Yet another facet of mental cruelty on the part of the
respondent canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant is
regarding the parental alienation. The learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the respondent intentionally alienated the child from the appellant depriving his parental right to be loved by the child. It amounts to nothing but mental cruelty, argued the counsel. We find some force in the said argument.{Para 16}
17. Parental alienation describes a process through which a
child becomes estranged from a parent as the result of the
psychological manipulation of another parent. It occurs when one parent undermines or prejudices the contact and relationship between the child and the other parent without well-founded reasons. It is a strategy whereby one parent intentionally displays to the child unjustified negativity aimed at the other parent. The purpose of this strategy is to damage the child’s relationship with the other parent and to turn the child’s emotions against the other parent. A child has right to the love and affection of both parents. Similarly, the parents have the right to receive the love and affection of the child. Any act on the
part of the one parent calculated to deny the love and affection of the child to the other parent by alienating the child from him/her amounts to mental cruelty.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH
18TH DAY OF MAY 2021
Mat.Appeal.No.523 OF 2019
PRABIN GOPAL Vs MEGHNA
Dated this the 18th day of May 2021
Author: Kauser Edappagath, J.
The husband in a marital dispute is the appellant. The original
petition filed by him against his wife (respondent) for divorce on the
ground of cruelty was dismissed by the Family Court, Thrissur (for
short ‘the court below’) vide impugned order.
2. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent
was solemnized on 27/12/2009 at Sree Krishna Temple, Guruvayoor as
per the Hindu religious rites. In the wedlock, a daughter named, Diya
Prabin, was born on 9/3/2011.
3. The appellant was working at Singapore as a bank manager
at the time of marriage. After a few days of marriage, the respondent
went to Singapore along with the appellant and both of them resided
together there. According to the appellant, immediately after the
commencement of the marital relationship, serious matrimonial
problems developed between them, which despite his earnest and
sincere effort, kept growing and intensified. It was alleged that the
respondent was extremely bad tempered and belligerent in nature,
constantly using filthy language and arguing with the appellant. She
showed complete disinterest in all household functions and refused to
attend her duties as a wife. Not only was the respondent distancing
himself from the appellant, but there were regular instances of outrage
and resentment, causing serious mental agony and pain to him, it was
alleged.
4. The appellant further alleged that the respondent refused to
show any signs of love and care towards his parents especially his
ailing father and other family members which caused deep mental
pain and misery on him. He highlighted an instance wherein the father
of the respondent physically hurt his parents causing serious injuries
on the hand of his mother which resulted in registration of a criminal
case against the respondent and her father at the Town West Police
Station, Thrissur. As a counterblast to the same, the respondent filed a
complaint raising false allegations against the appellant and his
parents resulting in registration of a crime against them. On hearing
about the same, the father of the appellant suffered a sudden paralytic
stroke and was admitted to the hospital. The intention of the
respondent and her parents was only to harass, cause loss, mental
agony and pain to the appellant and his family, it was alleged.
5. The appellant and the respondent made a short visit for 12
days to their native place in the month of May 2010. According to the
appellant, during the said visit, the respondent refused to reside in his
residence and when he requested her to reside or even visit his
residence, she started to pick up quarrel with him. Thereafter, the
respondent became pregnant while they were residing together in
Singapore and even at that point of time, the respondent continued
her reckless and inattentive behaviour. In December 2010, the
appellant and the respondent came to their native place so as to drop
the respondent at her residence for delivery as per the local custom.
During the said stay, the appellant and his mother regularly attempted
to visit the respondent at her residence. However, the respondent and
her parents refused to permit them to visit the respondent and tried to
detach her from the appellant and his parents. During every such
attempt, the respondent and her parents began insulting and
quarreling with the appellant and his family which deeply hurt him. It
was further alleged that he was informed about the delivery of his own
child through his family friends on the date of delivery. Even though he
rushed to the hospital, he was not permitted to see the child and
forcefully obstructed from entering the hospital by the respondents’
relatives and strangers on the instruction of the respondent and her
parents. It was also alleged that the appellant and his parents were
completely isolated from the child and the respondent even refused to
send a photo of the child. Hence, the parents of the appellant were
forced to file a complaint before the District Legal Service Authority,
Thrissur and it was only with intervention of the authority, they could
see the child. In these circumstances, the appellant filed OP No.
1091/2011 for restitution of conjugal rights and GOP No.154/2012 to
get the custody of the child before the Family Court, Thrissur. Even
though the respondent came to the residence of the appellant for
showing the child to his parents, after counselling in OP No.1091/2011,
immediately upon arrival, she began scolding, insulting, abusing and
quarreling with his parents leaving them devastated and traumatized,
it was alleged.
6. Admittedly, a mediation was taken place in the proceedings
before the Family Court wherein the matter was settled and both
parties agreed to live together on the basis of agreed terms and
conditions. The parties agreed to withdraw all pending criminal cases
filed against each other. It was further agreed that whenever the
appellant comes down from Singapore, he can reside with the
respondent and their child at Bangalore where she was employed at
that time. According to the appellant, just two weeks after the said
compromise, when he attempted to visit the respondent and the child
in Bangalore, she refused to even open the door and kept him waiting,
without giving him a chance to see his own daughter. Again in January,
2017, the appellant went to the workplace of the respondent at
Thrissur and tried to meet her. But the respondent refused to meet him
and insulted him causing mental agony to him. It is the case of the
appellant that after the compromise, the respondent never came to his
residence. She did not even contact him over the phone. Even after
the compromise, they did not reside together on a single day. It was
also alleged that after the compromise, the respondent continued to
exercise the mental cruelty on him as before and she has even
alienated the child from the appellant. The appellant specifically
asserted that the respondent committed breach of the terms of the
agreement and, hence, the compromise did not materialise. It was in
these circumstances, the appellant preferred the original petition for
dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty.
7. The respondent entered appearance before the court below
and filed detailed counter statement. She specifically denied various
instances of cruelty allegedly exercised by her on the appellant and
pleaded in the original petition. According to her, it was the appellant
who often quarreled with her and failed to discharge marital
obligations. It was contended that the appellant pledged her gold
ornaments without her consent and 25 sovereigns of gold ornaments
were taken by the appellant and kept with him. It was further
contended that the appellant did not pay any amount to maintain her
or the child and even did not meet the hospital expenditure when she
was admitted for delivery. The respondent has admitted the
compromise that has taken place at the Family Court and its terms.
According to her, it was the appellant who committed breach of the
terms of the compromise. It was contended that even though the
appellant agreed to withdraw the criminal case pending against the
respondent and her father, he did not do so. She asserted that she is
ready to reside with the appellant and discharge her marital
obligations even now. The respondent sought for the dismissal of the
petition.
8. As stated already, the appellant has also filed GOP
No.154/2012 for the custody of the child. The respondent has filed
another original petition as OP No.983/2017 against the appellant for a
decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellant
from entering into her residence and causing any inconvenience to her
or her child’s peaceful life or from taking the child by force. All these
three cases were tried together and a common order was passed. The
appellant was examined as PW1 and Exts. A1 to A34 were marked on
his side. The respondent was examined as RW1 and Exts. B1 to B13
were marked on her side. After trial, the court below found that all the
allegations of cruelty raised by the appellant till the date of filing the
compromise petition were actually condoned by him. The court below
further found that the appellant failed to comply with the terms of the
compromise by not withdrawing the criminal case filed against the
respondent and her father and, hence, the respondent cannot be
blamed for her refusal to live with him even after the compromise. The
court below further found that the cruelty alleged till the date of filing
the compromise in earlier case cannot be revived since the theory of
revival of cruelty cannot be applied to the facts of the case. The Court
below also observed that no instance of cruelty after the compromise
has been established by the appellant. Accordingly, it was held that
the appellant was not entitled to get a decree for divorce on the
ground of cruelty and the original petition was dismissed as per the
impugned order. Challenging the said order, the appellant preferred
this appeal.
9. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as
the respondent.
10. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent
took place on 27/12/2009. After eleven days of marriage, they went to
Singapore where they stayed together for about four months. During
this period, matrimonial disputes developed between them which were
further intensified by passage of time. After four months' stay at
Singapore, they came down to the native place for fifteen days.
Thereafter, they again went back to Singapore where the respondent
became pregnant. In December 2010, on the seventh month of
pregnancy, the appellant and the respondent came to their native
place so as to drop the respondent at her residence for delivery as per
the local custom. By that time their relationship has been further
deteriorated. The appellant alone went back on 5/1/2011. After the
delivery, the respondent did not go back to Singapore to join the
appellant. It appears that the marriage did not result in a bond being
created between the couple as expected. Admittedly, the appellant
and the respondent are living apart since 5/1/2011.
11. The definite case of the appellant is that over the course of
marriage with him, the respondent has perpetrated various iniquitous
acts, ranging from several mental agony by constantly using filthy
language, abdicating all shared household duties, causing his parents
to be physically assaulted, filing false and malicious prosecution to
entrap him and his family, and depriving him his right to visit and
assist in raising their child despite a settlement, making his life a living
hell. According to the appellant, in spite of various acts of cruelty
committed by the respondent, he, in the best interest of the child,
opted to file the original petition for restitution of conjugal rights as OP
No.1091/2011 before the Family Court, Thrissur. But, still, the
respondent repeated the matrimonial cruelty and even dragged his
parents to matrimonial controversy and they were even physically
assaulted. A false and frivolous criminal prosecution was also launched
against them. Even then, he acceded to a settlement in a mediation
held at Family Court and executed a settlement agreement which was
marked as Ext. A24. It was alleged that the respondent committed
breach of the settlement by not resuming the marital relationship and
continued with her acts of cruelty.
12. The court below did not care to consider or appreciate on
merits the various instances of cruelty alleged by the appellant till the
date of filing Ext. A24 compromise holding that those were condoned
by the appellant. Before examining the correctness of the finding of
the Court below regarding condonation of cruelty, we will examine
whether the appellant has established the cruelty pleaded.
13. The evidence consists of oral evidence of the appellant
alone. Normally, the matrimonial cruelty – be it physical or mental –
takes place within the four walls of the matrimonial home and,
therefore, independent witnesses may not be available. Thus, the
court can act upon the sole testimony of the spouse if it is found
convincing and reliable. The various acts of cruelty, both physical and
mental, as well as harassment, meted out by the appellant at the
hands of the respondent at Singapore as well as at the native place
have been spoken to in detail by the appellant. Even though the
appellant has been cross-examined in length, nothing tangible has
been brought out in the cross-examination to discredit his testimony. It
has come out in the evidence of the appellant that the respondent has
caused innumerable mental stress and pain by constantly showering
abusive words and filthy language towards him while they were living
in Singapore and also during their short stays at the native place.
Regular instances of outrage and resentment on the part of the
respondent has been spoken to by the appellant. He deposed that
apathy and indifferent conduct of the respondent made him
completely distressed which even affected his concentration on the
work. It has also come out in evidence that the respondent has
neglected and even physically assaulted his parents. Ext. A20 would
show that a crime was registered against the respondent and her
father on the allegation that they physically assaulted the appellant’s
parents. It has also come out in evidence that after the delivery of the
child, the appellant and his parents were denied access to the child by
the respondent and her parents. The appellant specifically deposed
that right from the first day of marriage, there has been a sustained
course of abusive and humiliating treatment and reprehensible
conduct on the part of the respondent.
14. It is settled that physical violence is not absolutely essential
to constitute cruelty. It is equally settled that mere bickering, coldness, austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, lack of affection, trivial irritations, quarrels, or normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life cannot amount to cruelty.
At the same time, to constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of
need not necessarily be so grave and severe so as to make
cohabitation virtually unendurable or of such character as to cause
danger to life, limb or health. It must be something more serious than
"ordinary wear and tear of the married life". It is sufficient if the
conduct and behaviour of one spouse towards the other is of such a
nature that it causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter
that it is not safe for him or her to continue the marital tie. The feeling
of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration and embarrassment in
one spouse caused by the sustained course of abusive and humiliating
conduct of other may sometimes lead to mental cruelty. Mental cruelty
may also consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and
abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of
the other party. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty, if by
ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise
be regarded as cruelty.
15. The Supreme Court in Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S.
Dastane (AIR 1975 SC 1534) has held, the standard of proof in
matrimonial cases would be same as in civil cases, that is, the Court
has to decide the cases based on preponderance of probabilities.
Therefore, the Court has to see what are the probabilities in a case
and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact,
but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of
the acts or omissions of the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and
feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural
pattern by the other and inference can be drawn from the attending
facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. From the kind of attitude,
conduct and treatment discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it can
readily be inferred that the appellant has every reason to apprehend
that it is not safe for him to continue the matrimonial relationship with
the respondent.
16. Yet another facet of mental cruelty on the part of the
respondent canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant is
regarding the parental alienation. The learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the respondent intentionally alienated the
child from the appellant depriving his parental right to be loved by the
child. It amounts to nothing but mental cruelty, argued the counsel.
We find some force in the said argument.
17. Parental alienation describes a process through which a
child becomes estranged from a parent as the result of the
psychological manipulation of another parent. It occurs when one
parent undermines or prejudices the contact and relationship between
the child and the other parent without well-founded reasons. It is a
strategy whereby one parent intentionally displays to the child
unjustified negativity aimed at the other parent. The purpose of this
strategy is to damage the child’s relationship with the other parent and
to turn the child’s emotions against the other parent. A child has right
to the love and affection of both parents. Similarly, the parents have
the right to receive the love and affection of the child. Any act on the
part of the one parent calculated to deny the love and affection of the
child to the other parent by alienating the child from him/her amounts
to mental cruelty.
18. Coming to the merits, the appellant has given evidence that
he and his parents were completely isolated from the child and the
respondent even refused to send a photo of the child. Hence, his
parents were forced to file a complaint before the District Legal
Services Authority, Thrissur and it was only with intervention of the
authority, they could see the child. He further gave evidence that the
respondent did not even inform him about the delivery of the child and
he came to know of the birth of the child through his family friends on
the date of delivery. Even though he rushed to the hospital, he was not
permitted to see the child and forcefully obstructed from entering the
hospital by the respondents’ relatives and strangers on the instruction
of the respondent and her parents, the appellant added. The appellant
further deposed that the respondent did not inform him about the
name laying ceremony of the child and never disclosed anything about
the child including its health condition. The appellant also deposed
that just two weeks after the said compromise, when he attempted to
visit the respondent and the child in Bangalore to celebrate the
birthday of the child, she refused to even open the door and kept him
waiting, without giving him a chance to see the child. Finally, he had to
leave the birthday gifts and cake in front of the flat and returned. He
specifically stated that after the compromise, the respondent
completely alienated the child from him. There is nothing on record to
disbelieve this evidence. The respondent as a mother breached every
duty she owed as the custodial parent to the non-custodial parent of
instilling love, respect and feeling in the child for its father. Nothing
can be more painful than experiencing one’s children—one’s own flesh
and blood—rejecting him/her. The above acts of the respondent
willfully alienating the child from the appellant, no doubt, constitute
mental cruelty.
19. The next question for consideration is whether the appellant
had, at any time, condoned the respondent/wife's cruelty? It was
contended that even assuming that this Court comes to the conclusion
that the above mentioned incidents amount to cruelty in matrimonial
law, in the facts of the present case, there was clear condonation on
the part of the appellant. As stated already, all the disputes between
the parties were settled in mediation at the Family Court by executing
a compromise agreement which was marked as Ext. A24. The court
below held that all the allegations of cruelty till the date of filing of Ext.
A24 compromise were actually condoned by the appellant. The court
below further held that the appellant committed breach of compromise
by not withdrawing criminal case against the parents of the
respondent since the breach was on his side, the cruelty alleged to
have been committed prior to the filing of the compromise petition will
not be revived and he cannot press into service the theory of revival
of cruelty. The contentions of the appellant that even after the said
condonation, the act of cruelty was repeatedly committed by the
respondent, matrimonial life was not restored and, hence, the past
acts of cruelty stood revived was not accepted by the court below.
20. Under S.23(1)(b) of the Act, in any proceeding under the Act
whether defended or not, the relief prayed for can be decreed only and
only if "where the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has
not in any manner condoned the cruelty". The above section casts an
obligation on the Court to consider the question of condonation and
obligation which has to be discharged even in undefended cases. The
relief prayed for can be granted only if the Court is satisfied that the
petitioner has not, in any manner, condoned the cruelty. In the present
case, respondent altogether denied allegation of cruelty in her counter
statement. She did not advance the plea of condonation as a defence
to such allegation. Nonetheless, learned trial Court considered the
contention relating to condonation and rejected the same upon
reference to evidence on record in accordance with law laid down in
Dr. N.G. Dastane (supra) to the effect that even though condonation
is not pleaded as defence by the respondent, it is Court's duty, in view
of the provisions under S.23(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, to
find whether the misconduct alleged to be the basis for seeking decree
of divorce was condoned by the appellant.
21. As to what constitutes condonation as envisaged under
Section 23(1)(b) of the Act has nowhere been elaborated under the
Act. 'Condonation' is a word of technical import, which means and
implies wiping of all rights of injured spouse to take matrimonial
proceedings. In a sense, condonation is reconciliation, namely, the
intention to remit the wrong and restore the offending spouse to the
original status which in every case deserves to be gathered from the
attending circumstances. Ordinarily, as a general rule, condonation of
matrimonial offence deprives the condoning spouse of the right of
seeking relief on the offending conduct. However, condonation cannot
be taken to be an absolute and unconditional forgiveness. Therefore, in
case the matrimonial offence is repeated even after an act of
condonation on the part of the spouse, it gets revived on the
commission of subsequent act resulting in matrimonial disharmony.
Past acts of cruelty even after condonation are grounds to seek divorce
if revived by later acts of cruelty.
22. The Supreme Court has very succinctly and elaborately
summarised the law regarding condonation in Dr. N.G. Dastane
(supra) and has observed thus:
“Condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the
restoration of offending spouse to the same position as he or she
occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute
condonation there must be, therefore, two things: forgiveness and
restoration. But condonation is always subject to the implied
condition that the offending spouse will not commit a fresh
matrimonial offence, either of the same variety as the one condoned
or of any other variety. No matrimonial offence is erased by
condonation. It is obscured but not obliterated. 'Since the condition
of forgiveness is that no further matrimonial offence shall occur, it is
not necessary that the fresh offence should be ejusdem generis with
the original offence. Condoned cruelty can, therefore be revived, say
by desertion or adultery. 'Condonation' under S.23(1)(b), therefore,
means conditional forgiveness, the implied condition being that no
further matrimonial offence shall be committed.”
The Division Bench of this Court in Chathu v. Jayasree (1990 (1) KLT
604) has held that the condonation is conditional forgiveness and
there cannot be condonation if offending spouse continues in
matrimonial offence. It was observed thus:
“Condonation of matrimonial transgression involves conditional
forgiveness of such transgression as is known to or believed by the
offended spouse, so as to restore the status quo ante as between the
spouses. To constitute condonation there must be two things:
Forgiveness and restoration. The real import of condonation is
conditional waiver of the right of the injured spouse to take out
proceedings. The condition is revival of the normal married life. There
cannot be condonation if the offending spouse continues to indulge in
the matrimonial offence. Forgiveness is meaningless unless there is
contrition in the person who seeks or pleads for forgiveness.
Condonation rests on some assurance to the offended spouse of
retracement of the offending spouse from the wrong path hitherto
followed.”
Recently, the Division Bench of this Court in Santhosh Kumar v.
Jayasree Damodaran (2020 (2) KLT 111) has held that an act of
cruelty once condoned could certainly revive and give rise to a cause
of action for dissolution of marriage, when the offending spouse
exploits and takes unfair advantage of the generosity or the
benevolence shown by the wronged spouse and takes to matrimonial
misdeeds over again.
23. What we can gather from the above precedents is that
condonation implies knowledge to the husband of being wronged by
wife, conscious election by him not to exercise the legal right flowing
therefrom, to forgive the wife conditionally and the same resulting in
the resumption of normal relationship between the couple. Thus, it is
resumption of normal marital ties with mutual understanding which
assumes significance. As has been held in Dr. N.G. Dastane (supra),
to constitute condonation, there must be two things: forgiveness and
restoration. If for constituting condonation, there must be forgiveness
and restoration, it is obvious that bilateral acts of both parties will be
required to be taken into account while considering the aspect of
condonation. Forgiveness and restoration cannot be unilateral and for
it to be effective and fruitful, it has to be bilateral.
24. Admittedly, Ext. A24 compromise agreement did not
materialise. Both the appellant and respondent accuse each other for
committing breach of the compromise agreement. At any rate, it is not
in dispute that there was breach of the compromise agreement. The
question is not one who has committed the breach. The question is
whether the compromise has been adhered to by both parties and
whether there was resumption of conjugal relationship. There is
absolutely no material on record to indicate resumption of conjugal life
between the appellant and the respondent after the compromise. Even
the respondent has admitted that the conjugal relationship has not
been resumed after the compromise. Her case is that the appellant
failed to withdraw criminal case against her and her parents and,
hence, she was justified in not resuming the conjugal life. The evidence
on record would further show that their relationship remained even
bitter and strained after the compromise. The appellant gave positive
evidence that the respondent repeated her acts of cruelty even after
the compromise by not resuming the normal marital relationship and
by wilfully alienating the child from him. The appellant has spoken two
specific instances where his attempt to meet the respondent and the
child was thwarted by the respondent. He deposed that on 9/3/2016,
when he went to Bangalore where the respondent was residing with
the child for celebrating the birthday of the child with birthday cake
and gift, the respondent even did not open the door and made him to
wait outside throughout the night. He stated another instance, that in
January, 2017, when he went to the workplace of the respondent at
Thrissur to meet her, she refused to meet him. Mere filing of
compromise petition would not amount to condonation of cruelty
unless and until the matrimonial life was restored. There is nothing on
record to show that the matrimonial life was restored. There was no
cohabitation admittedly. Thus, we have no hesitation to conclude that
neither the pleading nor the evidence indicate any bilateral act or
conduct so as to record a finding that there was forgiveness and
restoration between the parties amounting to condonation of the
cruelty on the part of the appellant. Therefore, the conclusion of the
court below on this ground is not legally sustainable. The subsequent
conduct of cruelty on the part of the respondent revived the earlier
conduct of proved cruelty and completely negated the condonation.
25. On an overall appreciation of the pleadings and evidence,
we find that the appellant and the respondent were at loggerheads
right from the inception of their marriage. The marriage never took off.
Regardless of the subsistence of the marriage for the last twelve
years, the couple was unable to patch up their differences. The
marriage is virtually shattered and has become a dead wood. The
allegations and counter allegations levelled against each other
establish that there is no further chance of a rapprochement. The
appellant has pleaded and proved specific instances of cruelty meted
out on him by the respondent which have been discussed in the
preceding paragraphs. Admittedly, they are residing separately since
January, 2011. The Supreme Court of India in Samer Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh [(2007) 4 SCC 511] has held that the insistence by one spouse to preserve the dead marriage could be treated as an act of cruelty. It
was observed thus:
“Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it
may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond
repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a
legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does
not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant
regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like
situation, it may be true mental cruelty.”
26. The upshot of the above discussions is that the appellant
has made out a case for granting a decree for dissolution of marriage
on the ground of cruelty u/s 13(1)(a) of the Act. The court below went
wrong in dismissing his original petition for dissolution of marriage.
The impugned order, thus, is not sustainable and is liable to be set
aside. We do so.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set
aside. OP No.344/2017 on the file of the Family Court, Thrissur is
allowed. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
solemnized on 27/12/2009 at Sree Krishna Temple, Guruvayoor stands
dissolved. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
JUDGE
Sd/-
DR. KAUSER EDAPPAGATH
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