Law Web: Supreme Court: Civil court should refuse to grant an injunction if it would delay completion of infrastructure project

Further, Section 41(f) of the 1963 Act clearly mandates that

an injunction cannot be granted to prevent, on the ground of

nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be

a nuisance. Similarly, the respondent No. 20 (State of

Maharashtra) is right in contending that the plaintiffs would have

equally efficacious relief by resorting to other mode of

proceedings. To wit, when the proposal regarding setting up of

the Project is being finalised and permissions are granted by the

competent authority under the concerned statutory dispensation,

at that time, the affected parties would be free to make

representation which can be considered by the competent

authority appropriately. Hence, the civil Court ought not to have

granted injunction simpliciter also because of the stipulation in

Section 41(h) of the 1963 Act, wherein it is made amply clear that

when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any

other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust,

an injunction cannot be granted. The scheme of Section 41 of

the 1963 Act predicates that the civil Court must refuse to grant

injunction in the situations referred to therein vide clauses (a) to

(j). The recent amendment to that provision by Act 18 of 2018

has inserted clause (ha), for making it explicitly clear that the

civil Court must refuse to grant injunction if it would impede or

delay the progress of completion of any infrastructure project,

such as the present one. Indeed, this amended provision does

not apply to the present case. However, the Court could not have

answered the matter in issue on the basis of assumptions and

conjectures, much less unsubstantiated claim of the plaintiffs.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2412/2020

Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad Vs Gangaram Narayan Ambekar

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Dated:May 6, 2020.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal emanates from the judgment and order dated

29.8.2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay1 in

Second Appeal No. 771/2015, whereby the judgment and decree

dated 11.2.2015 passed by the District Judge, Ratnagiri2 in

Regular Civil Appeal No. 34/2011 came to be affirmed, as a

result of which the suit filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 19

(original plaintiffs) in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division,

1 For short, “the High Court”

2 For short, “the first appellate Court”

Ratnagiri3 being RCS No. 25/2005 for permanent injunction

against the appellant and respondent No. 20 (State of

Maharashtra), restraining them from starting the Solid Waste

Disposal Project4 at the suit property, has been decreed. In other

words, the trial Court had dismissed the suit, but the first

appellate Court allowed (decreed) the same, which decision has

been upheld by the High Court in the Second Appeal.

3. Briefly stated, the respondent Nos. 1 to 19 filed the stated

suit on 31.1.2005 in representative capacity being residents of

different Wadas of the villages at Fansavle, Dandeadom, Mirjole,

Majgaon and Kelye in District Ratnagiri. The gravamen of the

issues raised in the stated suit was that the appellant – Ratnagiri

Nagar Parishad intends to set up a Solid Waste Disposal Project

(the Project) in the suit property at village Dandeadom, Taluka

and District Ratnagiri bearing Gat No. 219 admeasuring 2H46

Aars.5, which land had been allotted to the appellant by the State

Government. The suit land is located around 10 kms. away from

the limits of the Ratnagiri city at a hilly and sloppy area. The

entire area is rocky and hard. The location selected for setting

3 For short, “the trial Court”

4 For short, “the Project”

5 For short, “the suit land” or “the suit property”

up the Project was wholly illadvised,

as it would entail in serious

health problem for the villagers in the locality and also inevitably

pollute the river nearby flowing from Kelye village through the

villages Majgaon, Mhamurwadi upto Sakharat. Moreover, on this

river, Sheel Dam is located on the boundary of Fanasavle village,

which provides water supply to Ratnagiri city. Thus, the Project

is likely to pollute the Dam water as well. It is asserted that the

entire Kokan area receives heavy rainfall between months of June

and October and considering the direction of flow of river and

other streams in the nearby area, there is imminent possibility of

causing severe water pollution due to the solid waste piled up on

the suit property. Initially, some other site was identified for

setting up the Project, but due to political intervention, it has

been shifted to the present location, which is not at all ideal

being a rocky hard and sloppy track. Other fallow lands are

available in the Nagar Palika jurisdiction, which are more suited

for the intended Project spread over in several acres and are at

the base of the Ratnadurg Fort. The authorities had in fact

commenced the process of acquiring that land near Bhataye

seashore within the limits of Fansop village, but for reasons best

known to the authorities, the idea to continue the Project at that

location has been disbanded. It is asserted that there is no

existing public road access to the suit land and the trucks

carrying the solid waste will have to be provided access through

private lands in the neighbourhood including that of some of the

plaintiffs. Furthermore, the appellant had not taken any

permission from the competent authority (the Health Officer of

Jilla Parishad/Health Department). In substance, the grievance

is substantially about possible environmental fallout due to

setting up of the Project in the suit property and in particular, to

the nearby river and dam, which is the source of water supply to

habitants of District Ratnagiri.

4. The appellant filed written statement and refuted every

assertion in the plaint about the possible environmental fallout

due to setting up of the Project at the stated location. The

appellant asserted that the land belonged to the State

Government and only after due consultation and deliberations

with all concerned, it has been allotted to the appellant for

setting up of the Project thereat. Further, the necessity of setting

up such a project need not be underscored. It is a statutory

obligation of the appellant and also necessitated on account of

directions issued by the Court in public interest litigation in that

regard. The appellant is obliged to collect solid waste on daily

basis from the localities within the District (Ratnagiri) and

provide for mechanism to dispose of the same as per the

standard protocol. Considering the illeffects

of process of

collection and disposal of such waste, an expert opinion/report

was submitted to the Government. It is stated that the Project

would be set up strictly in conformity with the Environment

(Protection) Act, 19866, which had already come into force

including the Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and

Handling) Rules, 20007. These Rules have been formulated on

the basis of directions given by this Court. The appellant denied

that the Project would be a cause for pollution, as all precautions

would be taken and necessary environment clearances will be

obtained from the competent authority. It is stated that initially

the authorities had selected three places for setting up the

Project, but it was realised that the other two locations would be

noncompliant

with the prescribed conditions under the

concerned environment laws. As a matter of fact, the State

Government had established a HighLevel

Committee to make

6 For short, “the 1986 Act”

7 For short, “the 2000 Rules”

recommendations about the location of the Project, on 5.12.2003

consisting of (1) Regional Officer, Pollution Control, (2) SubDivisional

Forest Officer, (3) Jilla Parishad Geologist, Ground

Water Survey and Development Machinery, (iv) Town Planner and

(v) District Health Officer. The said Committee, after due

deliberations identified the suit property as ideal for setting up of

the proposed Project, which indeed would be compliant with all

environment regulations. The appellant, therefore, stoutly denied

the assertion in the plaint that the decision was taken by the

appellant unilaterally and without following due process. The

appellant also denied the assertion about likelihood of polluting

the Dam water or river flowing from village Kelye through other

villages upto the sea. The appellant denied the factual assertions

in the plaint and called upon the plaintiffs (respondent Nos. 1 to

19) to substantiate the relevant facts stated therein. The

appellant had specifically denied that the Project would be set up

on the slope, as suggested in the plaint. Further, it is asserted

that no waste, which will become rotten and wet or polluted

water will be allowed to flow from the suit land. These

precautions will be taken without exception and stringent

conditions will be prescribed as is evident from the official

records. In other words, the plaintiffs have made irresponsible

and frivolous statements in the plaint without any basis to

substantiate the same. According to the appellant, the suit was

politically motivated. The appellant specifically asserted that the

Project site was yet to be finalised by the appellant and would

abide strictly by the recommendations of the experts providing for

stringent conditions. The appellant asserted that because of the

pendency of the suit proceedings, necessary permissions and

clearances from the competent authority under the environment

laws could not be pursued further. It is thus stated that the

Project would be set up only after such permissions are granted

and would be implemented under the strict supervision of the

concerned authorities. The appellant also stated that the suit

was not maintainable and ought to be dismissed with costs.

5. On the basis of rival stand, the trial Court framed six issues

for determination as follows: Issues

1. Whether the Plaintiffs have established that the

disputed Solid Waste Disposal and Management project

is harmful to the health of the citizens of the

Panchkrosh?

2. Whether the Plaintiffs have established that the suit

property is not convenient for the Solid Waste Disposal

and Management Project?

3. Whether the Plaintiffs have established that

objections and obstructions have been caused in his

legal rights?

4.Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to seek relief in the

Civil Court?

5. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to get the

Permanent injunction Order?

6. What Order and Decree?

Both sides produced oral and documentary evidence in support

of their stand. The trial Court, after analysing the evidence

adduced by the plaintiffs (respondent Nos. 1 to 19), noted that

the assertions made by the plaintiffs were founded on their

understanding of the matter and no proof to support that claim

was forthcoming. The trial Court noted the admission given by

the plaintiffs’ witnesses that no proof has been produced by them

to establish the fact of existence of public settlements near the

suit property. Also, that they had no knowledge or expertise

about the solid waste Project nor they collected any information

from any expert before asserting that the said Project would not

be viable and entail in causing pollution to the Dam water and

river as such. They also admitted that the case set out by them

was on the basis of their personal knowledge and there was no

scientific basis. In the crossexamination,

they had admitted

that before taking possession of the disputed land for the

proposed Project, the Project Officer of the Nagar Parishad and

other Officers had held discussion with the Dandeadom

Sarpanch and members. These admissions clearly belied the

case made out by the plaintiffs that the appellant had decided to

set up the proposed Project unilaterally and without any

consultation. The trial Court, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the

suit filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 19 by concluding thus: “

15. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not given the

strong proof for establishing that there is residential

colonies near the Proposed project. In the same way, they

have not established the manner in which water pollution

will be caused due to the proposed project. For the

purpose of establishing that there will be water pollution

due to the proposed project, it was necessary for the

Plaintiffs to establish the so called Plan of the flow of

Dandeadom river. For the purpose of establishing that

there will be water pollution due to the project, it was

necessary for the plaintiffs to give evidence of expert

persons. The Plaintiffs have admitted in their cross

examination that they have taken personal information of

the solid Waste Project. The allegations made in the suit

by the plaintiff seems to be their personal opinion. In the

same way, it becomes clear that there is no scientific base

to their opinion. As the Plaintiffs have established that

there will be the alleged pollution in future, the question

of giving the permanent injunction does not arise. The

plaintiffs have not established that their legal right has

been neglected. The Plaintiffs have not given prima facie

evidence for giving the permanent injunction.

11. The answer of issues No. 1 to 4 is being given in the

negative and the Order is being made as under:

O R D E R

1. Suit is being dismissed with costs.

2. Decree may be made accordingly.”

6. The matter was carried in appeal by the respondent Nos. 1

to 19/plaintiffs. The first appellate Court after adverting to the

rival contentions formulated following points for its

consideration: Points

1. Whether the suit solid waste and Management Project is

injurious to the health of villagers in vicinity as alleged?

2. Whether the suit land is convenient and suitable for suit

solid waste and management project?

3. Whether there is an obstruction and interference in the

lawful rights of plaintiffs?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim relief before

Civil Court?

5.Whether plaintiffs are entitled to get decree of perpetual

injunction?

6.Whether judgment and decree of Ld. Trial Court requires

interference?

7. What order and decree?

The first appellate Court then adverted to the oral evidence of the

witnesses examined by the plaintiffs and defendants (appellant

and respondent No. 20) and went on to opine as follows: “

28. After considering the oral evidence led by both the

parties, it reveals that the oral evidence led by the

plaintiff is more trustworthy and credible than the

evidence led by the defendants. Because during cross

examination witnesses for plaintiffs remained stick up to

their version narrated by them in their examination in

chief, but, here, so far as regards evidence of defendant’s

witnesses, their statement in examination in chief is

demolished by way of cross examination, as they have

given above noted vital admissions. It reveals from oral

evidence led by both the parties that the suit property is

situated on hilly area, which is having stony surface. It

also reveals that the suit property is having slope towards

southern and western side. It also reveals that

Dandeadam river is situated on the bottom of the slope.

The witnesses for defendants itself also admitted that in

Ratnagiri city there is a collection of 15 to 16 trucks solid

waste per day. If such a huge wastage is going to be

stored on the suit property, which is having slope towards

river, then, definitely it will pollute river water. Because

the plaintiffs have specifically pleaded and deposed that

in the Konkan Region there is rain fall of 120 to 130 inch

per year in rainy season. A judicial note can be taken of

this fact that there is heavy rain fall in Konkan region in

every rainy season. If such a huge wastage is going to be

stored on the suit property, then definitely it will be flown

into river because of slope and because of the heavy rain

fall. If such a wastage will be flown into river water,

because of its decomposition, it will be fermented and it

will definitely pollute the river water. Admittedly river

water flows from various villages and Dandeadam river

joins with Sheel river within vicinity of Fansavale village.

Admittedly dam is constructed over Sheel river from

which there is water supply to Ratnagiri city. If such

river waste is polluted due to the solid waste storage, then

the entire water in Sheel dam will also be polluted and it

will result ultimately causing danger to the life and health

of citizens of Ratnagiri city and citizens of the vicinity.

Therefore, the oral evidence of plaintiffs shows that the

proposed project is dangerous for the life and health of

the citizens, so also the suit property is not suitable and

convenient for the proposed project.”

The first appellate Court then adverted to the documentary

evidence on record and opined as follows: “

31. It reveals from over all careful scrutiny of the

documentary evidence produced by both the parties that,

the defendants are not coming before the Court with

clean hands. Because the documentary evidence

produced on record by both the parties clearly shows that

previously S.No. 137/16 situated at village Kasop was

acquired for the project of solid waste management, but,

that project was cancelled and suddenly the defendants

acquired the suit property for the project, for which no

reason is given by the defendants. The defendants have

not given any reason as to why they cancelled the project

at village Kasop on S. No. 137/16. Admittedly, the

property bearing S. No. 137/16 is situated at the distance

of 3 to 4 kmtr. from Ratnagiri city, that too near sea

shore. Admittedly the suit property is situated at the

distance of 10 to 15 kmtr. from Ratnagiri city. Under

such circumstances genuine question arises for what

reasons the defendants cancelled their project on S.No.

137/16. To that effect it is the case of the plaintiffs that

because of political pressure by the side of Kohinoor Hotel

they cancelled the project. Considering entire evidence

before the Court and considering facts and

circumstances, I find substance in the submissions and

evidence of plaintiffs to that effect. Because, S. No.

137/16 at village Kasop was suitable and convenient by

all means and that too its compensation amount of Rs.

1,20,000/was

deposited by the defendant No. 1 under

such circumstances, there was no reason for the

defendants to cancel that project. But here that has been

done highhandedly without any plausible reason.

32. The cross examination of defendant No. 1 shows

that daily near about 15 to 16 trucks solid waste is

collected in the Ratnagiri City. Admittedly, the suit

property is situated at 15 kmtr. from Ratnagiri city. As

per the evidence of D.W. 1 near about 16 trucks are being

used daily for the management of solid waste. If we

consider the expenses of shifting 16 trucks solid waste

daily from Ratnagiri to suit property by trucks, then per

year the defendant No. 1 has to spend lacs [sic.] of rupees

for payment of trucks transportation charges. This also

shows that the suit property is not suitable for solid

waste management. Moreover, as per the evidence of

D.W. 1 that the vehicles used for transportation of solid

waste are open. As per the Municipal Solid Waste

(Management and Handling) Rule, 2000 (hereinafter

called as the Rule) clause 4 of Schedule 2 shows that,

“Vehicles used for transportation of wastage shall be

covered. Wastage should not be visible to public nor

exposed to open environment preventing their scattering.”

Therefore, this Rule shows that open vehicles can not be

used for transportation of solid waste, but, here as per

the admissions given by D.W. 2 open vehicles are being

used. If such open vehicles carries solid waste upto the

suit property, then again it will cause scattering of waste

and it will cause pollution.

33. The plaintiffs have specifically proved that the suit

property is situated in hilly area having sheer slope

towards a river, which is situated at the bottom of the

slope. In this respect, it is pertinent to note here the

provision of the Rules. The defendant No. 1 have itself

produced Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and

Handling) Rules, 2000 at Exh. 125. After perusal of these

Rules, it reveals that, certain guidelines in these Rules for

selection of a property for such a Solid Wastes Project.

Schedule 3 of these Rules deals with Site selection.

Clause 8 of Schedule 3 shows that, “the landfill site shall

be away from water bodies.” Here it is necessary to

reproduce Clause 8 of Schedule 3 of ready reference. It is

as under,

“Schedule 3(8) – The Landfill site shall be away

from habitation clusters, forest areas, water

bodies, monuments, National Parks, Wetlands

and places of important cultural, historical or

religious interest.”

34. This clause 8 clearly indicates that, the Solid Waste

Project must be away from water bodies and habitation

clusters. But, here in the case at hand, the proposed

project is situated near the river. Admittedly, in rainy

season the water will flow from the project to the river

and it will pollute the river water. Therefore, the

proposed project is also against the Clause 8 of Schedule

3 and hence, it is illegal one.

35. The sum and substance of above discussion is that,

it is an admitted position that S. No. 219 i.e. suit property

is situated on hilly area having sheer slope towards river

situated at its bottom. If such huge quantity of solid

waste is being stored on the suit property, then in rainy

season definitely it will decompose and it will be

fermented and it will flow into the river water, because of

which entire river water and dam water will be polluted.

Admittedly, that Sheel dam water is being supplied to the

citizens of Ratnagiri city and citizens in the vicinity. If a

such polluted water is supplied, then it will cause danger

to the life and health of the citizens. The defendants have

not produced on record any document, which will show

that the Pollution Control Board and Bhujal Survey

Officer has surveyed the suit property as convenient and

suitable for the project. No such clearance certificate

about suit property is produced on record. So also the

defendants have not produced on record any document,

which will show that they will filter the water and supply

it to the citizens. Therefore, if the water will be flown into

river then definitely pollution will happen and it will

cause danger to the life and health of the public. It is a

constitution right of every citizen to get unpolluted air,

water and environment. Right to life is provided under

Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Project are being

made for the welfare of public and not for causing danger

to their health and life. For the reason stated above, if

the project will be made on the suit property, then the

[sic] water will be polluted and it will cause definitely an

[sic] interference in the lawful rights of plaintiffs to get

unpolluted water and environment. Under such

circumstances, I find substances in the submissions of

Ld. Advocate for the plaintiff and I record my findings to

points No. 1 and 3 in the affirmative, point no. 2 in the

negative.”

On the basis of the aforesaid conclusions, the first appellate

Court passed the following order to decree the suit filed by

respondent Nos. 1 to 19: “

O R D E R

1. The appeal is allowed with costs.

2. The judgment and decree passed by Ld. Trial Court

dated 31.01.2011 is hereby set aside.

3. the suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 25/2005 is

decreed as under:

(a) The defendants and their representative are hereby

perpetually prohibited from starting proposed Solid Waste

(Management and Handling) Project on the suit property

i.e. Gat No. 219 of village Dandeadam.

4. Decree be drawn accordingly.”

7. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant carried the matter by way of

a Second Appeal before the High Court. The High Court after

adverting to the findings and conclusions recorded by the first

appellate Court, opined that the same did not warrant any

interference, not being perverse and being based on oral and

documentary evidence. In its opinion, therefore, no substantial

question of law arose for consideration. The High Court observed

thus: “

11. In my view, the defendant has failed to produce any

competent witness before the learned trial judge to prove

that if the project as proposed was allowed to be set up, it

will not cause any health hazard or create any pollution

problem and would not affect the villagers of the said

village. In my view the appreciation of evidence by the

appellate court is proper and does not warrant any

interference.

12. The finding of facts rendered by the appellate court

are not perverse and are based on the oral and

documentary evidence led by both parties and cannot be

interfered with by this court in the second appeal under

section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. There is

no substantial question of law having arisen in this

second appeal.

13. Second appeal is devoid of merits and is

accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.”

8. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal by

special leave. The thrust of the grievance of the appellant is that

the first appellate Court and the High Court committed manifest

error in entertaining the claim of the plaintiffs (respondent Nos. 1

to 19), which was not substantiated by the plaintiffs themselves.

The plaintiffs had failed to discharge the onus. They had failed to

establish jurisdictional facts regarding actionable nuisance and

moreso their suit was founded on mere apprehensions on the

basis of their understanding of the situation of the possibility of

nuisance or future nuisance. It was a quia timet action for

passing a preventive and precautionary permanent injunction

against the authorities. Significantly, no declaratory relief was

sought and the suit was only to grant simpliciter permanent

injunction, which cannot be countenanced. It was a speculative

suit and the plaintiffs having failed to discharge their initial

burden of proof, no relief could be granted. The Project has been

conceived after due deliberations by the competent authorities

and on the basis of opinion given by the experts in that regard.

Further, the Project will be fully compliant with all stipulations

for preserving environment and obviating even the slightest

possibility of causing pollution in the neighbourhood. The land

has been identified as an ideal land for the proposed Project by

the experts and the State Government had also accorded

approval by allotting the same to the appellant for the stated

purpose. The approach of the first appellate Court is completely

unacceptable, as it has failed to first examine the adequacy of the

evidence given by the plaintiffs and to ascertain whether the

plaintiffs had discharged their initial burden of proof at all.

However, the first appellate Court chose to first examine the

evidence of the defendants (appellant and respondent No. 20),

that too selectively, and misread the same out of context to form

its opinion and also took judicial notice of irrelevant facts which

is nothing short of being replete with conjectures and surmises.

The High Court fell in error in not entertaining the second appeal

despite such manifest and cardinal infirmities committed by the

first appellate Court.

9. The respondent No. 20 – State of Maharashtra has

supported this appeal. It is urged by the State that the subject

suit was completely premature, as only site for the Project is

identified. The suit is based on speculations and misplaced

assumptions that if the Project is installed at the identified

location, it would discharge waste and permit flow of polluted

water directly into the river. There is no actual basis for such

assumption. It is urged that the civil/trial Court could not have

granted injunction not only on account of Section 41(f) of the

Specific Relief Act, 19638, which predicates that the Court shall

not grant injunction to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an

act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance,

but also on account of Section 41(h), which envisages that when

equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other

usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust, an

injunction cannot be granted. It is urged that the plaintiffs could

assail the decision(s) of the appropriate authority of allotment of

land in question for the stated purpose, and setting up of the

Project which would be implemented after due permissions and

clearances, if granted by the competent authorities under the

concerned environment law. At the stage of consideration of

such proposal, the person(s) likely to be affected by the Project

could make representation to the concerned authority, and if the

decision of the authority is adverse, can invoke remedy of appeal

before the National Green Tribunal9 under the National Green

Tribunal Act, 201010. In that, the Tribunal (NGT) is established

to deal exclusively concerning the subject of environmental

8 For short, “the 1963 Act”

9 For short, “the NGT”

10 For short, “the 2010 Act”

protection and conservation of forests and other natural

resources and there is express bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil

Court, much less to grant any injunction or deal with

environmental issues in terms of Section 29 of the 2010 Act. It is

urged that after coming into force of the 2010 Act, jurisdiction of

civil Court is barred and for that reason, the decree passed by the

first appellate Court and confirmed by the High Court is not

sustainable in the eyes of law. It is urged that there is no other

suitable site for setting up of the Project; and the decision

regarding suitability of the subject land has been taken by the

Municipal Solid Waste Committee being the expert body in that

regard. Even that decision has not been assailed nor the

concerned authorities including the Pollution Control Board have

been made party to the suit. It is urged that the site has a

separate approach road available to transport the solid waste and

the assertion made by the plaintiffs to the contrary is

mischievous and false. The State has also urged to allow this

appeal and to set aside the decree passed by the first appellate

Court, as confirmed by the High Court vide impugned judgment.

10. Per contra, the respondent Nos. 1 to 19 (original plaintiffs)

have reiterated the grounds which had commended to the first

appellate Court and the High Court to decree the suit and issue

mandatory injunction against the authorities concerned. It is

urged that setting up of the Project at the stated location would

inevitably entail environment issues in the area and pollute the

river due to dumping of waste on the site. It is urged that when

the suit was filed, the civil Court was competent to adjudicate the

cause of action and grant relief of mandatory injunction as

prayed by the plaintiffs. As a result, the competence of the civil

Court was never questioned by the defendants. Further, reliance

is placed on the Affidavit in Compliance, which clearly indicates

that the Ratnagiri Airport is located within 6 kilometres from the

disputed land and the said Airport has now been declared as

Naval base. The subject land where the Project is proposed to be

established is on the Northern side of the Naval base and

Ratnagiri town is on the Southern side. Thus, as per the

applicable rules there is express bar for setting up of Solid Waste

Disposal Project (the Project) at the proposed location. Moreover,

because of the peculiar topography, the waste water will flow

towards the river in the neighbourhood and would be a serious

health hazard for population of around 1 lakh in Ratnagiri. It is

urged that the apprehension of the plaintiffs of future mischief

was not groundless but is based on strong foundation that the

site is on a slope and will create imminent toxic problem in the

area. In substance, the respondent Nos. 1 to 19 (plaintiffs) have

adopted the reasons which had weighed with the first appellate

Court and the High Court in second appeal and would urge that

this appeal be dismissed in light of the finding of fact so recorded

by the said Courts.

11. We have heard Mr. Rakesh Bhatkal and Mr. Somiran

Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sandeep

Deshmukh and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for the

respondent Nos. 1 to 19 and Mr. Sachin Patil and Mr. Rahul

Chitnis, learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra

(respondent No. 20).

12. The fundamental question for our consideration is the effect

of enactment of the 2010 Act. It is an Act to provide for

establishment of a National Green Tribunal (NGT) for effective

and expeditious disposal of cases relating to, amongst others,

environmental protection including enforcement of any legal right

relating to environment and giving relief and compensation for

damages to persons and property and for matters connected

therewith or incidental thereto. Chapter III of the Act delineates

the jurisdiction, powers and proceedings of the Tribunal. Section

14 deals with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (NGT) over all civil

cases where a substantial question relating to environment

(including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment)

is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of

the enactments specified in Schedule I. Section 20 predicates

that the Tribunal (NGT) shall, while passing any order or decision

or award, apply the principles of sustainable development, the

precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. Section

29 of the 2010 Act is of some significance. It is a provision

regarding bar of jurisdiction of civil Court. Section 29 reads

thus:“

29. (1) With effect from the date of establishment of the

Tribunal under this Act, no civil court shall have

jurisdiction to entertain any appeal in respect of any

matter, which the Tribunal is empowered to determine

under its appellate jurisdiction.

(2) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle dispute

or entertain any question relating to any claim for

granting any relief or compensation or restitution of

property damaged or environment damaged which may be

adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, and no injunction in

respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the

Tribunal in respect of the settlement of such dispute or

any such claim for granting any relief or compensation or

restitution of property damaged or environment damaged

shall be granted by the civil court.”

It will be now useful to advert to the exposition of a threeJudge

Bench of this Court in Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog

Sangathan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.11. In paragraphs

40 and 41 of the reported decision, the Court held as under: “

40. Keeping in view the provisions and scheme of the

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (for short “the NGT

Act”) particularly Sections 14, 29, 30 and 38(5), it can

safely be concluded that the environmental issues and

matters covered under the NGT Act, Schedule I should be

instituted and litigated before the National Green

Tribunal (for short “NGT”). Such approach may be

necessary to avoid likelihood of conflict of orders between

the High Courts and NGT. Thus, in unambiguous terms,

we direct that all the matters instituted after coming into

force of the NGT Act and which are covered under the

provisions of the NGT Act and/or in Schedule I to the

NGT Act shall stand transferred and can be instituted

only before NGT. This will help in rendering expeditious

and specialised justice in the field of environment to all

concerned.

41. We find it imperative to place on record a

caution for consideration of the courts of competent

jurisdiction that the cases filed and pending prior to

coming into force of the NGT Act, involving questions

of environmental laws and/or relating to any of the

seven statutes specified in Schedule I of the NGT Act,

should also be dealt with by the specialised tribunal,

that is, NGT, created under the provisions of the NGT

Act. The courts may be well advised to direct transfer

of such cases to NGT in its discretion, as it will be in

the fitness of administration of justice.”

(emphasis supplied)

11 (2012) 8 SCC 326

13. The question is whether the suit as filed in the year 2005

would be affected by the coming into force of the 2010 Act with

effect from 2.6.2010 and in particular consequent to

establishment of the Tribunal (NGT) on 18.10.2010. Indeed, the

present suit was filed prior to that date. However, it was pending

before the civil Court even after the establishment of the Tribunal

(NGT). For, the trial Court decided the suit only on 31.1.2011.

Concededly, the trial Court has not even adverted to the express

provision in the form of Section 29 regarding bar of jurisdiction of

the civil Court. On perusal of the tenor of the plaint and the

subject matter of the present suit, it is indisputable that the case

plainly involved substantial question relating to environment

including enforcement of legal right relating to environment.

That cause was the foundation for the relief of permanent

injunction sought by the plaintiffs. By virtue of Section 29 and in

particular the dictum in paragraph 41 of the reported decision of

this Court, the civil Court ought not to have continued with the

suit. It is a different matter that the trial Court chose to dismiss

the suit on the finding that the plaintiffs had failed to

substantiate the case set up by them in the plaint. Once the suit

was barred by law, the civil Court could not have proceeded

with the suit and at best, the parties could have been

relegated before the NGT, the special forum created by the 2010

Act. Indeed, the trial Court did not have the benefit of the

reported decision of this Court. For, the said decision was

rendered on 9.8.2012. However, it is intriguing that even the

first appellate Court and the High Court did not think it

necessary to advert to the effect of Section 29 of the 2010 Act and

in particular, the decision of this Court in Bhopal Gas Peedith

Mahila Udyog Sangathan (supra). The fact that the suit was

filed in earlier point of time, does not mean that the civil Court

could have continued with the action (in this case, first appeal

before the first appellate Court and the second appeal before the

High Court being continuation of the suit) concerning the

substantial question relating to environment including

enforcement of legal right relating to environment. In any case,

there remained no tittle of doubt after the exposition of this Court

that such pending cause/action ought to be transferred to the

NGT for adjudication thereof. As a concomitant of this

conclusion, the findings and conclusions rendered in favour of

the plaintiffs, in particular by the first appellate Court and the

High Court, will be of no avail and in law stand effaced being

without jurisdiction and nullity.

14. Arguendo, the plaint as filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 19

also suffers from another fundamental deficiency. Indeed, it is a

cleverly drafted plaint, so as to give an impression that the

competent authority had not taken any decision in exercise of

statutory powers until the filing of the suit. However, in the

written statement, clear assertion has been made by the

defendants (appellant and respondent No. 20) that the decision to

allot suit land to the appellant and for setting up the Project was

taken after due deliberation and consultation with the expert

Committee including in exercise of statutory powers of the

concerned authority in that regard. None of these decisions of

the competent authority has been assailed by the plaintiffs nor

any declaratory relief sought in that regard. In such a case, it

would not be enough to ask for permanent injunction simpliciter

and the suit so filed ought to have been rejected at the threshold

on that count alone. We may usefully advert to the exposition of

this Court in Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs.

Hargovind Jasraj & Anr.12. In paragraphs 26 to 31, the Court

observed thus: “

26. Mr Ahmadi next argued that the termination of the

lease being illegal and non est in law, the respondentplaintiffs

could ignore the same, and so long as they or

any one of them remained in possession, a decree for

injunction restraining the Port Trust from interfering with

their possession could be passed by the court competent

to do so. We are not impressed by that submission.

27. The termination of the lease deed was by an order

which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by having the same

set aside, or declared invalid for whatever reasons, it may

be permissible to do so. No order bears a label of its being

valid or invalid on its forehead. Anyone affected by any

such order ought to seek redress against the same within

the period permissible for doing so. We may in this regard

refer to the following oftquoted

passage in Smith v. East

Elloe Rural District Council (1956 AC 736). The following

are the observations regarding the necessity of recourse

to the Court for getting the invalidity of an order

established:

“… An order, even if not made in good faith, is

still an act capable of legal consequences. It

bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead.

Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at

law to establish the cause of invalidity and to

get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain

as effective for its ostensible purpose as the

most impeccable of orders.' [Smith case (1956

AC 736) pp. 76970]

(emphasis supplied)

This must be equally true even where the brand

of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the

order can effectively be resisted in law only by

obtaining the decision of the court. The

necessity of recourse to the court has been

pointed put repeatedly in the House of Lords

and Privy Council without distinction between

patent and latent defects.” [Ed.: Wade and

Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn., 1994.]

12 (2013) 3 SCC 182

28. The above case was approved by this Court

in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay

Environmental Action Group [(2011) 3 SCC 363], wherein

this Court observed: (SCC pp. 36970,

para 19)

“19. Thus, from the above it emerges that even

if the order/notification is void/voidable, the

party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that

the said order/notification is not binding upon

it. It has to approach the court for seeking such

declaration. The order may be hypothetically a

nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged

before the court in a given circumstance, the

court may refuse to quash the same on various

grounds including the standing of the petitioner

or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of

waiver or any other legal reason. The order may

be void for one purpose or for one person, it

may not be so for another purpose or another

person.”

29. To the same effect is the decision of this Court

in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 5

SCC 211] wherein this Court discussed the need for

determination of invalidity of an order for public

purposes: (SCC pp. 22526,

paras 36 & 3839)

“36. It is well settled that no order can be

ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded

that it was illegal, void or not in consonance

with law. As Prof. Wade states:

‘The principle must be equally true even

where the “brand of invalidity” is plainly

visible: for there also the order can

effectively be resisted in law only by

obtaining the decision of the court’

[ H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th

Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988)

352].

He further states:

‘The truth of the matter is that the court

will invalidate an order only if the right

remedy is sought by the right person in

the right proceedings and circumstances.

The order may be hypothetically a nullity,

but the court may refuse to quash it

because of the plaintiff's lack of standing,

because he does not deserve a

discretionary remedy, because he has

waived his rights, or for some other legal

reason. In any such case the “void” order

remains effective and is, in reality, valid.

It follows that an order may be void for

one purpose and valid for another; and

that it may be void against one person

but valid against another.’ [H.W.R.

Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn.,

Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 35253]

***

38. A similar question came up for

consideration before this Court in State of

Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [(1991) 4 SCC 1]. …

39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the

courts and referring to several cases, this Court

held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of

the order intends to approach the court for

declaration that the order against him was

inoperative, he must come before the court

within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If

the statutory time of limitation expires, the court

cannot give the declaration sought for.’”

(emphasis supplied)

30. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this

Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer [(1997) 1

SCC 9] , State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar

Manjeri Manikoth [(1996) 1 SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M.

Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [(1997) 3

SCC 443], where this Court has held that an order will

remain effective and lead to legal consequences unless

the same is declared to be invalid by a competent court.

31. It is true that in some of the above cases, this Court

was dealing with proceedings arising under Article 226 of

the Constitution, exercise of powers whereunder is

discretionary but then grant of declaratory relief under

the Specific Relief Act is also discretionary in nature. A

civil court can and may in appropriate cases refuse a

declaratory decree for good and valid reasons which

dissuade the court from exercising its discretionary

jurisdiction. Merely because the suit is within time is

no reason for the court to grant a declaration. Suffice

it to say that filing of a suit for declaration was in the

circumstances essential for the plaintiffs. That is

precisely why the plaintiffs brought a suit no matter

beyond the period of limitation prescribed for the

purpose. Such a suit was neither unnecessary nor a

futility for the plaintiff's right to remain in possession

depended upon whether the lease was subsisting or stood

terminated. It is not, therefore, possible to fall back upon

the possessory rights claimed by the plaintiffs over the

leased area to bring the suit within time especially when

we have, while dealing with the question of possession,

held that possession also was taken over pursuant to the

order of termination of the lease in question.”

(emphasis supplied)

We may also refer to Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy

(D) by LRs. & Ors.13, wherein this Court opined that where the

averments regarding title are mentioned in the plaint but if the

matter involves complicated question of fact and law relating to

title, the Court will relegate the parties to the remedy of a

comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the

issue in a suit for mere injunction.

15. Applying the principle underlying these dicta, as no

declaration has been sought by the plaintiffs in the present case,

the suit for simpliciter permanent injunction could not be

proceeded further at all. Even for this reason, the decree passed

by the first appellate Court and confirmed by the High Court,

cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. The Courts have

13 (2008) 4 SCC 594

clearly glossed over this crucial aspect, which disentitled the

plaintiffs for relief of permanent injunction simpliciter.

16. Be that as it may, on a fair reading of the judgment of the

trial Court, it is manifest that the trial Court had opined that the

plaintiffs failed to substantiate the case set out in the plaint

regarding the actionable nuisance. The trial Court justly

analysed the evidence of the plaintiffs in the first place to answer

the controversy before it. The first appellate Court, however,

after adverting to the oral and documentary evidence produced

by the parties, proceeded to first find fault with the evidence of

the defendants to answer the controversy in favour of the

plaintiffs. The first appellate Court committed palpable error in

not keeping in mind that the initial burden of proof was on the

plaintiffs to substantiate their cause for actionable nuisance,

which they had failed to discharge. In such a case, the weakness

in the defence cannot be the basis to grant relief to the plaintiffs

and to shift the burden on the defendants, as the case may be.

Thus understood, the findings and conclusions reached by the

first appellate Court will be of no avail to the plaintiffs.

17. Be that as it may, the first appellate Court ought to have

kept in mind the principle expounded in Kuldip Singh vs.

Subhash Chander Jain & Ors.14. In paragraphs 6 to 8 and 10

of the reported decision, the Court observed thus: “

6. A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is an action

preventive in nature and a specie of precautionary justice

intended to prevent apprehended wrong or anticipated

mischief and not to undo a wrong or mischief when it has

already been done. In such an action the court, if

convinced, may interfere by appointment of receiver or by

directing security to be furnished or by issuing an

injunction or any other remedial process.

In Fletcher v. Bealey [(1885) 28 Ch D 688], Mr Justice

Pearson explained the law as to actions quia timet as

follows:

“There are at least two necessary ingredients

for a quia timet action. There must, if no

actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent

danger, and there must also be proof that the

apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very

substantial. I should almost say it must be

proved that it will be irreparable, because, if

the danger is not proved to be so imminent

that no one can doubt that, if the remedy is

delayed the damage will be suffered, I think it

must be shown that, if the damage does occur

at any time, it will come in such a way and

under such circumstances that it will be

impossible for the plaintiff to protect himself

against it if relief is denied to him in a quia

timet action”.

7.Kerr on Injunctions (6th Edn., 1999) states the law on

“threatened injury” as under:

“The court will not in general interfere until an

actual nuisance has been committed; but it

may, by virtue of its jurisdiction to restrain acts

which, when completed, will result in a ground

of action, interfere before any actual nuisance

has been committed, where it is satisfied that

the act complained of will inevitably result in a

nuisance. The plaintiff, however, must show a

14 (2000) 4 SCC 50

strong case of probability that the

apprehended mischief will in fact arise in

order to induce the court to interfere. If

there is no reason for supposing that there is

any danger of mischief of a serious character

being done before the interference of the

court can be invoked, an injunction will not

be granted”.

8. In our opinion a nuisance actually in existence stands

on a different footing than a possibility of nuisance or a

future nuisance. An actuallyexisting

nuisance is capable

of being assessed in terms of its quantum and the relief

which will protect or compensate the plaintiff consistently

with the injury caused to his rights is also capable of

being formulated. In case of a future nuisance, a mere

possibility of injury will not provide the plaintiff with

a cause of action unless the threat be so certain or

imminent that an injury actionable in law will arise

unless prevented by an injunction. The court may not

require proof of absolute certainty or a proof beyond

reasonable doubt before it may interfere; but a strong

case of probability that the apprehended mischief will

in fact arise must be shown by the plaintiff. In other

words, a future nuisance to be actionable must be either

imminent or likely to cause such damage as would be

irreparable once it is allowed to occur. There may be yet

another category of actionable future nuisance when the

likely act of the defendant is inherently dangerous or

injurious such as digging a ditch across a highway or in

the vicinity of a children's school or opening a shop

dealing with highly inflammable products in the midst of

a residential locality.

xxx xxx xxx

10. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that

the bhatti was not operational on the date of filing of the

suit. A bhatti (baking oven) is not an activity which by

itself is illegal or inherently dangerous or injurious. It

cannot also be said that the bhatti merely because it has

been constructed or become operational would pose such

an injury as would be irreparable or would be incapable

of being taken care of by a process known to law. The

pleadings raised by the plaintiffs do not and could not

have set out the nature and extent of injury, if any,

caused or likely to be caused to the plaintiffs. The High

Court has at one place observed that the bhatti would

“emit smoke, heat and smell” which would be a nuisance

to the residents of the locality. At another place it has

stated that “smoke, gases and ash etc.” which were

emitted from the furnace would certainly be a nuisance

to the residents of the locality. The findings so recorded

are oscillating and are not clear and specific. They are

guesswork. A clear finding as to nuisance could not

have been recorded by basing it on generalised

statements of certain witnesses stating that

a bhatti emits smoke, heat and smell which

statements would be mere ipse dixit of the

witnesses. There is no foundation either in pleadings

or in evidence for observation made by the High

Court as to gases, ash etc. emitting from the furnace.

In our opinion, no case for quia timet action was

made out. The suit filed by the plaintiffs was

premature. No relief, much less by way of preventive

injunction, could have been allowed to the plaintiffs.

In our opinion, the suit as filed by the plaintiffs should

be dismissed with liberty to file an appropriate suit on

proof of cause of action having accrued to the plaintiffs

consistently with the observations made hereinabove.”

(emphasis supplied)

We have no hesitation in taking the view that the first appellate

Court proceeded on a mere possibility of injury likely to be

caused on account of setting up of the proposed Project. On the

other hand, the defendants asserted that the Project has been

conceived and the suit land has been identified for that purpose.

The Project is at a nascent stage for which permissions would be

obtained from the concerned authorities under the environment

laws before implementing the same. At this initial stage itself,

the civil Court was moved by the plaintiffs on the basis of their

understanding of the situation.

18. Further, Section 41(f) of the 1963 Act clearly mandates that