"Under Article 345, the Legislature of a State may adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purpose of the State. This power is subject to Articles 346 and Article 347 of the Constitution of India. It is, apparently, in terms of Article 345 that the Uttar Pradesh Legislature has passed the two laws, which we have adverted to namely, Uttar Pradesh Language (Bills and Acts) Act, 1950 and Uttar Pradesh Official Language Act, 1951. By virtue of these laws, undoubtedly, the State has adopted Hindi as the language for the purpose of enacting laws be they plenary or subordinate legislation, but it is hedged in with the limitation contained in Article 348(3) of the Constitution. Under Article 348(3), it becomes the duty to publish the translation of the law, which is made in the official language other than English. The publication of the translation is to be done under the authority of the Governor of the State in the official gazette of the State. Sub Article (3) of Article 348 further declares unambiguously that it shall be deemed to be the authoritative text of the English language under Article 348. It must be remembered that Article 348(1) provides that the authoritative texts of all Bills and Acts, inter alia, are to be in English language. It is to provide for the contingency where a State adopts any other language as its official language that the founding fathers provided for a translation to be made of the law into English, which is made by the Legislature in a language other than English. This English version is, undoubtedly, to be treated as the authoritative text within the meaning of Sub Article 1 of Article 348 of the Constitution of India."
21. Having thus referred to the various provisions of law, we must consider the effect of any ambiguity, which may exist between the two versions, namely, (i) English language and (ii) any other language, which may be the official language of the State concerned. There can be broadly two situations to our mind. As in the case of Nityanand Sharma (supra) and Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra), the original version of a law may be published in the English language. It may be followed by the Hindi version of the same. The second possibility is where the law may be made in the official language of the State concerned, as in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh where Hindi is the official language. A law may be made in Hindi language; it must be followed by an English translation within the meaning of Article 348(3), which is to be treated as authoritative text under Article 348(1). In a case where a law is made in English language and a confusion arises on account of the translation found in the Hindi version, quite clearly, dominance would be accorded to the English version. When a law is made, however, in the official language, other than English language as say the Hindi language as in the facts of this case and a discrepancy occurs when the translation takes place, it can give rise to two broad situations again. The first situation would be on account of the inadequacy or ineptitude of the translator, a doubt or ambiguity may be created by virtue of the translation made under Article 348(3) of the Constitution. While, it is true that Article 348(1) declares that the translation published under Article 348(3) will be the authoritative text within the meaning of Article 348(1), as the duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, every effort must be made to reconcile the differences. An attempt must be made to find out the intention of the law-giver. Both the Hindi version and the English version can be looked into and the Court would be acting within its powers in adopting the version, which best accords with the intention of the Legislature, applying various Rules of interpretation and in particular, the purpose Rule.
22. The second category of cases is those cases, where there is a conflict between the two versions, namely, the Hindi and the English. If there is a conflict between the Hindi version and the English version, it is our view that it is the translation published under Article 348(3), of the law, in English, which would prevail. This view of ours is arrived at by following what has been laid down by not only the Hon'ble Apex Court in Park Leather Industry's case (supra) but also by the seven Judges Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mata Badal Pandey's case (supra).
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Special Appeal No. 593 of 2017
Decided On: 18.09.2017
Shahjahan Baigam Vs. District Magistrate Udham Singh Nagar and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.M. Joseph, C.J. and Alok Singh, J.
Citation: AIR 2017 Uttar 200
1. The appellant is the writ petitioner.
2. The appellant was the Pradhan of a Village Panchayat. By the impugned decision, the financial powers of the appellant have been taken away. The judgment of the learned Single Judge reads as follows:
"Mr. Mr. Harshpal Sekhon, Advocate, present for the petitioner.
Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Additional CSC, present for the State/respondent Nos. 1 to 5.
The petitioner is a "Gram Pradhan" of Village Missarwala, District Udham Singh Nagar. On her own complaint, an inquiry has been constituted and the matter is presently inquired by the District Panchayat Raj Officer. Consequently, till the completion of the inquiry, the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner have been taken away under the provisions of Section 138(1)(c) of the Uttarakhand Panchayatiraj Act, 2016.
Since there is a statutory provision, wherein during pendency of an inquiry, these powers have to be taken away, this Court finds no anomaly in the order dated 28.07.2017 passed by respondent No. 1.
However, the writ petition stands disposed with the direction to the concerned District Panchayat Raj Officer to conduct the inquiry in the matter as expeditiously as possible without any undue delay, in accordance with law."
Feeling aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
3. We heard Mr. T.A. Khan, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Aditya Kumar Arya and Ms. Farida Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. C.S. Rawat, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand/respondents.
4. Substantially, three submissions have been raised before us by Mr. T.A. Khan, learned senior counsel for the appellant. In the first place, learned senior counsel would submit that there is no satisfaction by the State Government in the matter of taking away the financial powers of the appellant. Such a requirement is warranted on a reading of Section 138(1)(c) of the Uttarakhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') runs the argument. However, in the English version of the said provision, there is no requirement of Government being satisfied. The translation made available to us, undoubtedly, reads as follows:
"138. Removal of the office Bearer of Tri-Cadre Panchayat from their posts:-
"(1) The State Government may remove a member of the Panchayats on any of the following grounds:-
A. He had while holding the post of member of Village Panchayat, Area Panchayat or District Panchayat, tendered his vote or participated in the discussion in any commercial interest on behalf of any other person.
B. He has become physically or mentally disabled to perform his duties as Member, Pradhan, Up Pradhan, Pramukh, Up Pramukh, Chairman or Vice Chairman.
C. He had been found guilty for any misconduct in performing his duties during the performance of his duty as Member, Pradhan, Up Pradhan, Pramukh, Up Pramukh, Chairman, Vice Chairman, either in present tenure or in any preceding tenure or he has violated any provision of this Act or has caused loss or damage to Panchayat fund or property and in the opinion of the State Government, due to this misconduct, violation or loss or working unauthorizedly by husband, family members or relatives of such female members, Pradhan, Up Pradhan, Pramukh, Up Pramukh, Chairman, Vice Chairman have become unfit for their post, in those circumstances they will be suspended till the final departmental enquiry and their works and responsibilities may be assigned to a committee of three elected members of that Panchayat. Furthermore, that the disciplinary enquiry may also be taken against the departmental employee/officer, found guilty in the enquiry."
5. English version of Section 138(1)(c) reads as follows:
"138. Separation from their posts to the officers of the three tiers Panchayat
(1) The State Government may remove a member of the Panchayats on any of the following grounds:-
(c) that he has been guilty, whether in his present or an earlier term of office, of misconduct in the discharge of his duty as such member, Pradhan, Up pradhan, Pramukh, Up pramukh, Chairman, Vice Chairman or has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or caused loss or damage to the fund or property of the State Government or Panchayats and such misconduct, contravention or causing of loss or damage renders due to conduct of work as unauthorised in place by women representative, her husband or family members or relatives, such women shall be in eligible as member, Pradhan Up pradhan, Pramukh, Up pramukh, Chairman, Vice chairman, in such case they may be suspended upto the departmental final enquiry and their work and duties may be hand over to a committee of three elected members of the concerning Panchayat. In addition to the disciplinary action also may be taken against the departmental employees/officer, if found guilty in the enquiry."
6. The first question, therefore, we must answer is whether in view of this difference in the language, which is used, the Hindi version must not be discarded. What is stated in the Hindi version makes sense and, therefore, the Court may follow the Hindi version, he submits.
7. This question is no longer res integra though difficulty may arise in the application of the settled legal principles. We may advert to the case law in this regard. In the case of Haji Lal Mohammad Biri Works, Meerganj, Allahabad and others v. The Sales-tax Officer, Allahabad reported in MANU/UP/0051/1959 : AIR 1959 Allahabad 208, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider this question. Therein, notifications were issued by the State Government in exercise of Section 3A(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act of 1948. The Full Bench of the Court took the view that though Section 3A(2) was to be deemed to be in force on 31.03.1956 as the amendment to Section 3A(2) was given effect from the said date and the purport was to validate the notifications of 1956, which in turn had been held to be void earlier, the Court took note of the fact that the old Section continued to remain in force and, therefore, the notification under the old Section 3A(2) could not be converted into one, which was issued under the newly introduced Section and it was declared void. This led to a further amendment in Section 3 and it was this Section, which was interpreted. The said new Section had created a new legal fiction. The question arose as to what would be the difference between the Hindi version and the English version. The Court proceeded to hold, inter alia, as follows:
"On the language of Section 3 of the 1958 Act there was some argument by Shri Jagdish Samp, learned counsel for one of the petitioners, that, in this section, the expression 'in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act' should be read as qualifying the words 'the notifications' and should not be read as qualifying the expression, 'the said sections' which occurs a little earlier. To resolve this doubt, we went for the U.P. Gazette in which this Act was published in Hindi. Hindi has been adopted as (sic) language by the U.P. Legislature.
Under Article 348(3) of the Constitution if a Legislature of a State prescribes any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that Sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of that State is to be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under Article 348 of the Constitution.
The English version of the Act, on the basis of which arguments were advanced before us, in this State has merely the status of an authoritative text in the English language of the original Act. The original Act is in Hindi and wherever there be any doubt and, in fact, principally for purposes of properly interpreting any provision of such an enactment, the proper course is to look at the original Act as published in Hindi. In these circumstances, we looked up the Hindi version of this Act. On examining it, we find that there can be no doubt at all that the expression in English authoritative version in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act' qualifies the words 'the said sections' and does not qualify the words 'the notifications' in Section 3 of the U.P. Sales-tax (Validation) Act, 1958. The language in the Hindi version is as follows :
It would of course, have been better, had the meaning: conveyed in the original Hindi version been put in, the proper form in the English translation so as not to leave any ambiguity which could easily have been done if the expression 'on the date on which the notifications were issued' had not been placed in this Section at the place where this expression has been placed but had been placed earlier between the expression' as if the said sections were' and the words "in force". If this had been done it would not have been necessary for us to make a reference to the original Hindi version. That reference has clarified the point that Section 3 of the U.P. Sales-tax (Validation) Act, 1958, does not envisage that the notifications or 31-3-1956, were, in any form, in force immediately before the commencement of the Act. What that Section envisages is merely the fact of existence of those notifications or, to put it in another form, it takes notice of the fact that such notifications were at one time issued."
8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that this view of the court found approval at the hands of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision reported in the case of M/s. J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in MANU/SC/0308/1961 : AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1534. Therein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows:
"A construction which will lead to such a result must, if that is possible, be avoided. The words, "in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act", no doubt occur after the word, "notifications". But then the words, "in the form" can have no reference to the impugned notification, because it had never changed form, whereas they were quite appropriate to S. 3A, because it had been amended. It should further be noted that the Validation Act was published both in Hindi and in English, and both of them were authorised versions. The words in the Hindi version make it clear beyond all doubt that the words, "in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act" qualify the word "sections" and not the word "notifications". That is the view expressed by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in H. L.M. Biri Works v. Sales Tax Officer, MANU/UP/0051/1959 : A.I.R. 1959 All. 208, on a comparison of the two versions, and we are in agreement with it. There would have been no scope for this argument if transposing the words, the section read, "as if the said sections were, in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, in force on the date on which the notifications were issued." But even in its present setting that is the meaning of the section, and the impugned notification must be held to be within the saving of the Validation Act."
9. The next development, in terms of case law, we must notice is a judgment of seven learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mata Badal Pandey and another v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others reported in MANU/TN/1869/2015 : 1974 U.P. Tax Cases 570. Therein, the larger Bench took the following view:
"10. Whenever there exists an ambiguity in an enactment, well established rules or interpretation are applied to find out the intention of the Legislature. Whenever the question arises whether the word "and" used in a provision should be read as "or" or vice versa, the question is one of "doubt or ambiguity". But, where, the words are unambiguous, no question of interpretation thereof really arises.
11. We are, therefore, of opinion that where there is some doubt or ambiguity in any provision in the authoritative English text, it is permissible to look into the Hindi text to remove the doubt or ambiguity. We accordingly answer the question referred to this Bench in the affirmative."
However, it is also necessary to notice paragraph No. 4 of the said judgment, which reads as under:
"4. We may, at the very outset, mention that if the distinction between "conflict" in the Hindi text and the authoritative text in English and 'ambiguity or doubt' in the authoritative text in English is kept in mind, the apparent conflict in the decisions of this Court will disappear. A "Conflict" between the Hindi text and the authoritative English text is different from a "doubt or ambiguity" in the authoritative English text. There will be conflict between the provisions of the two texts when it is not possible to reconcile or harmonize them and then the question will arise as to which of the two shall prevail. Such a conflict does not by itself result in a "doubt or ambiguity" in the authoritative English text. The principles applicable to the resolution of "conflict" are not applicable to the resolution of "doubt or ambiguity". The normal rules of interpretation of statutes will have to be applied in the case of "doubt or ambiguity" in any provision of the authoritative English text."
10. Next, we may notice the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and another v. State of U.P. and others reported in MANU/SC/0483/1992 : (1992) 2 SCC 124. Therein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows:
"The third objection is that the Hindi version of the Amendment Act is differently worded and does not contain the words "for the first time" found in the English version. Reliance is placed on the decision of a Bench of seven judges of the Allahabad High Court in Mata Badal Pandey v. Board of Revenue, to the effect that, where there appears a doubt or ambiguity on a plain reading of the English words as to the true intention of the legislature and the Hindi version is conflicting or different, the Hindi text will be the key for finding the answer. We do not think the Hindi version really alters the position; actually it is the presence of the words "for the first time" in the English version that create an ambiguity. Without these words, the clause clearly provides that all supply of electricity, for which payment is to be made after May 20, 1983, will be charged at the rates to be fixed by the Board. We, therefore, reject the appellant's contention and hold that the fixation by the Board of rates from May 20, 1983 and, at different rates for different periods of time, is unexceptionable."
11. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nityanand Sharma and another v. State of Bihar and others reported in MANU/SC/0587/1996 : (1996) 3 SCC 576 is to be referred next. In the said case, the question arose in the following factual matrix:
"The appellants, who belonged to the Lohar caste, claimed the status of Scheduled Tribe under the Act and the order, and sought promotion in the quota reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. The case was founded partly on the fact that Lohar community was included in the Schedule under the Act, as reflected in the Hindi version of the order and, therefore, they claimed that they were entitled to status of Scheduled Tribes. In dealing with the contention, the Hon'ble Apex Court proceeded to hold as follows:
"19. Article 348(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything in Part II (in Chapter II Articles 346 and 347 relate to regional languages) the authoritative text of all bills to be introduced and amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament..... of all ordinances promulgated by the President..... and all orders, rules, regulations and bye laws issued under the Constitution or under any law made by Parliament, shall be in the English language. By operation of sub-article (3) thereof with a non obstante clause, where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article. Therefore, the Act and the Schedule thereto are part of the Act, as enacted by the Parliament in English language. It is the authoritative text. When the Schedules were translated into Hindi, the translator wrongly translated Lohara as Lohar omitting the letter 'a' while Lohra is written as mentioned in English version. It is also clear when we compare Part XVI of Second Schedule relating to the State of West Bengal, the word Lohar both in English as well as in the Hindi version was not mentioned. Court would take judicial notice of Acts of Parliament and would interpret the Schedule in the light of the English version being an authoritative text of the Act and the Second Schedule."
12. Next we must notice, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. and another v. State of U.P. and others reported in MANU/SC/0103/2001 : (2001) 3 SCC 135. In this case, the question arose as to whether tanned leather would fall within the expression 'hides and skins' under Entry 11 of Part G of the Schedule to the U.P. Krishi Utapadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964. Therein, the Hon'ble Apex Court proceeded to hold as follows:
"23. Even otherwise our above view is supported by the Hindi version of the definition. As has been set out in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti it is well known that in U.P. all legislations are in Hindi. Of course an English version is simultaneously published. Undoubtedly, if there is conflict between the two than the English version would prevail. However, if there is no conflict then one can always have assistance of the Hindi version in order to find out whether the word used in English includes a particular item or not. In the Hindi version the word used is 'Chamra'. There can be no dispute that the term 'Chamra' would include 'leather' in all its forms."
13. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nityanand Sharma's case (supra) has been followed in the judgment in the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma v. Union Public Service Commission and others reported in MANU/SC/8579/2006 : (2006) 10 SCC 587. Rejecting the request for reconsideration of the law laid down in the former case, the Hon'ble Apex Court agreed with the view taken in Nityanand Sharma's case (supra).
14. Lastly, we must, to complete the narrative relating to decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in this regard, refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Trade Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Associated Distributors Limited reported in MANU/SC/7607/2008 : (2008) 7 SCC 409. In this case, the question arose whether Bubble-gum would fall under the item 'confectionery' under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court, undoubtedly, proceeded to hold as follows:
"It is pertinent to mention here that the official language of the State of Uttar Pradesh is Hindi. If any difference is found between the notifications in English and Hindi, the notification issued in Hindi will be applicable. On the said notification, the courts have decided that confectionery comes within sweets (mithai) and sweetmeat, but it has not been mentioned that bubblegum comes within the category of a sweet."
15. We may also refer to the following decision of the Kerala High Court. In the case of Mercy George v. The Kerala State Election Commission and others reported in MANU/KE/0408/2009: 2009 (2) KLJ 844. The learned Single Judge of the said Court followed the decision in Nityanand Sharma's case (supra) and treated the English version as authoritative and binding and followed the same.
16. In the case of P.K. Alavi v. The District Collector and others reported in MANU/KE/0704/2007 : ILR 2007 (4) Kerala 221, the Division Bench of the Court was called upon to decide the issue in the following factual matrix:
"A law was passed called the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001. Section 23 of the said Act in the English version read as follows:
"23. Confiscation of vehicles - Whoever transports sand without complying with the provisions of this Act shall be liable to be punished and the vehicle used for the transactions is liable for seizure by the Police or Revenue Officials.
But, in the Malyalam version, in place of the word 'confiscation' a word, the meaning of which was seizure, was used. The Division Bench proceeded to take the view that a purposeful meaning must be given and took the view that the English version would prevail.
17. In this case, we must notice certain features. The Uttar Pradesh Legislature has passed Uttar Pradesh Language (Bills and Acts) Act, 1950. Therein, Section 2 reads as follows:
"2. Hindi to be used in Bills and Acts.-The language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by the Legislature of the State of Uttar Pradesh shall be Hindi in Devanagari script."
18. In the very next year, the very same Legislature passed Uttar Pradesh Official Language Act, 1951, to which also, reference is made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant. Therein, Section 2 reads as follows:
"2. Hindi to be official language of the State.-Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 346 and 347 of the Constitution Hindi in Devanagari script shall, with effect from such date as the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, be the language used in respect of the following:-
(a) (i) ordinances promulgated under Article 213 of the Constitution;
(ii) orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued by the State Government under the Constitution of India or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of the State, and
(b) all or any of the official purposes of the State; and different dates may be appointed for different purposes in Clauses (a) and (b) aforesaid."
19. By virtue of U.P. States Reorganization Act, 2000, both these Acts are applicable in the State of Uttarakhand. Therefore, the learned senior counsel for the appellant also would contend that Hindi being the official language, it is the Hindi version, which would prevail. At this juncture, it is necessary to notice two Articles of the Constitution of India, namely, Article 345 and Article 348. Articles 345 and Article 348 of the Constitution of India read as under:
"345. Official language or languages of a State.-Subject to the provisions of articles 346 and 347, the Legislature of a State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes of that State: Provided that, until the Legislature of the State otherwise provides by law, the English language shall continue to be used for those official purposes within the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.
348. Language to be used in the Supreme Court and in the High Courts and for Acts, Bills, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until Parliament by law otherwise provides-
(a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court,
(b) the authoritative texts-
(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State,
(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a State, and
(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and byelaws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, shall be in the English language.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a) of clause (1), the Governor of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any official purposes of the State, in proceedings in the High Court having its principal seat in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or order passed or made by such High Court.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of clause (1), where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or byelaw referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article."
20. A conjoint reading of all these provisions would yield the following result:
"Under Article 345, the Legislature of a State may adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purpose of the State. This power is subject to Articles 346 and Article 347 of the Constitution of India. It is, apparently, in terms of Article 345 that the Uttar Pradesh Legislature has passed the two laws, which we have adverted to namely, Uttar Pradesh Language (Bills and Acts) Act, 1950 and Uttar Pradesh Official Language Act, 1951. By virtue of these laws, undoubtedly, the State has adopted Hindi as the language for the purpose of enacting laws be they plenary or subordinate legislation, but it is hedged in with the limitation contained in Article 348(3) of the Constitution. Under Article 348(3), it becomes the duty to publish the translation of the law, which is made in the official language other than English. The publication of the translation is to be done under the authority of the Governor of the State in the official gazette of the State. Sub Article (3) of Article 348 further declares unambiguously that it shall be deemed to be the authoritative text of the English language under Article 348. It must be remembered that Article 348(1) provides that the authoritative texts of all Bills and Acts, inter alia, are to be in English language. It is to provide for the contingency where a State adopts any other language as its official language that the founding fathers provided for a translation to be made of the law into English, which is made by the Legislature in a language other than English. This English version is, undoubtedly, to be treated as the authoritative text within the meaning of Sub Article 1 of Article 348 of the Constitution of India."
21. Having thus referred to the various provisions of law, we must consider the effect of any ambiguity, which may exist between the two versions, namely, (i) English language and (ii) any other language, which may be the official language of the State concerned. There can be broadly two situations to our mind. As in the case of Nityanand Sharma (supra) and Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra), the original version of a law may be published in the English language. It may be followed by the Hindi version of the same. The second possibility is where the law may be made in the official language of the State concerned, as in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh where Hindi is the official language. A law may be made in Hindi language; it must be followed by an English translation within the meaning of Article 348(3), which is to be treated as authoritative text under Article 348(1). In a case where a law is made in English language and a confusion arises on account of the translation found in the Hindi version, quite clearly, dominance would be accorded to the English version. When a law is made, however, in the official language, other than English language as say the Hindi language as in the facts of this case and a discrepancy occurs when the translation takes place, it can give rise to two broad situations again. The first situation would be on account of the inadequacy or ineptitude of the translator, a doubt or ambiguity may be created by virtue of the translation made under Article 348(3) of the Constitution. While, it is true that Article 348(1) declares that the translation published under Article 348(3) will be the authoritative text within the meaning of Article 348(1), as the duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, every effort must be made to reconcile the differences. An attempt must be made to find out the intention of the law-giver. Both the Hindi version and the English version can be looked into and the Court would be acting within its powers in adopting the version, which best accords with the intention of the Legislature, applying various Rules of interpretation and in particular, the purpose Rule.
22. The second category of cases is those cases, where there is a conflict between the two versions, namely, the Hindi and the English. If there is a conflict between the Hindi version and the English version, it is our view that it is the translation published under Article 348(3), of the law, in English, which would prevail. This view of ours is arrived at by following what has been laid down by not only the Hon'ble Apex Court in Park Leather Industry's case (supra) but also by the seven Judges Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mata Badal Pandey's case (supra).
23. Having enunciated the legal principles governing the field, it becomes our duty to apply the law to the facts of this case. In this case, the English version of Section 138(1)(c) does not condition the power to be exercised on the Government being satisfied, a requirement, which, undoubtedly, is found in the Hindi version. We would have to supply those words in the English translation to make it in accord with the Hindi translation. In other words, in our view, this is not a case merely of doubt or ambiguity. This is a clear case, where words to be found in the Hindi version are missing in the English version. In fact, we may apply the analogy, which the learned senior counsel for the appellant drew between day and night between the two versions while addressing at the beginning of the arguments. We agree with him that there is a world of difference in the relevant portion between the Hindi version and the English version. This being a case of a conflict between the Hindi version and the English version, following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as also the Allahabad High Court, we hold that it is the English translation which would govern the field. This means that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned order must be treated as flawed, as the Government has not applied its mind and not formed its opinion as required under the Hindi version of Section 138(1)(c), the argument must fail and we reject it.
24. The next argument raised by learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the case, which is set up by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that the power of the Government under Section 138(1)(c) has been exercised by the District Magistrate within the terms of a notification issued under Section 140 and Section 185 of the Act (In fact, Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel points out that it is Section 146 and not Section 140). Section 146 and Section 185 of the Act reads as under:
"146. Delegation of powers by the State Government.
The State Government may delegate all or any of its powers under this Act to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit to impose.
185. Delegation of powers by the State Government.
The State Government may delegate all or any of its powers under this Act to appointed authority to it subject to the Zila Panchayat or Zila Panchayats or Kshetra Panchayat or Kshetra Panchayats or Gram Panchayats."
25. Learned senior counsel for the appellant made an attempt to contend that the power must be treated as having been delegated only within the meaning of Section 138(4). Section 138(4) of the Act reads as follows:
"138(4).Suspension- (a) If after the preliminary enquiry, the Pradhan, Up pradhan, Pramukh, Up pramukh, Chairman, Vice chairman found guilty in prima facie than till the final enquiry, the State Government may be suspended to him.
(b) If it is proved that the meeting if Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat is convened in the house of Pradhan/Up Pradhan than after enquiry against the concerning person, the State Government may be suspended to him;
Provided that shall not pass any order adversely affecting an person by the State Government/designated authority unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation."
26. The notification does not limit the power of the District Magistrate to exercise power under Section 138(4). Though the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the words 'prescribed authority' is to be found in Section 138(4), we do not think that having regard to the scope of the notification under Section 185, by which the power under Section 138 has been delegated to the prescribed authority, which in the case of local Panchayat is with the District Magistrate, the power should be abridged or in any way truncated.
27. The third and the last argument, which is addressed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the portion of Section 138(1)(c), which talks about depriving the Pradhan, inter alia, of his financial powers is an independent power and, therefore, the delegated powers, which the District Magistrate enjoys under the notification under Section 185 read with Section 146 cannot be extended to it. We do not think that there is any merit in the same. The power in respect of a Pradhan, Up Pradhan and a member of the Village Panchayat is unambiguously delegated by the State Government to the District Magistrate. The delegation of the power is not called in question in the writ petition. Therefore we are not called upon to pronounce on the said question either.
28. Learned senior counsel for the appellant also has a contention that his opponents have been put in place by virtue of the constitution of a Committee. We do not think that we should go into this aspect at all.
29. The upshot of the above discussion, necessarily, is that the appeal must fail. Having said so, we however feel that a time limit must be fixed for completing the enquiry. Accordingly, we direct that the final enquiry under Section 138 of the Act must be concluded within a period of two months from today.
30. We are deeply troubled by the problem, which is posed before us in this case by the appellant, consequent upon the manner in which the translations have been made. We have been confronted with the problem of non-availability of the translated versions of various laws. We would expect that the Government will not spare any effort in the matter of promptly making translations available and, what is more important, making translations, which are faithful to the original version of the law, which is made by the Legislature. This applies not only to plenary legislation but applies to all forms of subordinate legislation. Hence, we direct that a copy of this judgment will be forwarded to the Chief Secretary, State of Uttarakhand so that the Chief Secretary may bestow his attention on this aspect of the matter. Subject to the same, the appeal will stand dismissed without any order as to cost.
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