Apparently, the 2013 Act does not contemplate a
situation of discrimination on the basis of sex whereas it
specifically deals with sexual harassment in the workplace.
The very concept of sexual harassment in a workplace against a woman should start from an express or implied sexual advance, sexual undertone or unwelcome behaviour which has a sexual tone behind it without which provisions of Act 2013 will not apply. In Anil Rajagopal
(supra) also, this Court had while interpreting 2013 Act had
arrived at the very same finding.
14. In the result, we do not think that Anil Rajagopal
(supra) requires any reconsideration. We would only clarify that
any form of sexual approach or behaviour that is unwelcome will
come under the definition of 'sexual harassment' and it is not
confined to any of the sub clauses mentioned in Section 2(n),
which of course will depend upon the materials placed on record
and on a case to case basis. But it is made clear that in order to
take action under the 2013 Act, the acts complained of should
come within the purview of S.2(n) and Section 3 of the Act or any
other form of sexual treatment or sexual behaviour on the part of the respondent.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
&
MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
Dated: 02ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2020
WP(C).No.9219 OF 2020(B)
DR.PRASAD PANNIAN Vs THE CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
Author: Shaffique, J.
These cases had been referred to us based on a reference
order dated 15/9/2020. The substantial issue raised in the writ
petitions was whether a complaint given by the 8th respondent in
WP(C) No. 9219/2020 can be the basis of an enquiry under the
provisions of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the 2013 Act').
2. The writ petitioner contended that the allegations in
the complaint given by the 8th respondent did not disclose any
form of sexual harassment coming within the purview of the 2013
Act. Reference was also placed to the judgment of the learned
Single Judge of this Court in Anil Rajagopal v. State of Kerala
and Others [2017 (5) KHC 217], wherein the learned Single
Judge after referring to the definition of 'sexual harassment'
under Section 2(n) of the 2013 Act and S.3(2) held at paragraph 9
as under:
“9. As already noticed, there is no sexual harassment
complained of and a solitary allegation of any or all of the
acts enumerated under S.3(2), cannot constitute an offence
under the Act of 2013. Any such act should be connected
with and in relation to any act or behaviour of sexual
harassment. This Court also does not find any allegation of a
promise, threat or an offensive or hostile work environment
or a humiliating treatment against the 6th respondent, from
the complaint; which is in connection with an act or
behaviour of sexual harassment. There is no allegation that
the purported harassment was intended at sexual
exploitation of the complainant; which can only be if there is
any allegation as such of a sexual offence."
Learned Single Judge while considering the above matter
however did not agree with the above proposition. It was held at
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the reference order as under:-
“6. I am of the view that the definition given in Section 2
starts with "unless the context otherwise requires".
Clause (n) provides that sexual harassment will include
the acts and behaviour mentioned therein. Therefore, the
act or behaviour provided therein is not exhaustive; thus it
is an inclusive definition. Section 3 adds to some more
circumstances which can be termed as sexual harassment.
Both those provisions require to be construed having
regard to the legislative intent behind the Act 2013. It is
relevant to note that the Apex Court in the judgment in
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction: (2008)
6 SCC 732, while construing the definition of the term
"court" in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which
was also an inclusive definition as in the 2013 Act,
reiterating the judgments in State of Maharashtra v Indian
Medical Assn:(2002) 1 SCC 589 and Pandey & Co. Builders
(P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar :(2007) 1 SCC 467, held that in
given cases where the definition clause is prefaced by the
words like 'unless the context otherwise requires' it can be
opined that the legislature intended a different meaning.
The aforesaid proposition was approved by a larger Bench
of the Apex Court in State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan
Construction Co. Ld.: (2018) 2 SCC 602.
7.It is also relevant to note the judgment in Tata Power Co.
Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Ltd.: (2009) 16 SCC 659 where the
Apex Court construed the definition clause in Section 2 of
the Electricity Act, 2003, which prefixed the words "unless
the context otherwise requires". It was held that the
meaning should be assigned "subject to the context". In
para.97 of the judgment it was held as follows:
"97. However when the question arises as to the
meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not
only legitimate but proper to read that provision in
its context. The legal principle is that all statutory
definitions have to be read subject to the
qualification variously expressed in the definition
clause which created them and it may be that even
where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the
word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is
possible for the word to have some what different
meaning in different sections of the Act depending
upon the subject or context. That is why all
definitions in statutes generally begin with the
qualifying words "unless there is anything
repugnant to the subject or context". (See :
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks: (1998)
8 SCC 1, Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v.
Krishna Travel Agency: (2008) 6 SCC 741 and
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Deepa v. devi (2008) 1
SCC 414) xx"
The intent of the Act 2013, as seen from its statement of
object and reasons, is to ensure an equitous, safe, secure
and enabling environment for women to work with dignity,
free from all sorts of sexual harassment and thereby to
encourage women's participation in work, in recognition of
their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of India. It would also show that the same is
enacted in discharge of its obligation and commitment
under Article 11 of the Convention of Elimination of All
forms of Discrimination (CEDAW) which mandates the
parties to it to take all measures to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against women and also in the light of the
directions of the Apex Court in Visakha v. State of
Rajasthan & others: (1997) 7 SCC 323. Any interference
with the work of a woman employee or any act or
behaviour which creates an intimidating or offensive work
environment or even a humiliating treatment which is
likely to affect her health or safety also amounts to
discrimination against women which is liable to be
eliminated and should constitute implicit sexual
harassment. It is equally applicable to the women
students/teachers in higher educations, which are
governed by the UGC Regulations, 2015.
8. Therefore, I am of the view that the term 'sexual
harassment' is to be construed in the light of the
provisions contained in Section 2(n) read with Section 3 of
Act 2013 as well as the provisions contained in Regulation
2(k) of the UGC Regulations, 2015 having regard to the
circumstances arising in each case and a strict
construction of an inclusive definition even when the
circumstances mentioned in sub clause (i) to (v) of Section
3(2)/subclause (1) to (e) of Regulations 2(k)(ii) are
available would defeat the very purpose of the Act.
Therefore, I am of the view that the judgment in Anil
Rajagopal's case (supra) to the extent it construed the
provisions contained in Sections 2(n) and 3(2) of the Act,
2013 requires reconsideration."
3. We heard the learned senior counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar
appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner duly assisted by
Smt.Surya Binoy. Senior counsel argued that the provisions of the
2013 Act cannot be given a wide interpretation as envisaged by
the learned Single Judge in the reference order. It is pointed out
that harassment can be meted out against an individual in
different forms and only in instances where the harassment has
an element of sexual advance in some form, it becomes a sexual
harassment. A mere difference in sex between two individuals
cannot give rise to a sexual harassment even though there might
be harassment. To that extent, the learned Single Judge was not
justified in taking a view different from what is held in Anil
Rajagopal's case (supra). That apart, it is argued that the
provisions of the 2013 Act have to be given a strict interpretation
since any action pursuant to a complaint of sexual harassment
will affect the reputation and integrity of the opposite sex and
such acts may lead to penal consequence as well.
4. We heard Sri.Sajith Kumar, learned standing counsel
appearing on behalf of the University. Learned counsel supported
the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the reference order.
He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in
Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India and Others [2020 (3)
SCT 455 (SC)] wherein the Apex Court considered the question
relating to sexual harassment in workplace and held at paragraph
102 as under:-
“102. The scheme of the 2013 Act, Vishaka Guidelines and
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) predicates that a non-hostile
working environment is the basic limb of a dignified
employment. The approach of law as regards the cases of
sexual harassment at workplace is not confined to cases of
actual commission of acts of harassment, but also covers
situations wherein the woman employee is subjected to
prejudice, hostility, discriminatory attitude and humiliation in
day to day functioning at the workplace. Taking any other
view would defeat the purpose of the law. A priori, when
inaction or procrastination (intentionally or otherwise) is
meted out in response to the attempt of setting the legal
machinery in motion, what is put to peril is not just the
individual cries for the assistance of law but also the
foundational tenets of a society governed by the Rule of law,
thereby threatening the larger public interests. The denial of
timely inquiry and by a competent forum, inevitably results
in denial of justice and violation of fundamental right. The
factual matrix of the present case is replete with lack of
sensitivity on the part of Secretary (R) qua the complaint of
sexual harassment. To wit, time taken to process the stated
complaint and improper constitution of the first Complaints
Committee (intended or unintended) in violation of the
Vishaka Guidelines, constitute an appalling conglomeration
of undignified treatment and violation of the fundamental
rights of the Petitioner, more particularly Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution.”
5. We heard the learned counsel Smt.Rekha Vasudevan
appearing on behalf of the 8th respondent. Learned counsel
submits that sexual harassment can take different forms. First of
all, definition of sexual harassment in the 2013 Act itself is not
exhaustive, whereas it is inclusive in nature. Therefore, any form
of sexual intimidation or discrimination or behaviour which tends
to attract harassment only on account of difference in sex can
also be characterized as sexual harassment. She fully supports
the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the reference order.
She also placed before us judgment of a learned Single Judge of
the Delhi High Court in Dr.Punita K.Sodhi v. Union of India
and Others [WP(C) No. 367/2009 & CMs 828, 11426/2009]. In
that judgment, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court
after a detailed analysis of the legal principles in the matter
relating to sexual harassment held at paragraphs 79 and 80 as
under:-
“79. The above decisions help in appreciating that a complaint
of sexual harassment and sex based discrimination requires
the body entrusted with the investigation of such complaint to
undertake its task with the correct approach and sensitivity. If
the entire complaint of the Petitioner is examined in the light
of the above discussion, it is clear that the inquiry cannot be
limited to the complaint of the Petitioner that Dr. Malik
attempted to touch her at wrong places, while in the operation
theatre in 2001. Incidents of sexual harassment ought not to
be viewed in isolation. The other parts of the complaint are as
relevant in determining whether there was any persistent
conduct of the perpetrator which could be termed as sex
based discrimination or harassment over a prolonged period.
The humiliation faced by a victim of sexual harassment could
remain with the victim. It is revisited and compounded when
the victim and perpetrator have to continue to work in the
same establishment. The imbalance in the power equation
between the perpetrator and the victim could exacerbate the
problem. The impact of such incidents on the continuing
working relationship of the perpetrator and the victim will also
have to be considered in examining whether the complaint
made of sexual harassment, even if belated, is justified. In a
complaint of sexual harassment and sex based harassment or
discrimination, which persists over a length of time, the
defence of limitation or laches may not find relevance.
80. The Committee also appears to have overlooked the
numerous other instances cited by the Petitioner in her
complaint which partake of sex based harassment and
discrimination. While sexual harassment would be a specie of
sex based discrimination, the latter could encompass a whole
range of commissions and omissions, not restricted to acts
that partake of express unacceptable sexual acts or
innuendoes. CEDAW too recognises that harassment can be
'sex based' and take various forms. The use of abusive and
abrasive language and a certain imputation of the competence
of a person only because such person is of a certain gender
are matters that would be covered under the expression 'sex
based' discrimination. For instance, the specific case of the
Petitioner is that the language used by Dr. Malik in the memos
and letters issued by him, questioning the integrity and
competence of the Petitioner is plainly abusive. This has not
been considered at all by the Committee. To borrow the
articulation of the Supreme Court of Canada in Janzen,
discrimination on the basis of sex may be defined as practices
or attitudes which have the effect of limiting the conditions of
employment of, or the employment opportunities available to,
employees on the basis of a characteristic related to gender. It
is important for committees dealing with complaints of sexual
harassment to understand the above dimensions of sex based
discrimination at the work place and not narrowly focus only
on certain acts that may have been the trigger for a series of
acts constituting sex based harassment or discrimination. Also,
as pointed out in Ellison v. Brady, the Committee was required
to focus on the perspective of the victim. The injunction to
Courts that they "should consider the victim's perspective and
not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior"
equally applies to Committees that enquire into allegations of
sexual harassment and sex based discrimination."
6. Now let us consider the provisions of the 2013 Act. The
Preamble to the Act reads as under:-
“An Act to provide protection against sexual harassment of
women at workplace and for the prevention and redressal of
complaints of sexual harassment and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto”.
7. There is no dispute to the fact that sexual harassment
of women at workplace results in violation of fundamental rights
of equality, enshrined under Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution of India and her right to live with dignity under
Article 21 of the Constitution. It is to ensure a safe environment
free from sexual harassment for women that the Act had been
formulated. Section 2(n) defines sexual harassment as under:-
“2. Definitions. xxxx
(n) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the
following unwelcome acts or behavior (whether directly or
by implication) namely:—
(i) physical contact and advances; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or
(iv) showing pornography; or
(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal
conduct of sexual nature.”
Apparently it is an inclusive definition and only a few
unwelcoming acts or behaviour had been mentioned at subclauses
(i) to (v). There might be other instances as well. Any
such behaviour which is unwelcome could be either direct or
indirect. Sub-clauses (i) to (v) are only instances of unwelcome
acts or behaviour, but while interpreting a statute, we will have to
derive the meaning of the word “sexual harassment” taking into
account sub-clauses (i) to (v) as well. Sub-clauses (i) to (v) are all
illustrations. But when an allegation of sexual harassment is
made, though not coming within the parameters as specified in
sub-clauses (i) to (v), the act should have something to do with a
sexual advance either directly or by implication. Going by the
statute, only a few unwelcome acts had been delineated under
sub-clauses (i) to (v). It is possible that there might be other
unwelcome acts or behaviour which would amount to a sexual
advance or demand which the woman feels to be annoyed on
account of the fact that she is a woman.
8. Section 3 of the 2013 Act deals with prevention of
sexual harassment, which reads as under:-
“3. Prevention of sexual harassment.—(1) No
woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any
workplace.
(2) The following circumstances, among other
circumstances, if it occurs, or is present in relation to or
connected with any act or behavior of sexual
harassment may amount to sexual harassment:—
(i) implied or explicit promise of preferential
treatment in her employment; or
(ii) implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment
in her employment ; or
(iii) implied or explicit threat about her present or
future employment status; or
(iv) interference with her work or creating an
intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for
her; or
(v) humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or
safety”.
Section 3 creates an absolute prohibition to subject a women to
sexual harassment at workplace. There also, sub-section (2) of
Section 3 emphasises on any act or behaviour of sexual
harassment. Clauses (i) to (v) are instances which may occur in a
workplace. But still, a bare reading of sub-section (2) indicates
that the circumstances mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) are not
exhaustive. The words 'among other circumstances' clarifies the
said position. Any such circumstances, if it occurs, or is present in
relation to or connected with any act or behaviour of sexual
harassment alone can be treated as sexual harassment. In other
words, any act which tends to affect the women in the form of
clauses (i) to (v) in Section 3(2) would amount to sexual
harassment only if such eventualities occur and should be in
relation to or connected with any act or behavior of sexual
harassment. The purport of Section 3(2) is that, if any of the
eventualities mentioned under clauses (i) to (v) or any other
circumstances occur, it should be in relation to or connected with
any act or behaviour of sexual harassment.
9. Therefore, in order to constitute sexual harassment,
definitely there should be an attempt on the part of the
wrongdoer to do some act which was unwelcome or by way of
behaviour, either directly or by implication makes the victim to
feel that it amounts to sexual harassment.
10. Visakha v. State of Rajasthan & Others [(1997) 7
SCC 323] came to be decided at a time when there was no
statutory provision to provide for the effective enforcement of
gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and
abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at
workplaces. Those guidelines were formulated to be strictly
followed in all workplaces for the preservation and enforcement
of the right to gender equality of working women. Directions
issued by the Apex Court in the said judgment were to remain in
force until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field. It is
thereafter that the 2013 Act came into force, which provided for
taking disciplinary action against such persons involved in sexual
harassment of women at any workplace and also the penal
consequences thereof. Chapter II of the Act dealt with
constitution of Internal Complaints Committee and every
employer of a workplace was bound to constitute a Committee
known as the Internal Complaints Committee. The constitution of
such Committees has also been specifically mentioned in Section
4. Chapter III deals with constitution of Local Complaints
Committee which authority has to function in respect of
complaints of sexual harassment from establishments where the
Internal Committee has not been constituted. Chapter IV deals
with complaint. Section 9 is relevant, which reads as under:-
“9. Complaint of sexual harassment.— (1) Any
aggrieved woman may make, in writing, a complaint of
sexual harassment at workplace to the Internal Committee
if so constituted, or the Local Committee, in case it is not so
constituted, within a period of three months from the date
of incident and in case of a series of incidents, within a
period of three months from the date of last incident:
Provided that where such complaint cannot be made
in writing, the Presiding Officer or any Member of the
Internal Committee or the Chairperson or any Member of
the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall render all
reasonable assistance to the woman for making the
complaint in writing:
Provided further that the Internal Committee or, as
the case may be, the Local Committee may, for the reasons
to be recorded in writing, extend the time limit not
exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the
circumstances were such which prevented the woman from
filing a complaint within the said period.
(2) Where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a
complaint on account of her physical or mental incapacity
or death or otherwise, her legal heir or such other person
as may be prescribed may make a complaint under this
section.”
The compliant that should be given in writing by an aggrieved
woman is with reference to “a complaint of sexual harassment at
workplace”. Even an oral complaint can be given to the presiding
officer or any member of Internal Committee in the event the
complaint cannot be given in writing. There is a time limit
specified for giving such complaint as well. Section 10
contemplates a conciliation on receiving such a complaint and if
the matter is not settled through conciliation, an enquiry has to
be conducted in terms with Section 11. The enquiry has to be
conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed as per
service rules applicable to the respondent. In the case of a
domestic worker, the Local Committee shall forward a complaint
to the police for registering a case under S.509 of I.P.C. if prima
facie, it is found that a case exists against the respondent. The
Internal Committee is given the power of a civil Court while trying
a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, especially to summon
and enforce the attendance of any person and examining him on
oath, requiring the discovery and production of documents or any
other matter as may be prescribed. Chapter V deals with such
other steps that could be taken during the enquiry and after
receiving the enquiry report. Section 13 is relevant, which reads
as under:-
“13. Inquiry report.—(1) On the completion of an inquiry
under this Act, the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, shall provide a report of its
findings to the employer, or as the case may be, the District
Officer within a period of ten days from the date of completion
of the inquiry and such report be made available to the
concerned parties.
(2) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall
recommend to the employer and the District Officer that no
action is required to be taken in the matter
(3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as
the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation
against the respondent has been proved, it shall recommend
to the employer or the District Officer, as the case may be—
(i) to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in
accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable
to the respondent or where no such service rules have been
made, in such manner as may be prescribed;
(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service rules
applicable to the respondent, from the salary or wages of the
respondent such sum as it may consider appropriate to be
paid to the aggrieved woman or to her legal heirs, as it may
determine, in accordance with the provisions of section 15:
Provide that in case the employer is unable to make
such deduction from the salary of the respondent due to his
being absent from duty or cessation of employment it may
direct to the respondent to pay such sum to the aggrieved
woman:
Provided further that in case the respondent fails to pay
the sum referred to in clause (ii), the Internal Committee or
as, the case may be, the Local Committee may forward the
order for recovery of the sum as an arrear of land revenue to
the concerned District Officer.
(4) The employer or the District Officer shall act upon the
recommendation within sixty days of its receipt by him.”
An order passed under Section 13(3) is also appealable u/s 18 of
the Act to the appellate authority as may be prescribed.
11. A reading of the provisions of the Statute clearly
envisages a complaint involving sexual harassment. Section 9
also makes it clear that the complaint in writing should be with
reference to “a complaint of sexual harassment at workplace”.
Further, once the Internal Committee after enquiry arrives at a
conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been
proved, it shall recommend to the employer to take action for
sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the
provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent to
determine compensation etc. Therefore, when the statute had
been framed taking into account various aspects involved in the
matter, the complaint should be one relating to sexual
harassment. Section 3 of the Act is in the form of a prohibition.
The wordings used are “no woman shall be subjected to sexual
harassment at any workplace.” The judgment of the Delhi High
Court in Dr.Punita K.Sodhi (supra) also had been decided
before the 2013 Act coming into force wherein the Court had
gone to the extent of referring to discrimination on the basis of
sex.
12. Apparently, the 2013 Act does not contemplate a
situation of discrimination on the basis of sex whereas it
specifically deals with sexual harassment in the workplace.
Nisha Priya Bhatia (supra), was also a case where a complaint
was filed on 7/8/2007. The victim was being harassed by asking
her to join a sex racket running inside the organization for
securing quicker promotions and upon refusal to oblige, she was
subject to persecution. Enquiry was conducted in terms with the
judgment in Vishaka (supra). It is in the said background that
the Apex Court had the occasion to refer to the scheme of the
2013 Act, Vishaka (supra) guidelines and the Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). In the cases on hand, we are only concerned with the
provisions of the 2013 Act.
13. In the reference order, the learned Single Judge
proceeded on the basis that sexual harassment is to be construed
in the light of the provision contained in S.2(n) read with Section
3 of the 2013 Act as well as the provisions of Regulation 2(k) of
the University Grants Commission (prevention, prohibition and
rederessal of sexual harassment of women employees and
students in higher educational institutions) Regulations, 2015
('UGC Regulations, 2015' for short). Even in the UGC regulations,
'sexual harassment' has been given a meaning. Under the UGC
Regulations, 2015, 'sexual harassment' has been defined under
clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 2(k). Clause (i) itself refers to “an
unwanted conduct with sexual undertones" and then sub clauses
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are mentioned, which are almost similar to
clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(n) of the 2013 Act. Sub clause (2) of
S.2(k) indicates “any one (or more than one or all) of the
circumstances if it occurs or is present in relation or connected
with any behaviour that has explicit or implicit sexual undertones
and it is further specified under sub-clauses (a) to (e). Therefore,
even going by the UGC Regulations, sexual harassment has to
occur based on “an unwanted conduct with sexual undertone” or
“in relation or connected with any behaviour that has explicit or
implicit" "sexual undertones". Therefore, the very concept of
sexual harassment in a workplace against a woman should start
from an express or implied sexual advance, sexual undertone or
unwelcome behaviour which has a sexual tone behind it without
which provisions of Act 2013 will not apply. In Anil Rajagopal
(supra) also, this Court had while interpreting 2013 Act had
arrived at the very same finding.
14. In the result, we do not think that Anil Rajagopal
(supra) requires any reconsideration. We would only clarify that
any form of sexual approach or behaviour that is unwelcome will
come under the definition of 'sexual harassment' and it is not
confined to any of the sub clauses mentioned in Section 2(n),
which of course will depend upon the materials placed on record
and on a case to case basis. But it is made clear that in order to
take action under the 2013 Act, the acts complained of should
come within the purview of S.2(n) and Section 3 of the Act or any
other form of sexual treatment or sexual behaviour on the part of
the respondent.
The Registry shall place the matter before the learned
Single Judge.
No comments:
Post a Comment