Law Web: Supreme Court: Death Occurred Due To Single Injury Can Also Attract offence U/S 302 IPC (Murder)

From the above stated decisions, it emerges that there is no

hard and fast rule that in a case of single injury Section 302 IPC

would not be attracted. It depends upon the facts and

circumstances of each case. The nature of injury, the part of the

body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury

are the indicators of the fact whether the accused caused the death

of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. It cannot

be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever the

death occurs on account of a single blow, Section 302 IPC is ruled

out. The fact situation has to be considered in each case, more

particularly, under the circumstances narrated hereinabove, the

events which precede will also have a bearing on the issue whether

the act by which the death was caused was done with an intention

of causing death or knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but

without intention to cause death. It is the totality of the

circumstances which will decide the nature of offence.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 577 OF 2020

Stalin Vs State

Author: M. R. Shah, J.
Dated:September 9, 2020.

Leave granted.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the Madurai

Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal

Appeal (MD) No. 122 of 2016 by which the High Court has

dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed the Judgment and

Order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned IV

Additional District and Sessions Court, Tirunelveli in Sessions Case No. 354 of 2012, convicting the appellant herein – the original

accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, the

original accused has preferred the present appeal.

3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that vide order dated

01.04.2019, this Court has issued a notice in the present appeal

limited to the extent as to whether the conviction ought to have

been under Section 304 Part II or Section 302 IPC. Therefore, this

Court is required to consider whether the appellant herein – the

original accused has been rightly convicted for the offence

punishable under Section 302 IPC or is to be convicted for any

other lesser offence, viz. Section 304 Part II IPC.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – original

accused has vehemently submitted that as it is a case of a single

blow, Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted. It is submitted that

even the socalled

motive alleged for the incident is prior to four

months of the incident in question and, therefore, as such, the

prosecution has failed to establish and prove the motive for the

accused to kill the deceased.

4.1 It is submitted that, as such, the occurrence had taken place

out of a sudden and grave provocation and therefore the offence

would fall under Exception I to Section 300 IPC and, therefore, the

appellant has to be convicted for the lesser offence than Section 302

IPC.

4.2 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –

accused has heavily relied upon the decisions of this Court in the

cases of Kunhayippu v. State of Kerala (2000) 10 SCC 307 and

Musumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashra

(2000) 3 SCC 557 in support of his submission that for causing a

single stab injury, Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted.

4.3 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above

decisions of this Court, it is prayed to convert the conviction from

Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has

vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the

case and on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, both the

learned Trial Court as well as the High Court have rightly convicted

the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. It is

vehemently submitted that the accused caused the injury by a knife

blow on the vital part of the body – Lever. It is submitted that

considering the fact that the accused was having a knife; the injury

inflicted by the accused was on the vital part of the body; and that

there was no any grave and sudden provocation established and

proved, it is submitted that both the Courts below have rightly

convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302

IPC.

5.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has

vehemently submitted that there is no absolute proposition of law

laid down by this Court in any of the decisions that in case of a

single blow, Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted. It is submitted

that it is held by this Court in catena of decisions that number of

injuries is irrelevant; it is not always the determining factor for

ascertaining the intention. It is submitted that as held by this

Court, it is the nature of injury; the part of body where it is caused;

the weapon used in causing such injury which are the indicators of

the fact whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with

an intention of causing death or not. Learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the State has relied upon the following decisions of this

Court on the single injury and, in such a case, whether Section 302

IPC would be attracted or not:

(i) Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P. (2000) 1 SCC 319;

(ii) Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2003) 9

SCC 322;

(iii) Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444;

(iv) Bavisetti Kameswara Rao v. State of A.P. (2008) 15 SCC

725;

(v) Arun Raj v. Union of India. (2010) 6 SCC 457;

(vi) Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P. (2010) 9 SCC 799;

(vii) Ashokkumar Nagabhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat (2011)

10 SCC 604;

(viii) Vijay Ramkrishan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra

(2012) 11 SCC 592;

(ix) Som Raj v. State of H.P. (2013) 14 SCC 246;

(x) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalicharan (2019) 6 SCC 809;

(xi) State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram (2019) 13 SCC 131;

(xii) Ananta Kamilya v. State of West Bengal (2020) 2 SCC 511

6. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that

the prosecution has failed to establish and prove the motive and/or

that the motive alleged of the incident is prior to four months of the

incident in question, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

State has vehemently submitted that, as rightly observed by the

High Court, in a case where the eyewitnesses

are available, the

motive becomes insignificant. It is submitted that, in the present

case, PWs 1, 2 and 3 are the eyewitnesses

to the incident and

therefore, the motive is insignificant in the present case. Heavy

reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of

Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2019) 15 SCC 622.

7. Heard learned counsel on behalf of the respective parties at

length. As observed hereinabove, the only aspect which is required

to be considered in the present appeal is whether the appellant –

accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 302

IPC or any other lesser offence, more particularly, Section 304 Part

II IPC?

7.1 It is the case on behalf of the appellant – accused that as it is

a case of single injury, Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted and

the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC. While

considering the aforesaid submission, few decisions of this Court on

whether in a case of single injury, Section 302 IPC would be

attracted or not are required to be referred to:

7.1.1 In Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P., (2000) 1 SCC

319, this Court while deciding the question of whether a single blow with a knife on the chest of the deceased would attract Section 302 IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 32223, para 9)

“9. … there is no principle that in all cases of a

single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A

single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction

under Section 302 IPC, in some cases under Section

304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326

IPC. The question with regard to the nature of

offence has to be determined on the facts and in the

circumstances of each case. The nature of the

injury, whether it is on the vital or nonvital

part of

the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in

which the injury is caused and the manner in which

the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which

may go to determine the required intention or

knowledge of the offender and the offence

committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased

was disabled from saving himself because he was

held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted

though a single yet a fatal blow of the description

noted above. These facts clearly establish that the

appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In

any event, he can safely be attributed the knowledge

that the knifeblow

given by him was so imminently

dangerous that it must in all probability cause

death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause

death.”

7.1.2 In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of

Gujarat (2003) 9 SCC 322, this Court while discussing the

ingredients of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, held thus: (SCC pp.

32728,

para 11)

“11. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC

covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said

Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic

provocation) not covered by the first exception, after

which its place would have been more appropriate.

The Exception is founded upon the same principle,

for in both there is absence of premeditation. But,

while in the case of Exception 1 there is total

deprivation of selfcontrol,

in case of Exception 4,

there is only that heat of passion which clouds

men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which

they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in

Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done

is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In

fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which

notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck,

or some provocation given in the origin of the

dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have

originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both

parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal

footing. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation

and blows on each side. The homicide committed is

then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation,

nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed

on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more

appropriately applicable would be Exception 1.

There is no previous deliberation or determination

to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both

parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that

one of them starts it, but if the other had not

aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have

taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual

provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to

apportion the share of blame which attaches to each

fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if

death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a

sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken

undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual

manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the

person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all

the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is

to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4

to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two

to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there

must be no time for the passions to cool down and

in this case, the parties had worked themselves into

a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the

beginning. A fight is a combat between two and

more persons whether with or without weapons. It

is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to

what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a

question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or

not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts

of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is

not sufficient to show that there was a sudden

quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must

further be shown that the offender has not taken

undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual

manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used

in the provision means “unfair advantage”.”

7.1.3 In Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC

444, this Court while deciding whether a case falls under Section

302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 45758,

para 29):

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to

decide the pivotal question of intention, with care

and caution, as that will decide whether the case

falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II.

Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a

fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children,

utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable

glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes

culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge,

greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in

such cases. There may be no intention. There may

be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be

criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there

may be cases of murder where the accused attempts

to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put

forth a case that there was no intention to cause

death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of

murder punishable under Section 302, are not

converted into offences punishable under Section

304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not

amounting to murder, are treated as murder

punishable under Section 302. The intention to

cause death can be gathered generally from a

combination of a few or several of the following,

among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the

weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried

by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii)

whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the

body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing

injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of

sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;

(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or

whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether

there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased

was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave

and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for

such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of

passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury

has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel

and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt

a single blow or several blows. The above list of

circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and

there may be several other special circumstances

with reference to individual cases which may throw

light on the question of intention. Be that as it

may.”

7.1.4 In Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P. (2010) 9 SCC

799, this Court while deciding the question whether a blow on the

skull of the deceased with a crowbar would attract Section 302 IPC,

held thus, (SCC p. 803, para 16):

“16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the

mind of the accused, his intention has to be gathered

from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for

the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here,

the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of

offence. He has further chosen a vital part of the body i.e.

the head for causing the injury which had caused

multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the force

with which the appellant had used the weapon. The

cumulative effect of all these factors irresistibly leads to

one and the only conclusion that the appellant intended

to cause death of the deceased.”

7.1.5 In State of Rajasthan v. Kanhaiya Lal (2019) 5 SCC

639 this Court in paragraphs 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 held as follows:

“7.3. In Arun Raj [Arun Raj v. Union of India, (2010)

6 SCC 457 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 155] this Court observed

and held that there is no fixed rule that whenever a

single blow is inflicted, Section 302 would not be

attracted. It is observed and held by this Court in the

aforesaid decision that nature of weapon used and vital

part of the body where blow was struck, prove beyond

reasonable doubt the intention of the accused to cause

death of the deceased. It is further observed and held by

this Court that once these ingredients are proved, it is

irrelevant whether there was a single blow struck or

multiple blows.

7.4. In Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar [Ashokkumar

Magabhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604 :

(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 397] , the death was caused by single

blow on head of the deceased with a wooden pestle. It

was found that the accused used pestle with such force

that head of the deceased was broken into pieces. This

Court considered whether the case would fall under

Section 302 or Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. It is held

by this Court that the injury sustained by the deceased,

not only exhibits intention of the accused in causing

death of victim, but also knowledge of the accused in that

regard. It is further observed by this Court that such

attack could be none other than for causing death of

victim. It is observed that any reasonable person, with

any stretch of imagination can come to conclusion that

such injury on such a vital part of the body, with such a

weapon, would cause death.

7.5. A similar view is taken by this Court in the

recent decision in Leela Ram (supra) and after

considering catena of decisions of this Court on the issue

on hand i.e. in case of a single blow, whether case falls

under Section 302 or Section 304 Part I or Section 304

Part II, this Court reversed the judgment and convicted

the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC. In the

same decision, this Court also considered Exception 4 of

Section 300 IPC and observed in para 21 as under: (SCC

para 21)

“21. Under Exception 4, culpable homicide is

not murder if the stipulations contained in that

provision are fulfilled. They are: (i) that the act was

committed without premeditation; (ii) that there was

a sudden fight; (iii) the act must be in the heat of

passion upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the offender

should not have taken undue advantage or acted in

a cruel or unusual manner.”

7.1.6 In the case of Bavisetti Kameswara Rao (supra), this

Court has observed in paragraphs 13 and 14 as under:

“13. It is seen that where in the murder case there

is only a single injury, there is always a tendency to

advance an argument that the offence would invariably

be covered under Section 304 Part II IPC. The nature of

offence where there is a single injury could not be

decided merely on the basis of the single injury and thus

in a mechanical fashion. The nature of the offence would

certainly depend upon the other attendant

circumstances which would help the court to find out

definitely about the intention on the part of the accused.

Such attendant circumstances could be very many, they

being (i) whether the act was premeditated; (ii) the

nature of weapon used; (iii) the nature of assault on the

accused. This is certainly not an exhaustive list and

every case has to necessarily depend upon the evidence

available. As regards the user of screwdriver, the learned

counsel urged that it was only an accidental use on the

spur of the moment and, therefore, there could be no

intention to either cause death or cause such bodily

injury as would be sufficient to cause death. Merely

because the screwdriver was a usual tool used by the

accused in his business, it could not be as if its user

would be innocuous.

14. In State of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam [(1995) 1

SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 231] this Court considered the

usual argument of a single injury not being sufficient to

invite a conviction under Section 302 IPC. In that case

the injury was caused by a knife. The medical evidence

supported the version of the prosecution that the injury

was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause

death. The High Court had convicted the accused for the

offence under Section 304 Part II IPC relying on the fact

that there is only a single injury. However, after a

detailed discussion regarding the nature of injury, the

part of the body chosen by the accused to inflict the same

and other attendant circumstances and after discussing

clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC and further relying on

the decision in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958

SC 465] , the Court set aside the acquittal under Section

302 IPC and convicted the accused for that offence. The

Court (in Vedanayagam case [(1995) 1 SCC 326 : 1995

SCC (Cri) 231] , SCC p. 330, para 4) relied on the

observation by Bose, J. in Virsa Singh case [AIR 1958 SC

465] to suggest that: (Virsa Singh case [AIR 1958 SC

465], AIR p. 468, para 16)

“16. … With due respect to the learned Judge

he has linked up the intent required with the

seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have

shown, is not what the section requires. The two

matters are quite separate and distinct, though the

evidence about them may sometimes overlap.”

The further observation in the above case were:

(Virsa Singh case [AIR 1958 SC 465] , AIR p. 468, paras

16 & 17)

“16. … The question is not whether the

prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a

trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the

injury that is proved to be present. If he can show

that he did not, or if the totality of the

circumstances justify such an inference, then, of

course, the intent that the section requires is not

proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury

and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only

possible inference is that he intended to inflict it.

Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended

serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The

question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not

whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a

particular degree of seriousness, but whether he

intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the

existence of the injury is proved the intention to

cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the

circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But

whether the intention is there or not is one of fact

and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or

otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally

separate and distinct question and has nothing to

do with the question whether the prisoner intended

to inflict the injury in question.

17. … It is true that in a given case the enquiry

may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury.

For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of

the circumstances justify an inference, that the

prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and

that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the

sword or spear that was used, then of course the

offence is not murder. But that is not because the

prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended

to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but

because he did not intend to inflict the injury in

question at all. His intention in such a case would

be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference

is not one of law but one of fact; …”

(emphasis supplied)”

7.2 From the above stated decisions, it emerges that there is no