Law Web: Supreme Court: Power To Condone Delay Under Sec 5 Limitation Act Applies To Special Or Local Laws If It Is Not Expressly Excluded

Section 48(1) nowhere

expressly excludes the applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act.

The provisions of section 5 are applicable to Section 48 as they are not

expressly excluded by the provisions under the Act of 2005. More so,

in view of the provisions in section 45(4), which makes provisions to

condone the delay like the Limitation Act, conferring power upon an

authority also to condone delay. Further, suo motu revision has also

been provided under section 46. In section 48, there is no express

exclusion. Because of the scheme of the Act, it cannot be inferred that

by implication, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are

excluded. Provisions contained in section 29(2) of the Limitation Act

would be attracted as there is no express exclusion or by implication,

in view of the provisions of the Act of 2005. We hold that by virtue of

the provisions contained in section 29(2), provisions of section 5 of the

Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under Section 48 of the Act

of 2005.

22. The High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in

Patel Brothers (supra) in the context of the Assam VAT Act in which

the abovementioned provision of section 84 made the difference, which

makes specific provision that only sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation

Act are applicable. Consequently, it follows that other provisions are

not applicable. The decision in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) also

turned on the scheme of the Excise Act. The scheme of the Excise Act

is materially different than that of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act.

Thus, the decision in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) also cannot

be said to be applicable to interpret the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act. As

the revision under the Act of 2005 lies to the High Court, the

provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable, and there

is no express exclusion of the provisions of section 5 and as per

section 29(2), unless a special law expressly excludes the provision,

sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable. When we consider

the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, it is apparent

that its scheme is not ousting the provisions of the Limitation Act from

its ken which makes principles of section 5 applicable even to an

authority in the matter of filing an appeal but for the said provision

the authority would not have the power to condone the delay. By

implication also, it is apparent that the provisions of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act have not been ousted; they have the play for condoning

the limitation under Section 48 of the Act of 2005. Suo motu provision

of revisional power is also provided to the Commissioner within 5

years. Thus, the intendment is not to exclude the Limitation Act. We

condone the delay in filing of revision.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 82768277

OF 2019

SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER/ DEHAR

POWER HOUSE CIRCLE BHAKRA BEAS

MANAGEMENT BOARD (PW) SLAPPER

EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER,

SUNDER NAGAR/ASSESSING AUTHORITY

ARUN MISHRA, J.

Dated:October 25, 2019.

1. The question involved is whether the High Court while exercising

revisional power under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value

Added Tax Act, 2005 (‘the Act of 2005’), condone the delay in case a

revision under Section 48 of the Act of 2005, is filed beyond 90 days

from the date of communication of the order or it excludes the

applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in

consequence of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

2. The High Court vide impugned judgment and order dated

19.11.2018, has refused to condone the delay in the revision filed

under Section 48 read with Section 64(5) of the Act of 2005, against

the order passed by Himachal Pradesh Tax Tribunal. The Division

Bench of the High Court relying upon the decision of a Coordinate

Bench in CMP(M) No.1371 of 2017 titled State of Himachal Pradesh &

others v. Tritronics India Private Limited, has held that provision of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be applied and the High Court

cannot condone the delay. The revision has to be filed within 90 days,

as provided in Section 48 of the Act of 2005.

3. The provisions contained in Section 48 of the Act of 2005,

relating to the revisional power of the High Court, read as under:

“48. Revision to High Court. (

1) Any person aggrieved by an

order made by the tribunal under subsection

(2) of section 45 or

under subsection

(3) of section 46, may, within 90 days of the

communication of such order, apply to the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh for revision of such order if it involves any

question of law arising out of erroneous decision of law or failure

to decide a question of law.

(2) The application for revision under subsection

(1) shall

precisely state the question of law involved in the order, and it

shall be competent for the High Court to formulate the question

of law.

(3) Where an application under this section is pending, the High

Court may, or on application, in this behalf, stay recovery of any

disputed amount of tax, penalty or interest payable or refund of

any amount due under the order sought to be revised:

Provided that no order for stay of recovery of such disputed

amount shall remain in force for more than 30 days unless the

applicant furnishes adequate security to the satisfaction of the

Assessing Authority concerned.

(4) The application for revision under subsection

(1) or the

application for stay under subsection

(3) shall be heard and

decided by a bench consisting of not less than two judges.

(5) No order shall be passed under this section which adversely

affects any person unless such person has been given a

reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

4. The Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held

that considering the expression used in the provisions contained in

Section 48(1), the High Court could not condone the delay in filing

revision. The language contained therein excludes the applicability of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court cannot also exercise the

inherent powers to condone the delay. The High Court has taken into

consideration the provisions contained in Assam Value Added Tax,

2003. The provisions contained in Section 81 of the Assam Value

Added Tax, 2003, is held to be pari materia with the provisions of

Section 48 of the Act of 2005. The High Court has also referred to

Section 84 of the Assam Value Added Tax, 2003, which provides that

provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, shall apply in

computing the period of limitation in relation to the provisions

contained in the chapter. It was further observed that in the Act of

2005, there is no provision to infer that any provisions of the

Limitation Act apply. The decision in Patel Brothers v. State of Assam

& Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 350, has been relied on, in which while

considering the provisions contained in Section 81 of the Assam Value

Added Tax, 2003, it was held that provisions contained in Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, stand excluded by necessary implication by the

language employed in Section 84. The High Court has also referred to

the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central

Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791, rendered in

the context of the provisions contained in Section 35 of the Central

Excise Act, 1944, in which it has been held that reference has to be

made to the High Court within 180 days, and there is no power of the

High Court to condone the delay after the expiry of the prescribed

period of 180 days. Thus, the High Court has held that provisions of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, are not applicable and stand excluded

in the matter of revision filed under Section 48 of the Act of 2005.

5. The provisions contained in Section 29 of the Limitation Act

deals with savings. The provisions in respect to the limitation

prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local

law, is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the

provisions of Section 3 shall apply if the Schedule prescribed such

period. The provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only

in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded.

Section 29(2) is extracted hereunder:

“29. Savings.—

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal

or application a period of limitation different from the period

prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall

apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the

Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of

limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any

special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24

(inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to

which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local

law.”

(emphasis added)

6. Section 5 of the Limitation Act deals with the extension of the

prescribed period in particular exigencies. The provision applies to the

Court and is excluded in the application to the provisions of Order XXI

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). It provides that if the

Court is satisfied that the appellant/applicant had sufficient cause for

not preferring the appeal or making the application within limitation,

the Court may admit the same after the prescribed period.

Explanation attached to Section 5 makes it clear that in case the

appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice, or

judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the

prescribed period, may be sufficient cause within the meaning of

Section 5.

7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants has placed

reliance on Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2

SCC 133, in which it has been observed that in a case where the

special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the

Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open

to the Court to examine to what extent the scheme of special law

exclude the operation of Limitation Act. If, on an examination of the

relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act

are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be

called in aid to condone the delay under the Special Act. In the

context of Section 86 of Representation of People Act, it has been held

that the High Court is bound to dismiss an election petition, which

does not comply with the provisions of Section 81, 82 or 117. The

election petition has to be preferred within the period prescribed in

Section 81. Thus, the provision was held to be mandatory. The noncompliance

with which visits the penalty of the petition being

dismissed. Following observations have been made:

“17. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has been made

applicable to appeals both under the Act as well as under the

Code of Criminal Procedure, no case has been brought to our

notice where Section 29(2) has been made applicable to an

election petition filed under Section 81 of the Act by virtue of

which either Sections 4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been

attracted. Even assuming that where a period of limitation has

not been fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the

Limitation Act which is different from that fixed under Section 81

of the Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what we have to

determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly

excluded in the case of an election petition. It is contended before

us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there

must be an express reference made in the special or local law to

the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the

operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the

Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is

whether the scheme of the special law, that is, in this case, the

Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that

the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which

alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an

examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the

provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then

the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to

supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case

where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections

4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would

nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to

what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the

subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their

operation. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a

suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the

prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in Section

86 of the Act which gives a peremptory command that the High

Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply

with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117. It will be seen that

Section 81 is not the only Section mentioned in Section 86, and if

the Limitation Act were to apply to an election petition under

Section 81 it should equally apply to Sections 82 and 117

because under Section 86 the High Court cannot say that by an

application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Section 81 is

complied with while no such benefit is available in dismissing an

application for noncompliance

with the provisions of Sections 82

and 117 of the Act, or alternatively if the provisions of the

Limitation Act do not apply to Section 82 and Section 117 of the

Act, it cannot be said that they apply to Section 81. Again Section

6 of the Limitation Act which provides for the extension of the

period of limitation till after the disability in the case of a person

who is either a minor or insane or an idiot is inapplicable to an

election petition. Similarly, Sections 7 to 24 are in terms

inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in

respect of the filing of election petitions and their trial.”

(emphasis added)

8. In Sakuru v. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279, it has been held that the

provisions of the Limitation Act apply only to proceedings in Courts

and not to appeals or applications of bodies other than Courts such as

quasijudicial

Tribunals or executive authorities. Though the bodies or

authorities may be conferred with the powers under the Codes of Civil

or Criminal Procedure, however, special statute may contain an

express provision conferring on the Appellate Authority the power to

extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being

shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. In the absence

of such provisions, Section 5 would have no application.

9. In Lata Kamat v. Vilas, (1989) 2 SCC 613, provisions contained

in Section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act, came up for consideration,

wherein it was held that limitation prescribed therein is different from

the Schedule of Limitation Act. Regarding the provisions of Section

29(2) of the Limitation Act, it was observed that the provisions of the

Hindu Marriage Act do not exclude the operation of the provisions of

Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act. They have been held to be

applicable. Therefore, the time required for obtaining the copy of

judgment has to be excluded, as provided in Section 12(2) of

Limitation Act. The Court observed:

“12. The Schedule in the Limitation Act does not provide for an

appeal under the Hindu Marriage Act, but it is only provided in

subsection

(4) of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Thus the

limitation provided, in subsection

(4) of Section 28, is different

from the Schedule of the Limitation Act. According to subsection

(2) of Section 29, provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 will be

applicable unless they are not expressly excluded. It is clear that

the provisions of the Act do not exclude the operation of

provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, and therefore

it could not be said that these provisions will not be applicable. It

is therefore clear that to an appeal under Section 28 of the

Hindu Marriage Act, provisions contained in Section 12 subsection

(2) will be applicable; therefore, the time required for

obtaining copies of the judgment will have to be excluded for

computing the period of limitation for appeal. A Division Bench

of Delhi High Court in Chandra Dev Chadha case1held as under:

(AIR pp. 2425)

“The Hindu Marriage Act is a special law. That this

‘special law’ prescribes ‘for an appeal a period of limitation’ is

alsoevident.

The period of limitation is 30 days. It is a period

different from that prescribed in the First Schedule to the

Limitation Act, 1963. But when we turn to the First

Schedule, we find there is no provision in the First Schedule

for an appeal against the decree or order passed under the

Hindu Marriage Act. Now it has been held that the test of a

‘prescription of a period of limitation different from the period

prescribed by the First Schedule' as laid down in Section

29(2), Limitation Act, 1963 is satisfied even in a case where a

difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose

by omissions to provide for a limitation to a particular

proceeding under the Limitation Act, see, Canara Bank,

Bombay v. Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., Bombay, AIR 1953

Bom 35, approved by the Supreme Court in Vidyacharan

Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel2.

Once the test is satisfied, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 to

24, Limitation Act, 1963 would at once apply to the special

law. The result is that the court hearing the appeal from the

decree or order passed under the Hindu Marriage Act would

under Section 3 of the Limitation Act have the power to

dismiss the appeal if made after the period of limitation of 30

days prescribed therefor by the special law. Similarly, under

Section 5 for sufficient cause, it will have the power to

condone the delay. Likewise, under Section 12(2), the time

spent in obtaining a certified copy of the decree or order

appealed from will be excluded. If it is so, Section 12(2) of the

Limitation Act is attracted, and the appellants in all three

appeals will be entitled to exclude the time taken by them for

obtaining a certified copy of the decree and order. The

appeals are, therefore, within time."

Similar is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Sipra

Dey case3and also the M.P. High Court in Kantibai case4. It is

therefore clear that the contention advanced by the learned

counsel for the respondent based on the Limitation Act also is of

no substance.”

1 AIR 1979 Del 22

2 AIR 1964 SC 1099

3 AIR 1988 Cal 28

4 AIR 1978 MP 245

10. In State of W.B. & Ors. v. Kartick Chandra Das & Ors, (1996) 5

SCC 342, provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act came up for

consideration concerning the letters patent appeal filed in contempt

proceedings. It has been observed that there is no express exclusion

of provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act by a special or local

law, thus, on the strength of Section 29(2), Section 5 of Limitation Act

becomes applicable. The Court held:

4. It is not in dispute that under Section 19 of the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971, an appeal would lie to the Division Bench, and

limitation of 30 days from the date of the order has been prescribed

subject to the exclusion of the time taken for obtaining the certified

copy thereof. We have seen that the Appellate Side Rules of the

Calcutta High Court applicable to the area other than the city of

Calcutta had not expressly excluded the application of the limitation

under the Limitation Act.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent sought to contend that by

operation of Rule 3 of Chapter 8 of the Appellate Side Rules under

the Letters Patent the memorandum of appeal drawn up under

Order 41 Rule 1 CPC requires to be complied with as envisaged

thereunder since it had not been provided with any limitation. The

Division Bench was, therefore, right in holding that the Limitation

Act was not extended for an appeal filed under clause 15 of the

Letters Patent against the order passed by the learned Single Judge

under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is seen that

under the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court has framed the

Rules. Rule 35 envisages that:

"35. In respect of appeals from the orders of any Judge or

Bench of the original side, the rules of the original side

relating to appeals and in respect of appeals from the order of

any Judge or Bench of the appellate side, the rules of the

appellate side shall apply mutatis mutandis."

Therefore, for the appeals filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent

against the order of the learned Single Judge for the contempt

proceedings by necessary consequences, the procedure prescribed

in the appellate side would also be applicable and followed.

***

7. In consequence, by operation of Section 29(2) read with Section 3

of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law

under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, and limitation in

filing Letters Patent appeal stands attracted. In consequence,

Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands attracted to Letters

Patent appeal insofar as and to the extent to which they are not

expressly excluded either by special or local law. Since the rules

made on the appellate side, either for entertaining the appeals

under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or appeals arising under the

contempt of courts, had not expressly excluded, Section 5 of the

Limitation Act becomes applicable. We hold that Section 5 of the

Limitation Act does apply to the appeals filed against the order of

the learned Single Judge for the enforcement by way of a contempt.

The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that Section 5 of

the Limitation Act does not apply. The delay stands condoned. Since

the High Court had not dealt with the matter on merits, we decline

to express any opinion on merits. The case stands remitted to the

Division Bench for decision on merits.”

11. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995)

5 SCC 5, the question arose whether Appellate Authority constituted

under Section 18 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,

1965 has the power to condone the delay in filing of the appeal. The

Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no

power to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay

was not maintainable. This Court held that the Appellate Authority

under Section 18 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,

1965, acts as a Court and not a persona designatum, it can condone

the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act as the two requirements

for the applicability of Section 29 are satisfied, namely, (i) different

periods of limitation being prescribed under the local law; and (ii)

there is no express exclusion of provisions of Limitation Act. Following

are the relevant observations:

“9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied, the

consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically

follow. These consequences are as under:

(i) In such a case, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as

if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period

prescribed by the Schedule.

(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such

special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the

provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply

insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly

excluded by such special or local law.

10. In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, let us see whether Section 18

of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate

authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the

applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be

disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It

also cannot be disputed that it prescribes for appeal under

Section 18 a period of limitation which is different from the

period prescribed by the Schedule as the Schedule to the

Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for

filing appeal before the appellate authority under Section 18 of

the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of

limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that a

situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special

or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no

provision made in the Schedule to the Act, the second condition

for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied. As laid down by a

majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the

case of Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel5, when the

First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no timelimit

for a

particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a timelimit

for

it, it can be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation

Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by

limiting it provides for a different period, while the former permits

the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed

within the prescribed period. It is, therefore, different from that

prescribed in the former, and thus Section 29(2) would apply

even to a case where a difference between the special law and

Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a

particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are

satisfied, Section 29(2), on its own force will get attracted to

appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the

Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18

of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed

for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to

24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5, being one of

them, would, therefore, get attracted. It is also obvious that there

is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act, taking out the

applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed

5 AIR 1964 SC 1099

before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Act.

Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of

Section 29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied.

That was the view taken by the minority decision of the learned

Single Judge of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina

Kunhi Umma6. The majority did not agree on account of its wrong

supposition that appellate authority functioning under Section

18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. Once that presumption

is found to be erroneous as discussed by us earlier, it becomes at

once clear that minority view in the said decision was the correct

view and the majority view was an erroneous view.”

It has been held that if there is no express exclusion in the local

or special law, then the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the

Limitation Act shall apply by the provisions contained in Section 29(2)

of the Limitation Act.

12. In Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC

392, question came up for consideration when the application of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be excluded and whether

peremptory or imperative language of the special or local law can

exclude the application of Section 5, if not otherwise explicitly

excluded. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi against the acquittal

order, filed an application in the High Court of Delhi under Section

417, subSection

(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for special

leave to appeal from the order of acquittal. Section 417(4) of the Code

of Criminal Procedure required that application for special leave

should be filed before the expiry of sixty days. The application for

special leave should have been filed on 25.8.1971, but it was filed on

6 AIR 1974 Ker 162

27.8.1971. The argument was raised that time frame is sixty days as

prescribed in Section 417(4) for making an application for special leave

under subSection

(3) of that section was mandatory and inexorable

time limit which could not be relieved against or relaxed, and it

excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has

also been held that the provision of a period of limitation in a

howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to

displace the applicability of Section 5. The provisions of Section 5 of

the Limitation Act have been held to be applicable to condone the

delay in applying under Section 417(4), Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court has observed:

“6. The question which arose for consideration in Kaushalya Rani

case was apparently the same as in the present case, namely,

whether the time limit of sixty days prescribed in subsection

(4) of

Section 417 for making an application for special leave under subsection

(3) of that section could be extended by invoking Section 5 of

the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. This Court held that subsection

(4) of Section 417 laid down a special period of limitation for an

application by a complainant for special leave to appeal against an

order of acquittal and

“in that sense, this rule of sixty days bar is a special law, that is to

say, a rule of limitation which is specially provided for in the Code

itself, which does not ordinarily provide for a period of limitation for

appeals or applications.

This Court pointed out that since

“the special rule of limitation laid down in subsection

(4) of Section

417 of the Code is a special law of limitation governing appeals by

private prosecutors, there is no difficulty in coming to the

conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly out of the

way, in view of Section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act.”

The applicability of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was

thus held to be excluded in determining the period of limitation of

sixty days prescribed in subsection

(4) of Section 417 by reason of

Section 29(2)(b) of that Act, which provided in so many terms that

“for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed

for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the

remaining provisions of this Act”

that is, sections other than Sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 "shall not

apply." Now, there can be no doubt that if the present case were

governed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, this decision would

wholly apply and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi would not be

entitled to invoke the aid of Section 5 of that Act for the purpose of

extending the period of limitation of sixty days prescribed in subsection

(4) of Section 417 for an application by a complainant for

special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal. But the Indian

Limitation Act, 1908 has clearly no application in the present case

since that Act is repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963 which came

into force with effect from January 1, 1964, and the present case

must, therefore, be decided by reference to the provisions of the

Limitation Act, 1963.

7. There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act,

1963 insofar as the provision contained in Section 29, subsection

(2), is concerned. Whereas, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,

Section 29, subsection

(2), clause (b) provided that for the purpose

of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,

appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions of

the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in

Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the

applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded,

Section 29, subsection

(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 enacts in so

many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of

limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any

special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24,

which would include Section 5, shall apply insofar as and to the

extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or

local law. Section 29, subsection

(2), clause (b) of the Indian

Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of

Section 5, while Section 29, subsection

(2) of the Limitation Act,

1963, in clear and unambiguous terms, provides for the

applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya

Rani case7 can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by

the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the

hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by

reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since

under the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 is specifically made

applicable by Section 29, subsection

(2), it can be availed of for the

purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special

or local law, if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause

for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It

is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability

of Section 5 that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by

this Court in Kaushalya Rani case, the time limit of sixty days laid

down in subsection

(4) of Section 417 is a special law of limitation,

7 AIR 1964 SC 260

and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly

excludes the applicability of Section 5. It is true that the language of

subsection

(4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that

it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of

special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be

entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the

date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of

every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar

against entertainment of an application beyond the period of

limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes

necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application

may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of

limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not

sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion

is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for

special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the

coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be

available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient

cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty

days prescribed in subsection

(4) of Section 417, the application

would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of

sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. The

High Court, in the present case, did not, therefore, act without

jurisdiction in holding that the application preferred by the

Municipal Corporation of Delhi was not barred by the time limit of

sixty days laid down in subsection

(4) of Section 417 since the

Municipal Corporation of Delhi had sufficient cause for not

preferring the application within such time limit. The order granting

special leave was in the circumstances, not an order outside the

power of the High Court.”

13. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470,

the Court considered the question of applicability of the provisions

contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The

provisions contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996, came up for consideration. Relevant provisions contained

in Section 34(3) is extracted hereunder:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three

months have elapsed from the date on which the party making

that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request

had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that

request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal:

Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within

the said period of three months, it may entertain the application

within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."

Proviso to Section 34(3) provides three months period for making

an application. The Court, if satisfied on sufficient cause shown, may

entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not

thereafter. In Popular Construction Co. (supra) the Court held:

“8. Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period

within which the court could exercise its discretion, that would not

have been sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation

Act because “mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever

peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the

applicability of Section 5” 8.

***

11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for

the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days

was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of

the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant

that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood

extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary

implication stood excluded9.

12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is

concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the

proviso to subsection

(3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount

to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the

Limitation Act and would, therefore, bar the application of Section 5

of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the

court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond

the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase

"but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation

would justify such a result.”

It has been held that had the proviso to Section 34 merely

provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its

8 Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 at p. 397, para 7.

9 Patel Naranbhai Margabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai, (1992) 4 SCC 264.

discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to

24 of the Limitation Act. However, the expression in Section 34 “but

not thereafter” would amount to express exclusion within the meaning

of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

14. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,

Irrigation Department & Ors., 2008 (7) SCC 169, the question arose for

consideration concerning the limitation period prescribed in Section

34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, for setting aside of the

arbitral award. It has been held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act

is not excluded. However, applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act is excluded. Following is the relevant discussion:

“53. Subsection

(3) of Section 34 of the AC Act prescribes the

period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an

award as three months from the date on which the applicant has

received the arbitral award. The proviso thereto vests in the court

discretion to extend the period of limitation by a further period not

exceeding thirty days if the court is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause for not making the application within

three months. The use of the words "but not thereafter" in the

proviso makes it clear that even if a sufficient cause is made out for

a longer extension, the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. The

purpose of proviso to Section 34(3) of the AC Act is similar to that of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which also relates to extension of

the period of limitation prescribed for any application or appeal. It

vests a discretion in a court to extend the prescribed period of

limitation if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient

cause for not making the application within the prescribed period.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in

regard to the period of extension, whereas the proviso to subsection

(3) of Section 34 of the AC Act places a limit on the period of

extension of the period of limitation. Thus the proviso to Section

34(3) of the AC Act is also a provision relating to extension of period

of limitation, but differs from Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in

regard to period of extension, and has the effect of excluding Section

5 alone of the Limitation Act.

54. On the other hand, Section 14 contained in Part III of the

Limitation Act does not relate to extension of the period of limitation

but relates to exclusion of certain period while computing the period

of limitation. Neither subsection (3) of Section 34 of the AC Act nor

any other provision of the AC Act exclude the applicability of Section

14 of the Limitation Act to applications under Section 34(1) of the

AC Act. Nor will the proviso to Section 34(3) exclude the application

of Section 14, as Section 14 is not a provision for extension of

period of limitation, but for exclusion of certain period while

computing the period of limitation. Having regard to Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act, Section 14 of that Act will be applicable to an

application under Section 34(1) of the AC Act. Even when there is

cause to apply Section 14, the limitation period continues to be

three months and not more, but in computing the limitation period

of three months for the application under Section 34(1) of the AC

Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such

application before the wrong court is excluded, provided the

proceeding in the wrong court was prosecuted bona fide, with due

diligence. Western Builders10, therefore, lays down the correct legal

position."

15. In Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt.

Ltd. & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 791, the question arose for consideration

whether the High Court has the power to condone delay beyond the

period specified in section 35H

of the Central Excise Act. The

limitation for an appeal and reference is within 180 days from the date

of communication of the decision or order. Because of the provisions

and the Act, it was held that the time limit prescribed for making a

reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendible by Court

under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Central Excise Act has been

held to be a complete Code by itself. The import of “expressly

excluded” in section 29(2) was considered, and it has been observed

that even in the absence of express exclusion, the court can examine

10 (2006) 6 SCC 239

the extent of exclusion of Limitation Act by a special law, based on the

provisions or the nature of the subject matter. This Court has

considered the scheme of the various provisions and the scheme

thereunder thus:

“4. Chapter VIA

of the Act deals with appeals. As per Section 35,

any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed by a Central

Excise Officer may file an appeal to the Commissioner of Central

Excise (Appeals) within sixty days from the date of the

communication to him of such decision or order. The proviso to

subsection

(1) enables the Commissioner (Appeals) if he is satisfied

that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from

presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, to

allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.

5. Section 35B

speaks about appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. Any

person aggrieved by certain decisions/orders passed by the

Commissioner of Central Excise or the Commissioner (Appeals),

may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within three months

from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is

communicated to the officer concerned or the other party. Subsection

(5) enables the Appellate Tribunal to condone delay even

beyond the prescribed period if there was sufficient cause for not

presenting it within that period.

6. Section 35EE

provides for revision by the Central Government.

As per subsection

(2), an application under subsection

(1) shall be

made within three months from the date of the communication.

However, proviso to subsection

(2) enables the revisional authority

to condone the delay for a further period of ninety days, if sufficient

cause is shown.

7. Unamended Section 35G

speaks about appeal to the High Court.

Subsection

2(a) enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal to

the High Court within 180 days from the date on which the order

appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Central Excise

or the other party. There is no provision to condone the delay in

filing appeal beyond the prescribed period of 180 days.

8. Unamended Section 35H

speaks about reference application to

the High Court. As per subsection

(1), the Commissioner of Central

Excise or the other party within a period of 180 days of the date

upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35C

direct the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law

arising from such order of the Tribunal. Here again, as per subsection

(1), application for reference is to be made to the High Court

within 180 days, and there is no provision to extend the period of

limitation for filing the application to the High Court beyond the

said period and to condone the delay.

9. In these three appeals, we are concerned with “reference

application” made to the High Court under Section 35H(

1) of the

Act before amendment of the Central Excise Act by Act 49 of 2005

(w.e.f. 28122005)

by which several provisions of the Act were

omitted including Section 35H.

However, in view of the reference

made, it is but proper to consider the question referred before us.

** ** **

32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B,

35EE,

35G,

and 35H

makes the position clear that an appeal and

reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only

from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other

words, the language used in other provisions makes the position

clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to

entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after

expiry of 60 days, which is the preliminary limitation period for

preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the

delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there

is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High

Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to

condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days."

The Court has also taken note of the fact that the sufficient

period of limitation of 180 days has been provided for reference,

provision for condonation of delay was not made in filing the reference.

The legislature intended that there should not be any condonation of

delay beyond 180 days. The Court has observed with respect to the

sufficiency of a period of 180 days which is more than the period

prescribed for an appeal and revision thus:

“33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and

to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central

Government, the legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days

respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to

the High Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to

enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. We

are of the view that the legislature provided sufficient time, namely,

180 days for filing reference to the High Court, which is more than

the period prescribed for an appeal and revision."

Under the scheme of the Act and the provision of limitation of

180 days, for filing reference to the High Court was more than the

period prescribed for an appeal and revision.

16. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Anshuman Shukla, (2014)

10 SCC 814, a 3Judge

Bench of this Court held that even if the

amendment to section 19 of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran

Adhiniyam, 1983 was made in 2005, as the court had the power to

take suo moto cognizance and call for record of an award at any time,

there was no legislative intent to exclude the applicability of section 5

of the Limitation Act. Apart from that, this Court observed that section

19 of the Act of 1983, did not contain any express rider on the power

of the High Court to entertain an application for revision after the

expiry of the prescribed limitation thereunder. Thus, the provisions of

section 29(2) are applicable in the absence of such rider, and delay in

filing the revision was condoned. The Court observed:

“32. Section 19 of the 1983 Act does not contain any express rider

on the power of the High Court to entertain an application for

revision after the expiry of the prescribed period of three months.

On the contrary, the High Court is conferred with suo motu power,

to call for the record of an award at any time. It cannot, therefore,

be said that the legislative intent was to exclude the applicability of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 19 of the 1983 Act.

33. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to delve into the question

whether the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Act is a court

or not for answering the issue in the present case as the delay in

filing the revision has occurred before the High Court, and not the

Arbitral Tribunal.

Answer to Point (ii)

34. In light of the reasons recorded above, we are of the opinion that

the case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena11, was decided

erroneously. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to Section

19 of the 1983 Act. No express exclusion has been incorporated

therein, and there is neither any evidence to suggest that the

legislative intent was to bar the application of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act on Section 19 of the 1983 Act. The cases which were

relied upon to dismiss the special leave petition, namely,

Nasiruddin12 and Popular Construction13, can be distinguished both

in terms of the facts as well as the law applicable, and thus, have

no bearing on the facts of the present case.”

The provision of section 19(1) of the Madhya Pradesh

Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 is extracted hereunder:

“19. High Court’s power of revision.—(1) The High Court may suo

motu at any time or on an application for revision made to it within

three months of the award by an aggrieved party, call for the record

of any case in which an award has been made under this Act by

issuing a requisition to the Tribunal, and upon receipt of such

requisition, the Tribunal shall send or cause to be sent to that

Court the concerned award and record thereof.”

17. In Patel Brothers v. State of Assam & Ors., 2017 (2) SCC 350, the

question came up for consideration concerning the provisions

contained in the Assam Value Added Tax Act. This Court considered

the provisions contained in sections 81 and 84 of the VAT Act read

with sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In the matter of

condoning the delay in filing revision in the High Court, it has been

held that given the provisions contained in sections 81 and 84 of the

VAT Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be

said to be applicable. There can be implied exclusion of the provisions

11 (2004) 2 MPJR (SN) 374

12 (2003) 2 SCC 577

13 (2001) 8 SCC 470

of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Even in the absence of express

exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act, it is open to a court

to consider the implied exclusion. It has been held:

“20. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in

such cases is to examine the provisions of the special law to arrive

at a conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude

the operation of the Limitation Act. In the instant case, we find that

Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the

Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act. The

apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to

exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of any express provision

in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act

would apply. If the intention of the legislature was to make Section

5, or for that matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act

applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, there was no

necessity to make specific provision like Section 84 thereby making

only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such

proceedings, inasmuch as these two sections would also have

become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It

is, thus, clear that the legislature intended only Sections 4 and 12

of the Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act,

applicable under the VAT Act, thereby excluding the applicability of

the other provisions.

21. The judgment in Mangu Ram14, would not come to the aid of the

appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under

CrPC from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the

Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation prevailed in

Anshuman Shukla case15. On the contrary, in the instant case, a

scrutiny of the scheme of the VAT Act goes to show that it is a

complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing

the timelimit

within which each forum would be competent to

entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act

appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings

initiated under the different provisions contained therein but also to

ensure finality of the decision made thereunder. The fact that the

period of limitation described therein has been equally made

applicable to the assessee as well as the Revenue lends ample

credence to such a conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold

that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a

proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act, stands excluded by

necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in Section

84.”

14 (1976) 1 SCC 392

15 (2014) 10 SCC 814

This Court has considered section 84 of the VAT Act of Assam.

Same is as follows:

"84. Application of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963.—

In computing the period of limitation under this Chapter, the

provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall, so

far as may be, apply.”

Section 81 deals with revision, and section 84 deals with the

Limitation Act. Section 84 makes a vital difference for the Chapter in

which the provision of section 81 finds a place. Only the provisions of

sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act are made applicable, and other

provisions stand excluded by limited application of the provisions of

the Limitation Act. The decision under the Assam VAT Act has turned

on the aforesaid crucial provision of section 84.

18. In M. P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise,

(2015) 7 SCC 58, this Court considered the connotations of the court

and civil proceedings under section 14 of the Limitation Act and the

provisions were held applicable to the proceedings in the case of the

appeal being filed under section 120 of the Customs Act.

19. In Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida v. Punjab

Fibres Ltd., Noida, (2008) 3 SCC 73, a question arose of condonation of

delay in filing reference application to the High Court. It has been held

that section 5 is not applicable. In the said case, the court has

followed the decision in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central

Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 70. In Singh Enterprises

(supra), it has been held:

“6. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 35 of the

Act which reads as follows:

“35. Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals).—(1) Any person

aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a

Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of

Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central

Excise (Appeals) [hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the

Commissioner (Appeals)] within sixty days from the date of the

communication to him of such decision or order:

Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may if he is satisfied

that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from

presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days,

allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.

(2) Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed

form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner.”

** ** **

8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the

Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction

to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under

the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can

be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation

Act") can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to

Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be

preferred within three months from the date of communication to

him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is

satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from

presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can

allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other

words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60

days, but in terms of the proviso, further 30 days' time can be

granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The

proviso to subsection

(1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal

clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal

to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used

makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate

authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30

days after the expiry of 60 days, which is the normal period for

preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section

5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were

therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone

the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.”

20. In Chaudharana Steels Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central

Excise, Allahabad, (2009) 15 SCC 183, the question of delay in filing

an appeal under section 35G

of the Central Excise Act, 1944 came up

for consideration. The Court held that the High Court has no power to

condone the delay and followed the decision in Punjab Fibres Ltd.

(supra).

21. In the light of the decisions as mentioned earlier, when we

examine the scheme of the Act of 2005, the provisions contained in

section 45 provides for an appeal from every original order passed

under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. Subsection

(4) of section

45 provides appeal to be filed within 60 days, or such more extended

period as the appellate authority may allow, for reasons to be recorded

in writing. Thus, because of the provisions contained in section 45(4),

the principles of section 5 would apply to an appeal before the

appellate authority, which otherwise in the absence of specific

provision would not have applied to authority. The revision is provided

to the Commissioner suo motu under the provisions of section 46(1),

and the period provided is 5 years for suo motu exercise of revisional

power. However, the tribunal has the power to entertain application

within 60 days from the date of communication of the order. When we

consider the provisions of section 48, revision is provided to the High

Court, and an aggrieved person may within 90 days of the

communication of such order, file a revision. Section 48(1) nowhere