Monday, 19 July 2021

Supreme Court: Court should not discharge accused for an offence U/S 306 of IPC while confirming charge U/S 304B of IPC

This Court in the case of Bhupendra (supra) has in

paragraph 30 held as under:

“30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section

306 IPC is much broader in its application and

takes within its fold one aspect of Section 304B

IPC. These two sections are not mutually exclusive.

If a conviction for causing a suicide is based on

Section 304B IPC, it will necessarily attract

Section 306 IPC. However, the converse is not true.

Having heard learned counsel parties, considering

the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the

suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we

are of the opinion that respondents no.1 and 2 ought not

to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306

IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC

and other related sections had already been framed and

confirmed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.601 OF 2021


BHAGWANRAO MAHADEO PATIL  Vs  APPA RAMCHANDRA SAVKAR 

Dated: July 14, 2021


Leave granted.

By this appeal the appellant, who is the

complainant/father of the deceased, has challenged the

order of the High Court whereby the accused respondents,

who are the mother-in-law and father-in-law of the

deceased, have been discharged of the offence under

Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short

“IPC”).

The brief facts of this case are that Aarti

(deceased) was married to Gaurav on 02.01.2016. Within a

period of about 15 months, on 02.04.2017, the deceased

committed suicide, leaving behind two suicide notes dated

01.04.2017 and 02.04.2017. The complainant/father of the

deceased filed an FIR on 03.04.2017 for offences under

Sections 304B, 306, 498A, 406, 506 read with Section 34

IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act

against the husband-Gaurav and also against the father-

in-law and mother-in-law, who are arrayed as respondent

nos.1 and 2 in this appeal.

An application for discharge was filed by

respondents no.1 and 2 before the Trial Court and by

order dated 23.07.2018, Sessions Judge rejected the said

application of respondents no.1 and 2. The Sessions

Judge, on the basis of the statement of the witnesses and

suicide notes, prima facie, found that there was

sufficient material on record to frame charges against

all the accused.

The said order was challenged by respondents no.1

and 2 before the High Court and by order dated

15.04.2019, the High Court partly allowed the Criminal

Revision application of the private respondents to the

extent that they were discharged of the offence under

Section 306 IPC. The High Court found that on the basis

of FIR, suicide notes and personal diary, there was

evidence to frame charge of the offence of cruelty under

the provisions of IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act but there

was no material to frame charge under Section 306 IPC. It

was also held that in order to attract the provisions of

Section 306 IPC, there should be specific material of

constituting the offence under Section 107 IPC, which

constitutes the offence of abatement and as such, there

were no allegations stating that the respondents, who are

in-laws, treated the deceased so badly that she took the

decision of committing suicide.

On the aforesaid grounds, while maintaining the

charges under the other provisions, respondents no.1 and

2 were discharged of the offence under Section 306 IPC.

Challenging the said Order, the complainant, thus, filed

this appeal.

Heard Mr.Sudhanshu S.Chaudhary, learned counsel for

the appellant/complainant, Mr. Shekhar Jagtap, learned

counsel for the private respondents no.1 and 2 and Mr.

Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

State of Maharashtra.

The submission of learned counsel for the appellant

is that once the charges under Section 304B IPC have been

framed, the charge under Section 306 IPC could not be

deleted because there were suicide notes of the deceased

and there were statements of the witnesses, on perusal of

which, the in-laws could not have been discharged of the

offence under Section 306 IPC. It is contended that

though in a given case, where charge under Section 306

IPC is framed, a party could be discharged under Section

304B IPC, but not the reverse. In support of his

submission, learned counsel for the appellant has relied

upon the decision of this Court in the case of Bhupendra

vs. State of Madhya Pradesh - (2014) 2 SCC 106.

Per contra, Mr. Shekhar Jagtap, learned counsel for

respondents no.1 and 2 submitted that in the suicide

notes, there is no allegation against respondents no.1

and 2 and, thus, the said respondents, who are father-inlaw

and mother-in-law of the deceased, have rightly been

discharged of the offence under Section 306 IPC. Learned

counsel has relied on the decision of this Court in the

case of Gurjit Singh vs. State of Punjab – (2019) 16

SCALE 634.

We have perused the said judgment and find that the

same was not a case of discharge but a decision on merits

in appeal against the conviction of the accused and,

thus, the ratio of the said judgment would not be

applicable to the facts of this case.

This Court in the case of Bhupendra (supra) has in

paragraph 30 held as under:

“30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section

306 IPC is much broader in its application and

takes within its fold one aspect of Section 304B

IPC. These two sections are not mutually exclusive.

If a conviction for causing a suicide is based on

Section 304B IPC, it will necessarily attract

Section 306 IPC. However, the converse is not true.

Having heard learned counsel parties, considering

the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the

suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we

are of the opinion that respondents no.1 and 2 ought not

to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306

IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC

and other related sections had already been framed and

confirmed.


Accordingly, we allow this appeal by setting aside

the order of the High Court while restoring the order of

the Sessions Judge.

...................J.

(VINEET SARAN)

...................J.

(DINESH MAHESHWARI)

New Delhi;

July 14, 2021


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