A clear reading of this provision of the Act would indicate that in cases where no appeal lies to the Bench that it is competent for the Appellate Authority to revise the order in question if the occasion so arises. The power to revise orders passed by a Single Judge has thus been clearly invested with the Appellate Bench. The learned Judges appear to have been carried away by the decision of this Court in C.R.A. No. 33 of 1977, where an observation has been made to the effect that no revision application under section 29(3) of the Rent Act would lie to the Bench of Small Causes Court in the case of procedural orders and orders which do not permanently affect the substantive rights of the parties under the Rent Act. To my mind, there is a clear misapplication of the ratio of this decision in the present case. Undoubtedly, Sapre, J., (as he then was) made the aforesaid observations in a situation where the revision was virtually without substance or in other words, where there was no justification for the Bench to revise the order of the lower courts.
5. Mr. Ketkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted, with full justification to my mind, that as far as the present proceeding is concerned, the petitioner genuinely apprehended a situation whereby he would have been dispossessed and, therefore, he prayed for an injunction order. This was neither a mere procedural situation nor could it be said that it was a case where the substantive rights of the parties under the Rent Act were being affected. Under these circumstances the aforesaid decision could not have had any application. Mr. Ketkar has also relied on section 42 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and in particular sub-section (4) thereof which reads as follows :
42(4). Where no appeal lies under this sub-section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding, the Bench of two Judges specified in sub-section (1) may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit."
Mr. Ketkar is right when he points out that sub-section (4) very clearly makes provision for a situation whereby the Appellate Bench in appropriate cases can call for the record and proceedings and can exercise its revisional powers even though an appeal does not lie in such cases. As indicated by me above, the present case was certainly one of those situations where the revisional powers ought to have been exercised, and as is apparent from the speaking orders passed, by the Appellate Bench, where such powers had in fact been exercised at the interim stage. To this extent, the final order dated 27-8-1981 was clearly faulty and is liable to be set aside.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Writ Petition No. 3091 of 1981
Decided On: 10.12.1991
Yusuf Ibrahim Pawaskar Vs. Karamchand Narayan Tandon by his heirs and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.F. Saldanha, J.
Citation: 1991(4) BomCR 549,1993 MHLJ 71,1994 BomRC 140 (Bom)
This writ petition is directed against an order dated 27-8-1981 passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes wherein the learned Judges have taken the view that the Revision Application preferred by the present petitioner against an order dated 16-12-1980 of the trial Court was not competent.
2. The petitioner had originally filed a suit before the Court of Small Causes contending that he should be declared as a tenant in respect of the disputed premises. Since the petitioner apprehended that his possession would be interferred with, he had applied for an ad interim injunction whereupon the trial Court passed a short order to the effect that apart from the petitioner's bare word, he had not made out any case for the grant of injunction and, therefore, that it was necessary to issue notice to the opposite party. What needs to be taken cognizance of is the fact that the petitioner had specifically pleaded in the application that he apprehended infringement of his rights and he, therefore, prayed for specific reliefs from the Court which were denied to him at that point of time. Though the order states that notice is issued to the respondent, in effect, it is an order refusing to grant an injunction.
3. The petitioner filed a revision application before the Appeal Bench which Revision Application was entertained and the Bench also granted the petitioner a composite injunction as prayed for by him. This injunction was thereafter extended by order dated 16th March, 1981 by the Appellate Bench till the hearing and final disposal of the revision application.
4. The only ground on which the Bench has dismissed the Revision Application is that the order dated 16-12-1980 was not an appealable order and furthermore, that under the provisions of section 29(3) of the Rent Act, no revision application was competent. Section 29(3) of the Rent Act reads as follows :
"29(3) Where no appeal lies under this section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding in Greater Bombay the Bench of two Judges specified in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) and elsewhere the District Court, may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order made was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and (the Bench or Court aforesaid or the District Judge or any Judge to whom the case may be referred by the District Judge, shall) pass such order with respect thereto as it or he thinks fit."
A clear reading of this provision of the Act would indicate that in cases where no appeal lies to the Bench that it is competent for the Appellate Authority to revise the order in question if the occasion so arises. The power to revise orders passed by a Single Judge has thus been clearly invested with the Appellate Bench. The learned Judges appear to have been carried away by the decision of this Court in C.R.A. No. 33 of 1977, where an observation has been made to the effect that no revision application under section 29(3) of the Rent Act would lie to the Bench of Small Causes Court in the case of procedural orders and orders which do not permanently affect the substantive rights of the parties under the Rent Act. To my mind, there is a clear misapplication of the ratio of this decision in the present case. Undoubtedly, Sapre, J., (as he then was) made the aforesaid observations in a situation where the revision was virtually without substance or in other words, where there was no justification for the Bench to revise the order of the lower courts.
5. Mr. Ketkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted, with full justification to my mind, that as far as the present proceeding is concerned, the petitioner genuinely apprehended a situation whereby he would have been dispossessed and, therefore, he prayed for an injunction order. This was neither a mere procedural situation nor could it be said that it was a case where the substantive rights of the parties under the Rent Act were being affected. Under these circumstances the aforesaid decision could not have had any application. Mr. Ketkar has also relied on section 42 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and in particular sub-section (4) thereof which reads as follows :
42(4). Where no appeal lies under this sub-section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding, the Bench of two Judges specified in sub-section (1) may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit."
Mr. Ketkar is right when he points out that sub-section (4) very clearly makes provision for a situation whereby the Appellate Bench in appropriate cases can call for the record and proceedings and can exercise its revisional powers even though an appeal does not lie in such cases. As indicated by me above, the present case was certainly one of those situations where the revisional powers ought to have been exercised, and as is apparent from the speaking orders passed, by the Appellate Bench, where such powers had in fact been exercised at the interim stage. To this extent, the final order dated 27-8-1981 was clearly faulty and is liable to be set aside.
6. In the result, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b). In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Mr. Ketkar points out that in spite of his best efforts, there has been no response from the petitioner. He is, therefore, unable to state as to whether the proceeding is still pending and furthermore, as to whether the matter has been settled out of Court or not. The above order has been passed by me on the assumption that the suit is still pending before the trial Court.
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