The order passed by the High Court in the present matter was not to
enable the Prosecutor to rectify the defects or infirmities in the evidence or
to enable him to lead evidence which he had not cared to lead on the earlier occasion. The evidence in the form of testimony of those twelve witnesses
was led and those witnesses were cross-examined. There was no infirmity
except the one that the evidence was not led in the presence of the
appellants. The remedy proposed was only to rectify such infirmity, and not
to enable the Prosecutor to rectify defects in the evidence.
25. We must also consider the matter from the stand point and perspective
of the victims as suggested by the learned Amicus Curiae. Four persons of a
family were done to death. It is certainly in the societal interest that the
guilty must be punished and at the same time the procedural requirements
which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered to. If there was an infraction,
which otherwise does not vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to
remedy the situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the
accused as well as societal interest are adequately safeguarded. The very
same witnesses were directed to be de novo examined which would ensure
that the interest of the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the
accused will have every right and opportunity to watch the witnesses
deposing against them, watch their demeanor and instruct their counsel
properly so that said witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the
process, the interest of the accused would also stand protected. On the other
hand, if we were to accept the submission that the proceedings stood vitiated
and, therefore, the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination
of the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage of justice.
The persons who are accused of committing four murders would not
effectively be tried. The evidence against them would not be read for a
technical infraction resulting in great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order
and directions passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair
procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses, after due
distillation from their cross-examination can be read in evidence.
26. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order passed and the
directions issued by the High Court in the present matter. We affirm the
view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.656-657 OF 2019
ATMA RAM Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Dated:April 11, 2019.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals challenge the decision dated 03.12.2018 passed by the
High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Death
Reference No.2 of 2017 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018.
3. FIR No.493 was registered with Police Station Bhadara, District
Hanumangarh on 13.10.2013 in respect of offences punishable under Sections
302, 307, 452, 447, 323, 147, 148 and 149 IPC pursuant to reporting by one
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 2
Kailash. It was stated that seven named persons including present four
appellants and some other unknown persons had come to the agricultural field
of the informant while harvesting operations were going on and had opened
an assault. As a result, father of the informant named Bhanwarlal and brother
of the informant named Pankaj died on the spot while the informant suffered
injuries. It was further alleged that the same assembly, thereafter, went to the
village and assaulted inmates of the house in which his grandfather named
Momanram died. Later, the informant Kailash also succumbed to his injuries.
4. After due investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants
namely Atmaram, Omprakash, Leeladhar and Shravan Kumar while others
were reported to be absconding. The trial was conducted in the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Bhadara, District Hanumangarh. It appears that at
the stage of recording of evidence, the appellants who were then in judicial
custody were not produced in court. The order dated 28.10.2014 passed by
the Trial Court recorded the objection of the Advocate for the appellants. The
examination-in-chief of PW1-Chanduram and PW2-Chandrakala was
undertaken without the appellants being present in Court and the crossexamination
was deferred. The order recorded:-
“In Evidence PW1 Chanduram & PW2
Chandrakala, Chief Examination was recorded.
Advocate for accused sought time for Cross
Examination. Therefore, statements of witnesses were
kept reserved. Witnesses PW1 & PW2 are to be
present for Cross Examination on 28.11.2014 and
Witness no. 12, 13 and 143 are to be issued summons
to remain present on 29.11.2014. For recording
evidence be present on 28.11.2014, till then Judicial
Custody of Accused Atmaram, Om Prakash,
Leeladhar and Shravan is extended.”
5. Similarly, following 10 witnesses were also examined in Court on
dates mentioned against their names, without ensuring the presence of the
appellants in Court.
PW3 Surendra Singh 13.2.2015
PW4 Dharam Pal 13.2.2015
PW 12 Vikrant Sharma 13.8.2015
PW 13 Prahlad 3.9.2015
PW 14 Ram Kumar 9.10.2015
PW 15 Sushila 9.10.2015, 5.11.2015
PW 17 Dr. Arun Tungariya 8.3.2016
PW 18 Ram Pratap 12.5.2016, 20.6.2016, 14.2.2017
PW 20 Sahab Singh 22.11.2016
PW 23 Ramesh Kumar 14.2.2017
6. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 03.11.2017 found that
the prosecution had proved the case against the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt and convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections
147, 148, 452, 447, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 323 read with
Section 149 IPC. The matter was then heard on sentence. After hearing the
Public Prosecutor and Advocates for the complainant, as well as the
appellants, the Trial Court imposed death sentence upon the appellants,
subject to confirmation by the High Court. Consequently, the matter stood
referred to the High Court in D.B. Criminal Death Reference No.2 of 2017.
The appellants also filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018, which was
heard along with the Death Reference case.
7. It was submitted inter alia on behalf of the appellants that the entire
trial was vitiated because the Trial Court had recorded statements of as many
as twelve witnesses without ensuring presence of the appellants in Court.
Relying on Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’,
for short), it was submitted that the procedure adopted by the Trial Court of
recording statements of the witnesses, without ensuring the presence of the
appellants, amounted to an incurable illegality and as such the trial ought to be
declared to be vitiated and the appellants be acquitted of the charges levelled
against them. While opposing these submissions, the Prosecutor contended
that not only did the Advocate for the appellants conduct extensive crossexamination
of the witnesses but no objection was raised at any time during
such cross examination. Further, no plea was raised before the Trial Court
during final arguments that the appellants were, in any way, prejudiced on
account of their absence in the proceedings.
8. The High Court observed that despite “pertinent objection of the
defence counsel (albeit raised at the initial stages)”, the Trial Court had
proceeded to record the statements of twelve witnesses in the absence of the
appellants. In the light of the facts on record, the question which arose for
consideration was then framed by the High Court as under:-
“… …the significant question which arises for the
Court’s consideration is as to whether, the entire trial
should be declared vitiated; or that the matter should
be remanded to the trial court for recording the
statements of these witnesses afresh by exercising
powers under Section 391 Cr.P.C. or that the
impugned judgment should be set aside and the denovo
trial directed by exercising powers under Section
386(b) Cr.P.C.”
9. After hearing both sides, the High Court considered cases of State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhooraji1, Pandit Ukha Kolhe vs. The State of
Maharashtra2 and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and
Anr3. The High Court then concluded:-
“In the case of Pandit Ukha Kolhe, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by majority view held that the
prosecution should be given opportunity to lead
1 (2001) 7 SCC 679
2 (1964) 1 SCR 926
3 (2009) 7 SCC 104
evidence on the matters indicated in the course of the
judgment; the accused be examined afresh under
Section 342 Cr.P.C. and the appeal be decided afresh.
Thus, in this case as well, the Supreme Court directed
that fresh evidence should be taken on matters of
significance even at the appellate stage.
Thus, none of the precedents cited by the defence
counsel lays down a straightjacket formula that a denovo
trial cannot be directed in any condition. As a
matter of fact, if any such view is taken, then the
scope and operation of Section 386(b) Cr.P.C. would
be rendered redundant.
In view of the discussion made hereinabove and
looking to the glaring facts of the case at hand, we feel
that in order to do complete justice to the accused as
well as to the victims, the entire case cannot be
thrown out by holding the proceedings to be vitiated
on account of the mistakes committed by the trial
Judge or the prison authorities concerned. A fresh
trial/de-novo has to be ordered by directing the trial
court to lawfully re-record statements of the witnesses
indicated above whose evidence was recorded in the
first round without ensuring presence of the accused
in the court.
During the course of arguments, Shri Moti Singh,
Advocate representing the appellants agreed that in
case, the matter is remanded for fresh trial, no
direction is required to be given to record the
statements of the remaining witnesses afresh because
when their testimony was recorded, the accused were
kept present in the course proceedings.”
10. The High Court, therefore, quashed and set aside the judgment dated
03.11.2017 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No.14/2014 and
directed as under:-
“… …It is hereby directed that trial court shall
summon and record the statements of the witnesses
P.W.1 Chandu Ram, P.W.2 Chandrakala, P.W.3
Surendra Singh, P.W.4 Dharam Pal, P.W.12 Vikrant
Sharma, P.W.13 Prahlad, P.W. 14 Ram Kumar, P.W.15
Sushila, P.W.17 Dr. Arun Tungariya, P.W. 18 Ram
Pratap, P.W.20 Sahab Singh and P.W.23 Ramesh
Kumar afresh after securing presence of the accused
in the court. Upon remand, the trial court shall
conduct the proceedings on a day to day basis and
shall, after recording the statements of the witnesses
afresh in the above terms, re-examine the accused
under Section 313 Cr.P.C.; provide them a
justifiable/proper opportunity of leading defence and
decide the case afresh and as per law within four
months from the date of receipt of copy of this
judgment.”
11. The decision of the High Court is presently under challenge.
Considering the nature of controversy involved and the questions raised in the
matter, this Court appointed Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate as
Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. In the meantime, as a result of the order
passed by the High Court, the Trial Court had proceeded with de novo trial as
directed and those twelve witnesses were re-examined. After hearing both
sides the matter was reserved for judgment. Therefore, on 07.03.2019 this
Court directed the Trial Court not to pronounce the judgment till further
orders. The matter was, thereafter, heard by this Court. Mr. Sanjay Hegde,
learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the appellants, Dr. Manish
Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the State and Mr.
Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae at the
request of the Court. After the oral submissions, the parties also filed their
written submissions.
12. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants
submitted:-
A) Section 273 of the Code opens with expression, “Except
as otherwise expressly provided… …” and the only exceptions
to the application of Section 273 are those expressly provided
i.e. in Sections 299 and 317 of the Code. Subject to these
exceptions, Section 273 Cr.P.C. is absolutely mandatory.
B) The right of an accused to watch the prosecution
witnesses deposing before a Court is a valuable right and
infringement of such a right is gravely prejudicial.
C) A re-trial wipes out from the record the earlier
proceedings and affords the Prosecutor an opportunity to rectify
the infirmities in the earlier proceedings. Therefore, it can be
ordered in very rare circumstances and certainly not to take
away the advantage ensuing to the accused.
D) In any case, no partial re-trial can be ordered.
13. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the State
submitted:-
A) The conclusion of the High Court that Section 273 is
mandatory was accepted by the State and no appeal was
preferred. Proceeding on such premise, the question was
whether the trial was vitiated or the error could be rectified.
Relying on Section 279 of the Code under which evidence has
to be given in a language understood by the accused and
infraction thereof was not found to be of such magnitude so as
to vitiate the proceedings4, he submitted that infraction of
Section 273 would also not vitiate the trial.
B) Sections 460 to 465 of the Code stipulate remedies with
respect to breaches of provisions of the Code and resultant
effect. Contravention of Section 273 is not considered to be
breach of such magnitude which ought to result in vitiation of
proceedings.
4 Shiv Narayan Kabira vs. State of Madras 1967 (1) SCR 138
C) Relying on articles from Harvard Law Review5 and
Columbia Law Review6 it was submitted that theory of
Harmless Error in criminal matters is firmly embedded in
criminal jurisprudence and error in the present matter is one
which comes within such category.
D) The contravention of Section 273 was remedied by the
order of re-trial so that there should not be any prejudice to the
accused. The order directing de novo examination of twelve
witnesses and re-trial to that extent was just and proper.
14. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate and Amicus Curiae relied
upon decisions of this Court in State of Maharashtra and another vs.
Praful B. Desai7, Sakshi and others vs. Union of India8, Mahendra
Chawla vs. Union of India9 and various provisions of the Code to submit:-
A) The provisions of Section 273 are mandatory in nature only
to the extent that the evidence taken in the course of the trial
ought to be in the presence of the accused or when his personal
5 Harvard Law Review Vol. 131:2117
6 Columbia Law Review Online – Vol.118 October 4, 2018 Pages 118-34
7 (2003) 4 SCC 601
8 (2004) 5 SCC 518
9 (2018) 15 SCALE 497
attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader; and
that the physical presence of the accused is not mandatory.
B) Elaborating further, it was submitted that non-compliance of
the provisions of Section 273 is not an irregularity which would
vitiate the criminal trial completely, as the irregularity was
curable.
C) Under Sections 366 to 371 of the Code dealing with
“Submission of Death Sentences for Confirmation” and
Sections 372 to 394 dealing with “Appeals”, the High Court
was empowered to direct re-trial and record additional evidence
or direct further enquiry.
D) The provisions of Chapter XXVIII dealing with Death
References are wider/larger in import as compared to the
powers under Chapter XXIX dealing with appeals and the view
taken by the High Court was supported more strongly by the
provisions of Chapter XXVIII of the Code.
E) The criminal jurisprudence also recognizes rights of
victims in a criminal trial. In the present case, four male
members of the family were killed, and the view taken by the
High Court was an extremely balanced view which ensured that
there was no failure or miscarriage of justice for the victims as
well as the accused.
15. The cases cited by the learned Amicus Curiae dealt with issues
whether recording of evidence by video conferencing satisfied the mandate
of Section 273 of the Code.
A) In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai10 it was observed:
“9. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents, that
the procedure governing a criminal trial is crucial to
the basic right of the accused under Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the
procedure for trial of a criminal case is expressly laid
down, in India, in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It
was submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure
lays down specific and express provisions governing
the procedure to be followed in a criminal trial. It was
submitted that the procedure laid down in the Code of
Criminal Procedure was the “procedure established by
law”. It was submitted that the legislature alone had
the power to change the procedure by enacting a law
amending it, and that when the procedure was so
changed, that became “the procedure established by
law”. It was submitted that any departure from the
procedure laid down by law would be contrary to
Article 21. In support of this submission reliance was
placed on the cases of A.K. Gopalan v. State of
Madras11, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor12 and Siva
Kumar Chadda v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi13. There
10 (2003) 4 SCC 601
11 AIR 1950 SC 27
12 AIR 1936 PC 253 (2): 37 Cri LJ 897
13 AIR 1995 SC 915 (sic)
can be no dispute with these propositions. However, if
the existing provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code permit recording of evidence by videoconferencing
then it could not be said that “procedure
established by law” has not been followed.
20. Recording of evidence by video-conferencing also
satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that
evidence be recorded in the presence of the accused.
The accused and his pleader can see the witness as
clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before
them. In fact the accused may be able to see the
witness better than he may have been able to if he was
sitting in the dock in a crowded courtroom. They can
observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to
playback would enable better observation of
demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition
of the witness. The accused would be able to instruct
his pleader immediately and thus cross-examination of
the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of
playback would give an added advantage whilst crossexamining
the witness. The witness can be confronted
with documents or other material or statement in the
same manner as if he/she was in court. All these
objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded
by video-conferencing. Thus no prejudice, of
whatsoever nature, is caused to the accused. Of
course, as set out hereinafter, evidence by videoconferencing
has to be on some conditions.”
B) In Sakshi vs. Union of India14 the observations of this Court
were:-
“27. The other aspect which has been
highlighted and needs consideration relates to
providing protection to a victim of sexual abuse at the
time of recording his statement in court. The main
14 (2004) 5 SCC 518
suggestions made by the petitioner are for
incorporating special provisions in child sexual abuse
cases to the following effect:
(i) Permitting use of a videotaped interview of
the child’s statement by the judge (in the presence of a
child-support person).
(ii) Allow a child to testify via closed-circuit
television or from behind a screen to obtain a full and
candid account of the acts complained of.
(iii) The cross-examination of a minor should only be
carried out by the judge based on written questions
submitted by the defence upon perusal of the testimony
of the minor.
(iv) Whenever a child is required to give testimony,
sufficient breaks should be given as and when required
by the child.
C) Recently in Mahender Chawla and Ors. vs. Union of India
(UOI) and Ors.15, this Court stated:-
“29. As pointed out above, in Sakshi's case, the
Court had insisted about the need to come up with a
legislation for the protection of witnesses. It had even
requested the Law Commission to examine certain aspects,
which resulted to 172nd review of rape laws by the Law
Commission. However, the Court specifically rejected the
suggestion of the Law Commission regarding examination
of vulnerable witnesses in the absence of Accused. Having
regard to the provisions of Section 273 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which is based on the tenets of
principle of natural justice, that the witness must be
examined in the presence of the Accused, such a principle
cannot be sacrificed in trials and in inquiries regarding
sexual offences. In such a scenario examination of these
witnesses through video conferencing provides the
solution which balances the interest of the Accused as well
as vulnerable witnesses.”
15 2018 (15) SCALE 497
30. We will briefly refer to the statutory provisions
governing the situation. Section 273 Cr.P.C. lays down
that:
“273. Except as otherwise expressly provided,
all evidence taken in the course of the trial or other
proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the
accused, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed
with, in the presence of his pleader.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 327 CrPC lays down
that any criminal court enquiring into or trying any
offence shall be deemed to be open court, to which the
public generally may have access, so far as the same
can conveniently contain them. Sub-section (2) of the
same section says that:
“327. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1) the inquiry into and trial of rape or an
offence under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section
376-B, Section 376-C or Section 376-D of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be conducted incamera.”
Under the proviso to this sub-section
“the Presiding Judge may, if he thinks fit, or on
an application made by either of the parties, allow any
particular person to have access to, or be or remain in,
the room or building used by the court”.
It is rather surprising that the legislature while
incorporating sub-section (2) to Section 327 by
amending Act 43 of 1983 failed to take note of
offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC and omitted
to mention the aforesaid provisions. Deposition of the
victims of offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC
can at times be very embarrassing to them.
31. The whole inquiry before a court being to
elicit the truth, it is absolutely necessary that the
victim or the witnesses are able to depose about the
entire incident in a free atmosphere without any
embarrassment. Section 273 CrPC merely requires the
evidence to be taken in the presence of the accused.
The section, however, does not say that the evidence
should be recorded in such a manner that the accused
should have full view of the victim or the witnesses.
Recording of evidence by way of video-conferencing
vis-à-vis Section 273 CrPC has been held to be
permissible in a recent decision of this Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai1. There is
major difference between substantive provisions
defining crimes and providing punishment for the
same and procedural enactment laying down the
procedure of trial of such offences. Rules of procedure
are handmaiden of justice and are meant to advance
and not to obstruct the cause of justice. It is, therefore,
permissible for the court to expand or enlarge the
meanings of such provisions in order to elicit the truth
and do justice with the parties.”
16. We must also note certain observations of this Court in Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur vs State of Maharashtra3 on which Mr. Hegde, learned
Senior Advocate placed heavy reliance.
18. The right of an accused to watch the
prosecution witnesses deposing before a court of law
indisputably is a valuable right. The Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution explicitly provides
therefor, which reads as under:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.”
We may, however, notice that such a right has not yet
been accepted as a fundamental right within the
meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by
the Indian courts. In the absence of such an express
provision in our constitution, we have to proceed on a
premise that such a right is only a statutory one.
22. We may, however, notice that even in the
United States of America, the accused’s right under
the Sixth Amendment is not absolute. The right of
confrontment of an accused is subject to just
exceptions, including an orderly behaviour in the
courtroom. In case of disruptive behaviour an accused
can be asked to go outside the courtroom so long he
does not undertake to behave in an orderly manner. It
was so held in Illinois v. Allen16.
17. Shri Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Advocate also relied upon the
statutory exceptions to the ambit of Section 273 of the Code. We may
therefore consider the provisions of Section 273, 299 and 317 of the Code at
the outset. Said provisions are:-
“273. Evidence to be taken in presence of accused.
– Except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence
taken in the course of the trial or other proceeding
shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or, when
his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the
presence of his pleader:
[Provided that where the evidence of a woman below
the age of eighteen years who is alleged to have been
16 397 US 337 (1970)
subjected to rape or any other sexual offence, is to be
recorded, the court may take appropriate measures to
ensure that such woman is not confronted by the
accused while at the same time ensuring the right of
cross-examination of the accused.]
299. Record of evidence in absence of accused – (1)
If it is proved that an accused person has absconded,
and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting
him, the Court competent to try 1[, or commit for trial]
such person for the offence complained of may, in his
absence, examine the witnesses (if any) produced on
behalf of the prosecution, and record their depositions
and any such deposition may, on the arrest of such
person, be given in evidence against him on the
inquiry into, or trial for, the offence with which he is
charged, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving
evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be
procured without an amount of delay, expenses or
inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the
case, would be unreasonable.
(2) If it appears that an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life has been committed by some
person or persons unknown, the High Court or the
Sessions Judge may direct that any Magistrate of the
first class shall hold an inquiry and examine any
witnesses who can give evidence concerning the
offence and any depositions so taken may be given in
evidence against any person who is subsequently
accused of the offence, if the deponent is dead or
incapable of giving evidence or beyond the limits of
India.”
317. Provision for inquiries and trial being held in
the absence of accused in certain cases. – (1) At any
stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the
Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be
recorded that the personal attendance of the accused
before the Court is not necessary in the interests of
justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the
proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if
the accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with
his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial
in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of
the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such
accused.
(2) If the accused in any such case is not represented
by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers
his personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks
fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either
adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of
such accused be taken up or tried separately.”
18. Section 273 opens with the expression “Except as otherwise expressly
provided…” By its very nature, the exceptions to the application of Section
273 must be those which are expressly provided in the Code. Shri Hegde is
right in his submission in that behalf. Sections 299 and 317 are such express
exceptions provided in the Code. In the circumstances mentioned in said
Sections 299 and 317, the contents of which need no further elaboration, the
Courts would be justified in recording evidence in the absence of the
accused. Under its latter part, Section 273 also provides for a situation in
which evidence could be recorded in the absence of the accused, when it
says “when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his
pleader”. There was a debate during the course of hearing in the present
matter whether such dispensation by the Court has to be express or could it
be implied from the circumstances. We need not go into these questions as
the record clearly indicates that an objection was raised by the Advocate
appearing for the appellants right at the initial stage that the evidence was
being recorded without ensuring the presence of the appellants in Court.
There was neither any willingness on the part of the appellants nor any order
or direction by the trial Court that the evidence be recorded in the absence of
the appellants. The matter, therefore, would not come within the scope of
the latter part of Section 273 and it cannot be said that there was any
dispensation as contemplated by the said Section. We will, therefore,
proceed on the footing that there was no dispensation and yet the evidence
was recorded without ensuring the presence of the accused. The High Court
was, therefore, absolutely right in concluding that Section 273 stood violated
in the present matter and that there was an infringement of the salutary
principle under Section 273. The submissions advanced by Shri Sanjay
Hegde, learned Senior Advocate, relying upon paragraphs in Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and others17 as quoted above,
that the right of the accused to watch the prosecution witness is a valuable
right, also need not detain us. We accept that such a right is a valuable one
and there was an infringement in the present case. What is material to
17 (2009) 7 SCC 104
consider is the effect of such infringement? Would it vitiate the trial or such
an infringement is a curable one?
19. The emphasis was laid by Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior
Advocate for the State on the articles relied upon by him to submit that the
theory of “harmless error” which has been recognized in criminal
jurisprudence and that there must be a remedial approach. Again, we need
not go into these broader concepts as the provisions of the Code, in our
considered view, are clearly indicative and lay down with clarity as to which
infringements per se, would result in vitiation of proceedings. Chapter
XXXV of the Code deals with “Irregular Proceedings”, and Section 461
stipulates certain infringements or irregularities which vitiate proceedings.
Barring those stipulated in Section 461, the thrust of the Chapter is that any
infringement or irregularity would not vitiate the proceedings unless, as a
result of such infringement or irregularity, great prejudice had occasioned to
the accused. Shri Hegde, learned Senior Advocate was quick to rely on the
passages in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur10 to submit that the prejudice in such
cases would be inherent or per se. Paragraphs 57 and 58 of said decision
were as under:-
“57. Mr. Naphade would submit that the appellant did
not suffer any prejudice. We do not agree.
Infringement of such a valuable right itself causes
prejudice. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan18 this Court
clearly held: (SCC p. 395, para 24)
“24. … In our view the principles of natural justice
know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it
would have made any difference if natural justice had
been observed. The non-observance of natural justice
is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice
independently of proof of denial of natural justice is
unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has
denied justice that the person who has been denied
justice is not prejudiced.”
58. In A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak19 a seven-Judge
Bench of this Court has also held that when an order
has been passed in violation of a fundamental right or
in breach of the principles of natural justice, the same
would be a nullity. (See also State of Haryana vs.
State of Punjab20 and Rajasthan SRTC vs. Zakir
Hussain21.”
20. The aforementioned observations in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur10 must
be read in the peculiar factual context of the matter. The accused Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur was tried in respect of certain offences in a Court in Delhi
and at the same time he was also an accused in a trial under the provisions of
TADA Act22 in a Court in Pune. The trial in the Court in Pune proceeded on
18 (1980) 4 SCC 379
19 (1988) 2 SCC 602
20 (2004) 12 SCC 673
21 (2005) 7 SCC 447
22 Terrorists and Anti Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
the basis that Jayendra Vishnu Thakur was an absconding accused. The
evidence was thus led in the trial in Pune in his absence when he was not
sent up for trial, at the end of which all the accused were acquitted.
However, in an appeal arising therefrom, this Court convicted some of the
accused for offences with which they were tried. In the meantime, Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur was convicted by the Court in Delhi and was undergoing
sentence imposed upon him. Later, he was produced before the Court in
Pune with a supplementary charge-sheet and charges were framed against
him along with certain other accused. A request was made by the Public
Prosecutor that the evidence of some of the witnesses, which was led in the
earlier trial be read in evidence in the fresh trial against Jayendra Vishnu
Thakur as those witnesses were either dead or not available to be
examined23. The request was allowed which order of the Court in Pune was
under challenge before this Court. It was found by this Court that the basic
premise for application of Section 299 of the Code was completely absent.
The Accused had not absconded. He was very much in confinement and
could have been produced in the earlier trial before the Court in Pune. Since
the requirements of Section 299 were not satisfied, the evidence led on the
earlier occasion could not be taken as evidence in the subsequent
23 Paras 8 & 9 of Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra (supra)
proceedings. The witnesses were not alive and could not be re-examined in
the fresh trial nor could there be cross-examination on behalf of the accused.
If the evidence in the earlier trial was to be read in the subsequent trial, the
accused would be denied the opportunity of cross-examination of the
concerned witnesses. Thus, the prejudice was inherent. It is in this factual
context that the observations of this Court have to be considered. Same is
not the situation in the present matter. It is not the direction of the High
Court to read the entire evidence on the earlier occasion as evidence in the
de novo trial. The direction is to re-examine those witnesses who were not
examined in the presence of the appellants. The direction now ensures the
presence of the appellants in the Court, so that they have every opportunity
to watch the witnesses deposing in the trial and cross-examine said
witnesses. Since these basic requirements would be scrupulously observed
and complied with, there is no prejudice at all.
21. The learned Amicus Curiae was right in relying upon the provisions of
Chapter XXVIII (Sections 366 to 371 of The Code) and Chapter XXIX
(Sections 372 to 394 of The Code). He was also right in saying that the
Chapter XXVIII was more relevant in the present matter and the judgment of
the High Court was supported more strongly by provisions of Chapter
XXVIII. The provisions of Sections 366 to 368 and Sections 386 and 391
are quoted here for ready reference:-
“366. Sentence of death to be submitted by Court
of Session for confirmation – (1) When the Court of
Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings
shall be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence
shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the
High Court.
(2) The Court passing the sentence shall commit the
convicted person to jail custody under a warrant.
367. Power to direct further inquiry to be made or
additional evidence to be taken – (1) If, when such
proceedings are submitted, the High Court thinks that
a further inquiry should be made into or additional
evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt
or innocence of the convicted person, it may make
such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to
be made or taken by the Court of Session.
(2) Unless the High Court otherwise directs, the
presence of the convicted person may be dispensed
with when such inquiry is made or such evidence is
taken.
(3) When the inquiry or evidence (if any) is not made
or taken by the High Court the result of such inquiry
or evidence shall be certified to such Court.
368. Power of High Court to confirm sentence or
annual conviction – In any case submitted under
section 366, the High Court –
(a) may confirm the sentence, or pass any other
sentence warranted by law, or
(b) may annul the conviction, and convict the
accused of any offence of which the Court of
Session might have convicted him, or order of a
a new trial on the same or an amended charge, or
(c) may acquit the accused person:
Provided that no order of confirmation shall be
made under this section until the period allowed
for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an
appeal is presented within such period, until
such appeal is disposed of.
386. Powers of the Appellate Court. – After
perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his
pleader, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under
section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears,
the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or
may –
(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse
such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or
that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as
the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence
on him according to law;
(b) in an appeal from a conviction –
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or
discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a
Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such
Appellate Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the
nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the
sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;
(c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence –
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit
or discharge the accused or order him to be
re-tried by a Court competent to try the
offence, or
(ii) Alter the finding maintaining the sentence,
or
(iii) With or without altering the finding alter
the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or
reduce the same;
(d) in an appeal from any other order alter or reverse
such order;
(e) Make any amendment or any consequential or
incidental order that may be just or proper:
Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced
unless the accused has had an opportunity of
showing cause against such enhancement:
Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not
inflict greater punishment for the offence which is
in its opinion the accused has committed, than
might have been inflicted for that offence by the
Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.
391. Appellate Court may take further evidence or
direct it to be taken – (1) In dealing with any appeal
under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks
additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its
reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or
direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the
Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of
Session or a Magistrate.
(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the
Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall
certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such
Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the
appeal.
(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to
be present when the additional evidence is taken.
(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be
subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it
were an inquiry.”
22. According to Section 366 when a Court of Sessions passes a sentence
of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the High Court and the
sentence of death is not to be executed unless it is confirmed by the High
Court. Section 367 then proceeds to lay down the power of the High Court
to direct further enquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken.
Section 368, thereafter, lays down the power of the High Court to confirm
the sentence so imposed or annul the conviction. One of the powers which
the High Court can exercise is one under Section 368 (c) of the Code and
that is to “acquit the accused person”. Pertinently, the power to acquit the
person can be exercised by the High Court even without there being any
substantive appeal on the part of the accused challenging his conviction. To
that extent the proceedings under Chapter XXVIII which deals with
“submission of death sentences for confirmation” is a proceeding in
continuation of the trial. These provisions thus entitle the High Court to
direct further enquiry or to take additional evidence and the High Court may,
in a given case, even acquit the accused person. The scope of the chapter is
wider. Chapter XXIX of the Code deals with “Appeals”. Section 391 also
entitles the Appellate Court to take further evidence or direct such further
evidence to be taken. Section 386 then enumerates powers of the Appellate
Court which inter alia includes the power to “reverse the finding and
sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a
Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or
committed for trial”. The powers of Appellate Court are equally wide. The
High Court in the present case was exercising powers both under Chapters
XXVIII and XXIX of the Code. If the power can go to the extent of
ordering a complete re-trial, the exercise of power to a lesser extent namely
ordering de novo examination of twelve witnesses with further directions as
the High Court has imposed in the present matter, was certainly within the
powers of the High Court. There is, thus, no infraction or jurisdictional error
on the part of the High Court.
23. It is true that as consistently laid down by this Court, an order of
retrial of a criminal case is not to be taken resort to easily and must be made
in exceptional cases. For example, it was observed by this Court in Pandit
Ukha Kolhe vs State of Maharashtra2, as under:-
“15. An order for retrial of a criminal case is made in
exceptional cases, and not unless the appellate Court
is satisfied that the Court trying the proceeding had no
jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by
serious illegalities or irregularities or on account of
misconception of the nature of the proceedings and on
that account in substance there had been no real trial
or that the Prosecutor or an accused was, for reasons
over which he had no control, prevented from leading
or tendering evidence material to the charge, and in
the interests of justice the appellate Court deems it
appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the
case, that the accused should be put on his trial again.
An order of re-trial wipes out from the record the
earlier proceeding, and exposes the person accused to
another trial which affords the prosecutor an
opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the
earlier trial, and will not ordinarily be countenanced
when it is made merely to enable the prosecutor to
lead evidence which he could but has not cared to lead
either on account of insufficient appreciation of the
nature of the case or for other reasons. Harries, C.J., in
Ramanlal Rathi v. The State24
"If at the end of a criminal prosecution the
evidence leaves the Court in doubt as to the guilt of
the accused the latter is entitled to a verdict of not
guilty. A retrial may be ordered when the original trial
has not been satisfactory for particular reasons, for
example, if evidence had been wrongly rejected which
should have been admitted, or admitted when it
should have been rejected, or the Court had refused to
hear certain witness who should have been heard. But
retrial cannot be ordered on the ground that the
prosecution did not produce the proper evidence and
did not know how to prove their case."
24. The order passed by the High Court in the present matter was not to
enable the Prosecutor to rectify the defects or infirmities in the evidence or
to enable him to lead evidence which he had not cared to lead on the earlier
24 AIR (1951) Cal.305
occasion. The evidence in the form of testimony of those twelve witnesses
was led and those witnesses were cross-examined. There was no infirmity
except the one that the evidence was not led in the presence of the
appellants. The remedy proposed was only to rectify such infirmity, and not
to enable the Prosecutor to rectify defects in the evidence.
25. We must also consider the matter from the stand point and perspective
of the victims as suggested by the learned Amicus Curiae. Four persons of a
family were done to death. It is certainly in the societal interest that the
guilty must be punished and at the same time the procedural requirements
which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered to. If there was an infraction,
which otherwise does not vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to
remedy the situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the
accused as well as societal interest are adequately safeguarded. The very
same witnesses were directed to be de novo examined which would ensure
that the interest of the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the
accused will have every right and opportunity to watch the witnesses
deposing against them, watch their demeanor and instruct their counsel
properly so that said witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the
process, the interest of the accused would also stand protected. On the other
hand, if we were to accept the submission that the proceedings stood vitiated
and, therefore, the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination
of the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage of justice.
The persons who are accused of committing four murders would not
effectively be tried. The evidence against them would not be read for a
technical infraction resulting in great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order
and directions passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair
procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses, after due
distillation from their cross-examination can be read in evidence.
26. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order passed and the
directions issued by the High Court in the present matter. We affirm the
view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals. The restraint which
we had placed on the Trial Court not to pronounce the judgment hereby
stands vacated. The Trial Court is now free to take the matter to its logical
conclusion. Let a copy of this Order be immediately transmitted to the
concerned Trial Court.
27. We must say that we have not, and shall not be taken to have
expressed any opinion on the merits or demerits of the case of the
prosecution, and the matter shall be gone into on its own merits at every
stage of the proceedings.
28. In the end, we must express our appreciation and gratitude to the
learned Amicus Curiae for rendering very effective and able assistance in the
matter. We are indeed grateful to him.
………..…..……..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
..………….……………J.
(Indu Malhotra)
New Delhi,
April 11, 2019
Print Page
enable the Prosecutor to rectify the defects or infirmities in the evidence or
to enable him to lead evidence which he had not cared to lead on the earlier occasion. The evidence in the form of testimony of those twelve witnesses
was led and those witnesses were cross-examined. There was no infirmity
except the one that the evidence was not led in the presence of the
appellants. The remedy proposed was only to rectify such infirmity, and not
to enable the Prosecutor to rectify defects in the evidence.
25. We must also consider the matter from the stand point and perspective
of the victims as suggested by the learned Amicus Curiae. Four persons of a
family were done to death. It is certainly in the societal interest that the
guilty must be punished and at the same time the procedural requirements
which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered to. If there was an infraction,
which otherwise does not vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to
remedy the situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the
accused as well as societal interest are adequately safeguarded. The very
same witnesses were directed to be de novo examined which would ensure
that the interest of the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the
accused will have every right and opportunity to watch the witnesses
deposing against them, watch their demeanor and instruct their counsel
properly so that said witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the
process, the interest of the accused would also stand protected. On the other
hand, if we were to accept the submission that the proceedings stood vitiated
and, therefore, the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination
of the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage of justice.
The persons who are accused of committing four murders would not
effectively be tried. The evidence against them would not be read for a
technical infraction resulting in great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order
and directions passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair
procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses, after due
distillation from their cross-examination can be read in evidence.
26. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order passed and the
directions issued by the High Court in the present matter. We affirm the
view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.656-657 OF 2019
ATMA RAM Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Dated:April 11, 2019.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals challenge the decision dated 03.12.2018 passed by the
High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Death
Reference No.2 of 2017 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018.
3. FIR No.493 was registered with Police Station Bhadara, District
Hanumangarh on 13.10.2013 in respect of offences punishable under Sections
302, 307, 452, 447, 323, 147, 148 and 149 IPC pursuant to reporting by one
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 2
Kailash. It was stated that seven named persons including present four
appellants and some other unknown persons had come to the agricultural field
of the informant while harvesting operations were going on and had opened
an assault. As a result, father of the informant named Bhanwarlal and brother
of the informant named Pankaj died on the spot while the informant suffered
injuries. It was further alleged that the same assembly, thereafter, went to the
village and assaulted inmates of the house in which his grandfather named
Momanram died. Later, the informant Kailash also succumbed to his injuries.
4. After due investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants
namely Atmaram, Omprakash, Leeladhar and Shravan Kumar while others
were reported to be absconding. The trial was conducted in the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Bhadara, District Hanumangarh. It appears that at
the stage of recording of evidence, the appellants who were then in judicial
custody were not produced in court. The order dated 28.10.2014 passed by
the Trial Court recorded the objection of the Advocate for the appellants. The
examination-in-chief of PW1-Chanduram and PW2-Chandrakala was
undertaken without the appellants being present in Court and the crossexamination
was deferred. The order recorded:-
“In Evidence PW1 Chanduram & PW2
Chandrakala, Chief Examination was recorded.
Advocate for accused sought time for Cross
Examination. Therefore, statements of witnesses were
kept reserved. Witnesses PW1 & PW2 are to be
present for Cross Examination on 28.11.2014 and
Witness no. 12, 13 and 143 are to be issued summons
to remain present on 29.11.2014. For recording
evidence be present on 28.11.2014, till then Judicial
Custody of Accused Atmaram, Om Prakash,
Leeladhar and Shravan is extended.”
5. Similarly, following 10 witnesses were also examined in Court on
dates mentioned against their names, without ensuring the presence of the
appellants in Court.
PW3 Surendra Singh 13.2.2015
PW4 Dharam Pal 13.2.2015
PW 12 Vikrant Sharma 13.8.2015
PW 13 Prahlad 3.9.2015
PW 14 Ram Kumar 9.10.2015
PW 15 Sushila 9.10.2015, 5.11.2015
PW 17 Dr. Arun Tungariya 8.3.2016
PW 18 Ram Pratap 12.5.2016, 20.6.2016, 14.2.2017
PW 20 Sahab Singh 22.11.2016
PW 23 Ramesh Kumar 14.2.2017
6. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 03.11.2017 found that
the prosecution had proved the case against the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt and convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections
147, 148, 452, 447, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 323 read with
Section 149 IPC. The matter was then heard on sentence. After hearing the
Public Prosecutor and Advocates for the complainant, as well as the
appellants, the Trial Court imposed death sentence upon the appellants,
subject to confirmation by the High Court. Consequently, the matter stood
referred to the High Court in D.B. Criminal Death Reference No.2 of 2017.
The appellants also filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018, which was
heard along with the Death Reference case.
7. It was submitted inter alia on behalf of the appellants that the entire
trial was vitiated because the Trial Court had recorded statements of as many
as twelve witnesses without ensuring presence of the appellants in Court.
Relying on Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’,
for short), it was submitted that the procedure adopted by the Trial Court of
recording statements of the witnesses, without ensuring the presence of the
appellants, amounted to an incurable illegality and as such the trial ought to be
declared to be vitiated and the appellants be acquitted of the charges levelled
against them. While opposing these submissions, the Prosecutor contended
that not only did the Advocate for the appellants conduct extensive crossexamination
of the witnesses but no objection was raised at any time during
such cross examination. Further, no plea was raised before the Trial Court
during final arguments that the appellants were, in any way, prejudiced on
account of their absence in the proceedings.
8. The High Court observed that despite “pertinent objection of the
defence counsel (albeit raised at the initial stages)”, the Trial Court had
proceeded to record the statements of twelve witnesses in the absence of the
appellants. In the light of the facts on record, the question which arose for
consideration was then framed by the High Court as under:-
“… …the significant question which arises for the
Court’s consideration is as to whether, the entire trial
should be declared vitiated; or that the matter should
be remanded to the trial court for recording the
statements of these witnesses afresh by exercising
powers under Section 391 Cr.P.C. or that the
impugned judgment should be set aside and the denovo
trial directed by exercising powers under Section
386(b) Cr.P.C.”
9. After hearing both sides, the High Court considered cases of State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhooraji1, Pandit Ukha Kolhe vs. The State of
Maharashtra2 and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and
Anr3. The High Court then concluded:-
“In the case of Pandit Ukha Kolhe, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by majority view held that the
prosecution should be given opportunity to lead
1 (2001) 7 SCC 679
2 (1964) 1 SCR 926
3 (2009) 7 SCC 104
evidence on the matters indicated in the course of the
judgment; the accused be examined afresh under
Section 342 Cr.P.C. and the appeal be decided afresh.
Thus, in this case as well, the Supreme Court directed
that fresh evidence should be taken on matters of
significance even at the appellate stage.
Thus, none of the precedents cited by the defence
counsel lays down a straightjacket formula that a denovo
trial cannot be directed in any condition. As a
matter of fact, if any such view is taken, then the
scope and operation of Section 386(b) Cr.P.C. would
be rendered redundant.
In view of the discussion made hereinabove and
looking to the glaring facts of the case at hand, we feel
that in order to do complete justice to the accused as
well as to the victims, the entire case cannot be
thrown out by holding the proceedings to be vitiated
on account of the mistakes committed by the trial
Judge or the prison authorities concerned. A fresh
trial/de-novo has to be ordered by directing the trial
court to lawfully re-record statements of the witnesses
indicated above whose evidence was recorded in the
first round without ensuring presence of the accused
in the court.
During the course of arguments, Shri Moti Singh,
Advocate representing the appellants agreed that in
case, the matter is remanded for fresh trial, no
direction is required to be given to record the
statements of the remaining witnesses afresh because
when their testimony was recorded, the accused were
kept present in the course proceedings.”
10. The High Court, therefore, quashed and set aside the judgment dated
03.11.2017 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No.14/2014 and
directed as under:-
“… …It is hereby directed that trial court shall
summon and record the statements of the witnesses
P.W.1 Chandu Ram, P.W.2 Chandrakala, P.W.3
Surendra Singh, P.W.4 Dharam Pal, P.W.12 Vikrant
Sharma, P.W.13 Prahlad, P.W. 14 Ram Kumar, P.W.15
Sushila, P.W.17 Dr. Arun Tungariya, P.W. 18 Ram
Pratap, P.W.20 Sahab Singh and P.W.23 Ramesh
Kumar afresh after securing presence of the accused
in the court. Upon remand, the trial court shall
conduct the proceedings on a day to day basis and
shall, after recording the statements of the witnesses
afresh in the above terms, re-examine the accused
under Section 313 Cr.P.C.; provide them a
justifiable/proper opportunity of leading defence and
decide the case afresh and as per law within four
months from the date of receipt of copy of this
judgment.”
11. The decision of the High Court is presently under challenge.
Considering the nature of controversy involved and the questions raised in the
matter, this Court appointed Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate as
Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. In the meantime, as a result of the order
passed by the High Court, the Trial Court had proceeded with de novo trial as
directed and those twelve witnesses were re-examined. After hearing both
sides the matter was reserved for judgment. Therefore, on 07.03.2019 this
Court directed the Trial Court not to pronounce the judgment till further
orders. The matter was, thereafter, heard by this Court. Mr. Sanjay Hegde,
learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the appellants, Dr. Manish
Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the State and Mr.
Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae at the
request of the Court. After the oral submissions, the parties also filed their
written submissions.
12. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants
submitted:-
A) Section 273 of the Code opens with expression, “Except
as otherwise expressly provided… …” and the only exceptions
to the application of Section 273 are those expressly provided
i.e. in Sections 299 and 317 of the Code. Subject to these
exceptions, Section 273 Cr.P.C. is absolutely mandatory.
B) The right of an accused to watch the prosecution
witnesses deposing before a Court is a valuable right and
infringement of such a right is gravely prejudicial.
C) A re-trial wipes out from the record the earlier
proceedings and affords the Prosecutor an opportunity to rectify
the infirmities in the earlier proceedings. Therefore, it can be
ordered in very rare circumstances and certainly not to take
away the advantage ensuing to the accused.
D) In any case, no partial re-trial can be ordered.
13. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the State
submitted:-
A) The conclusion of the High Court that Section 273 is
mandatory was accepted by the State and no appeal was
preferred. Proceeding on such premise, the question was
whether the trial was vitiated or the error could be rectified.
Relying on Section 279 of the Code under which evidence has
to be given in a language understood by the accused and
infraction thereof was not found to be of such magnitude so as
to vitiate the proceedings4, he submitted that infraction of
Section 273 would also not vitiate the trial.
B) Sections 460 to 465 of the Code stipulate remedies with
respect to breaches of provisions of the Code and resultant
effect. Contravention of Section 273 is not considered to be
breach of such magnitude which ought to result in vitiation of
proceedings.
4 Shiv Narayan Kabira vs. State of Madras 1967 (1) SCR 138
C) Relying on articles from Harvard Law Review5 and
Columbia Law Review6 it was submitted that theory of
Harmless Error in criminal matters is firmly embedded in
criminal jurisprudence and error in the present matter is one
which comes within such category.
D) The contravention of Section 273 was remedied by the
order of re-trial so that there should not be any prejudice to the
accused. The order directing de novo examination of twelve
witnesses and re-trial to that extent was just and proper.
14. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate and Amicus Curiae relied
upon decisions of this Court in State of Maharashtra and another vs.
Praful B. Desai7, Sakshi and others vs. Union of India8, Mahendra
Chawla vs. Union of India9 and various provisions of the Code to submit:-
A) The provisions of Section 273 are mandatory in nature only
to the extent that the evidence taken in the course of the trial
ought to be in the presence of the accused or when his personal
5 Harvard Law Review Vol. 131:2117
6 Columbia Law Review Online – Vol.118 October 4, 2018 Pages 118-34
7 (2003) 4 SCC 601
8 (2004) 5 SCC 518
9 (2018) 15 SCALE 497
attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader; and
that the physical presence of the accused is not mandatory.
B) Elaborating further, it was submitted that non-compliance of
the provisions of Section 273 is not an irregularity which would
vitiate the criminal trial completely, as the irregularity was
curable.
C) Under Sections 366 to 371 of the Code dealing with
“Submission of Death Sentences for Confirmation” and
Sections 372 to 394 dealing with “Appeals”, the High Court
was empowered to direct re-trial and record additional evidence
or direct further enquiry.
D) The provisions of Chapter XXVIII dealing with Death
References are wider/larger in import as compared to the
powers under Chapter XXIX dealing with appeals and the view
taken by the High Court was supported more strongly by the
provisions of Chapter XXVIII of the Code.
E) The criminal jurisprudence also recognizes rights of
victims in a criminal trial. In the present case, four male
members of the family were killed, and the view taken by the
High Court was an extremely balanced view which ensured that
there was no failure or miscarriage of justice for the victims as
well as the accused.
15. The cases cited by the learned Amicus Curiae dealt with issues
whether recording of evidence by video conferencing satisfied the mandate
of Section 273 of the Code.
A) In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai10 it was observed:
“9. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents, that
the procedure governing a criminal trial is crucial to
the basic right of the accused under Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the
procedure for trial of a criminal case is expressly laid
down, in India, in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It
was submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure
lays down specific and express provisions governing
the procedure to be followed in a criminal trial. It was
submitted that the procedure laid down in the Code of
Criminal Procedure was the “procedure established by
law”. It was submitted that the legislature alone had
the power to change the procedure by enacting a law
amending it, and that when the procedure was so
changed, that became “the procedure established by
law”. It was submitted that any departure from the
procedure laid down by law would be contrary to
Article 21. In support of this submission reliance was
placed on the cases of A.K. Gopalan v. State of
Madras11, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor12 and Siva
Kumar Chadda v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi13. There
10 (2003) 4 SCC 601
11 AIR 1950 SC 27
12 AIR 1936 PC 253 (2): 37 Cri LJ 897
13 AIR 1995 SC 915 (sic)
can be no dispute with these propositions. However, if
the existing provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code permit recording of evidence by videoconferencing
then it could not be said that “procedure
established by law” has not been followed.
20. Recording of evidence by video-conferencing also
satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that
evidence be recorded in the presence of the accused.
The accused and his pleader can see the witness as
clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before
them. In fact the accused may be able to see the
witness better than he may have been able to if he was
sitting in the dock in a crowded courtroom. They can
observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to
playback would enable better observation of
demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition
of the witness. The accused would be able to instruct
his pleader immediately and thus cross-examination of
the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of
playback would give an added advantage whilst crossexamining
the witness. The witness can be confronted
with documents or other material or statement in the
same manner as if he/she was in court. All these
objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded
by video-conferencing. Thus no prejudice, of
whatsoever nature, is caused to the accused. Of
course, as set out hereinafter, evidence by videoconferencing
has to be on some conditions.”
B) In Sakshi vs. Union of India14 the observations of this Court
were:-
“27. The other aspect which has been
highlighted and needs consideration relates to
providing protection to a victim of sexual abuse at the
time of recording his statement in court. The main
14 (2004) 5 SCC 518
suggestions made by the petitioner are for
incorporating special provisions in child sexual abuse
cases to the following effect:
(i) Permitting use of a videotaped interview of
the child’s statement by the judge (in the presence of a
child-support person).
(ii) Allow a child to testify via closed-circuit
television or from behind a screen to obtain a full and
candid account of the acts complained of.
(iii) The cross-examination of a minor should only be
carried out by the judge based on written questions
submitted by the defence upon perusal of the testimony
of the minor.
(iv) Whenever a child is required to give testimony,
sufficient breaks should be given as and when required
by the child.
C) Recently in Mahender Chawla and Ors. vs. Union of India
(UOI) and Ors.15, this Court stated:-
“29. As pointed out above, in Sakshi's case, the
Court had insisted about the need to come up with a
legislation for the protection of witnesses. It had even
requested the Law Commission to examine certain aspects,
which resulted to 172nd review of rape laws by the Law
Commission. However, the Court specifically rejected the
suggestion of the Law Commission regarding examination
of vulnerable witnesses in the absence of Accused. Having
regard to the provisions of Section 273 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which is based on the tenets of
principle of natural justice, that the witness must be
examined in the presence of the Accused, such a principle
cannot be sacrificed in trials and in inquiries regarding
sexual offences. In such a scenario examination of these
witnesses through video conferencing provides the
solution which balances the interest of the Accused as well
as vulnerable witnesses.”
15 2018 (15) SCALE 497
30. We will briefly refer to the statutory provisions
governing the situation. Section 273 Cr.P.C. lays down
that:
“273. Except as otherwise expressly provided,
all evidence taken in the course of the trial or other
proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the
accused, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed
with, in the presence of his pleader.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 327 CrPC lays down
that any criminal court enquiring into or trying any
offence shall be deemed to be open court, to which the
public generally may have access, so far as the same
can conveniently contain them. Sub-section (2) of the
same section says that:
“327. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1) the inquiry into and trial of rape or an
offence under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section
376-B, Section 376-C or Section 376-D of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be conducted incamera.”
Under the proviso to this sub-section
“the Presiding Judge may, if he thinks fit, or on
an application made by either of the parties, allow any
particular person to have access to, or be or remain in,
the room or building used by the court”.
It is rather surprising that the legislature while
incorporating sub-section (2) to Section 327 by
amending Act 43 of 1983 failed to take note of
offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC and omitted
to mention the aforesaid provisions. Deposition of the
victims of offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC
can at times be very embarrassing to them.
31. The whole inquiry before a court being to
elicit the truth, it is absolutely necessary that the
victim or the witnesses are able to depose about the
entire incident in a free atmosphere without any
embarrassment. Section 273 CrPC merely requires the
evidence to be taken in the presence of the accused.
The section, however, does not say that the evidence
should be recorded in such a manner that the accused
should have full view of the victim or the witnesses.
Recording of evidence by way of video-conferencing
vis-à-vis Section 273 CrPC has been held to be
permissible in a recent decision of this Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai1. There is
major difference between substantive provisions
defining crimes and providing punishment for the
same and procedural enactment laying down the
procedure of trial of such offences. Rules of procedure
are handmaiden of justice and are meant to advance
and not to obstruct the cause of justice. It is, therefore,
permissible for the court to expand or enlarge the
meanings of such provisions in order to elicit the truth
and do justice with the parties.”
16. We must also note certain observations of this Court in Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur vs State of Maharashtra3 on which Mr. Hegde, learned
Senior Advocate placed heavy reliance.
18. The right of an accused to watch the
prosecution witnesses deposing before a court of law
indisputably is a valuable right. The Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution explicitly provides
therefor, which reads as under:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.”
We may, however, notice that such a right has not yet
been accepted as a fundamental right within the
meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by
the Indian courts. In the absence of such an express
provision in our constitution, we have to proceed on a
premise that such a right is only a statutory one.
22. We may, however, notice that even in the
United States of America, the accused’s right under
the Sixth Amendment is not absolute. The right of
confrontment of an accused is subject to just
exceptions, including an orderly behaviour in the
courtroom. In case of disruptive behaviour an accused
can be asked to go outside the courtroom so long he
does not undertake to behave in an orderly manner. It
was so held in Illinois v. Allen16.
17. Shri Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Advocate also relied upon the
statutory exceptions to the ambit of Section 273 of the Code. We may
therefore consider the provisions of Section 273, 299 and 317 of the Code at
the outset. Said provisions are:-
“273. Evidence to be taken in presence of accused.
– Except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence
taken in the course of the trial or other proceeding
shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or, when
his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the
presence of his pleader:
[Provided that where the evidence of a woman below
the age of eighteen years who is alleged to have been
16 397 US 337 (1970)
subjected to rape or any other sexual offence, is to be
recorded, the court may take appropriate measures to
ensure that such woman is not confronted by the
accused while at the same time ensuring the right of
cross-examination of the accused.]
299. Record of evidence in absence of accused – (1)
If it is proved that an accused person has absconded,
and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting
him, the Court competent to try 1[, or commit for trial]
such person for the offence complained of may, in his
absence, examine the witnesses (if any) produced on
behalf of the prosecution, and record their depositions
and any such deposition may, on the arrest of such
person, be given in evidence against him on the
inquiry into, or trial for, the offence with which he is
charged, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving
evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be
procured without an amount of delay, expenses or
inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the
case, would be unreasonable.
(2) If it appears that an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life has been committed by some
person or persons unknown, the High Court or the
Sessions Judge may direct that any Magistrate of the
first class shall hold an inquiry and examine any
witnesses who can give evidence concerning the
offence and any depositions so taken may be given in
evidence against any person who is subsequently
accused of the offence, if the deponent is dead or
incapable of giving evidence or beyond the limits of
India.”
317. Provision for inquiries and trial being held in
the absence of accused in certain cases. – (1) At any
stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the
Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be
recorded that the personal attendance of the accused
before the Court is not necessary in the interests of
justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the
proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if
the accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with
his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial
in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of
the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such
accused.
(2) If the accused in any such case is not represented
by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers
his personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks
fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either
adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of
such accused be taken up or tried separately.”
18. Section 273 opens with the expression “Except as otherwise expressly
provided…” By its very nature, the exceptions to the application of Section
273 must be those which are expressly provided in the Code. Shri Hegde is
right in his submission in that behalf. Sections 299 and 317 are such express
exceptions provided in the Code. In the circumstances mentioned in said
Sections 299 and 317, the contents of which need no further elaboration, the
Courts would be justified in recording evidence in the absence of the
accused. Under its latter part, Section 273 also provides for a situation in
which evidence could be recorded in the absence of the accused, when it
says “when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his
pleader”. There was a debate during the course of hearing in the present
matter whether such dispensation by the Court has to be express or could it
be implied from the circumstances. We need not go into these questions as
the record clearly indicates that an objection was raised by the Advocate
appearing for the appellants right at the initial stage that the evidence was
being recorded without ensuring the presence of the appellants in Court.
There was neither any willingness on the part of the appellants nor any order
or direction by the trial Court that the evidence be recorded in the absence of
the appellants. The matter, therefore, would not come within the scope of
the latter part of Section 273 and it cannot be said that there was any
dispensation as contemplated by the said Section. We will, therefore,
proceed on the footing that there was no dispensation and yet the evidence
was recorded without ensuring the presence of the accused. The High Court
was, therefore, absolutely right in concluding that Section 273 stood violated
in the present matter and that there was an infringement of the salutary
principle under Section 273. The submissions advanced by Shri Sanjay
Hegde, learned Senior Advocate, relying upon paragraphs in Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and others17 as quoted above,
that the right of the accused to watch the prosecution witness is a valuable
right, also need not detain us. We accept that such a right is a valuable one
and there was an infringement in the present case. What is material to
17 (2009) 7 SCC 104
consider is the effect of such infringement? Would it vitiate the trial or such
an infringement is a curable one?
19. The emphasis was laid by Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior
Advocate for the State on the articles relied upon by him to submit that the
theory of “harmless error” which has been recognized in criminal
jurisprudence and that there must be a remedial approach. Again, we need
not go into these broader concepts as the provisions of the Code, in our
considered view, are clearly indicative and lay down with clarity as to which
infringements per se, would result in vitiation of proceedings. Chapter
XXXV of the Code deals with “Irregular Proceedings”, and Section 461
stipulates certain infringements or irregularities which vitiate proceedings.
Barring those stipulated in Section 461, the thrust of the Chapter is that any
infringement or irregularity would not vitiate the proceedings unless, as a
result of such infringement or irregularity, great prejudice had occasioned to
the accused. Shri Hegde, learned Senior Advocate was quick to rely on the
passages in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur10 to submit that the prejudice in such
cases would be inherent or per se. Paragraphs 57 and 58 of said decision
were as under:-
“57. Mr. Naphade would submit that the appellant did
not suffer any prejudice. We do not agree.
Infringement of such a valuable right itself causes
prejudice. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan18 this Court
clearly held: (SCC p. 395, para 24)
“24. … In our view the principles of natural justice
know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it
would have made any difference if natural justice had
been observed. The non-observance of natural justice
is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice
independently of proof of denial of natural justice is
unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has
denied justice that the person who has been denied
justice is not prejudiced.”
58. In A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak19 a seven-Judge
Bench of this Court has also held that when an order
has been passed in violation of a fundamental right or
in breach of the principles of natural justice, the same
would be a nullity. (See also State of Haryana vs.
State of Punjab20 and Rajasthan SRTC vs. Zakir
Hussain21.”
20. The aforementioned observations in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur10 must
be read in the peculiar factual context of the matter. The accused Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur was tried in respect of certain offences in a Court in Delhi
and at the same time he was also an accused in a trial under the provisions of
TADA Act22 in a Court in Pune. The trial in the Court in Pune proceeded on
18 (1980) 4 SCC 379
19 (1988) 2 SCC 602
20 (2004) 12 SCC 673
21 (2005) 7 SCC 447
22 Terrorists and Anti Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
the basis that Jayendra Vishnu Thakur was an absconding accused. The
evidence was thus led in the trial in Pune in his absence when he was not
sent up for trial, at the end of which all the accused were acquitted.
However, in an appeal arising therefrom, this Court convicted some of the
accused for offences with which they were tried. In the meantime, Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur was convicted by the Court in Delhi and was undergoing
sentence imposed upon him. Later, he was produced before the Court in
Pune with a supplementary charge-sheet and charges were framed against
him along with certain other accused. A request was made by the Public
Prosecutor that the evidence of some of the witnesses, which was led in the
earlier trial be read in evidence in the fresh trial against Jayendra Vishnu
Thakur as those witnesses were either dead or not available to be
examined23. The request was allowed which order of the Court in Pune was
under challenge before this Court. It was found by this Court that the basic
premise for application of Section 299 of the Code was completely absent.
The Accused had not absconded. He was very much in confinement and
could have been produced in the earlier trial before the Court in Pune. Since
the requirements of Section 299 were not satisfied, the evidence led on the
earlier occasion could not be taken as evidence in the subsequent
23 Paras 8 & 9 of Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra (supra)
proceedings. The witnesses were not alive and could not be re-examined in
the fresh trial nor could there be cross-examination on behalf of the accused.
If the evidence in the earlier trial was to be read in the subsequent trial, the
accused would be denied the opportunity of cross-examination of the
concerned witnesses. Thus, the prejudice was inherent. It is in this factual
context that the observations of this Court have to be considered. Same is
not the situation in the present matter. It is not the direction of the High
Court to read the entire evidence on the earlier occasion as evidence in the
de novo trial. The direction is to re-examine those witnesses who were not
examined in the presence of the appellants. The direction now ensures the
presence of the appellants in the Court, so that they have every opportunity
to watch the witnesses deposing in the trial and cross-examine said
witnesses. Since these basic requirements would be scrupulously observed
and complied with, there is no prejudice at all.
21. The learned Amicus Curiae was right in relying upon the provisions of
Chapter XXVIII (Sections 366 to 371 of The Code) and Chapter XXIX
(Sections 372 to 394 of The Code). He was also right in saying that the
Chapter XXVIII was more relevant in the present matter and the judgment of
the High Court was supported more strongly by provisions of Chapter
XXVIII. The provisions of Sections 366 to 368 and Sections 386 and 391
are quoted here for ready reference:-
“366. Sentence of death to be submitted by Court
of Session for confirmation – (1) When the Court of
Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings
shall be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence
shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the
High Court.
(2) The Court passing the sentence shall commit the
convicted person to jail custody under a warrant.
367. Power to direct further inquiry to be made or
additional evidence to be taken – (1) If, when such
proceedings are submitted, the High Court thinks that
a further inquiry should be made into or additional
evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt
or innocence of the convicted person, it may make
such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to
be made or taken by the Court of Session.
(2) Unless the High Court otherwise directs, the
presence of the convicted person may be dispensed
with when such inquiry is made or such evidence is
taken.
(3) When the inquiry or evidence (if any) is not made
or taken by the High Court the result of such inquiry
or evidence shall be certified to such Court.
368. Power of High Court to confirm sentence or
annual conviction – In any case submitted under
section 366, the High Court –
(a) may confirm the sentence, or pass any other
sentence warranted by law, or
(b) may annul the conviction, and convict the
accused of any offence of which the Court of
Session might have convicted him, or order of a
a new trial on the same or an amended charge, or
(c) may acquit the accused person:
Provided that no order of confirmation shall be
made under this section until the period allowed
for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an
appeal is presented within such period, until
such appeal is disposed of.
386. Powers of the Appellate Court. – After
perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his
pleader, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under
section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears,
the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or
may –
(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse
such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or
that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as
the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence
on him according to law;
(b) in an appeal from a conviction –
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or
discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a
Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such
Appellate Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the
nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the
sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;
(c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence –
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit
or discharge the accused or order him to be
re-tried by a Court competent to try the
offence, or
(ii) Alter the finding maintaining the sentence,
or
(iii) With or without altering the finding alter
the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or
reduce the same;
(d) in an appeal from any other order alter or reverse
such order;
(e) Make any amendment or any consequential or
incidental order that may be just or proper:
Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced
unless the accused has had an opportunity of
showing cause against such enhancement:
Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not
inflict greater punishment for the offence which is
in its opinion the accused has committed, than
might have been inflicted for that offence by the
Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.
391. Appellate Court may take further evidence or
direct it to be taken – (1) In dealing with any appeal
under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks
additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its
reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or
direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the
Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of
Session or a Magistrate.
(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the
Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall
certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such
Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the
appeal.
(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to
be present when the additional evidence is taken.
(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be
subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it
were an inquiry.”
22. According to Section 366 when a Court of Sessions passes a sentence
of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the High Court and the
sentence of death is not to be executed unless it is confirmed by the High
Court. Section 367 then proceeds to lay down the power of the High Court
to direct further enquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken.
Section 368, thereafter, lays down the power of the High Court to confirm
the sentence so imposed or annul the conviction. One of the powers which
the High Court can exercise is one under Section 368 (c) of the Code and
that is to “acquit the accused person”. Pertinently, the power to acquit the
person can be exercised by the High Court even without there being any
substantive appeal on the part of the accused challenging his conviction. To
that extent the proceedings under Chapter XXVIII which deals with
“submission of death sentences for confirmation” is a proceeding in
continuation of the trial. These provisions thus entitle the High Court to
direct further enquiry or to take additional evidence and the High Court may,
in a given case, even acquit the accused person. The scope of the chapter is
wider. Chapter XXIX of the Code deals with “Appeals”. Section 391 also
entitles the Appellate Court to take further evidence or direct such further
evidence to be taken. Section 386 then enumerates powers of the Appellate
Court which inter alia includes the power to “reverse the finding and
sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a
Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or
committed for trial”. The powers of Appellate Court are equally wide. The
High Court in the present case was exercising powers both under Chapters
XXVIII and XXIX of the Code. If the power can go to the extent of
ordering a complete re-trial, the exercise of power to a lesser extent namely
ordering de novo examination of twelve witnesses with further directions as
the High Court has imposed in the present matter, was certainly within the
powers of the High Court. There is, thus, no infraction or jurisdictional error
on the part of the High Court.
23. It is true that as consistently laid down by this Court, an order of
retrial of a criminal case is not to be taken resort to easily and must be made
in exceptional cases. For example, it was observed by this Court in Pandit
Ukha Kolhe vs State of Maharashtra2, as under:-
“15. An order for retrial of a criminal case is made in
exceptional cases, and not unless the appellate Court
is satisfied that the Court trying the proceeding had no
jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by
serious illegalities or irregularities or on account of
misconception of the nature of the proceedings and on
that account in substance there had been no real trial
or that the Prosecutor or an accused was, for reasons
over which he had no control, prevented from leading
or tendering evidence material to the charge, and in
the interests of justice the appellate Court deems it
appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the
case, that the accused should be put on his trial again.
An order of re-trial wipes out from the record the
earlier proceeding, and exposes the person accused to
another trial which affords the prosecutor an
opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the
earlier trial, and will not ordinarily be countenanced
when it is made merely to enable the prosecutor to
lead evidence which he could but has not cared to lead
either on account of insufficient appreciation of the
nature of the case or for other reasons. Harries, C.J., in
Ramanlal Rathi v. The State24
"If at the end of a criminal prosecution the
evidence leaves the Court in doubt as to the guilt of
the accused the latter is entitled to a verdict of not
guilty. A retrial may be ordered when the original trial
has not been satisfactory for particular reasons, for
example, if evidence had been wrongly rejected which
should have been admitted, or admitted when it
should have been rejected, or the Court had refused to
hear certain witness who should have been heard. But
retrial cannot be ordered on the ground that the
prosecution did not produce the proper evidence and
did not know how to prove their case."
24. The order passed by the High Court in the present matter was not to
enable the Prosecutor to rectify the defects or infirmities in the evidence or
to enable him to lead evidence which he had not cared to lead on the earlier
24 AIR (1951) Cal.305
occasion. The evidence in the form of testimony of those twelve witnesses
was led and those witnesses were cross-examined. There was no infirmity
except the one that the evidence was not led in the presence of the
appellants. The remedy proposed was only to rectify such infirmity, and not
to enable the Prosecutor to rectify defects in the evidence.
25. We must also consider the matter from the stand point and perspective
of the victims as suggested by the learned Amicus Curiae. Four persons of a
family were done to death. It is certainly in the societal interest that the
guilty must be punished and at the same time the procedural requirements
which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered to. If there was an infraction,
which otherwise does not vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to
remedy the situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the
accused as well as societal interest are adequately safeguarded. The very
same witnesses were directed to be de novo examined which would ensure
that the interest of the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the
accused will have every right and opportunity to watch the witnesses
deposing against them, watch their demeanor and instruct their counsel
properly so that said witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the
process, the interest of the accused would also stand protected. On the other
hand, if we were to accept the submission that the proceedings stood vitiated
and, therefore, the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination
of the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage of justice.
The persons who are accused of committing four murders would not
effectively be tried. The evidence against them would not be read for a
technical infraction resulting in great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order
and directions passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair
procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses, after due
distillation from their cross-examination can be read in evidence.
26. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order passed and the
directions issued by the High Court in the present matter. We affirm the
view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals. The restraint which
we had placed on the Trial Court not to pronounce the judgment hereby
stands vacated. The Trial Court is now free to take the matter to its logical
conclusion. Let a copy of this Order be immediately transmitted to the
concerned Trial Court.
27. We must say that we have not, and shall not be taken to have
expressed any opinion on the merits or demerits of the case of the
prosecution, and the matter shall be gone into on its own merits at every
stage of the proceedings.
28. In the end, we must express our appreciation and gratitude to the
learned Amicus Curiae for rendering very effective and able assistance in the
matter. We are indeed grateful to him.
………..…..……..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
..………….……………J.
(Indu Malhotra)
New Delhi,
April 11, 2019
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