Right of a husband to get Fair trial Vs Right of privacy of wife

1)  In the divorce proceedings, the husband filed a Compact Disc (CD) purporting to contain an audio-video

recording of the wife supposedly speaking with her lady friend, by name Sugandha, on phone and talking about the husband and his family in a manner, which the husband claims was derogatory, defamatory and constituted cruelty to him.

2) The wife opposed the CD being brought on record on the ground, firstly, that the contents of the CD were tampered with and were therefore not authentic ; and secondly, that the contents of the CD were not admissible in evidence since they were a

recording of a ‘private’ conversation that the wife had had with a friend, which had been secretly recorded by the husband, without the knowledge or consent of the wife, in breach of her fundamental right to privacy.

3)  On the other hand, it is the husband's contention that although privacy

has been recognised by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right, this right

is not absolute but is subject to exceptions. Relying upon other judicial

precedents, it is urged that the husband was entitled to establish cruelty on

the wife’s part and to prove his case seeking dissolution of marriage on that

ground ; and in these circumstances, the wife's right to privacy must give

way to the husband's right to bring evidence to prove his case, else the

husband would be denied the right to fair trial guaranteed under Article 21

of the Constitution. It is of course also argued on behalf of the husband, that

section 14 of the Family Courts Act specifically empowers a Family Court

to receive evidence, if in its opinion such evidence will assist the court to

deal effectively with the dispute, regardless of whether the same is otherwise

relevant or admissible under the Evidence Act.
4) While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must

yield to the right of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant

to court, to prove its case. It is a critical part of the hallowed concept of fair

trial that a litigating party gets a fair chance to bring relevant evidence

before court. It is important to appreciate that while the right to privacy is

essentially a personal right, the right to a fair trial has wider ramifications

and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public

justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out

evidence that a litigating party may wish to lead at the very threshold.

24. Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the

event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest

between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise

under the expansive Article 21, the right to privacy may have to yield to the right to fair trial.

5)  If it were to be held that evidence sought to be adduced before a Family Court should be excluded based on an objection of breach of privacy or some other cognate right, then in many a case the provisions of section 14 would be rendered nugatory and dead-letter. It must be borne in mind that Family Courts have been established to deal with what are essentially

sensitive, personal disputes relating to dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, legitimacy of children, guardianship, custody, and access to minors; which matters, by the very nature of the relationship from which

they arise, involve issues that are private, personal and involve intimacies. It

is easily foreseeable therefore, that in most cases that come before the

Family Court, the evidence sought to be marshalled would relate to the private affairs of the litigating parties. If section 14 is held not to apply in its full expanse to evidence that impinges on a person's right to privacy, then section 14 may as well be effaced from the statute. And yet, falling back upon the general rule of evidence, the test of admissibility would only be

relevance ; and accordingly, even ignoring section 14, fundamental considerations of fair trial and public justice would warrant that evidence be received if it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. No purpose would therefore be  served by emasculating the salutary provisions of section 14 of

the Family Courts Act by citing breach of privacy. Looking at it

dispassionately, even assuming evidence is collected in breach of privacy, at best and at worst, it is the process of collection of evidence that would be tainted not the evidence itself.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Dated : 30th June, 2020

 CM(M) 40/2019 and CM APPL.No.1226/2019

DEEPTI KAPUR Vs  KUNAL JULKA 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns

order dated 24.12.2018 made by the learned Principal Judge (South), Family

Court, Saket, Delhi in HMA No.609/2012 titled Kunal Julka vs. Deepti

Kapur.

2. The issue at hand arises from a matrimonial dispute which is pending

before the Family Court by way of a divorce petition bearing HMA

No. 609/2012, the relevant details of which are referred to hereinafter.

3. The petitioner/wife is the respondent in the aforesaid divorce petition

which was filed on 26.09.2012 by the respondent/husband seeking

dissolution of their marriage on the ground of cruelty available under section

13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the divorce proceedings, the

husband filed a Compact Disc (CD) purporting to contain an audio-video

recording of the wife supposedly speaking with her lady friend, by name

Sugandha, on phone and talking about the husband and his family in a

manner, which the husband claims was derogatory, defamatory and

constituted cruelty to him. In the written statement filed by the wife in the

divorce proceedings, she opposed the taking on record of the CD and the

purported transcript of conversation contained therein. The wife opposed the

CD being brought on record on the ground, firstly, that the contents of the

CD were tampered with and were therefore not authentic ; and secondly, that

the contents of the CD were not admissible in evidence since they were a

recording of a ‘private’ conversation that the wife had had with a friend,

which had been secretly recorded by the husband, without the knowledge or

consent of the wife, in breach of her fundamental right to privacy.

4. In response to the wife’s objections, the husband moved an

application before the Family Court, in which he in effect sought

appointment of an expert to prove the genuineness of the CD with the

purpose of bringing the CD on record. Agreeing with the husband's

contentions, by way of impugned order dated 24.12.2018, the Family Court

allowed the husband to bring on record the evidence comprised in the CD,

while directing that the contents of the CD be examined by the Forensic

Science Laboratory (FSL) to assess the genuineness of the recording. By

way of the impugned order, the Family Court has directed the FSL to render

its opinion on the following aspects :

“The FSL shall report :(l) (sic) Whether the contents of CD

and the original recording in the recording device are at

variance? (2) Whether the original recording has been

tempered (sic) with? (3)Whether the transcript relied upon

by the petitioner is correct, as per the original recording?”

5. While the prayer made in the application on which the Family Court

has made the impugned order is somewhat ambiguous, the essential question

raised in the present proceeding is as regards the admissibility of the

contents of the CD, since according to the wife, the conversation comprised

in the CD has been recorded in breach of her fundamental right to privacy;

and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

Petitioner’s submissions :

6. The wife’s objection arises from the conceded position that the audiovideo

recording on the CD was made by means of a CCTV camera installed

by the husband in the bedroom of the parties ; and that is how the

conversation between the wife and her friend came to be recorded. The wife

accordingly contends that since the evidence comprised in the CD was

collected in breach of the wife's fundamental right to privacy, the same is

not admissible in a court of law. Relying on a Constitution Bench judgment

of the Supreme Court in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. vs. Union

of India & Ors.1, the wife has urged that privacy has (now) been recognised

by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right, available to a person not only

against the State but also against private individuals. It is argued that a

person is entitled to criticise someone and not share the criticism with the

world ; and that a person has a right to all thoughts and behavioural patterns

1 (2017) 10 SCC 1

within one’s zone of privacy. In this context, it is urged that the

conversation between the wife and her friend, conducted in the bedroom and

therefore in the belief that the same was being conducted in private, cannot

be brought on record and be cited in evidence. It is further submitted that

since the husband's action of secretly recording the conversation using a

CCTV camera installed in the bedroom is a violation of the wife's

fundamental right to privacy, the recording is per se illegal and therefore not

admissible in evidence.

7. In the context of section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1984 (‘Family

Courts Act', for short), it is argued, that though this provision otherwise

empowers a Family Court to receive evidence, if in the opinion of the

Family Court, such evidence assists it to deal effectually with a dispute,

whether or not the same is otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian

Evidence Act 1872 (‘Evidence Act’, for short), yet this section does not

permit evidence which is inadmissible “as per the Constitution” to be taken

on record. Relying upon certain judicial precedents, it is argued on behalf of

the wife that since the conversation comprised in the CD was recorded in

breach of the wife’s fundamental right to privacy as recognised in the

Constitution, it cannot be admitted in evidence even under section 14 of the

Family Courts Act.

8. Additionally it has been urged that the husband’s action of

surreptitiously and clandestinely recording the wife's telephone conversation

with her friend also amounts to an offence under section 354-D of the Indian

Penal Code 1860, whereby the very act of recording such conversation is a

criminal offence, punishable in law ; and accordingly evidence collected by committing a penal offence must per se be inadmissible in a court of law for

any purpose and under any statute.

Respondent’s submissions :

9. On the other hand, it is the husband's contention that although privacy

has been recognised by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right, this right

is not absolute but is subject to exceptions. Relying upon other judicial

precedents, it is urged that the husband was entitled to establish cruelty on

the wife’s part and to prove his case seeking dissolution of marriage on that

ground ; and in these circumstances, the wife's right to privacy must give

way to the husband's right to bring evidence to prove his case, else the

husband would be denied the right to fair trial guaranteed under Article 21

of the Constitution. It is of course also argued on behalf of the husband, that

section 14 of the Family Courts Act specifically empowers a Family Court

to receive evidence, if in its opinion such evidence will assist the court to

deal effectively with the dispute, regardless of whether the same is otherwise

relevant or admissible under the Evidence Act.

10. In support of their respective submissions, the parties have cited the

following judicial precedents:

Precedents cited by the petitioner/wife :

(i) Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. vs. UOI & Ors.

(supra) : in which a 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy is a

constitutionally protected right of an individual.

(ii) Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari vs. Nagaphanender Rayala2 : in

which a single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has

held that the act of phone tapping by the husband is illegal

and infringed the wife’s right to privacy.

(iii) State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh3 : in which, while dealing

with section 50 of The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act 1985 (‘NDPS Act’, for short), a 5-Judge

Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that while

considering the aspect of fair trial, the nature of the evidence

obtained and the nature of the safeguard violated are both

relevant factors. Courts cannot allow admission of evidence

against an accused where the court is satisfied that the

evidence had been obtained by conduct of which the

prosecution ought not to take advantage, particularly when

that conduct causes prejudice to the accused.

Precedents cited by the respondent/husband :

(i) Yusufalli Esmail Nagree vs. The State of Maharashtra4 : in

which a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that a

tape recording can be considered as a statement, provided it

is not tampered with; and that the tape recording was done

without knowledge is not in itself an objection to its

admissibility.

2 MANU/AP/0907/2007

3 (1999) 6 SCC 172

4 (1967) 3 SCR 720

(ii) N. Sri Rama Reddi & Ors. vs. V. V. Giri5 : in which a

5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has upheld

the decision in S. Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab : (1964) 4

SCR 733, that a tape recorded conversation is admissible. It

was further held that a tape recording can be used to

corroborate as well as contradict evidence.

(iii) R. M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra6 : in which a 2-

Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that conversation

that is tape recorded by an external device, without tampering

or interrupting telephone lines, is admissible in evidence. In

this case the Supreme Court has spelt-out three conditions for

admissibility of a tape recording, namely (a) relevance, (b)

voice identification and (c) proof of accuracy. Further it has

been held that evidence, even if procured illegally, is

admissible.

(iv) Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari vs. Brijmohan Ramdass

Mehra & Ors.7 : in which a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court has held that tape recordings of speeches were

documents under section 3 of the Evidence Act, which stood

on no different footing than photographs, and were

admissible after satisfying the three conditions as laid down

inter alia in RM Malkani (supra).

5 (1970) 2 SCC 340

6 (1973) 1 SCC 471

7 (1976) 2 SCC 17

(v) X vs. Hospital Z8 : in which a 2-Judge bench of the Supreme

Court has held that the disclosure by a doctor of a serious

disease suffered by a prospective groom that saved the

prospective wife from contracting that disease, did not invade

the man’s right to privacy, despite the fact that one of the

most important aspects of a doctor-patient relationship is the

doctor’s duty to maintain secrecy about a patient’s medical

condition ; and that though the right to privacy is one of the

basic human rights, it is not treated as absolute and is subject

to such action as may lawfully be taken for prevention of

crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or

protection of rights and freedoms of others. For completeness

it must be noted that upon an application made subsequently,

a 3-Judge bench of the Supreme Court in X vs. Y Hospital9

clarified that the decision of the 2-Judge bench decided only

that revealing the man’s medical condition to the fiancé’s

relatives did not violate his right to privacy since the fiancé

had a right to know about the medical status of the man she

was to marry, while holding that certain other observations

made by the 2-Judge bench were uncalled for.

(vi) Sharda vs. Dharmpal10 : in which a 3-Judge Bench of the

Supreme Court has held that a matrimonial court has the

power to order a person to undergo medical tests ; and

8 (1998) 8 SCC 296

9 (2003) 1 SCC 500

10 (2003) 4 SCC 493

passing of such an order by the court would not be in

violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21; and

that if a party refuses to submit himself to medical

examination despite a court order, the court will be entitled to

draw an adverse inference against that party.

(vii) Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate 11 : in

which a 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, citing

Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari (supra), has held that tape

recordings are documents under section 3 of the Evidence

Act, which stood on no different footing than photographs;

and were admissible after satisfying the three conditions as

laid down inter alia in R.M. Malkani (supra), though with

more stringent standards of proof.

(viii) Anurag Kumar Singh & Ors. vs. State of Uttarakhand &

Ors.12 : in which a 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has

held that courts cannot give any direction contrary to the

statutes or rules made thereunder in purported exercise of

judicial discretion.

(ix) Anvar P. V. vs. P.K. Basheer & Ors.13 : in which a 3-Judge

Bench of the Supreme Court has held that electronic record

produced for inspection of the court is documentary evidence

under section 3 of the Evidence Act, to be proved in

11 (2010) 4 SCC 329

12 (2016) 9 SCC 426

13 (2014) 10 SCC 473

accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 65-B

of the Evidence Act.

(x) Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. vs. UoI & Ors.

(supra) : in which a 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy is a

fundamental right; however it is not an absolute right and has

to be placed in the context of other rights and values.

(xi) Havovi Kersi Sethna vs. Kersi Gustad Sethna14 : in which a

single Judge of the Bombay High Court has followed the

tests laid down inter alia in RM Malkani (supra) as to the

admissibility of tape recorded conversations.

(xii) Manohar Lal Agrawal vs. Santosh & Ors.15 : in which a

Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has held that the

Family Court has been left free to receive any evidence or

material which assists it to deal effectually with a dispute and

the provisions of the Evidence Act would not be applicable.

(xiii) Preeti Jain vs. Kunal Jain & Anr. 16 : in which a single

Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has held that the

‘privilege’ in respect of husband-and-wife communication

under section 122 of the Evidence Act is eclipsed by section

14 of the Family Courts Act 1984.

14 SCC OnLine Bom 120

15 MANU/RH/0162/1993

16 SCC OnLine Raj 2838

(xiv) Sagrika Debata vs. Satyanarayan Debata & Anr. 17 : in

which a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has held

that consideration of evidence by a Family Court is not

restricted by the rules of relevancy or admissibility provided

under the Evidence Act.

(xv) Akham Ibodi Singh vs. Akham Biradhwaja Singh & Anr18.:

in which case a single Judge of the Gauhati High Court has

held that the Family Court deals with disputes concerning the

family by adopting an approach radically different from that

adopted in ordinary civil proceedings ; and that section 14 of

the Family Courts Act does not suffer from any vice of either

arbitrariness or being fanciful.

(xvi) Pootholi Damodaran Nair vs. Babu19 : in which a single

Judge of the Kerala High Court has held that a tape recording

can be considered as a statement provided it is not tampered

with; and the tests laid down inter alia in R.M. Malkani

(supra) are followed.

Decision of the Family Court :

11. In allowing the husband’s application, the Family Court has dealt with

the rival contentions of the parties in the following way :

“7.1 There can be no dispute to the law laid down in

K.S.Puttaswamy & Anr.'s case (supra). The law, as

17 2009 SCC OnLine Ori 82

18 2006 SCC OnLine Gau 276

19 2005 SCC OnLine Ker 189

enunciated by a Full Bench (sic) of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India is binding and sacrosanct. However, this

court is of the opinion that the scope of K.S.Puttaswamy &

Anr.'s case (supra) is restricted to a stage prior to violation

of the right to privacy. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India

has held that a person has a right to maintain his privacy.

This right has been conferred the status of a Fundamental

right. The protection has been enunciated to be available

against state, as well, as non-state entities. However, the

consequences of such violation, on the admissibility/

inadmissibility of the evidence collected by such violation,

are not the subject matter or have not been discussed in the

judgment.”

“7.2 Thus, in the present case, the act of petitioner/ husband

of planting an audio-video recorder without the knowledge

and permission of respondent, certainly amounts to invasion

of respondent's right to privacy. Petitioner had no right to

plant such a device. Having planted the said recorded (sic)

and made a recording therein, the legally permissible

consequences would follow. In appropriate proceedings,

petitioner can be held liable for violating the respondent's

Fundamental right to privacy. The question that needs to be

answered by this court in the present application is, from

the next stage onwards i.e. 'whether the evidence so

collected in violation of respondent's Fundamental right

to privacy is admissible or not ?. This court is of the

opinion that K.S.Puttaswamy & Anr's case (supra) is silent

on this question. Reliance upon law laid down in X Vs.

Hospital Z's, case (supra) and Sharda Vs. Dharampal's

case (supra) also does not answer this question. In X Vs.

Hospital Z's case (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court that dissemination of information about a

person being infected with HIV +ve is not hit by right of

privacy, as the prospective spouse has a right to protect

herself from being infected. In Sharda Vs. Dharampal's

case (supra), Family courts' power to direct a person to

undergo medical test was held not violative of Article 21 of

the Constitution of India. The judgments relied upon by ld.

counsels based on Article 19 & 21 of the Constitution of

India, therefore, do not answer the question, which this

court is required to answer.”

(Emphasis supplied)

12. The Family Court has further given the following reason for receiving

the evidence filed by way of the CD in light of section 14 of the Act :

“8.1 It is sec.-14 of the Family Court of Act, which squarely

& clearly answers the question posed. Sagarika Devatta's

case (supra) elucidates the object of sec.-14 of the Family

Courts Act. The legislature's wisdom to keep the procedure

in legal aspect of a Family Court, to be simple and noncomplicated

have been held to be the object of the Sec.-14

of the Family Court Act. For ready reference, Sec.-14 of the

Family Court Act is reproduced hereinbelow :

* * * * * *

It is, therefore, evident that the Family Court is within its

right to receive any report, statement, document or

information, which in the opinion of the court will assist it

in effectually dealing with a dispute between the parties;

whether such evidence is relevant or admissible or not.

Therefore, the question of admissibility of the evidence

collected by violating the respondent's right to privacy,

would not be gone into, by a Family Court and the evidence

shall be taken on record; if the court is of the opinion, that

such evidence will assist it in dealing with the dispute

effectively.”

“8.2 This court is of the opinion that the conversation

between the respondent and her friend, wherein, she has

allegedly spoken about the petitioner/ his family and the

status of the matrimonial life would, certainly assist the

court in effectively deciding the dispute between the

parties. Such a piece of evidence is certainly relevant.

Therefore, in view of sec.-14 of the Family Court Act, the

evidence can not be thrown out on the ground that the same

is inadmissible. Dr. Hingorani's argument that the

admissibility mentioned in Sec.-14 of The Family Courts Act

pertains to admissibility under Indian Evidence Act and not

under the Constitution of India, does not impress this court.

The question of admissibility has been defined only under

the Indian Evidence Act and there is no way that

appreciation of admissibility of evidence can be carried out

under Constitution of India. Therefore, court is of the

opinion that the audio-video recording, as contained in the

CD is certainly permissible to be taken on record and

considered for effectively adjudicating the dispute between

the parties.”

(Emphasis supplied)

13. The Family Court has differed with the view taken by a single Judge

of the Rajasthan High Court in Vishal Kaushik vs. Family Court & Anr.20,

holding that judgement to be per incuriam for the reason that, according to

the Family Court, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in R.M. Malkani

(supra) as followed in State vs. Navjot Sandhu21 was not brought to the

notice of the Rajasthan High Court and has therefore not been considered.

14. The Family Court has relied essentially upon the law as expatiated by

the Supreme Court in Navjot Sandhu (supra), as is discussed later in this

judgment.

20 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 7851

21 (2005) 11 SCC 600

Discussion and conclusions :

15. The impugned order requires to be tested on the anvil of well-worn

principles of admissibility of evidence ; as moulded in light of section 14 of

the Family Courts Act, which creates a special dispensation for a Family

Court receiving evidence to effectively decide disputes before it ; and above

all in view of the overarching effect of the recent, authoritative recognition

given by the Constitution Bench judgment of our Supreme Court to the right

to privacy as a fundamental, though not absolute, right. In assessing the

scope and operation of section 14 of the Family Courts Act, attention must

also be given to the interpretative principles of a ‘special law’ prevailing

over the ‘general law’ ; and of a ‘later statute’ prevailing over an ‘earlier

statute’. The question also needs to be addressed as to whether admissibility

is to be decided based only on principles of evidence or also based on

constitutional rights and principles. Finally, it also needs to be seen if ethical

and moral considerations should also be factored-in for deciding

admissibility of evidence.

16. At this point, it would be useful to extract the relevant Constitutional/

statutory provisions which need to be considered. These are:

The Family Courts Act 1984

“14. Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.-A Family

Court may receive as evidence any report, statement,

documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion,

assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the

same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).”

“20. Act to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this

Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent

therewith contained in any other law for the time being in

force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law

other than this Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Indian Evidence Act 1872

“5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts-

Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the

existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such

other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no

others.

Explanation—This section shall not enable any person to give

evidence of a fact which he is disentitled to prove by any

provision of the law for the time being in force relating to Civil

Procedure.”

“7. Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect of facts in

issue-

Facts which are the occasion, cause, or effect, immediately or

otherwise, of relevant facts, or facts in issue, or which

constitute the state of things under which they happened, or

which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or

transaction, are relevant.”

“8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or

preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to

any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or

proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or

relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence

against whom is subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if

such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue

or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent

thereto.

Explanation 1- The word "conduct" in this section does not

include statements, unless those statements accompany and

explain acts other than statements, but this explanation is

not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other

section of this Act.

Explanation 2—When the conduct of any person is

relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and

hearing, which affects such conduct is relevant.”

“Section 65B : Admissibility of electronic records.

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any

information contained in an electronic record which is

printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or

magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter

referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be

also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section

are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in

question and shall be admissible in any proceedings,

without further proof or production of the original, as

evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated

therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Constitution of India

“21. Protection of life and personal liberty - No person

shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except

according to procedure established by law.”

17. The Statement of Objects and Reasons (SOR) of the Family Courts

Act enunciates the main purpose of its enactment in the following words :

“Several associations of women, other organizations and

individuals have urged, from time to time, that Family Courts

be set up for the settlement of family disputes, where emphasis

should be laid on conciliation and achieving socially desirable

results and adherence to rigid rules of procedure and evidence

should be eliminated. The Law Commission in its 59th report

(1974) had also stressed that in dealing with disputes

concerning the family the court ought to adopt an approach

radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil

proceedings and that it should make reasonable efforts at

settlement before the commencement of the trial.”

* * * * * *

“2. The Bill inter alia, seeks to—

* * * * * *

h) simplify the rules of evidence and procedure so as to enable

a Family Court to deal effectually with a dispute;”

(Emphasis supplied)

meaning thereby, that apart from the emphasis on settlement of disputes by

conciliation, the other main objective was to ensure expeditious proceedings

inter alia by simplifying the rules of evidence required to be followed by

Family Courts.

18. One of the earliest, leading decisions on the question of admissibility

of tape-recorded conversations is Regina vs. Maqsud Ali22, where a secretly

tape-recorded conversation was the only incriminating piece of evidence

implicating the accused persons for murder. In the face of strong objection

raised by the defence however, in exercise of his discretion, the trial judge

admitted the tape recording in evidence. In this backdrop, the court of

22 (1966) 1 QB 688

criminal appeal held that there was no difference in principle between a tape

recording and a photograph; accordingly, a tape recording was admissible in

evidence provided that its accuracy could be proved and the voices properly

identified and provided the evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible.

The court did not lay down any exhaustive set of rules by which the

admissibility of evidence could be judged but observed that such evidence

had always to be regarded with caution and assessed in the light of all the

circumstances of a particular case. The court further observed that but for

the fact that the tape recorder was a mechanical device, it was no different

from an eavesdropper, and since the accused were not in custody and no

caution was required, the use of the tape recorder could not be said to

operate unfairly against them. The court said that the method of taking the

tape recording could not affect its admissibility, which still remained a

matter for the discretion of the judge. The court however added that it

should not be taken to be saying that such recordings are admissible

whatever the circumstances, but it does appear wrong to deny to the law of

evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices.

19. The law in India in relation to ‘admissibility’ of evidence is crisp,

clear and consistent. A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in

Pooran Mal vs. The Director of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi &

Ors.23 (and connected matters) was considering a challenge to the seizure of

articles consisting of account books, documents and valuables by Income

Tax Authorities, purporting to exercise their authority for search and seizure

under section 132 of the Income Tax Act 1961 and Rule 112-A of Income

23 (1974) 1 SCC 345

Tax Rules. The legal challenge was that the said provisions were violative of

the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and

31 of the Constitution. Enunciating the law on the point, the Supreme Court

observed as under:

“23. * * * * * *

Now, if the Evidence Act, 1872 which is a law consolidating,

defining and amending the law of evidence, no provision of

which is challenged as violating the Constitution — permits

relevancy as the only test of admissibility of evidence (See

Section 5 of the Act) and, secondly, that Act or any other

similar law in force does not exclude relevant evidence on the

ground that it was obtained under an illegal search or seizure,

it will be wrong to invoke the supposed spirit of our

Constitution for excluding such evidence. Nor is it open to us

to strain the language of the Constitution, because some

American Judges of the American Supreme Court have spelt

out certain constitutional protections from the provisions of the

American Constitution. In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chander

already referred to, a search and seizure made under the

Criminal Procedure Code was challenged as illegal on the

ground of violation of the fundamental right under Article

20(3), the argument being that the evidence was no better than

illegally compelled evidence. In support of that contention

reference was made to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the

American Constitution and also to some American cases which

seemed to hold that the obtaining of incriminating evidence by

illegal seizure and search tantamounts to the violation of the

Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not place any

embargo on reasonable searches and seizures. It provides that

the right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be

violated. Thus the privacy of a citizen's home was specifically

safeguarded under the Constitution, although reasonable

searches and seizures were not taboo. Repelling the

submission, this Court observed at p. 1096:

“A power of search and seizure is in any system of

jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the

protection of social security and that power is necessarily

regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have

thought fit not to subject such regulation to

constitutional limitations by recognition of a

fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American

Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it,

into a totally different fundamental right, by some process

of strained construction. Nor is it legitimate to assume that

the constitutional protection under Article 20(3) would be

defeated by the statutory provisions for searches.”

It, therefore, follows that neither by invoking the spirit of our

Constitution nor by a strained construction of any of the

fundamental rights can we spell out the exclusion of evidence

obtained on an illegal search.”

“24. So far as India is concerned its law of evidence is

modelled on the rules of evidence which prevailed in English

Law, and Courts in India and in England have consistently

refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground

that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. In Barindra

Kumar Ghose v. Emperor the learned Chief Justice Sir

Lawrence Jenkins says at page 500:

“Mr Das has attacked the searches and has urged that, even if

there was jurisdiction to direct the issue of search warrants, as

I hold there was, still the provisions of the Criminal Procedure

Code have been completely disregarded. On this assumption he

has contended that the evidence discovered by the searches is

not admissible, but to this view I cannot accede. For, without in

any way countenancing disregard of the provisions prescribed

by the Code, I hold that what would otherwise be relevant does

not become irrelevant because it was discovered in the course

of a search in which those provisions were disregarded. As

Jimutavahana with his shrewd common sense observes — “a

fact cannot be altered by 100 texts,” and as his commentator

quaintly remarks: “If a Brahmana be slain, the precept ‘slay

not a Brahmana’ does not annul the murder”. But the absence

of the precautions designed by the Legislature lends support to

the argument that the alleged discovery should be carefully

scrutinized.”

* * * * * *

In Kuruma v. Queen [1955 AC 197] where the Privy Council

had to consider the English Law of Evidence in its application

to Eastern Africa, Their Lordships propounded the rule thus:

“The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in

considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is

relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the

Court is not concerned with how it was obtained.”

* * * * * *

In Kuruma case, Kuruma was searched by two police officers

who were not authorised under the law to carry out a search

and, in the search, some ammunition was found in the unlawful

possession of Kuruma. The question was whether the evidence

with regard to the finding of the ammunition on the person of

Kuruma could be shut out on the ground that the evidence had

been obtained by an unlawful search. It was held it could not be

so shut out because the finding of ammunition was a relevant

piece of evidence on a charge for unlawful possession. In a

later case before the Privy Council in Herman

King v. Queen [(1969) 1 AC 304] which came on appeal from a

Court of Appeal of Jamaica, the law as laid down in Kuruma

case was applied although the Jamaican Constitution

guaranteed the constitutional right against search and seizure

* * * * * * In other words search and seizure for the purposes

of preventing or detecting crime reasonably enforced was not

inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee against search

and seizure. It was held in that case that the search of the

appellant by a Police Officer was not justified by the warrant

nor was it open to the Officer to search the person of the

appellant without taking him before a Justice of the Peace.

Nevertheless it was held that the Court had a discretion to

admit the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and

the constitutional protection against search of person or

property without consent did not take away the discretion of the

Court. Following Kuruma v. Queen the Court held that it was

open to the Court not to admit the evidence against the

accused if the Court was of the view that the evidence had

been obtained by conduct of which the prosecution ought not

to take advantage. But that was not a rule of evidence but a

rule of prudence and fair play. It would thus be seen that in

India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence

lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily

implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence

obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to

be shut out.”

(Emphasis supplied)

20. Following earlier decisions, the position regarding admissibility of

evidence is very pithily captured by a 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court

in Navjot Sandhu (supra) as follows :

“154. * * * * * *

The legal position regarding the question of admissibility of the

tape-recorded conversation illegally collected or obtained is no

longer res integra in view of the decision of this Court in R.M.

Malkani v. State of Maharashtra. In that case, the Court

clarified that a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant

conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible as res gestae

under Section 7 of the Evidence Act. Adverting to the argument

that Section 25 of the Telegraph Act, 1885 was contravened the

learned Judges held that there was no violation. At the same

time, the question of admissibility of evidence illegally obtained

was discussed. The law was laid down as follows: (SCC p. 477,

para 24)

“There is warrant for the proposition that even if

evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a

century ago it was said in an English case where a

constable searched the appellant illegally and found a

quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be

a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it

were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal

means, it could not be used against a party charged with

an offence. See Jones v. Owens. The Judicial Committee

in Kuruma v. R. dealt with the conviction of an accused of

being in unlawful possession of ammunition which had

been discovered in consequence of a search of his person

by a police officer below the rank of those who were

permitted to make such searches. The Judicial Committee

held that the evidence was rightly admitted. The reason

given was that if evidence was admissible it matters not

how it was obtained. There is of course always a word of

caution. It is that the judge has a discretion to disallow

evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of

admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused.

That caution is the golden rule in criminal jurisprudence.”

“155. We may also refer to the decision of a Constitution Bench

of this Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection

(Investigation) in which the principle stated by the Privy

Council in Kuruma case was approvingly referred to while

testing the evidentiary status of illegally obtained evidence.

Another decision in which the same approach was adopted is a

recent judgment in State v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate. ****** ”

(Emphasis supplied)

21. Although in Puttaswamy (supra) the 9-Judge Constitution Bench of

the Supreme Court has not dealt with the law and principles of evidence in

the context of the right to privacy, the observations of the Supreme Court in

that case that are relevant for purposes of the present discussion are the

following :

On the right to privacy being a fundamental right :

“644. The right to privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right

which protects the inner sphere of the individual from

interference from both State and non-State actors and allows

the individuals to make autonomous life choices.”

On right to privacy not being an absolute right:

“325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental

freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life and

personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute

right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will have to

withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on

fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an invasion of

privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates

a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must

also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and

personal liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or

personal liberty must meet the threefold requirement of (i)

legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need,

defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and (iii)

proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the

objects and the means adopted to achieve them.”

On the need to place right to privacy in the context of other rights

and values:

“509. Based upon the prevalent thinking of the US Supreme

Court, a seminal judgment was delivered by Mathew, J. in

Gobind [Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975

SCC (Cri) 468]. This judgment dealt with the M.P. Police

Regulations, similar to the Police Regulations contained in

Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC

1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332]. After setting

out the majority and minority opinions in the said judgment,

Mathew, J. went on to discuss the US Supreme Court judgments

in Griswold [Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965 SCC OnLine US

SC 124 : 14 L Ed 2d 510 : 85 S Ct 1678 : 381 US 479 (1965)]

and Roe [Roe v. Wade, 1973 SCC OnLine US SC 20 : 35 L Ed

2d 147 : 410 US 113 (1973)] . In a very instructive passage the

learned Judge held: (Gobind case [Gobind v. State of M.P.,

(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] , SCC pp. 155-57,

paras 22-24 & 27-28)

“ * * * * * *

23. Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern

of any system of limited Government, is protected in part

under our Constitution by explicit constitutional

guarantees. In the application of the Constitution our

contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what

may be. Time works changes and brings into existence new

conditions. Subtler and far-reaching means of invading

privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street

what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition

of privacy raises serious questions about the propriety of

judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the

Constitution. Of course, privacy primarily concerns the

individuals. It therefore relates to and overlaps with the

concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy

must confess that there are serious problems of defining

the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in

autonomy must also be placed in the context of other

rights and values.

24. Any right to privacy must encompass and protect

the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,

motherhood, procreation and child-bearing. This

catalogue approach to the question is obviously not as

instructive as it does not give analytical picture of

distinctive characteristics of the right to privacy. Perhaps,

the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying

principle underlying the concept has been the assertion

that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit

in the concept of ordered liberty.

* * * * * *

27. There are two possible theories for protecting

privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home

harm others only to the extent that they cause offence

resulting from the mere thought that individuals might be

engaging in such activities and that such “harm” is not

constitutionally protectable by the State. The second is

that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can

be free from societal control. The importance of such a

sanctuary is that individuals can drop the mask, desist for

a while from projecting on the world the image they want

to be accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect

the values of their peers rather than the realities of their

natures.

28. The right to privacy in any event will necessarily

have to go through a process of case-by-case development.

Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty,

the right to move freely throughout the territory of India

and the freedom of speech create an independent right to

privacy as an emanation from them which one can

characterise as a fundamental right, we do not think that

the right is absolute.”

The Police Regulations were, however, not struck down,

but were termed as being perilously close to being

unconstitutional.”

(Emphasis supplied)

22. It is crucial to note however, that at the time that the decisions in M.P.

Sharma & Ors. vs. Satish Chandra & Ors.24 and subsequently in Pooran

Mal (supra) were rendered, privacy was not recognised as a fundamental

right under the Constitution, as indeed no such right had been expressly

enunciated by our Founding Fathers. Today however, in Puttaswamy

(supra), our Supreme Court has recognised privacy as a fundamental right,

while qualifying it to say that the right to privacy is not absolute but is

subject to exceptions, limitations and contours ; and must be placed in the

context of other rights and values. However, even at the time of M.P.

Sharma (supra) and Pooran Mal (supra), Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g),

20(3) and 31, under which these cases arose, were very much in Part-III of

the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights; and yet the Supreme Court

opined that merely because a search or seizure was illegally conducted and

may amount to breach of a fundamental right, that would not make the

search or seizure invalid in law. Applying the same principle, this court is of

the view that although today, privacy is recognised as a fundamental right,

that alone would not make evidence collected in breach of that right,

inadmissible. Muchless would it negate the specific statutory dispensation

contained in section 14 of the Family Courts Act, which says that evidence

24 AIR 1954 SC 300

would be admissible, whether or not the same is otherwise relevant or

admissible under the Evidence Act.

23. While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must

yield to the right of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant

to court, to prove its case. It is a critical part of the hallowed concept of fair

trial that a litigating party gets a fair chance to bring relevant evidence

before court. It is important to appreciate that while the right to privacy is

essentially a personal right, the right to a fair trial has wider ramifications

and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public

justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out

evidence that a litigating party may wish to lead at the very threshold.

24. Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the

event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest

between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise

under the expansive Article 21, the right to privacy may have to yield to the

right to fair trial. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations

of a 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision of our Supreme Court in Sahara

India Real Estate Corporation Limited & Ors. vs. Securities and

Exchange Board of India & Anr.25 , where the court observes thus :

“ ..... It must not be forgotten that no single value, no matter

exalted, can bear the full burden of upholding a democratic

system of government. Underlying our constitutional system are

a number of important values, all of which help to guarantee

our liberties, but in ways which sometimes conflict. Under of

Constitution, probably, no values are absolute. All important

25 (2012) 10 SCC 603

values, therefore, must be qualified and balanced against other

important, and often competing, values. This process of

definition, qualification and balancing is as much required with

respect to the value of freedom of expression as it is for other

values. Consequently, free speech, in appropriate cases, has got

to correlate with fair trial. It also follows that in an appropriate

case one right (say freedom of expression) may have to yield to

the other right like right to a fair trial. Further, even Articles

14 and 21 are subject to the test of reasonableness after the

judgement of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.”

(Emphasis supplied)

25. In fact, the rule of evidence that the test of admissibility of evidence is

only its relevancy, laid down inter-alia in Pooran Mal (supra) has been

followed by our courts even after Puttaswamy (supra). In one of the most

recent judgments in Yashwant Sinha & Ors. vs. Central Bureau of

Investigation through its Director & Anr.26, where the issue before the

Supreme Court was whether it should permit certain documents, which the

State Authorities alleged had been unauthorisedly removed from the records

of the Ministry of Defence, to be placed on record in a review petition; and

whether the review petitioners should be permitted to rely upon such

unauthorisedly procured documents. The Attorney General had submitted

that the Supreme Court could not consider these documents. Dealing with

this objection the Supreme Court opined as under:

“9. An issue has been raised by the learned Attorney with

regard to the manner in which the three documents in question

had been procured and placed before the Court. In this regard,

as already noticed, the documents have been published in The

Hindu newspaper on different dates. That apart, even assuming

26 (2019) 6 SCC 1

that the documents have not been procured in a proper manner

should the same be shut out of consideration by the Court ? In

Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection this Court has taken the

view that the “test of admissibility of evidence lies in its

relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied

prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence obtained

as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut

out”.

* * * * * *

“45. I may also notice another aspect. Under the common law,

both in England and in India, the context for material being

considered by the court is relevancy. There can be no dispute

that the manner in which evidence is got, namely, that it was

procured in an illegal manner would not ordinarily be very

significant in itself in regard to the court's decision to act upon

the same [see in this context judgment of this Court in Pooran

Mal v. Director of Inspection].”

(Emphasis supplied)

26. Coming now to the scope and purport of section 14 of the Family

Courts Act, that has been discussed in a judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of

the Bombay High Court in Deepali Santosh Lokhande vs. Santosh

Vasantrao Lokhande 2018 (1) Mh. L.J. 944, in which case, while deciding an application to

bring on record electronic evidence under section 65B of the Evidence Act,

the Bombay High Court has taken the following view :

“5. Having considered the submissions as urged on behalf of

the parties, it is quite clear that the proceeding before the

Family Court would stand on a different footing from the

proceeding before the regular Civil Courts where the rigour of

the provisions of the Evidence Act are fully applicable for the

Civil Court to evaluate the evidence on preponderance of

probabilities and for that matter even the proof of electronic

record. It is apposite to examine the provisions of section 14 of

the Family

Courts Act which reads as under:…..”

* * * * * *

“6. …….. The object, effect and consequence of this provision

is to remove any embargo on the Family Court to first examine

the relevancy or admissibility of the documents under Indian

Evidence Act in considering such documents in adjudication of

the matrimonial dispute. The Statement of Object and Reasons

leading to the enactment of the Family Court's Act would also

become a guiding factor so as to ascertain the intention of the

legislature in framing section 14 when it uses the above words.

One of the objects of the legislation as Clause 2 (h) of the

Statement of Object and Reasons would provide is “simplify the

rules of evidence and procedure so as to enable a Family Court

to deal effectively with a dispute”. This clearly manifests the

intention of the legislature to remove complexities in the

application of rules of evidence to make the procedure more

comprehensible so as to enable a Family Court to deal

effectively with a matrimonial dispute under the Family Courts

Act, which is a special Act.”

“7. When section 14 stipulates and says that the Family Court

can receive a document in evidence irrespective of the same

being relevant or admissible in evidence under the Evidence

Act, it signifies two important facets namely that the Family

Court at the threshold cannot reject a document on the ground

that the document is not legally admissible in evidence and

secondly the test and rigor of relevancy and admissibility of the

document can be dispensed with by the Family Court if the

Family Court is of the opinion that any evidence would assist it

to deal effectively with the dispute. It cannot be disputed that

admissibility presupposes relevancy as admissibility is founded

on law whereas relevancy is determined by Court using judicial

skills, logic and experience. Admissibility does not signify that

a particular fact stands proved but merely that such a fact is

received by the Court for the purpose of being weighed. The

learned Judge overlooked that merely because the documents

are marked as Exhibits and the same also becoming available

for cross-examination, is neither an admission as to documents

nor can be treated as an admission of its contents.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, discussing the effect of section 20 of the Family Courts Act,

which gives overriding effect to that statute, the Bombay High Court has

held as under :

“9. A cumulative reading of section 14 and section 20 of the

Family Courts Act, takes within its ambit the restricted

applications of the provisions of the Evidence Act qua the

documentary evidence which includes electronic evidence,

whether or not the same is relevant or admissible, if in the

opinion of the Family Court such evidence would assist the

Family Court to deal effectively with the matrimonial dispute.

Considering the above object and the intention of the

legislature, in providing for a departure, from the normal rules

of evidence under the Evidence Act, in my opinion, there was

no embargo for the learned Judge of the Family Court to

accept and exhibit the documents as sought by the petitionerwife.

Ultimately, it is the absolute power and authority of the

Family Court either to accept or disregard a particular

evidence in finally adjudicating the matrimonial dispute.

However, to say that a party would be precluded from placing

such documents on record and or such documents can be

refused to be exhibited unless they are proved, in my opinion,

goes contrary to the object of section 14 of the Family Courts

Act”

“10. In matrimonial cases, the Family Court is expected to

adopt standards as to how a prudent person would gauge the

realities of life and a situation of commotion and turmoil

between the parties and applying the principle of

preponderance of probabilities, consider whether a particular

fact is proved. Thus, the approach of the Family Court is

required to be realistic and rational to the facts in hand rather

than technical and narrow. It cannot be overlooked that

matrimonial disputes involve human problems which are

required to be dealt with utmost human sensitivity by using all

intelligible skills to judge such issues. The Family Court has a

special feature where in a given case there may not be legal

representation of the parties. Section 13 of the Act makes such

a provision. In such a situation, the parties who are not experts

in law cannot be expected to know the technical rules of the

evidence qua the relevancy, admissibility and proof of

documents. Thus, the strict principles as referred in the

impugned order on the decisions which are not under the

Family Courts Act, would not be of any relevance in the

proceedings before the Family Court.”

“11. Thus, in my opinion, even if there is any electronic record

for which certificate under section 65-B of the Evidence Act is

necessary, it would not preclude the learned Judge of the

Family Court to exhibit such documents and receive such

documents in evidence, on forming an opinion as to whether the

documents would assist the Court, to deal effectively with the

dispute in hand. Such exercise has not been undertaken in

passing the impugned order.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. In this court's opinion, the Legislature being fully cognisant of the

foregoing principle of admissibility of evidence, has enacted section 14

infact to expand that principle insofar as disputes relating to marriage and

family affairs are concerned ; and the Family Court is thereby freed of all

rigours and restrictions of the law of evidence. The Legislature could not

have enunciated it more clearly than to say that the Family Court “may

receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter

that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether

or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872”. Therefore the only criterion or test under section 14

for a Family Court to receive, that is to say admit, evidence is its subjective

satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectually with the

dispute. It may also be relevant to note that under section 13 of the Family

Courts Act, parties are to represent themselves without the assistance of

lawyers ; and therefore even more so, all technical aspects of admissibility

of evidence are to be ignored before a Family Court, since parties appearing

in-person cannot be expected to be well versed with the technicalities of the

law of evidence. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations

made by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shiv Anand

Damodar Shanbhag vs Sujata Shiv Anand Shanbhagh 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 421

28. For the record, the vires of section 14 of the Family Courts Act has

not been challenged by the petitioner in these proceedings.

29. To be sure, in view of the expressed intention of the Legislature in

section 14 of the Family Courts Act, all that is being said here is that evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, may be received by

the Family Court if it is of opinion that the evidence would assist it to

effectively decide the dispute. It is not being suggested that the Family

Court is bound to believe, accept or act upon such evidence for purposes of

adjudication.

30. As observed by the Bombay High Court in the aforementioned case, it

is noteworthy that, what is permitted under section 14 is only for the Family

Court to receive evidence without the rigours and shackles of the

conventional rules of evidence, with the only threshold test being that in the

opinion of the Family Court that piece of evidence will assist it to deal

effectively with the dispute at hand. Thereafter however, the Family Court is

free to either accept or discard or give weightage or disregard a particular

piece of evidence when finally adjudicating the dispute. As under the

ordinary law of evidence, so also under section 14, there is absolutely no

compulsion on the Family Court to accept a given piece of evidence as proof

of a fact-in-issue or of a relevant fact, merely because such evidence has

been taken on record by disregarding all rigours of the rules of evidence.

Correspondingly, it is open to the contesting party to dispute, cross-examine

and disprove the evidence so cited; and to thereby contest any claim being

made on the basis of such evidence. The limited relaxation as it were, in

section 14 is that even if under the Evidence Act or under conventional rules

of evidence, a certain piece of evidence (whether a report, statement,

document, information or other matter) is ex-facie found to be not relevant

and therefore not admissible, the Family Court may yet receive such

evidence on record if in its opinion, the evidence would assist it to deal effectively with the dispute. What credence, value or weightage is to be

given to the evidence so received is discretionary upon the judge, when

finally adjudicating the dispute.

31. Another settled principle of interpretation of statutes that guides us in

understanding the scope and operation of section 14 is the maxim 'generalia

specialibus non derogant’. In Barker vs. Edger & Others29 , the Privy

Council of the House of Lords has pithily summarised the purport of the

maxim in the following words :

“The general maxim is, “Generalia specialibus non derogant.”

When the Legislature has given its attention to a separate

subject, and made provision for it, the presumption is that a

subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with

the special provision unless it manifests that intention very

clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect

according to its own subject-matter and its own terms.”

While in the above case, the Privy Council was dealing with a

subsequent general enactment, the principle applies a fortiori to a

subsequent special enactment. That is to say, a special enactment would

prevail, whether made earlier or subsequently, over a general enactment if

that is the discernible intention of the Legislature in relation to the subject

matter of the special enactment. Our Supreme Court has also dealt with the

issue in Sharat Babu Digumarti vs. Government (NCT of Delhi)30 in which

the issue was of construing section 81 of the Information Technology Act

2000, which provision is in pari materia with section 20 of the Act and

29 1898 AC 748

30 (2017) 2 SCC 18

gives an overriding effect to the Information Technology Act over anything

inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.

The other provision of law in question was section 292 of the Indian Penal

Code 1860 which makes the sale of obscene books etc. a penal offence. In

Sharat Babu Digumarti (supra), the Supreme Court has opined as under :

“32. Section 81 of the IT Act also specifically provides that the

provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything

inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time

being in force. All provisions will have their play and

significance, if the alleged offence pertains to offence of

electronic record. It has to be borne in mind that IT Act is a

special enactment. It has special provisions. Section 292 IPC

makes offence sale of obscene books, etc. but once the offence

has a nexus or connection with the electronic record the

protection and effect of Section 79 cannot be ignored and

negated. We are inclined to think so as it is a special provision

for a specific purpose and the Act has to be given effect to so as

to make the protection effective and true to the legislative

intent. This is the mandate behind Section 81 of the IT Act. The

additional protection granted by the IT Act would apply.”

* * * * * *

“37. The aforesaid passage clearly shows that if legislative

intendment is discernible that a latter enactment shall prevail,

the same is to be interpreted in accord with the said intention.

We have already referred to the scheme of the IT Act and how

obscenity pertaining to electronic record falls under the scheme

of the Act. We have also referred to Sections 79 and 81 of the

IT Act. Once the special provisions having the overriding effect

do cover a criminal act and the offender, he gets out of the net

of IPC and in this case, Section 292. It is apt to note here that

electronic forms of transmission are covered by the IT Act,

which is a special law. It is settled position in law that a special

law shall prevail over the general and prior laws. When the Act

in various provisions deals with obscenity in electronic form, it

covers the offence under Section 292 IPC.”

(Emphasis supplied)

32. To address the aspect whether ethical and moral considerations should

be factored-in to decide admissibility of evidence, attention may be drawn

to the observation of the Supreme Court in Pooran Mal (supra), where the

court said that when there is no express or specifically implied prohibition

in the Constitution, it is uncalled for and unwarranted to invoke the spirit of

the Constitution to exclude evidence. Equally so, in the face of the settled

rule of evidence as augmented by section 14 of the Family Courts Act, it

would be unwarranted to bring into the picture subjective and undefined

ethical and moral values or considerations, to decide if evidence should

even be receivable by a Family Court. Without at all denigrating the

importance of ethical and moral considerations, in the opinion of this court,

to say that a Family Court should shut-out evidence at the very threshold on

the basis of how it is collected, would be (i) in breach of section 14 which

unequivocally expresses the intention of the Legislature ; (ii) in breach of

settled principles of evidence ; and (iii) in breach of the enunciation by the

Supreme Court that though the right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is

not absolute and must be placed in the context of other rights and values.

Such construction would have more potential for mischief than possible

salutary effect.

33. If it were to be held that evidence sought to be adduced before a

Family Court should be excluded based on an objection of breach of privacy or some other cognate right, then in many a case the provisions of section 14

 would be rendered nugatory and dead-letter. It must be borne in mind that

Family Courts have been established to deal with what are essentially

sensitive, personal disputes relating to dissolution of marriage, restitution of

conjugal rights, legitimacy of children, guardianship, custody, and access to

minors; which matters, by the very nature of the relationship from which

they arise, involve issues that are private, personal and involve intimacies. It

is easily foreseeable therefore, that in most cases that come before the

Family Court, the evidence sought to be marshalled would relate to the

private affairs of the litigating parties. If section 14 is held not to apply in its

full expanse to evidence that impinges on a person's right to privacy, then

section 14 may as well be effaced from the statute. And yet, falling back

upon the general rule of evidence, the test of admissibility would only be

relevance ; and accordingly, even ignoring section 14, fundamental

considerations of fair trial and public justice would warrant that evidence be

received if it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. No purpose would

therefore be served by emasculating the salutary provisions of section 14 of

the Family Courts Act by citing breach of privacy. Looking at it

dispassionately, even assuming evidence is collected in breach of privacy, at

best and at worst, it is the process of collection of evidence that would be

tainted not the evidence itself.

34. The sequitur to the aforesaid constitutional and legal landscape is

that :

(a) The settled rule, purely from the standpoint of the law of

evidence, is that evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant,

regardless of how it is collected. Digressing from this settled

position would have wide ramifications and consequences; and

would be a serious hindrance to judicial proceedings across the

board, in several foreseeable and unforeseeable ways. On the

other hand, the possible misuse of this rule of evidence,

particularly in the context of the right to privacy, can be

addressed by prudent exercise of judicial discretion by a court

not at the time of receiving evidence but at the time of using

evidence at the stage of adjudication ;

(b) Merely admitting evidence on the record is not proof of a factin-

issue or a relevant fact ; admitting evidence is not even

reliance by the court on such evidence ; admitting evidence is

mere inclusion of evidence in the record, to be assessed on a

comprehensive set of factors, parameters and aspects, in the

discretion of the court ;

(c) The limited threshold test of ‘relevance’ ensures that the right

of a party to bring evidence to court, and thereby to a fair trial,

is not defeated. What weight is to be given to evidence so

brought-in, and whether or not the court ultimately relies upon

such evidence for proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact, is

always in the discretion of the court. This, a court may do on

other considerations, including considerations of justice and fair

play. We must be clear that the test of admissibility is only a

‘threshold test’, which opens the doors of the court, as it were,

so that relevant evidence brought by a litigating party is

permitted entry into the court records. It does not bind the court

to treat such evidence as proof of a fact-in-issue or relevant fact.

Section 14 of the Family Courts Act makes this threshold test

even less stringent, in that the Family Court may receive

evidence, whether or not it would otherwise be relevant or

admissible under the Evidence Act, provided in its opinion such

evidence would assist it in effectively dealing with the dispute;

(d) It appears that a crucial facet of the above rule of evidence has

so far been ignored, namely the consequences that may follow

if evidence is collected illegally by violation of someone’s

rights. Merely because a court allows evidence to be admitted,

does not mean that the person who has illegally collected such

evidence is absolved of liability that may arise, whether in civil

or criminal law or both ;

(e) Although MP Sharma (supra) and Pooran Mal (supra) were

decided before the right to privacy was authoritatively

recognised as a fundamental right in Puttaswamy (supra), the

challenge in those two cases also arose from allegations of

violation of fundamental rights inter alia under Articles 20(3)

and 14 of the Constitution. Also, the decision in Puttaswamy

does not allude to any change in the principles of admissibility

of evidence by reason of recognition of privacy as a

fundamental right ; and in fact the principle of Pooran Mal has

been followed by the Supreme Court even as recently as 2019

in Yashwant Sinha (supra), which is a post-Puttaswamy

judgment, though in the context of documents procured illegally

from a ministry and not in breach of any fundamental right ;

(f) Drawing from the observations of the Supreme Court in

Tukaram S. Digole (supra), a word of caution would be in place

here. The Family Court must bear in mind that tape recordings

are more susceptible to tampering and alteration by

transposition, excision etc., which may be difficult to detect;

and therefore such evidence must be received and treated with

caution and circumspection ; and, to rule-out the possibility of

any kind of tampering, the standard of proof applied by a court

for the authenticity and accuracy of a tape recording should be

more stringent as compared to other documentary evidence;

(g) In the context of section 50 of the NDPS Act, in Baldev Singh

(supra) the Supreme Court has said that while considering the

aspect of fair trial, the nature of evidence obtained and the

nature of the safeguard violated are both relevant factors. If

therefore, evidence has been collected in a search conducted in

violation of the statutory mandate of section 50 of the NDPS

Act, the admission of such evidence would make the trial

unfair ; and in that circumstance, the evidence must be

excluded. Under the Family Courts Act, on the other hand, the

statutory mandate of section 14 is to relax the rules of

admissibility of evidence, which relaxation must therefore

guide the Family Court.

35. That being said however, considering the breadth of the power

conferred upon it under section 14 of the Family Courts Act, some

safeguards are required to be considered by the Family Court while

exercising its power to receive evidence under that provision. Firstly, even

though a given piece of evidence may have been admitted on the record, the

Family Court must be extremely circumspect in what evidence it chooses to

rely upon in deciding the dispute, particularly the authenticity and

genuineness of the evidence, for which stringent standards must be applied.

Secondly, if in its opinion the nature of the evidence sought to be adduced is

inappropriate, embarrassing or otherwise sensitive in nature for any of the

litigating parties, or for that matter for some other person not directly

connected with the litigation, the court may restrict the parties who are

present in court at the time of considering such evidence ; or may anonymise

or redact the evidence ; or may conduct in-camera proceedings so as not to

cause distress to any person or party, while at the same time not hesitating to

receive evidence that the Family Court considers necessary for effectively

deciding the dispute. All proceedings must be conducted strictly within the

bounds of decency and propriety; and no opportunity should be given to any

party to create a spectacle in the guise of producing evidence. Thirdly, in

egregious cases, the Family Court may initiate or direct initiation of legal

action against a litigating party or other person, who may appear guilty of

procuring evidence by illegal means. Any party aggrieved by the production

of such evidence would also be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings,

whether in civil or criminal law, against concerned parties for procuring

evidence illegally, although the initiation or pendency of such proceeding

shall not make the evidence so produced inadmissible before the Family

Court.

36. It may be noted that in the impugned order the Family Court has

expressed its subjective opinion that the recording comprised in the CD will

certainly assist it in deciding the dispute between the parties ; and that

therefore the evidence on the CD is relevant. Even otherwise, the

conversation between the wife and her friend, which is the subject matter of

recording on the CD, in which she is alleged to have spoken about the

husband and his parents, would be a ‘relevant fact’ as understood in law,

upon a combined reading of sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Evidence Act. To that

extent therefore, the contents on the CD are relevant for purposes of the

divorce proceedings.

37. While consistency in law is of utmost importance and law must get its

full play regardless of the fact situation, this court must record the unease it

feels with regard to a certain aspect that has arisen in this matter. Marriage is

a relationship to which sanctity is still attached in our society. Merely

because rules of evidence favour a liberal approach for admitting evidence

in court in aid of dispensation of justice, this should not be taken as approval

for everyone to adopt any illegal means to collect evidence, especially in

relationships of confidence such as marriage. If the right to adduce evidence

collected by surreptitious means in a marital or family relationship is

available without any qualification or consequences, it could potentially

create havoc in people’s personal and family lives and thereby in the society

at large. For instance, if a spouse has the carte blanche to install a recording

device in a bedroom or other private space or to adopt any means

whatsoever to collect evidence against the partner, even if in circumstances

of matrimonial discord, it would be difficult to foresee the length to which a

spouse may go in doing so ; and such possibility would itself spell the end of

the marital relationship. It is not uncommon for spouses to continue living

together, even in matrimonial strife, for years on-end. So, while law must

trump sentiment, a salutary rule of evidence or a beneficent statutory

provision, must not be taken as a license for illegal collection of evidence.

38. In the above view of the matter, and subject to the above observations,

this court finds no infirmity in the impugned order and the same is upheld.

39. The petition is disposed of in the above terms, leaving the parties to

bear their respective costs.

40. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.

June 30, 2020

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