Whether a major child is entitled to get maintenance under domestic violence Act?

The learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out definition of a
“child” as contained in section 2 (b) of the Act in order to submit that a
“child” means any person below the age of eighteen years and includes any
adopted, step or foster child. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court
in the case of Shri Rajendra D. Seth Vs. Rekha Jha @ Rekha R. Seth
(2016) ALL MR (Cri) 1506, in which this Court has held that a child who is
major in age would not be entitled for maintenance.
4. On hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner it is apparent that the
impugned order which is passed under section 20 of the Act cannot be
sustained. Section 20 of the Act provides for a monetary relief to meet the
expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child
of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence. As noticed
earlier, a “child” within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act means any
person below the age of 18 years. It is apparent from the record that the
second respondent has attained majority and thus cannot be said to be a
“child” within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the Act. A similar view has
been taken by this Court in the case of Shri Rajendra D. Seth (supra). In
that view of the matter the petition is allowed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 23 OF 2018
 Mr. Antonio De Matos Sequeira Almeida,
 Vs
Mrs. Felicidade Wilma Almeida,

CORAM: C. V. BHADANG, J.
 DATE: 4th June, 2018.

On 7/2/2018, a notice for final disposal was issued in this case. The
respondents have chosen not to appear although served. The present petition
can be disposed off on a short count.
2. The first respondent had filed an application under section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Act, for short)
seeking various reliefs including a monetary relief. The second respondent
happens to be the son of the petitioner and the first respondent. Admittedly,
the second respondent has attained majority and presently is aged about 25
years and has obtained an Engineering Degree. The learned Magistrate by
order dated 13/3/2012 has granted interim maintenance to the second
respondent at the rate of Rs.8000/- per month. Feeling aggrieved, the
petitioner challenged the same before the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal
Appeal No.126/2012 inter alia on the ground that under the provisions of the
Act, only a minor child is entitled to the relief. The learned Sessions Judge
has dealt with this aspect in para 11 of the impugned judgment and has found
that the child is not self supporting and is having no income of its own and is
pursuing his studies and in that view of the matter, the learned Sessions
Judge refused to accept the ground as raised and has dismissed the appeal by
judgment and order dated 4/11/2017. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner is3 Wpcr 23 2018
before this Court.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. None appears for
the respondents. Perused record.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out definition of a
“child” as contained in section 2 (b) of the Act in order to submit that a
“child” means any person below the age of eighteen years and includes any
adopted, step or foster child. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court
in the case of Shri Rajendra D. Seth Vs. Rekha Jha @ Rekha R. Seth
(2016) ALL MR (Cri) 1506, in which this Court has held that a child who is
major in age would not be entitled for maintenance.
4. On hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner it is apparent that the
impugned order which is passed under section 20 of the Act cannot be
sustained. Section 20 of the Act provides for a monetary relief to meet the
expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child
of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence. As noticed
earlier, a “child” within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act means any
person below the age of 18 years. It is apparent from the record that the
second respondent has attained majority and thus cannot be said to be a
“child” within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the Act. A similar view has
been taken by this Court in the case of Shri Rajendra D. Seth (supra). In
that view of the matter the petition is allowed. The impugned order is hereby
set aside. The application for interim monetary relief stands dismissed.
 C. V. BHADANG, J.

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