Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of
this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and
held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties
have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is
not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of
non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed
with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.349 OF 2019
The State of Madhya Pradesh V Laxmi Narayan
M.R. SHAH, J.
Dated:MARCH 05, 2019
A two Judge bench of this Court vide its order dated 08.09.2017,
in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Court
in the cases of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466
and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC 149, has
referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and that is how the
matter is placed before a Bench of three Judges.
1.1 Vide order dated 19.11.2018, since the same question of law is
2
involved, this Court tagged the connected appeal with the main
appeal.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.
8000/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application,
preferred by the respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the
proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, relying upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Shiji @ Pappu & others vs. Radhika and another (2011)
10 SCC 705, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present
appeal.
2.1 Office report dated 18.08.2017 indicates that service of show
cause notice on the respondents is complete, and respondent nos. 1 to
3 are represented by Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advocate, but during
the course of hearing, nobody appeared for the respondents.
3. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodged
against the respondents herein and two unknown persons at Police
Station Raun, District Bhind, for the offences punishable under
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime
No.36/13. It was alleged that on 03.03.2013 at about 9:30 p.m., the
complainant – Charan Singh, who is an operator of LNT machine is
extracting sand of Sindh River at Indukhi Sand Mine and at that time
firing from other side of river started and the counter firing from this
side also started then he heard that take away your machine from
here. It is alleged that some people came there from which Sanjeev
(respondent no.2 herein), Lature (respondent no.1 herein), Sant Singh
(respondent no.3 herein) and two unknown persons came near to the
complainant and his machine and told him to run away, then
somebody told to Sanjeev (respondent no.2 herein) to fire and then
Sanjeev fired on the complainant and then they ran away. The
complainant fell from the machine. The bullet hit the complainant on
elbow of right hand. Somehow the complainant managed to reach the
village and a person called a car and admitted the complainant in
District Hospital.
3.1 That on 04.03.2013, the duty doctor in the District Hospital
informed the police and on the basis of the statement of the
complainant, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/13 was registered under
4
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.
3.2 That the medical examination of the injured complainant was
conducted at District Hospital and five injuries were found on his body
and injuries nos. 1 to 4 were opined to be caused by fire arm and
injury no.5 was advised for x-ray.
3.3 That on 05.03.2013, the police reached on the spot and prepared
spot map; statement of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. and the police seized simple soil, blood stained soil and
other articles from the spot of the incident and prepared their seizure
memos.
3.4 That the accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 of
2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings
against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the sole ground of a
compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant.
4. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the
criminal proceedings against the accused solely on the ground that the
accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably.
5
While quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the
High Court has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Shiji (supra).
5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and
order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
6. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya
Pradesh has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed
a grave error in quashing the FIR which was for the offences under
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.
6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High
Court has quashed the FIR mechanically and solely on the basis of the
settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused,
without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences
alleged against the accused persons.
6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR, the High Court has
not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were against the
society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the
two individuals.
6.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the
decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the
FIR. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High
Court ought to have appreciated that in all the cases where the
complainant has compromised/entered into a settlement with the
accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of
recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be
exercise of futility. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that in a given case despite
the complainant may not support in future and in the trial in view of
the settlement and compromise with the accused, still the prosecution
may prove the case against the accused persons by examining the
other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the medical evidence
and/or other evidence/material. It is submitted that in the present
cases the investigation was in progress and even the statement of the
witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also collected. It
is submitted that therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court has clearly erred in considering and relying upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra).
6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that the accused were hard core
criminals and many criminal cases were registered against them and
they are a serious threat to the society. It is submitted that all these
aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused
were required to be considered by the High Court while quashing the
FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,
and more particularly when the offences alleged were against the
society at large, namely, attempt to murder, which is a
non-compoundable offence. In support of his submissions, learned
counsel for the appellant-State has placed reliance on the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC
303; State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State
of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana
Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh
(2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC
641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan
Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019, State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 in Criminal
8
Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013.
6.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeal and
quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court quashing and setting aside the FIR, in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
7. As observed hereinabove, nobody appeared on behalf of the
respondents – accused.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at great
length.
9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present
appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307
and 34 of the IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the
complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and
the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this
Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that
there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons
and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High
Court has quashed the FIR.
9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact
that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it
appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness
of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court
has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the
distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong
and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State
of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the
Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the
entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the
settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes
to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution,
circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the
High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire
conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the
criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by
the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307
and 34 of the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court
in a catena of decisions.
9.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this
Court has observed and held as under:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where
the offender and the victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
any compromise between the victim and the offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity, etc.;
cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of
the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise
between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court
shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.”
9.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6
SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh
(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court
can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play
a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising
its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of
the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the
matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High
Court should refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by
the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage
before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already
been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved
under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of
sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
9.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Court has
had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the
FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of
decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the
following propositions:
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or
to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer
new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.
(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to
quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is
non-compoundable.
(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court.
(5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate.
(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving
mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or
the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a
serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with
the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of
public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing
insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the State have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved
in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.”
9.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically
observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding
an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of
imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private
parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a
serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that
where the accused are facing trial under Sections 307 read with
Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society,
accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by
demonstrating their innocence.
9.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically
observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable
and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between
the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the
proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar
is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the
case of Kalyan Singh (supra) and Dhruv Gurjar (supra).
10. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh (supra) is concerned, this Court in paragraph 29.6
admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be
17
generally treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. However, this Court further observed that the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further
corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be
seen, which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the decision
of this case in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) shall be of no
assistance to the accused in the present case.
11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this
Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR by observing
that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is
no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would
be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the
High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid
ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the
said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought
to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant
has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any
conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too
early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still
can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the
other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly
when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil
nature and/or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this
Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between
the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this
Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution
where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations…will be
a futile exercise that will serve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it
was also further observed ‘that even the alleged two eyewitnesses,
however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the
prosecution version’, and to that this Court observed and held ‘that
the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality
and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such circumstances, be justifiably
invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and
thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in
the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:
“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the
same with utmost care and caution. The width and the
nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is
sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for
reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance
of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power
under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to
say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the
ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise
that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.
The High Court may be justified in declining interference
if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot
assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a
petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to
consider the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent
powers may be invoked.”
11.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case
which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the
parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the
society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the
dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision
may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very
serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under
Section 307 IPC. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the
relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has
materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that
in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording
conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility.
The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of
this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case.
12. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat
20
(supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court
has noted the difference between the power of compounding of
offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the
powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal
proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court
further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a
criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section
320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while,
on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for
quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of
justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in
the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very
Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court
can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play
a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising
its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of
the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the
matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High
Court should refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by
the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage
before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already
been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved
under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of
sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of
this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and
held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties
have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is
not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of
non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed
with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High
Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences
under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the
investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused
managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and
sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The
allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in
commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence
and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the
High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the
accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically
quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court
has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.
15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the present
appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated
07.10.2013 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case
No. 8000 of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the
FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the
accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019
16. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 is
concerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under
Sections 323, 294, 308 & 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that the
accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of
the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be
any possibility of recording a conviction against the accused. Offence
under Section 308 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. While
committing the offence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are
also absconding, and in the meantime, they have managed to enter
into a compromise with the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons
stated above, this appeal is also allowed, the impugned judgment and
order dated 28.05.2018 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous
Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside, and
the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the
accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
……………………………….J.
[A.K. SIKRI]
……………………………….J.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………….J.
MARCH 05, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
Print Page
this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and
held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties
have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is
not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of
non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed
with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.349 OF 2019
The State of Madhya Pradesh V Laxmi Narayan
M.R. SHAH, J.
Dated:MARCH 05, 2019
A two Judge bench of this Court vide its order dated 08.09.2017,
in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Court
in the cases of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466
and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC 149, has
referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and that is how the
matter is placed before a Bench of three Judges.
1.1 Vide order dated 19.11.2018, since the same question of law is
2
involved, this Court tagged the connected appeal with the main
appeal.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.
8000/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application,
preferred by the respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the
proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, relying upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Shiji @ Pappu & others vs. Radhika and another (2011)
10 SCC 705, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present
appeal.
2.1 Office report dated 18.08.2017 indicates that service of show
cause notice on the respondents is complete, and respondent nos. 1 to
3 are represented by Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advocate, but during
the course of hearing, nobody appeared for the respondents.
3. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodged
against the respondents herein and two unknown persons at Police
Station Raun, District Bhind, for the offences punishable under
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime
No.36/13. It was alleged that on 03.03.2013 at about 9:30 p.m., the
complainant – Charan Singh, who is an operator of LNT machine is
extracting sand of Sindh River at Indukhi Sand Mine and at that time
firing from other side of river started and the counter firing from this
side also started then he heard that take away your machine from
here. It is alleged that some people came there from which Sanjeev
(respondent no.2 herein), Lature (respondent no.1 herein), Sant Singh
(respondent no.3 herein) and two unknown persons came near to the
complainant and his machine and told him to run away, then
somebody told to Sanjeev (respondent no.2 herein) to fire and then
Sanjeev fired on the complainant and then they ran away. The
complainant fell from the machine. The bullet hit the complainant on
elbow of right hand. Somehow the complainant managed to reach the
village and a person called a car and admitted the complainant in
District Hospital.
3.1 That on 04.03.2013, the duty doctor in the District Hospital
informed the police and on the basis of the statement of the
complainant, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/13 was registered under
4
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.
3.2 That the medical examination of the injured complainant was
conducted at District Hospital and five injuries were found on his body
and injuries nos. 1 to 4 were opined to be caused by fire arm and
injury no.5 was advised for x-ray.
3.3 That on 05.03.2013, the police reached on the spot and prepared
spot map; statement of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. and the police seized simple soil, blood stained soil and
other articles from the spot of the incident and prepared their seizure
memos.
3.4 That the accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 of
2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings
against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the sole ground of a
compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant.
4. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the
criminal proceedings against the accused solely on the ground that the
accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably.
5
While quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the
High Court has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Shiji (supra).
5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and
order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
6. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya
Pradesh has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed
a grave error in quashing the FIR which was for the offences under
Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.
6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High
Court has quashed the FIR mechanically and solely on the basis of the
settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused,
without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences
alleged against the accused persons.
6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR, the High Court has
not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were against the
society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the
two individuals.
6.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the
decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the
FIR. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High
Court ought to have appreciated that in all the cases where the
complainant has compromised/entered into a settlement with the
accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of
recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be
exercise of futility. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that in a given case despite
the complainant may not support in future and in the trial in view of
the settlement and compromise with the accused, still the prosecution
may prove the case against the accused persons by examining the
other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the medical evidence
and/or other evidence/material. It is submitted that in the present
cases the investigation was in progress and even the statement of the
witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also collected. It
is submitted that therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court has clearly erred in considering and relying upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra).
6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that the accused were hard core
criminals and many criminal cases were registered against them and
they are a serious threat to the society. It is submitted that all these
aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused
were required to be considered by the High Court while quashing the
FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,
and more particularly when the offences alleged were against the
society at large, namely, attempt to murder, which is a
non-compoundable offence. In support of his submissions, learned
counsel for the appellant-State has placed reliance on the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC
303; State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State
of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana
Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh
(2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC
641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan
Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019, State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 in Criminal
8
Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013.
6.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeal and
quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court quashing and setting aside the FIR, in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
7. As observed hereinabove, nobody appeared on behalf of the
respondents – accused.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at great
length.
9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present
appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307
and 34 of the IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the
complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and
the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this
Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that
there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons
and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High
Court has quashed the FIR.
9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact
that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it
appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness
of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court
has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the
distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong
and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State
of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the
Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the
entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the
settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes
to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution,
circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the
High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire
conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the
criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by
the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307
and 34 of the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court
in a catena of decisions.
9.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this
Court has observed and held as under:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where
the offender and the victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
any compromise between the victim and the offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity, etc.;
cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of
the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise
between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court
shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.”
9.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6
SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh
(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court
can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play
a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising
its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of
the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the
matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High
Court should refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by
the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage
before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already
been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved
under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of
sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
9.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Court has
had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the
FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of
decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the
following propositions:
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or
to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer
new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.
(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to
quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is
non-compoundable.
(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court.
(5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate.
(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving
mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or
the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a
serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with
the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of
public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing
insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the State have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved
in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.”
9.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically
observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding
an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of
imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private
parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a
serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that
where the accused are facing trial under Sections 307 read with
Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society,
accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by
demonstrating their innocence.
9.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically
observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable
and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between
the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the
proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar
is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the
case of Kalyan Singh (supra) and Dhruv Gurjar (supra).
10. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh (supra) is concerned, this Court in paragraph 29.6
admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be
17
generally treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. However, this Court further observed that the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further
corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be
seen, which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the decision
of this case in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) shall be of no
assistance to the accused in the present case.
11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this
Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR by observing
that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is
no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would
be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the
High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid
ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the
said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought
to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant
has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any
conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too
early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still
can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the
other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly
when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil
nature and/or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this
Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between
the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this
Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution
where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations…will be
a futile exercise that will serve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it
was also further observed ‘that even the alleged two eyewitnesses,
however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the
prosecution version’, and to that this Court observed and held ‘that
the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality
and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such circumstances, be justifiably
invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and
thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in
the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:
“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the
same with utmost care and caution. The width and the
nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is
sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for
reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance
of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power
under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to
say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the
ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise
that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.
The High Court may be justified in declining interference
if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot
assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a
petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to
consider the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent
powers may be invoked.”
11.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case
which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the
parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the
society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the
dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision
may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very
serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under
Section 307 IPC. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the
relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has
materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that
in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording
conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility.
The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of
this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case.
12. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat
20
(supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court
has noted the difference between the power of compounding of
offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the
powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal
proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court
further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a
criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section
320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while,
on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for
quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of
justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in
the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very
Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court
can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play
a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising
its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of
the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the
matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High
Court should refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by
the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage
before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already
been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved
under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of
sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of
this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and
held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties
have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is
not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of
non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed
with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High
Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences
under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the
investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused
managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and
sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The
allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in
commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence
and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the
High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the
accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically
quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court
has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.
15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the present
appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated
07.10.2013 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case
No. 8000 of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the
FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the
accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019
16. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 is
concerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under
Sections 323, 294, 308 & 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that the
accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of
the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be
any possibility of recording a conviction against the accused. Offence
under Section 308 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. While
committing the offence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are
also absconding, and in the meantime, they have managed to enter
into a compromise with the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons
stated above, this appeal is also allowed, the impugned judgment and
order dated 28.05.2018 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous
Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside, and
the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the
accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
……………………………….J.
[A.K. SIKRI]
……………………………….J.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………….J.
MARCH 05, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
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