Law Web: Delhi HC: Amendments to Prevention of Corruption Act, 2018 do not have a retrospective effect

However, this Court is unable to accept that the PC

(Amendment) Act, 2018 seeks to repeal the provisions of Section

13(1)(d) of the Act, as it existed prior to 26.07.2018 ab initio. Mens

rea is an integral part of the offence under Sub-clause (ii) of Section

13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The use of the word ‘abuse’ in the said Subclause

indicates so. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the

legislative intent of repealing Section 13 of the PC Act was to exclude

the said offence from the scope of PC Act with retrospective effect.

54. In view of the above, Section 6(d) of the General Clauses Act is

applicable and persons convicted of committing the offence of

criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act would not

be absolved of their offences or the liability incurred prior to the PC

Act coming into force. It is also relevant to note that the offence of

criminal misconduct as falling under the provisions of Section

13(1)(d) of the PC Act prior to its amendment, is not the same offence

as is now covered under the amended provision.

55. In view of the above, this Court is unable to accept that if it is

established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had abused his

position for securing a pecuniary advantage to VISUL, the benefit of

any beneficial construction of the PC (Amendment) Act, 2018 could

be extended to him.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: 22.05.2020

CRL.A. 1186/2017

MADHU KODA Vs STATE THROUGH CBI .

CORAM

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

1. The appellant has filed the present applications, inter alia,

praying that the operation of the impugned order dated 13.12.2017

passed by the learned Special Judge convicting the appellant of the

offence of criminal misconduct under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of

clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 13 read with sub-section (2) of

section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter ‘PC

Act’), be stayed.

2. The appellant desires to contest for election to public offices,

including contest elections for the Legislative Assembly of the State of

Jharkhand but is disqualified to do so on account of his conviction.

The appellant states that he was elected as a member of Bihar

Legislative Assembly for the first time in the year 2000. On

15.11.2000, the State of Jharkhand was carved out from the erstwhile

State of Bihar. The appellant held the office of the Minister of the

State for Rural Engineering Organization thereafter and continued to

do so till the year 2003. It is stated that thereafter, he held the office of

Minister of Panchayati Raj of Special Arrangement. The appellant

successfully contested the elections for the Legislative Assembly in

the year 2005 and in September 2006 was appointed the Chief

Minister of the State of Jharkhand. He continued to hold the said

office till 23.08.2008.

3. The appellant has been convicted by the impugned order in a

case captioned “CBI v. M/s Vini Iron and Steel Udyog Limited and

Ors.”arising from FIR No. RC 219 2012E 0012. The Trial Court

found that the appellant had abused his position as a public servant in

order to obtain the allocation of Rajhara Coal Block in favour of M/s

Vini Iron and Steel Udyog Limited (hereafter ‘VISUL’), without any

public interest.

Submissions

4. Mr Abhimanyu Bhandari, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant advanced contentions on, essentially, three fronts. First, he

submitted that there is neither any allegation nor any evidence to

establish, that the appellant had demanded any illegal gratification,

which is sine qua non of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC

Act. He stated that in absence of any such finding, the appellant’s

conviction under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act is ex facie

unsustainable. He relied on the deicions of the Supreme Court in

Khaleel Ahmed vs State of Karnataka: (2015) 16 SCC 350;

B.Jayaraj vs State of Andhra Pradesh: (2014) 13 SCC 55; P

Satyanarayana Murthy v Dist Inspector of Police and Others: (2015)

10 SCC 152; Mrs Neeraj Dutta vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi); and

State of Maharashtra v Dyaneshwar Laxman: (2009) 15 SCC 200 in

support of his contention that demand of illegal gratification was a

necessary ingredient of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC

Act.

5. Second, he submitted that the PC Act was amended with effect

from 26th July 2018 and the provisions of Section 13(1)(d) stand

deleted by virtue of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act,

2018 (hereafter the ‘PC Amendment Act, 2018’). He submited that the

allegations made against the appellant no longer constitute an offence

and, therefore, he is entitled to be acquitted by virtue of the doctrine of

beneficial construction. He relied on the decision of the Supreme

Court in T. Barai v enry AH Hoe and Another: (1983) 1 SCC 177 in

support of his contention.

6. Third, he submitted that the appellant’s conviction rested on the

assumption that he was close to one Vijay Joshi who controlled

VISUL. It is alleged that the machinery of the Government of

Jharkhand had worked to favour VISUL on account of the close

relationship between the appellant and Sh. Vijay Joshi. However, he

submitted, that there was no admissible evidence, which would even

remotely link or establish any such connection between the appellant

and Sh. Vijay Joshi. He contended that thus, the allegations of any

conspiracy must fail.

7. Mr R.S. Cheema, learned senior counsel appearing for CBI

countered the aforesaid submissions. He stated that the provisions of

Section 13(1)(d) of the PC did not necessarily require establishing that

any illegal gratification had been demanded or paid to the public

servant. He relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Neera

Yadav v CBI: (2017) 8 SCC 757; C.K. Jaffer Shareiff v State: (2013)

1 SCC 205; R Venkatkrishnan vs CBI: (2009) 11 SCC 737; and

State of Rajasthan vs Fatehkaran Mehdu: (2017) 3 SCC 198.

8. He briefly narrated the facts as found by learned Trial Court and

submitted that the same clearly establish that VISUL had been

favoured with allocation of the Coal Block at the instance of the

appellant. He also countered the submission that the benefit of PC

Amendment Act, 2018 could be extended to the appellant. He

referred to Section 6(d) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereafter

‘the General Clauses Act’) and contended that since the appellant had

been convicted prior to the PC Amendment Act, 2018 coming into

force, the benefit of the same could not be extended to the appellant.

9. Next, he submitted that this was a case of conspiracy and the

facts of the case clearly established that the appellant was complicit in

the offence notwithstanding that his connection with Vijay Joshi had

not been irrefutably established.

10. Lastly, he submitted that whilst at the interim stage, the

sentence awarded to a convict can be suspended on the basis of a

prima facie view; his conviction cannot be stayed without considering

the wider ramifications. He referred to the decisions in KC Sareen vs

CBI: 2001(6) SCC 584; CBI v MN Sharma: 2008(8) SCC 549 and

Md. Dilawar Mir Vs CBI: 2014 SCC Online Del 6424 in support of

his contentnion.

The factual context

11. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to briefly

narrate the factual context in which the present controversy arises.

12. On 13.11.2006, the Ministry of Coal, Government of India

issued an advertisement inviting applications for allocating thirty-eight

coal blocks pertaining to power, steel and cement sectors. This also

included Rajhara (North, Central & Eastern) Coal Block (hereafter

referred to as “Rajhara Coal Block”).

13. On 08.01.2007, M/s VISUL submitted its application for

allocation of Rajhara Coal Block situated in the State of Jharkhand, to

the Ministry of Coal, under the signatures of its Director, Shri Vaibhav

Tulsyan. The said Coal Block was intended to be used for an

integrated steel plant proposed to be set up in the State of Jharkhand.

A copy of the application filed by VISUL was also sent to the State of

Jharkhand for its comments.

14. It is stated that while processing VISUL’s application for

allotment of the Rajhara Coal Block, it was found that VISUL’s

requirement was low and therefore the State of Jharkhand did not

recommend allocation of any Coal Block in favour of VISUL. It sent

letters dated 07.12.2007 and 16.01.2008 recommending that the

Rajhara Coal Block be allocated jointly to M/s Zoom Vallabh Steel

Ltd. and M/s Mukund Limited.

15. It is stated that the Ministry of Steel, Government of India had

also set down a criteria for recommendation for allotment of coal

blocks. This included categorising applicants under various categories

depending upon their existing production capacity and proposed

capacity. It is stated that all companies which did not propose

achieving 0.3 MTPA capacity by December 2010 were not placed

under any category and, therefore, were ineligible for being

recommended for allocation of any coal block.

16. It is stated that based on the said criteria, VISUL was ineligible

for being recommended for allocation of any coal block. Therefore,

Ministry of Steel also did not recommend allocation of any coal block

in favour of VISUL.

17. Prior to May 2008, the State Government of Jharkhand was not

considering VISUL’s application favorably for recommendation. But

in the month of May 2008, the ownership of M/s VISUL changed

hands from the Tulsyan family to one Vijay Joshi, who is alleged to be

a close associate of the appellant. And, with the change in the

shareholding of VISUL, its fortunes also changed for the better.

18. All applications pertaining to steel and cement sector were

considered by the 36th Screening Committee headed by the Secretary,

Ministry of Coal, Government of India at its meetings held on

07.12.2007, 08.12.2007, 07.02.2008, 08.02.2008 and on 03.07.2008.

The said Committee made the final recommendations in its meeting

held on 03.07.2008.

19. On 02.07.2008, Shri B.K. Bhattacharya – who was a Section

Officer with the Department of Mines, State Government of Jharkhand

– prepared a note stating that the performance of M/s Zoom Vallabh

Steel Ltd was not satisfactory but the progress of VISUL was, and

therefore VISUL be recommended for allocation of the Rajhara Coal

Block.

20. It is stated that one of the co-accused, A.K. Basu, the then Chief

Secretary, Government of Jharkhand attended the final meeting of the

36th Screening Committee held on 03.07.2008 as a representative of

the State, Government of Jharkhand. And, despite being aware that

VISUL was not recommended for allocation of a coal block, he

allegedly insisted at the said meeting that M/s VISUL be considered

for allocation of Rajhara Coal Block. He also emphasized that the

Appellant (who was the chief minister of the State of Jharkhand)

desired that the Rajhara Coal Block be allocated to VISUL.

21. The 36th Screening Committee recommended the allocation of

Rajhara Coal Block jointly in favour of VISUL and Mukund and on

17.07.2008, the Prime Minister approved the same with some

modifications.

22. It is stated that thereafter, on 28.07.2008, a note was prepared

for recommending the allotment of Rajhara Coal Block exclusively to

VISUL. The said note was put up through the Deputy Secretary,

Secretary and the Chief Secretary before the Chief Minister

(appellant) on 28.07.2008 and he made an endorsement

recommending allotment of Rajhara Coal Block in favour of VISUL

exclusively, on the same date.

23. Shri A.K. Basu sent a letter on 28.07.2008 recommending that

VISUL be allocated the Rajhara Coal Block exclusively and Mukund

be allocated some other coal block. But, by that time, the 36th

Screening Committee had made its recommendations and the Prime

Minister had approved the allocation of the Rajhara Coal Block in

favour of VISUL and Mukund Ltd. jointly. Therefore, the said

recommendation was not considered.

Reasons and Conclusion

24. The first and foremost question to be addressed is whether it

was necessary for the prosecution to establish that the appellant had

demanded illegal gratification, for securing the appellant’s conviction

for committing an offence under section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

25. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, as in force at the material time,

is set out below:

“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant. – (1) A

public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal

misconduct, -

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(d) if he, -

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or

for any other person any valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,

obtains for himself or for any other person any

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains

for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage without any public interest.”

26. A plain reading of sub clause (ii) and sub-clause (iii) of clause

(d) sub-section (1) of section 13 of the PC Act indicates that a public

servant would commit an offence of criminal misconduct if he, by

abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any

other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. A plain

reading of the sub-clauses of clause (d) of section 13(1) of the PC Act

do not indicate that a demand of illegal gratification is a necessary

ingredient of the offence of criminal misconduct. Thus, there is no

reason to read-in such a condition in the said sub-clauses.

27. Mr Bhandari had rested his contention on the strength of certain

decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. In B. Jayaraj (supra), the

Supreme Court had observed as under:

“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is

concerned, it is a settled position in law that

demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to

constitute the said offence and mere recovery of

currency notes cannot constitute the offence

under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all

reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily

accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The

above position has been succinctly laid down in

several judgments of this Court. By way of

illustration reference may be made to the decision

in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P.2 and C.M. Girish

Babu v. CBI.

8. In the present case, the complainant did

not support the prosecution case insofar as demand

by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has

not examined any other witness, present at the time

when the money was allegedly handed over to the

accused by the complainant, to prove that the same

was pursuant to any demand made by the accused.

When the complainant himself had disowned what

he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.P-11)

before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to

prove that the accused had made any demand, the

evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Ext. P-11

cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion

that the above material furnishes proof of the

demand allegedly made by the accused. We are,

therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial

court as well as the High Court was not correct in

holding the demand alleged to be made by the

accused as proved. The only other material

available is the recovery of the tainted currency

notes from the possession of the accused. In fact

such possession is admitted by the accused himself.

Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes

from the accused without proof of demand will not

bring home the offence under Section 7. The above

also will be conclusive insofar as the offence

under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in

the absence of any proof of demand for illegal

gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or

abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be

held to be established.”

28. The decision of the Supreme Court in B. Jayaraj (supra) was

followed by the Supreme Court it in its subsequent decision in Khalil

Ahmed v. State of Karnataka (supra).

29. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police

and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that the proof of

demand of an illegal gratification is the gravamen of an offence under

section 7 and sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below:

“20. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern

the imperative pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 of

the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj in

unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery

of currency notes from an accused without proof of

demand would not establish an offence Under Section

7 as well as 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It has been

propounded that in the absence of any proof of

demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or

illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant

to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage

cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand,

thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality

and of permeating mandate for an offence under

Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the

Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged

therein, it has been held that while it is extendable

only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those

under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) of the Act, it is

contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of

illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any

official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal

gratification, it was emphasized, could follow only if

there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was

held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal

presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also

not arise.

21. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus,

is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and

13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof,

unmistakably the charge therefore, would fail. Mere

acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal

gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of

demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to

bring home the charge under these two sections of the

Act.

22. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove

the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and

mere recovery of the amount from the person accused

of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act

would not entail his conviction thereunder.”

30. Although the above proposition appears attractive, a closer

examination of the aforesaid decisions clearly indicate that the same

cannot be read as authorities for the proposition that demand of an

illegal gratification is a necessary condition for convicting a public

servant for an offence of misconduct, as contemplated under Section

13(1)(d) of the PC Act. This is for two reasons. First of all, the plain

language of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act does not indicate that a

demand of illegal gratification by the public servant is an essential

ingredient of an offence of misconduct.

31. Secondly, a bare perusal of the judgments cited on behalf of the

appellant indicates that in all those cases, charges against the accused

were also framed under Section 7 of the PC Act. In terms of Section 7

of the PC Act, whoever being or expecting to be a public servant

accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any

person for himself or for any other person any gratification whatever,

other than the legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or

forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show

in exercise of his official functions in favour or disfavour to any

person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or

disservice to any person, would be punishable for committing an

offence under the said section. In other words, Section 7 of the PC

Act refers to an offence of demanding or obtaining illegal

gratification. In all the cases referred to on behalf of the appellant, the

accused were charged with the offence of demanding/accepting illegal

gratification. In addition, the accused were also charged with the

offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act in conjunction with the

offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. Clearly, in order to establish

the offence in such cases, it would be necessary for the prosecution to

establish that the accused had demanded or had obtained illegal

gratification either himself or by any other person as the same is

necessary for securing a conviction of an offence under Section 7 of

the PC Act.

32. Apart from criminal misconduct being in conjunction of

demand for illegal gratification, an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of

the PC Act could also be established as a standalone offence. In

Neera Yadav v. CBI (supra), the Supreme Court had examined the

provisions of Section 13 of the PC Act as then in force and had

explained the ingredients necessary for commission of the said

offence. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said decision are relevant and

are set out below:

“16. Section 13 of the PC Act in general lays down that

if a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or

otherwise abusing his position as a public servant

obtains for himself or for any other person any

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, he would be

guilty of “criminal misconduct”. Sub-section (2) of

Section 13 speaks of the punishment for such

misconduct. Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)

of the PC Act lays down the essentials and punishment

respectively for the offence of “criminal misconduct”

by a public servant. Section 13(1)(d) reads as under:

“13. Criminal misconduct by a public

servant.— (1) A public servant is said to commit

the offence of criminal misconduct—

(d) if he—

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains

for himself or for any other person any

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public

servant, obtains for himself or for any other

person any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public

servant, obtains for any person any valuable

thing or pecuniary advantage without any

public interest; or”

17. A perusal of the above provision makes it

clear that if the elements of any of the three subclauses

are met, the same would be sufficient to

constitute an offence of “criminal misconduct”

under Section 13(1)(d). Undoubtedly, all the

three wings of clause (d) of Section 13(1) are

independent, alternative and disjunctive. Thus,

under Section 13(1)(d)(i), obtaining any valuable

thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or

illegal means by a public servant in itself would

amount to criminal misconduct. On the same

reasoning “obtaining a valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage” by abusing his official

position as a public servant, either for himself or

for any other person would amount to criminal

misconduct.”

33. Ms Neera Yadav was, at the material time, the chairperson and

the Chief Executive Officer of Noida (New Okhla Industrial

Development Authority). In that case, the prosecution had alleged that

Smt. Neera Yadav had abused her official position for allotment of a

plot bearing no. B002 in Sector 32 in the draw of lots. It was alleged

that within a week of the allotment of the said plot, Ms Neera Yadav

had made a request for allotment of a plot in any of developed sectors

through conversion. The allotment of the plot bearing no. B002, which

was allotted in Sector 32, was converted to an allotment of a plot in

Sector 14A Noida comprising of an area of 415 square meters (Plot

No. 26). It was further alleged that after conversion of the plot, the

Chief Architect Planner of Noida had put up a note on the directions

of Smt. Neera Yadav for proposing a revision in the layout plan of

Plot Nos. 26, 27 and 28 in Sector 14A, by increasing their size from

450 square meters to 562 square meters, 525 square meters and 487.5

square meters respectively. Smt. Neera Yadav approved the same to

her benefit. It was alleged that by a subsequent change in the plan, a

7.5 meter wide road was carved out to the east of plot no. 26, which

also resulted in benefitting her. In addition to the above, the

prosecution established that Smt. Neera Yadav had abused her

position in securing allotments of two plots in favour of her daughters.

Both her daughters were allotted shops in Noida and on the basis of

such allotment, they had applied for allotment of residential plots,

which were also allotted to them. Since the allegations against Ms

Neera Yadav were established, she was convicted for criminal

misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act read with Section

13(2) of the PC Act. She was sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of three years with the fine of ₹1,00,000/.

The Allahabad High Court upheld her conviction. Ms Neera Yadav

appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld her

conviction but reduced her prison sentence from three years to two

years. In this case, there was no question of any demand for illegal

gratification as Ms Neera Yadav had abused her position as a public

servant for securing valuable property for herself and her children.

34. In R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI (supra), the Supreme Court had

explained the import of sub-clause (iii) of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC

Act in the following manner:

“161. xxxx xxxx

Section 13 in general lays down that if a public

servant, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise

abusing his position as a public servant obtained for

himself or for any other person any valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage he would be guilty of “criminal

misconduct”. Sub-section (2) thereof speaks of the

punishment for such misconduct. (See C.K.

Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India.)

162. The ingredients of sub-clause (iii) of

Section 13(1)(d) contemplate that a public servant who

while holding office obtains for any person any

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any

public interest would be guilty of criminal misconduct.

Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides for the

punishment for such criminal misconduct. Minimum

sentence is prescribed under Section 13(2) of the 1988

Act and a public servant who abuses his position as

such for obtaining for himself or for any other person

any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be

punished for a term of imprisonment, which is less

than for the duration of one year.

163. For convicting the person under Section

13(1)(d)(iii), there must be evidence on record that the

accused “obtained” for any other person any valuable

thing or pecuniary advantage without any public

advantage.”

35. In this case also, the prosecution had neither established nor was

required to establish that the accused had demanded or obtained any

illegal gratification for obtaining for any person any valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage.

36. Thus, the contention that it is necessary for the prosecution to

establish a demand for illegal gratification for sustaining the allegation

of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act as in force prior to

26th July 2018, is without merit.

37. Having stated the above, it is also necessary to observe that

mere arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of official power to confer any

benefit or pecuniary advantage to an unconnected party, may be not be

sufficient to impute that the exercise of such power is culpable

misconduct under sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of

Section 13 of the PC Act. First of all, it would be necessary for the

prosecution to establish that the public servant had abused his official

position; that is, used it for wrongdoing and for a purpose he ought not

to have. Secondly, the same was for securing a valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person, without any

public interest. Obviously, if the third person, who has acquired a

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, is unconnected with the public

servant, it would be difficult to accept that the conduct of the public

servant is culpable in terms of Sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Subsection

(1) of Section 13 of the PC Act.

38. The legislative intent is not to punish a public servant for any

erroneous decision; but to punish him for corruption. The preamble of

the PC Act indicates that it was enacted “to consolidate and amend the

law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected

therewith.” Thus, to fall within the four corners of Sub-clause (ii) of

clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the PC Act, the

decision/conduct of the public servant must be dishonest amounting to

corruption. Transparency International defines corruption as\“the

abuse of entrusted power for private gain”.

39. Mens rea, the intention and/or knowledge of wrongdoing, is an

essential condition of the offence of criminal misconduct under

Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the PC Act. Section 20 of the PC Act does not

apply to offences under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act and therefore,

mens rea cannot be presumed. It is, thus, necessary for the prosecution

to establish the same.

40. The scope of contentions advanced before this court are limited

and therefore, at this stage, it is not apposite to examine whether the

prosecution has established the necessary ingredients of Section

13(1)(d)(ii) of the PC Act. Needless to state that this aspect and the

evidence obtaining in this case would be required to be examined at

the stage of final hearing.

41. The next question to be considered is whether the appellant is

liable to be acquitted in view of the enactment of the PC (Amendment)

Act, 2018. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that he is

entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of beneficial construction. Since

the misconduct as contemplated under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC is no

longer an offence punishable under the PC Act as amended by virtue

of the PC Amendment Act 2018, the benefit of the same ought to be

extended to the appellant. Mr Bhandari had sought to draw strength

from the decision of the Supreme Court in T. Barai (supra) for

canvassing the above contention.

42. Section 13, as amended by virtue of the PC (Amendment) Act,

2018 and as is currently in force, reads as under:

“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—(1) A

public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal

misconduct:—

(a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or

otherwise converts for his own use any property

entrusted to him or any property under his control as a

public servant or allows any other person so to do; or

(b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during

the period of his office.

Explanation 1.—A person shall be presumed to

have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any

person on his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any

time during the period of his office, been in possession

of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to

his known sources of income which the public servant

cannot satisfactorily account for.

Explanation 2.—The expression “known sources

of income” means income received from any lawful

sources.”.

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal

misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a

term which shall be not less than four years but which

may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”

43. In T. Barai (supra), the question, which fell for consideration

before the Supreme Court, related to the applicability of Section 16A

of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as inserted by the

Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 1976 (referred to

as ‘the Central Amendment Act’) in relation to the prosecution that

was launched under Section 16(1)(a) as applicable in the State of West

Bengal between the period 29.04.1974 to 01.04.1976. The offences in

question were punishable with imprisonment for life and therefore

triable by the Court of Sessions by virtue of the Act as amended by

Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics (West

Bengal Amendment) Act, 1973. The Division Bench of the Calcutta

High Court held that by virtue of the Prevention of Food Adulteration

(Amendment) Act, 1976 (Central Act) – which came into force on

01.04.1976 – all pending proceedings for trial of offences punishable

under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act as amended by the Prevention of

Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics (West Bengal

Amendment) Act, 1973 (referred to as the West Bengal Amendment

Act), that had not been concluded would cease to be governed by the

West Bengal Amendment Act and would come within the purview of

the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as amended by the

Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 1976.

Accordingly, the Court directed the Magistrate to proceed with the

trial because the punishment prescribed under the amended scheme

were significantly lower for the offences in question and, therefore,

such offences were triable by the Magistrate. In the aforesaid context,

following questions were framed by the Supreme Court for its

consideration – (i) whether the Central Amendment Act impliedly

repealed the West Bengal Act with effect from 01.04.1976 and, if so,

the effect of such repeal; (ii) whether the High Court was justified in

holding that the West Bengal Amendment Act was deemed to have

been obliterated from the statute book for all intents and purposes and,

therefore, excluded the operation of Section 8 of the Bengal General

Clauses Act, 1899 (which is pari materia to the Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897.); and (iii) whether the pending

proceedings were governed by the Central Amendment Act and

whether the repealed West Bengal Amendment Act preserved the

punishment to be imposed.

44. The court held that the Central Amendment Act had the effect

of completely obliterating the West Bengal Amendment Act and

would have a retrospective effect as it covered the same offence that

was the subject matter of the West Bengal Amendment Act. The

Central Act neither created a new offence nor posited that the

offending act had ceased to be an offence. It is settled law that an ex

post facto legislation, which enhances the punishment for an offence

and creates a new offence, cannot be applied retrospectively as the

same would violate Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.

However, an ex post facto law that mitigates the rigors of law, does

not foul fall of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. There is no

reason to restrict the retrospective operation of such an enactment,

which reduces the rigors of the law. In view of the aforesaid

principles, the Supreme Court held that merely because the Central

Amendment Act had not expressly repealed the West Bengal

Amendment Act, it could not be said that the former was not

retrospective in its operation. The Supreme Court found that the

legislation had substituted the scheme and, therefore, the Act as

amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act stood repealed. The

Court was also of the view that the intention of the legislature was to

do so with retrospective effect. It is material to note that one of the

reasons that persuaded the Supreme Court to take the said view was

the fact that the Central Amendment Act was in respect of the same

offence that was earlier punishable under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act.

45. The provisions of Section 13 of the PC Act were substituted by

virtue of the PC (Amendment) Act, 2018. It is well settled that the

effect of substitution of a statutory provision by another is that the

earlier provision is repealed and is replaced by the provisions so

enacted. The provisions existing prior to the substitution cease to exist

and the provisions enacted in substitution of the earlier provisions

replace the earlier ones. Subject to any savings provision, the effect

would be to write down the substituted provision in the Act as

originally enacted. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2004) 8SCC 1, the Supreme Court had explained the effect of substitution of a

statutory provision in the following words:

“24. The substitution of one text for the other preexisting

text is one of the known and well-recognised

practices employed in legislative drafting. “Substitution”

has to be distinguished from “supersession” or a mere

repeal of an existing provision.

25. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the

earlier provision and its replacement by the new

provision (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation,

ibid, p.565). If any authority is needed in support of the

proposition, it is to be found in West U.P. Sugar Mills

Assn. and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.: (2002) 2 SCC

645, State of Rajasthan Vs. Mangilal Pindwal: (1996) 5

SCC 60, Koteswar Vittal Kamath Vs. K. Rangappa

Baliga and Co.: (1969) 1 SCC 255 and A.L.V.R.S.T.

Veerappa Chettiar Vs. S. Michael & Ors.: AIR 1963 SC

933. In West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Ors.’s

case (supra) a three-Judges Bench of this Court held that

the State Government by substituting the new rule in

place of the old one never intended to keep alive the old

rule. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances

centering around the issue the Court held that the

substitution had the effect of just deleting the old rule

and making the new rule operative. In Mangilal

Pindwal’s case (supra) this Court upheld the legislative

practice of an amendment by substitution being

incorporated in the text of a statute which had ceased to

exist and held that the substitution would have the effect

of amending the operation of law during the period in

which it was in force. In Koteswar’s case (supra) a

three-Judges Bench of this Court emphasized the

distinction between “supersession” of a rule and

“substitution” of a rule and held that the process of

substitution consists of two steps : first, the old rule is

made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought

into existence in its place.”

46. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Prevention of

Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 makes it clear that the said Bill

was introduced pursuant to India’s ratification of the United Nations

Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in May 2011, judicial

pronouncements, and the need to bring domestic laws in line with

international practices. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads

as under:-

“The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides

for prevention of corruption and for matters connected

therewith. The ratification by India of the United Nations

Convention Against Corruption, the international

practice on treatment of the offence of bribery and

corruption and judicial pronouncements have

necessitated a review of the existing provisions of the

Act and the need to amend it so as to fill in the gaps in

description and coverage of the offence of bribery so as

to bring with it in line with the current international

practice and also to meet more effectively, the country’s

obligations under the aforesaid convention.”

47. The said Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 19.08.2013

and was referred to the Department related Standing Committee on

Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice which presented its

69th Report on the Bill to the Parliament on 06.02.2014. The Law

Commission also submitted a Report (254th Report) expressing its

views on the amendments. The Select Committee of Rajya Sabha on

Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 was constituted on

11.12.2015 to examine the Bill and the amendments proposed by

Government and the members and to submit its Report to the Rajya

Sabha.

48. The current international practices as laid down by the United

Nations Convention Against Corruption does not provide any reason

for substitution of Section 13 of the PC Act. The Report of the Law

Commission is also silent on the amendment to Section 13 of the PC

Act. However, the Select Committee of Rajya Sabha on Prevention of

Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 does briefly indicate that the

Government had proposed as many as thirty official amendments to

the aforesaid Bill in 2015. The Select Committee had considered the

said amendments and also elicited the views of various stakeholders

including the Central Bureau of Investigation. It held several sittings

to examine the said amendments proposed by the Bill. The Committee

also noticed that Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of the PC Act had covered a new

species of crime related to corruption, which was not contemplated

under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Committee also

referred to the decision of this Court in the matter of Runu Ghosh and

Ors. v. Central Bureau of Investigation: 2011 SCC Online Del 5501,

wherein a Division Bench of this court had articulated the aforesaid

view and rejected the challenge to the provisions of Section

13(1)(d)(iii) of the PC Act. In that case, this Court had also held that

mens rea was not an essential ingredient of the offence under Section

13(1)(d)(iii) of the PC Act. The Report submitted by the Select

Committee further indicates that most of the stakeholders had agreed

to the amendment proposed by the Government, which had the effect

of deleting the provisions of section 13(1)(d)(iii) of the PC Act. It does

appear from the above that the intention of substituting Section 13 by

enacting the PC (Amendment) Act, 2018 was to exclude the act of any

public servant obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for

any person, without any public interest as an offence of criminal

misconduct.

49. It is relevant to note that PC Act was enacted, inter alia, to

make the then existing anti corruption laws more effective by

widening their coverage and strengthening the provisions. It was

enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to prevention of

corruption and for matters related thereto. The Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 did not include any offence of the nature as

specified under Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of the PC Act. It does appear that

the said provision was introduced only for the purpose of expanding

the scope and coverage of the law relating to prevention of corruption.

Thus, for the first time, an act/conduct resulting in a pecuniary

advantage to a third party was held culpable, as a species of

corruption, merely because such an act or conduct was without public

interest.

50. There were serious concerns expressed that decisions which did

not involve any mens rea or any guilty intention or knowledge could,

nonetheless, be considered as offences under the PC Act. Some

stakeholders also expressed the view that such an interpretation would

make public servants reluctant to make any decisions involving grant

of any advantage to any third party.

51. It is apparent that said concerns were addressed by substituting

Section 13 of the PC Act. The enactment of the PC (Amendment) Act,

2018 to substitute the provisions of Section 13 does indicate the

legislative intent to exclude any such act, which was construed as

criminal misconduct only for the reason that the conduct was against

public interest.

52. Since the PC Amendment Act addressed the concerns regarding

Sub-clause (iii) of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, it would stand to

reason to accept that the legislative intent was always to ensure that

mens rea be considered as an integral part of any offence of

corruption. As noticed herein before, the very definition of corruption,

as is commonly understood, includes an element of dishonesty and

abuse of power by a public servant.

53. However, this Court is unable to accept that the PC