The essentials to be satisfied in order to attract an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. was elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. (cited supra). The relevant paragraph is
extracted hereinunder:
“10. […] This section as its marginal note
indicates renders punishable false charge of offence
with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an
offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause
to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a
person with intent to cause him injury or with similar
intent to falsely charge any person with having
committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or
lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.
Instituting or causing to institute false criminal
proceedings assume false charge but false charge may
be preferred even when no criminal proceedings
result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the
appellant cannot be said to have instituted any
criminal proceeding against any person. So that part
of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression
“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,
cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution
witness against an accused person during the course
of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to
the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to
put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation
and not when speaking to prove the false charge by
making deposition in support of the charge framed in
that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read
along with the expression “institution of criminal
proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible
of analogous meaning should be understood to have
been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were
their colour and content from each other. They seem to
have been used in a technical sense as commonly
understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,
therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or
to someone who is in a position to get the offender
punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,
it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a
report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or
an officer having authority over the person against
whom the allegations are made. The statement in
order to constitute the “charge” should be made with
the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.{Para 16}
20.This Court had an occasion to consider the judgement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) in the
judgement in S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial
Educational Charitable Trust &Ors (cited supra). The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereinunder:
“7. It is our duty to point out that the alleged offence
of the Sub-Inspector informing in the charge sheet the
pregnancy of the girl concerned despite her medical
certificate informing otherwise, would not and cannot
fall within the definition of Section 211 IPC. It also is
to be seen that Perumal had faced prosecution
pursuant to a Magistrate taking cognizance.
Fortunately, offence of making a false charge does not
stand attracted as otherwise, it would be unfair to
prosecute the Sub-Inspector who filed the charge
sheet, while not doing so, the Judicial Magistrate who
took cognizance thereon. As explained by the Supreme
Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [(1973) 2
SCC 406], ‘the essential ingredient of an offence
under section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be
instituted any criminal proceeding against a person
with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to
falsely charge any person with having committed an
offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground
for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing
to institute false criminal proceedings assume false
charge but false charge may be preferred even when
no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression
“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,
cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution
witness against an accused person during the course
of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to
the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to
put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation
and not when seeking to prove the false charge by
making deposition in support of the charge framed in
that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be,
read along with the expression “institution of criminal
proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible
of analogous meaning should be understood to have
been. used in their cognate sense. They get as it were
their colour and content from each other. They seem to
have been used in a technical sense as commonly
understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,
therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or
to someone who is in a position to get the offender
punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,
it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a
report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or
to an officer having authority over the person against
whom the allegations are made. The statement in
order to constitute the “charges” should be made with
the intention and object of setting criminal law in
motion.”
22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by
one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station,
Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The
Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the
case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under
Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original
or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion.
Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in
motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’sCase (cited
supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get
attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or
given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when
the document was in custodia legis.
23. In the present case, the main grievance of the
Respondent seems to be that he was unnecessarily made to undergo
the agony of a malicious prosecution. Since this prosecution was
investigated by the Petitioner, the Respondent wants to rope in the
Petitioner as if the said officer prosecuted a false charge. If investigating
officers are going to be exposed to such proceedings in all cases where
the accused persons are acquitted from all charges, it will directly
interfere with the independence of the authority in conducting an
investigation. This is the reason why the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Santokh Singh’s Case (cited supra) held that the words “false
charges” must be read along with the expression “institution of criminal
proceedings”, which relates back to the initiation of criminal proceedings
and it can never be related to an alleged false charge framed after the
filing of the final report.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
CORAM
JUSTICE MR.N.ANAND VENKATESH
Crl.O.P No.2514 of 2020 and Crl.MP.No.1536 of 2020
A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj .
Dated:26.02.2021
This Criminal Original Petition has been filed challenging the
summons issued by the Court below directing the Petitioner to attend an
enquiry initiated by the court below based on the complaint given by
the Respondent under Section 340 of The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).
2. The Respondent who was arrayed as A3 in S.C. No. 123 of
2005 before the Additional District and Sessions Court, FTC III, Chennai,
faced trial along with 3 other accused persons for an offence under
Sections 120B, 307, 450, 451, 384, 506-Part II of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as “I.P.C”) read with Section 109, I.P.C.
The FIR in this case was registered in Crime No. 473 of 2002 by the F-2
Police Station, Egmore and later on the investigation was transferred to
the file of the CBCID. The Petitioner who was then the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, CBCID was assigned the task of investigating
the case. It was based on the final report filed by the Petitioner, the
accused persons faced the trial before the concerned court.
3. The trial court on appreciation https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ of the oral and documentary evidence and after considering the facts and
circumstances of the case was pleased to acquit all the accused persons
from all the charges through a judgement dt. 23.02.2006.
4. This judgement was taken on appeal by the CBCID before
this Court in Crl. Appeal No. 52 of 2010. This Court by a judgement dt.
22.06.2017, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment passed
by the trial court.
5. The Petitioner thereafter, filed a complaint before the
court below in the year 2019 under Section 340, Cr.P.C. against the
defacto complainant and the Petitioner herein, on the ground that they
have committed an offence under Section 211, I.P.C., and the entire
case was a malicious prosecution against the Respondent.
6. The court below on receipt of the complaint proceeded to
issue summons to the Petitioner to conduct an enquiry before acting
upon the complaint. Aggrieved by the summons issued by the court
below, the present petition has been filed before this Court.
7. Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner had only
investigated the FIR after it was transferred to CBCID and the mere fact
that the Respondent was acquitted by the court will not attract an
offence under Section 211, I.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted
that if the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. cannot be made applicable
against the Petitioner, there was no occasion for the court below to even
conduct a preliminary enquiry by issuing summons to the Petitioner. It
was submitted that the sum and substance of the complaint given by
the Respondent is that there was a malicious prosecution against the
Respondent and if the claim made by the Respondent is taken to be
true, the Respondent can only file a suit claiming for damages for
malicious prosecution before the competent court, and it cannot be a
ground to file a complaint under Section 340, Cr.P.C.
8. The learned counsel in order to substantiate his
submissions relied upon the following judgements of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court:
a.Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, reported in
(2005) 4 SCC 370;
b. Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. reported in
(1973) 2 SCC 406;
c. Sasikala Pushpa v. State of T.N, reported in (2019) 6
SCC 477; and
d. S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial
Educational Charitable Trust &Ors. reported in 2015
SCC OnLine Mad 11421.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent submitted that the findings given by the trial court and this
Hon’ble Court in the criminal appeal clearly show that the entire case is
false and the Respondent has been intentionally roped in as an accused
for having filed a Habeas Corpus Petition questioning an illegal arrest
made by the police. The learned counsel further submitted that the
court below has only called the Petitioner for a preliminary enquiry and
whatever grounds are raised by the Petitioner in the present petition,
can be raised before the court below and the court below will take a
decision in accordance with law. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot be
allowed to rush to this Court even without giving an explanation to the
court below by attending the enquiry. The learned counsel in order to
substantiate his submissions relied upon the judgement of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki reported in (2014) 5 SCC 377.
10. This Court has carefully considered the submissions
made on either side and the materials available on record.
11. It is true that the court below has issued a summon to
the Petitioner to attend an enquiry in order to enable the Court to take a
decision on the complaint given by the Respondent. The complaint is
given on the basis that the Petitioner has committed an offence under
Section 211, I.P.C. If the allegations made in the complaint, even if
taken as it is, do not make out an offence under Section 211, I.P.C.,
there is no requirement for the Petitioner to go through the ordeal of an enquiry before the court below.
12. In view of the above, this Court will test the complaint
given by the Respondent to satisfy itself as to whether an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has been made out against the Petitioner. This is the only limited scope that is involved in the present petition.
13. For proper appreciation, Section 211, I.P.C. is extracted
hereinunder:
211. False charge of offence made with intent
to injure.—Whoever, with intent to cause
person, institutes or causes to be instituted any
criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely
charges any person with having committed an offence,
knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such
proceeding or charge against that person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both; and if such criminal proceeding be
instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable
with death, [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment
for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
14. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C.
are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having
committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the
complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for
making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been
given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on various occasions has
dealt with the scope of Section 211, I.P.C. and the same can be taken
note of before coming to a conclusion in this case.
16. The essentials to be satisfied in order to attract an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. was elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. (cited supra). The relevant paragraph is
extracted hereinunder:
“10. […] This section as its marginal note
indicates renders punishable false charge of offence
with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an
offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause
to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a
person with intent to cause him injury or with similar
intent to falsely charge any person with having
committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or
lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.
Instituting or causing to institute false criminal
proceedings assume false charge but false charge may
be preferred even when no criminal proceedings
result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the
appellant cannot be said to have instituted any
criminal proceeding against any person. So that part
of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression
“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,
cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution
witness against an accused person during the course
of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to
the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to
put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation
and not when speaking to prove the false charge by
making deposition in support of the charge framed in
that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read
along with the expression “institution of criminal
proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible
of analogous meaning should be understood to have
been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were
their colour and content from each other. They seem to
have been used in a technical sense as commonly
understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,
therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or
to someone who is in a position to get the offender
punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,
it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a
report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or
an officer having authority over the person against
whom the allegations are made. The statement in
order to constitute the “charge” should be made with
the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.
[…]”.
17. The learned counsel for the Respondent placed heavy
reliance upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki(cited supra). The relevant portions of the judgement is
extracted hereinunder:
“5.The case of the appellant herein in his
complaint is that though Nagal alleged an offence of
cheating against the appellant which led to the
pregnancy of Nagal, such an offence was not proved
against him. Upon the registration of Crime No. 18 of
2008, Nagal was subjected to medical examination.
She was not found to be pregnant. Dr Geetha, who
examined Nagal, categorically opined that Nagal was
not found to be pregnant on the date of examination
which took place six days after the registration of the
FIR. In spite of the definite medical opinion that Nagal
was not pregnant, the respondent chose to file a
charge-sheet with an allegation that Nagal became
pregnant. Therefore, according to the appellant, the
charge-sheet was filed with a deliberate false
statement by the respondent herein.
6.The appellant, therefore, prayed in his
complaint as follows:
“It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to take this complaint on file, try the accused
under Section 193 IPC for deliberately giving false
evidence in the court as against the complainant, and
punish the accused and pass such further or other
orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper.”
The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the
ground that Section 195 CrPC bars criminal courts to
take cognizance of an offence under Section 193 IPC
except on the complaint in writing of that court or an
officer of that court in relation to any proceeding in
the court where the offence under Section 193 is said
to have been committed and a private complaint such
as the one on hand is not maintainable.
9.The facts relevant for the issue on hand are
that:
9.1.The appellant was prosecuted for the
offences under Sections 417 and 506 Part I IPC. (The
factual allegations forming the basis of such a
prosecution are already noted earlier.)
9.2.The respondent filed a charge-sheet with an
assertion that the appellant was responsible for
pregnancy of Nagal.
9.3.Even before the filing of the charge-sheet, a
definite medical opinion was available to the
respondent (secured during the course of the
investigation of the offence alleged against the
appellant) to the effect that Nagal was not pregnant.
9.4. Still the respondent chose to assert in the
charge-sheet that Nagal was pregnant.
9.5. The prosecution against the appellant
ended in acquittal.
9.6. The abovementioned indisputable facts, in
our opinion, prima facie may not constitute an offence
under Section 193 IPC but may constitute an offence
under Section 211 IPC. We say prima facie only for the
reason that this aspect has not been examined at any
stage in the case nor any submission is made before us
on either side but we cannot help taking notice of the
basic facts and the legal position.”
18. In the present case, it must be borne in mind that the
allegations in the complaint is to the effect that an offence has been
committed as referred to in Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. and therefore, it
becomes important to understand the scope of this provision since it
forms the basis for proceeding further with the complaint under Section
340, Cr.P.C. It is as this juncture, this Court wants to place reliance upon
the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah
v. Meenakshi Marwah (cited supra) and the relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereinunder:
“23. In view of the language used in Section 340
CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint
regarding commission of an offence referred to in
Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the
words “court is of opinion that it is expedient in the
interests of justice”. This shows that such a course
will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires
and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint,
the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a
finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests
of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the
offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This
expediency will normally be judged by the court by
weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the
person affected by such forgery or forged document,
but having regard to the effect or impact, such
commission of offence has upon administration of
justice. It is possible that such forged document or
forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury
to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a
very valuable property or status or the like, but such
document may be just a piece of evidence produced or
given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence
may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of
evidence on the broad concept of administration of
justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the
court may not consider it expedient in the interest of
justice to make a complaint.”
“33. In view of the discussion made above, we
are of the opinion that SachidaNand Singh [(1998) 2
SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly
decided and the view taken therein is the correct view.
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only
when the offences enumerated in the said provision
have been committed with respect to a document after
it has been produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the
document was in custodia legis.”
19.The principle behind holding a preliminary
Section 340, Cr.P.C. was summarized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sasikala Pushpa v. State of T.N, (cited supra) by placing reliance on
Iqbal Singh Marwahv. Meenakshi Marwah(cited supra) and the
relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinunder:
“10. It is fairly well settled that before lodging of the
complaint, it is necessary that the court must be satisfied
that it was expedient in the interest of justice to lodge the
complaint. It is not necessary that the court must use the
actual words of Section 340 CrPC; but the court should
record a finding indicating its satisfaction that it is
expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be
made. Observing that under Section 340 CrPC, the
prosecution is to be launched only if it is expedient in the
interest of justice and not on mere allegations or to
vindicate personal vendetta. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v.
Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi
Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] , this
Court held as under: (SCC pp. 386-87, para 23) […]
11. Before proceeding to make a complaint regarding
commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b)
CrPC, the court must satisfy itself that “it is expedient in
the interest of justice”. The language in Section 340 CrPC
shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest
of justice requires and not in every case. It has to be seen in
the facts and circumstances of the present case whether any
prima facie case is made out for forgery or making a forged
document warranting issuance of directions for lodging the
complaint under Sections 193, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.”
20.This Court had an occasion to consider the judgement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) in the
judgement in S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial
Educational Charitable Trust &Ors (cited supra). The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereinunder:
“7. It is our duty to point out that the alleged offence
of the Sub-Inspector informing in the charge sheet the
pregnancy of the girl concerned despite her medical
certificate informing otherwise, would not and cannot
fall within the definition of Section 211 IPC. It also is
to be seen that Perumal had faced prosecution
pursuant to a Magistrate taking cognizance.
Fortunately, offence of making a false charge does not
stand attracted as otherwise, it would be unfair to
prosecute the Sub-Inspector who filed the charge
sheet, while not doing so, the Judicial Magistrate who
took cognizance thereon. As explained by the Supreme
Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [(1973) 2
SCC 406], ‘the essential ingredient of an offence
under section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be
instituted any criminal proceeding against a person
with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to
falsely charge any person with having committed an
offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground
for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing
to institute false criminal proceedings assume false
charge but false charge may be preferred even when
no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression
“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,
cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution
witness against an accused person during the course
of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to
the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to
put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation
and not when seeking to prove the false charge by
making deposition in support of the charge framed in
that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be,
read along with the expression “institution of criminal
proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible
of analogous meaning should be understood to have
been. used in their cognate sense. They get as it were
their colour and content from each other. They seem to
have been used in a technical sense as commonly
understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,
therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or
to someone who is in a position to get the offender
punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,
it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a
report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or
to an officer having authority over the person against
whom the allegations are made. The statement in
order to constitute the “charges” should be made with
the intention and object of setting criminal law in
motion.”
21. The above judgements set out the procedure while
dealing with an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. Firstly, in order to
initiate proceedings under Section 340,Cr.P.C., an application has to be
made to the Court upon which the Court can initiate an inquiry into any
offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. Secondly,
offences as set out in the complaint have to be made out. In the
present case, the complainant alleges that an offence under Section
211, I.P.C. has been made out.
22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by
one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station,
Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The
Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the
case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under
Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original
or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion.
Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in
motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’sCase (cited
supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get
attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or
given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when
the document was in custodia legis.
23. In the present case, the main grievance of the
Respondent seems to be that he was unnecessarily made to undergo
the agony of a malicious prosecution. Since this prosecution was
investigated by the Petitioner, the Respondent wants to rope in the
Petitioner as if the said officer prosecuted a false charge. If investigating
officers are going to be exposed to such proceedings in all cases where
the accused persons are acquitted from all charges, it will directly
interfere with the independence of the authority in conducting an
investigation. This is the reason why the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Santokh Singh’s Case (cited supra) held that the words “false
charges” must be read along with the expression “institution of criminal
proceedings”, which relates back to the initiation of criminal proceedings
and it can never be related to an alleged false charge framed after the
filing of the final report.
24. This Court after considering the judgement of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) has come
up with this fine distinction in the case of S.
MukanchandBothra(citedsupra). That apart, the facts of the present
case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case dealt with by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki.
25. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the
offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has not been made out against the
Petitioner. The Respondent cannot pick and choose certain observations
made by the trial court and this Court, and make it a basis for filing an
application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. to punish the Petitioner under
Section 211, I.P.C.
26. A careful reading of the petition filed by the Respondent
at the best makes out a case for malicious prosecution. In a case of
malicious prosecution, which gives rise to a tortious liability, only a suit
for damages can be filed by establishing the ingredients to maintain
such a suit. The grounds for maintaining a suit for malicious prosecution
cannot form the basis for filing a petition under Section 340, Cr.P.C.
since it has to independently satisfy the requirements of Section
195(1)(b), Cr.P.C.
27. In view of the above finding rendered by this Court, the
Petitioner need not undergo the ordeal of facing an enquiry before the
court below. Consequently, the impugned summons issued to the
Petitioner in Crl M.P. No 23751 of 2019 is hereby quashed and this
Criminal Original Petition is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the
connected miscellaneous petitoin is closed.
26.02.2021
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