opinion, the only
necessary and proper party to the suit is the Mumbai Municipal
Corporation, Greater Mumbai, i.e., Respondent No.1, who has
issued such notice, and for deciding this question either way, the
presence of respondent Nos.2 and 3 is not at all required. In other
words, the suit can be decided even in the absence of respondent
Nos.2 and 3.
…........
17 In the suit in question, the Court is not called upon to
adjudicate the rights between the appellant and respondents Nos. 2
and 3 in relation to the suit house. Any such dispute, if arises, the
same can be decided in the separate suit, which is pending between
the parties or may be filed, if required, by the parties against each
other but such dispute cannot be tried on the cause of action
pleaded in the present suit by the appellant where the lis is
essentially between the appellant (plaintiff) and respondent no.1.
Merely because the suit house is the subject matter between all the
parties is no ground to get the dispute arising between the parties
settled in one suit regardless of the nature of cause of action on
which the suit is founded.”
28. The case of the petitioners herein rests on a much weaker
foundation than the aforesaid two cases. The case of Ramesh
Hirachand Kundanmal (Supra), the party added therein was the
original lessee of the premises on which unauthorized construction was
alleged. In the case of Mohamed Hussain Gulam Ali Shariffi (Supra),
the parties added therein claimed to have an interest in the suit house
by virtue of an agreement for sale allegedly executed in their favour. In
the case at hand, the petitioners do not claim any proprietary interest in
the land on which the unauthorized constructions are allegedly erected.
The petitioners, on the contrary, desire to ensure a favourable outcome
of C.S. No. 94 of 2017 so as to advance their commercial interest. This
pure commercial interest separates the petitioners from the class
litigants who have an abiding interest in the orderly and planned
development and thus approach the Court to compel the planning
authority to perform its duty.
29. The learned Judge was justified in observing that the
impleadment of the petitioners would change the nature of adjudication.
If the petitioners are impleaded as party defendants, inevitably, the
questions as to whether the building permission was lawfully granted, whether access as per norms was available at the time of grant of building permission and whether the Corporation can now withheld the permission for want of access as per norms would be urged for consideration and adjudication. These aspects are not germane for the adjudication of the dispute between the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 and respondent No.11. There is a clear and present danger of the trial of the suit taking the turn of a distinct trial between the petitioners and Planning Authority.
30. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that the learned
Judge, City Civil Court has rightly exercised the discretion by not
impleading the petitioners as party defendants to Suit No. 94 of 2017 by
applying the correct legal principles to the facts of the case. Thus, no
interference is warranted in the impugned orders in exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, the petitions deserve to be dismissed.
31. The petitions stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as
to costs.
32. Rule stands discharged.
[ N.J. JAMADAR, J. ]
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