While relying upon the principles annunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, the learned Appellate Court in the impugned judgment observed that the daughter-in-law (petitioner herein) was not residing at the house in question on the day of presentation of the complaint nor any time soon before. Further observed that she was occupying a staff quarter allotted to her husband and lived in the house in
question only for short duration and occasionally visited parents-in-law, to say only thrice. The Appellate Court accordingly held that these short durational visits or stay of daughter-in-law at the house of the parents-inlaw would not get the house a colour of being a shared house hold and having hold so, the restraint order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside, it being without any finding as regards the nature of premises being a shared house hold. Further held that the parents-in-law shall be well within their rights to sell off the house in question.{Para 14}
20. But the pertinent question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the old aged parents-in-laws, who at the fag-end of their life, wish to sell off their property to relocate themselves in a better place of their choice, be restrained to sell of the house or permitted to do it? In this regard, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish
Chandra Ahuja (Supra) are as under:-
“90. Before we close our discussion on Section 2(s),
we need to observe that the right to residence under Section
19 is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared
household especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted
against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. The senior
citizens in the evening of their life are also entitled to live
peacefully not haunted by marital discord between their son
and daughter-in-law. While granting relief both in
application under Section 12 of the 2005 Act or in any civil
proceedings, the Court has to balance the rights of both the
parties. The directions issued by the High Court [Ambika
Jain v. Ram Prakash Sharma, 2019 SCC OnLine Del
11886] in para 56 adequately balance the rights of both the
parties.”
21. Applying the afore-noted observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the case in hand, this Court finds that the impugned judgment dated 03.05.2021 suffers from no illegality or infirmity.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
CRL.M.C. 1327/2021 & CRL.M.A.7314/2021
VIBHUTI WADHWA SHARMA Vs KRISHNA SHARMA AND ANR.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT
Pronounced on: 17.05.2021
1. Parties to the present petition are related to each other in a way that
petitioner is the daughter-in-law and respondents are her parents-in-law. The
matrimonial dispute between petitioner-wife, with son of respondents is the
foundation of dispute inter se parties. Multiple legal proceedings are said to
be pending between husband and wife but what has brought parties to this
Court is the Agreement to Sell dated 18.02.2021 entered between
respondent No.1- mother-in-law with third party qua property bearing Flat
No.33, Second Floor, SFS DDA Flats, Motia Khan, New Delhi, which is
purportedly in her name. According to petitioner the property in question is
a shared household property where she had lived with her husband and so,
she cannot be alienated from the said property.
2. In the aforesaid view of the matter, petitioner filed an application
under Section 19(1)(d) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) and the learned Magistrate after issuance of notice,
vide order dated 15.03.2021 granted interim relief to petitioner restraining
the respondents from selling or alienating the property in question. The
learned Metropolitan Magistrate posted the matter for 27.07.2021 for
arguments on interim application as well as on application seeking restraint.
3. Aggrieved against the said interim order dated 15.03.2021 passed by
the learned Magistrate, respondents herein preferred a revision petition
before the Court of Sessions under Section 395/397 Cr.P.C., which was
converted into an appeal and vide judgment dated 03.05.2021 the said
appeal was allowed. This is how petitioner is before this Court seeking
setting aside of judgment dated 03.05.2021 passed by the learned Appellate
Court.
4. Since the subject matter of the present petition is Agreement to Sell
dated 18.02.2021 which has to be concluded or executed by 18.05.2021 and
also since time is the essence of any agreement, therefore, the present
petition has been heard on a short notice. Learned counsel for respondents
has chosen to argue the present petition without filing any reply and
therefore, with the consent of counsel for the parties, the present petition
was finally heard at length.
5. Mr. Jatan Singh, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the
impugned judgment dated 03.05.2021 passed by the learned Appellate Court
shows utter non application of mind, as it has been passed without
considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned counsel
submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has failed to consider the
provisions of Section 2(a) and 2(s) of DV Act, 2005 and has also failed to
correctly interpret the law laid down the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja 2021 (1) SCC 148, as the said decision
does not distinguish between permanent living or short duration living in the
shared household. Further submitted that the Appellate Court has not
considered said judgment in its correct perspective wherein definition of
shared household in Section 2(s) of DV Act has been rewritten by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
6. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that the Appellate
Court has wrongly held that since petitioner most of the time had stayed at
different workstations of her husband, however, lived in the property in
question on three occasions for a short duration with the respondents,
therefore, the said house cannot be said to be a shared household.
7. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that petitioner’s complaint under
the DV Act, 2012 is pending consideration for the last 4½ years and by
permitting the respondents to execute the Agreement to Sell, great prejudice
has been caused to petitioner and her minor son. Thus, interest of justice
demands that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and
respondents be restrained from selling the property in question without
making any provision for alternative accommodation for the petitioner and
her son. A direction is also sought to the learned trial court to expeditiously
decide petitioner’s application under Section 19 (1) (d) of DV Act.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Rupenshu Pratap Singh, learned counsel for
respondents submitted that the property in question is in the name of
mother-in-law and being the sole owner, she has a legal right to alienate or
sell the property as per her wish and so, the Agreement to Sell dated
18.02.2021 is a valid agreement and petitioner has no right to challenge it.
Learned counsel submitted that petitioner has no title or interest in the
property in question and the property is not a joint property. Moreover, since
the marriage of petitioner with the son of respondents, she has stayed with
him at the place of his posting and has visited them occasionally, so, the
house cannot be said to be a shared household. Further submitted that the
learned Appellate Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment while
discussing the various provisions of law and applying the law laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja (Supra), and so, the
present petition deserves to be dismissed. Lastly, learned counsel
emphasized that the Agreement to Sell has to be concluded by the first
respondent by 18.05.2021 and if it is not so done, it would cause huge loss to her.
9. This Court heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned judgment, provisions of DV Act as well as Hon’ble Supreme
Court’s decision in Satish Chandra Ahuja (Supra) carefully.
10. On an application filed by the petitioner/complainant to restrain the
respondents/parents-in-law from selling or alienating the subject property,
notice was issued and a restrained order was passed on 15.03.2021 by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate. However, since Agreement to Sell has to
be executed within a limited time frame, the aggrieved parents-in-law filed
an appeal against the restraint order, which was allowed by the learned
Appellate Court after giving due opportunity of being heard.
11. While passing the impugned judgment, the learned Appellate Court
has elaborately discussed the various provisions of law under the DV Act
with regard to shared house hold. While noting the provisions of Section 17
of the Statute, the learned Appellate Court observed as under:-
“The provision grants a right to the aggrieved person to
reside in shared house-hold irrespective of her right, title or
interest in the same. Sub-sec.-2 of the Sec.-17 of the Statute
provides that the aggrieved person shall not be evicted or
excluded from the shared house-hold save in accordance
with procedure established by law. Exclusion, here, cannot
be read to protect titular interests of aggrieved person.”
12. Further, the learned Appellate Court has referred to Section 2(s) of the
Statute, which defines shared household and relied upon decision in Satish
Chandra Ahuja (Supra) where the rights of an aggrieved woman as
provided under Sections 17 & 19 of the Statute, came to be revisited by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
13. The said decision has been intricately discussed in the impugned
judgment dated 03.05.2021 passed by the learned Appellate Court. The
relevant paras relied upon are as under:-
“67. …………….When we look into the different kinds of
orders or reliefs, which can be granted on an application
filed by aggrieved person, all orders contemplate providing
protection to the women in reference to the premises in
which aggrieved person is or was in possession. Our above
conclusion is further fortified by statutory scheme as
delineated by Section 19 of the 2005 Act. In event, the
definition of “shared household” as occurring in Section
2(s) is read to mean that all houses where the aggrieved
person has lived in a domestic relationship along with the
relatives of the husband shall become shared household,
there will be number of shared household, which was never
contemplated by the legislative scheme. The entire scheme
of the Act is to provide immediate relief to the aggrieved
person with respect to the shared household where the
aggrieved person lives or has lived. As observed above, the
use of the expression “at any stage has lived” was only with
intent of not denying the protection to aggrieved person
merely on the ground that aggrieved person is not living as
on the date of the application or as on the date when the
Magistrate concerned passes an order under Section 19.
The apprehension expressed by this Court in para 26 in S.R.
Batra v. Taruna Batra, thus, was not true apprehension and
it is correct that in event such interpretation is accepted, it
will lead to chaos and that was never the legislative intent.
We, thus, are of the considered opinion that shared
household referred to in Section 2(s) is the shared
household of aggrieved person where she was living at the
time when application was filed or in the recent past had
been excluded from the use or she is temporarily absent.
68. The words “lives or at any stage has lived in a
domestic relationship” have to be given its normal and
purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household
has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere
fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a
shared household. The intention of the parties and the
nature of living including the nature of household have to be
looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to
treat the premises as shared household or not. As noted
above, the 2005 Act was enacted to give a higher right in
favour of women. The 2005 Act has been enacted to provide
for more effective protection of the rights of the women who
are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the
family. The Act has to be interpreted in a manner to
effectuate the very purpose and object of the Act. Section
2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 of the 2005 Act grants an
entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence
under the shared household irrespective of her having any
legal interest in the same or not.”
14. While relying upon the principles annunciated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, the learned Appellate Court in the
impugned judgment observed that the daughter-in-law (petitioner herein)
was not residing at the house in question on the day of presentation of the
complaint nor any time soon before. Further observed that she was
occupying a staff quarter allotted to her husband and lived in the house in
question only for short duration and occasionally visited parents-in-law, to
say only thrice. The Appellate Court accordingly held that these short
durational visits or stay of daughter-in-law at the house of the parents-inlaw
would not get the house a colour of being a shared house hold and
having hold so, the restraint order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate
was set aside, it being without any finding as regards the nature of premises
being a shared house hold. Further held that the parents-in-law shall be well
within their rights to sell off the house in question.
15. The stand of petitioner is that the Appellate Court could not have
applied the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra
Ahuja (Supra) as the said judgment does not distinguish between permanent
living or short living. Reliance was placed upon extract of Para-67, which
reads as under:-
“67…………………… We, thus, are of the considered opinion
that shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is the
shared household of aggrieved person where she was living
at the time when application was filed or in the recent past
had been excluded from the use or she is temporarily
absent.”
16. This Court is in agreement with the ratio of law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja (Supra), however, the
facts of the present case are distinguishable on facts of the said case. In
Satish Chandra Ahuja (Supra) the daughter-in-law was residing on the first
floor of the subject property and had therefore claimed her right as shared
household but in the present case, the petitioner has actually never resided with the parents-in-laws.
17. Pertinently, the marriage of petitioner with son of respondents was
solemnized on 12.12.2013, who is an officer in Indian Air Force. It is not
disputed by either side that after marriage, petitioner along with her husband
i.e. son of respondents, lived at the place of his postings. The fact remains
that petitioner never resided with parents-in-laws and always stayed at the
place of posting of her husband and visited them occasionally. However, it
cannot be lost sight of the fact that petitioner had been living with her
husband in ‘official accommodation’ at the place of his posting and she
cannot claim the said official accommodation as the shared household, but
the element of living in ‘permanency’ has also to be seen. In this regard, the
pertinent observations of The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-68 of decision
Satish Chandra Ahuja (Supra), have been rightly relied upon by the
Appellate Court in my considered opinion.
18. Further, multiple legal proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord
between petitioner and her husband as well as parents-in-law are said to be
pending. The intent and purpose of DV Act is to safeguard the interest of
distressed women. Petitioner in her complaint filed under the DV Act has
prayed for restraining the respondents from dispossessing her or in any
manner disturbing her possession from the subject property. Further, she has
also prayed for an alternative accommodation.
19. The provisions of Section 17 of the DV Act stipulates that every
woman in a domestic relationship shall have a right to reside in the shared
household whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the
same. However, in the present case admittedly petitioner has in fact neither
permanently nor for a longer period resided in the house of parents-in-laws
and so, it cannot be termed as ‘shared household’. Thus, there is no question
of evicting or dispossessing her from there. However, to safe guard the
interest of petitioner the trial court, while deciding petitioner’s petition
under the DV Act, may pass an order to provide with an alternative
accommodation to petitioner under Section 19 (1) (f) of the DV Act.
20. But the pertinent question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the old aged parents-in-laws, who at the fag-end of their life, wish to sell off their property to relocate themselves in a better place of their choice, be restrained to sell of the house or permitted to do it? In this regard, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish
Chandra Ahuja (Supra) are as under:-
“90. Before we close our discussion on Section 2(s),
we need to observe that the right to residence under Section
19 is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared
household especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted
against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. The senior
citizens in the evening of their life are also entitled to live
peacefully not haunted by marital discord between their son
and daughter-in-law. While granting relief both in
application under Section 12 of the 2005 Act or in any civil
proceedings, the Court has to balance the rights of both the
parties. The directions issued by the High Court [Ambika
Jain v. Ram Prakash Sharma, 2019 SCC OnLine Del
11886] in para 56 adequately balance the rights of both the
parties.”
21. Applying the afore-noted observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the case in hand, this Court finds that the impugned judgment dated 03.05.2021 suffers from no illegality or infirmity.
22. The present petition is accordingly dismissed while making it clear
that the observations made by this Court are in the peculiar facts of the
present case and shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case.
23. Pending application is disposed of being infructuous.
(SURESH KUMAR KAIT)
JUDGE
MAY 17, 2021
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