The learned trial Judge has found that family of the landlady was consisting of the landlady, her widowed daughter, her son, daughter in law and two grand children. Taking into consideration these aspects, the learned trial Judge found that the accommodation in occupation of the plaintiffs was not sufficient to meet their requirement and as such held that the plaintiff had proved the case regarding bonafide requirement. Insofar as the ground regarding comparative hardship is concerned, the learned trial Judge has relied on the admission given by the defendant herself that she was owing a building at Dombivali. The learned Appellate Court while reversing the said finding has relied on the additional evidence which is placed on record i.e. a document regarding acquisition of flat in the name of the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff at Badlapur. The learned Appellate Judge has observed that the plaintiffs and her daughter can reside on the first floor of the building owned by her at Thane and the son and daughter-in-law alongwith their children can reside at Badlapur. While arriving at a finding that the test of comparative hardship was in the favour of the tenant, the learned Appellate Court totally ignores the admission given by the tenant that she owns a building at Dombivali. In my considered view the finding of the learned Appellate Court in this respect is nothing but pervert.
31. By now it is settled principle of law that neither the tenant nor the Court can dictate the landlord as to what is bonafide and reasonable need. It is equally settled that landlord is the best Judge of his requirement. Reliance in this respect could be placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Meenal E. Kshrisagar vs. Traders & Agencies & anr. {1997 (1) Mh. L.J.}. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court
As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the Courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises.
32. It is to be noted that learned Appellate Court has totally ignored the evidence of the father of the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff, namely Dinkar Gopal Deshpande. In any case it was not for the Appellate Court to have directed that the plaintiff's family should be separated and plaintiff and her daughter should stay at Thane and other members be shifted at Badlapur. As observed by the Apex Court, it is not for the Court to dictate to the landlord, as to how he should use the property. The learned trial Court considering that present accommodation was not sufficient for accommodating family of six members has rightly granted the decree on the said ground.
Had the Appellate Court noticed this admission, may be the finding which is recorded by him, could not have been recorded. The learned Appellate Court wants the plaintiff's family to be separated, some members to reside at Thane and others to reside at Badlapur, when they have a house of their own at Thane. It is to be noted that Dombivali is a much better location as compared to Badlapur. It is difficult to understand as to how the plaintiff landlady's family be directed to be separated and the defendant-tenant be permitted to reside in the tenanted premises, when on own admission of the defendant she owns a building at Dombivali. In that view of the matter, findings in that regard also in my considered view are not sustainable in law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Writ Petition No. 5202 of 2002 with Civil Application No. 673 of 2013
Decided On: 10.05.2013
Smt. Sudha Sumant Barve Vs. Smt. Ranjana Ramesh Padhye
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. The petition challenges the order passed by the learned Joint District Judge, Thane dated 21st June, 2002 thereby allowing civil appeal no. 145/1999 filed by the respondent-tenant and setting aside the decree of eviction as passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane in Regular Civil Suit No. 293/1995 dated 29th July, 1999. The facts in brief giving rise to the present petition are as under:
The original plaintiff is the owner of ground and first floor of a building known as Shrikrupa Building located at Gawand Peth at Thane. The husband of the defendant was the tenant of the plaintiff in respect of two rooms and kitchen with W.C./Bathroom admeasuring 650 sq. ft area on the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 160/- per month exclusive of taxes since March 1974. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the suit premises were given on rent to the husband of the defendant only for residential purposes. The husband of the defendant-tenant died on 17th December, 1993. After the death of defendant's husband she started residing alongwith her two children in the suit premises.
2. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant was working in Murphy Co. at Thane and after accepting the voluntary retirement scheme she started a creche in the suit premises. According to the plaintiff there were 18-20 children in the said creche. It is the case of the plaintiff that on account of this, there was a nuisance to the plaintiff as well as other residents of the Society.
3. According to the plaintiff rent was unpaid since 1st January, 1994. It can be seen from the record that defendant sent a notice dated 15th March, 1994 to the plaintiff requesting for changing rent receipt in her name. However, plaintiff by her reply dated 22nd June, 1994 terminated the tenancy of the defendant. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had erected permanent structures without her permission as under:
i) North side open gallery is enclosed by iron grills 14' X 4'.
ii) West side open gallery is also enclosed by iron grills 13' X 4'.
iii) The original doors were broken.
iv) East side window covered by iron angles 5' X 2'.
4. It was further the case of the plaintiff that plaintiff was residing alongwith her family members, totally 6 in number. The members residing were the plaintiff herself who was a schizophrenia patient, her divorced daughter namely Rekha Sumant Barve, son of plaintiff namely Yeshwant, his wife, their two school going children. It is the case of the plaintiff that area in their occupation was only 300 sq. ft with common toilet and bathroom and that the said area was inadequate. The plaintiffs, therefore, pleaded for the requirement of the suit premises on the ground of bonafide requirement also. On the basis of the aforesaid contentions, a suit for eviction came to be filed by the plaintiff.
5. The defendant resisted the suit by filing the written-statement. One of the grounds raised by the plaintiff was regarding non-joinder of the necessary parties i.e. her son and daughter. It was the contention of the defendant that plaintiff had deliberately not joined them as respondent. It was further the case of the defendant that though after the death of her husband she attempted to pay rent, the same was not accepted. It was also the further case that even money orders were not accepted and as such defendant was depositing the rent in the Bank. Insofar as starting of creche is concerned, the same was specifically denied by the defendant. It was her case that she was taking students to the school and bringing them back from school residing in nearby locality, so as to earn her livelihood. She also denied the contention regarding the permanent alteration made to the structure. The contention of the plaintiff regarding bonafide requirement was also denied by the defendant.
6. On these pleadings the suit was tried by the learned trial Judge. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge negated the issue regarding non-maintainability of the suit. The learned Judge of the trial Court gave positive findings on the issue regarding causing nuisance and annoyance, carrying out permanent alterations in the suit premises without the consent of the landlord and requirement of suit premises for reasonable and bonafide requirement. The learned trial Judge also found that test of comparative hardship was also in favour of the plaintiff and as such decreed the suit.
7. Being aggrieved thereby an appeal was preferred by the respondent. During the pendency of appeal, an application came to be filed by the appellant for leading additional evidence. The said additional evidence sought to be brought on record was regarding certified copy of the agreement of a flat, which was allegedly acquired by the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff. The learned Appellate Court had rejected the said application. However, in civil revision application the learned Single Judge of this Court vide judgment and order dated 30th January, 2002 allowed the application to lead the evidence. However, the said order restricted it only to the extent for permission to lead the additional evidence, on the question as to whether the daughter-in-law of the respondent had after the judgment acquired possession of alternate premises. After considering the rival submissions the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decree. Being aggrieved thereby the present petition.
8. Shri Joshi the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that learned Appellate Court has grossly erred in allowing the appeal. The learned Counsel submits that the learned Appellate Court has failed to take into consideration the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum (Mst) v/s. Mohd. Usman & Ors. MANU/SC/0590/1991 : (1991) 3 SCC page-114. The learned Counsel submits that Apex Court has clearly held that, if the interest of the other members of the family is effectively represented by the defendant, then merely because such members are not impleaded as defendant, cannot be a ground for dismissal of the suit. The learned Counsel submits that, as a matter of fact a notice was given by the defendant herself on her behalf and her children, that after her death she should be treated as tenant and the rent receipts be issued in her name. The learned Counsel further submits that learned Appellate Court has erred in dismissing the suit on this ground.
9. The learned Counsel further submits that insofar as the finding of the Appellate Court regarding change of user is concerned, the same is also not sustainable. He submits that learned trial Judge had correctly held that suit premises were let out for residential purposes and use thereof for the purpose of creche was not sustainable. Shri Joshi further submits that the finding of the Appellate Court regarding carrying out any alterations in the structure of permanent nature is concerned, the same is also not sustainable. He submits that learned trial Judge has rightly upon apprehension of material held that the defendant had changed the user and rightly decreed the suit. He submits that the learned trial Judge has failed to take into consideration the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dr. C.C. Yi v/s. Smt. Janakidevi Anantlal Gupta & ors. Janakidevi Gupta & ors. {MANU/MH/0324/2001 : 2001 (3) ALL MR. 324}.
10. The learned Counsel submits that the finding of the learned Appellate Court on the ground of bonafide requirement is also totally unsustainable. The learned Counsel submits that during the pendency of the proceedings the original plaintiff has died. However, her daughter who is a divorced is having severe arthritis problem and as such not in a position to climb on the first floor. It is stated that though an additional area of 200 sq. meters on the first floor has become vacant, the same is not sufficient for the need of family of the plaintiff i.e. her daughter, son, daughter-in-law and two grand children. It is submitted that grand children who were taking education are now grown up and their marriages cannot be arranged on account of paucity of accommodation. The learned Counsel submits that the learned Appellate Court has also grossly erred in reversing the finding on the ground of comparative hardship. It is submitted that the respondent-tenant is owning a house at Dombivali. Her children are earning handsomely and as such test of comparative hardship is rather in favour of the plaintiff than the defendant. The learned Counsel, therefore, submits that petition deserves to be allowed.
11. Shri Joshi submitted that insofar as finding regarding Badlapur flat is concerned, it is the specific case of the plaintiff that said flat is purchased by the father of the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff out of the funds received by him on his retirement and that he is residing in the said flat. He submits that inspite of this specific case being put up, the learned Appellate Court has failed to take the same into consideration.
12. As against this Shri Agrawal, Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent, relying on various judgments of Apex Court as well as this Court, submits that the suit without impleading the son and daughter of the defendant was itself bad in law and as such has been rightly dismissed by the learned Appellate Court. The learned Counsel relies on following judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court.
1. MANU/SC/0105/1995 : AIR 1995 SC 515
Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha V/s. Eileen K. Patricia D'Rozarie
2. MANU/SC/0358/1990 : AIR 1990 SC 2053
Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit V/s. Balmohan Gopal Kurup
3. MANU/MH/0786/1998 : 1998 (1) Bom. C.R. 712
Laxmidas Morarji V/s. Jahangir Dinshaw Bamji
4. 1997 VLJ 884
(BOMBAY HIGH COURT) Batubhai Malubhai V/s. Rampyaribai Bhaulal Kanwaj
5. 1996 Bom. R.C. 233
(BOMBAY HIGH COURT) Moro Vinayak Sathe Trust V/s. Mangal Gour Mohanlal Maniyar
6. MANU/MH/0295/1985 : AIR 1986 BOM. 288
Guruprasad V/s. Addl. Dist. Magistrate Nagpur
7. MANU/GJ/0069/1977 : 1977 (2) RCR 58
(GUJRAT HIGH COURT) Malangbhai Gabubhai V/s. Dhankorben & Ors.
8. MANU/SC/0358/1990 : AIR 1990 SC 2053
Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit V/s. Balmohan Gopal Kurup
The learned Counsel submits that judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Textiles Association (India) Bombay Unit v/s. Balmohan Gopal Kurup cited supra is by the three Hon'ble Judges whereas the judgment in the case of Surayya Begum cited supra is by two Hon'ble Judges and as such it is the judgment in the case of Textile Association which would bind this Court. The learned Counsel submits that in view of consistent view taken by this Court, that the suit itself was not tenable, no interference would be warranted with the judgment of the Appellate Court. The learned Counsel further submits that the finding of the learned Appellate Court on the issue of change of user and alterations of permanent nature is also correct in law and warrants no interference. The learned Counsel submits that insofar as bonafide requirement is concerned, the finding is also in accordance with law. He submits that the plaintiff apart from now having an additional 200 sq. meters area on first floor, also has a flat at Badlapur and as such the ground of bonafide requirement is without substance. The learned Counsel further submits that on the test of comparative hardship also defendant has a better case, inasmuch as she is living in the suit premises with her two children, whereas the plaintiffs have a sufficient accommodation to live in. The learned Counsel, therefore, submits that suit deserves to be dismissed with costs.
13. The first question that will have to be considered is as to whether the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court that suit as filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable in law is correct or not?
14. The learned Appellate Judge has held that the suit as filed by the present plaintiffs was not maintainable in law inasmuch as the son and daughter of the defendant who are also the legal heirs of the original tenant were not impleaded as defendant. The learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously urged that the view taken by the learned Appellate Court in this regard is taken on the basis of the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Textile Association cited supra and submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed on short ground. The learned Counsel also relies on the various judgments of the this Court in support of his contention that it has been a consistent view of this Court that the suit without impleading all the legal heirs of the original tenant is not maintainable in law.
15. Undisputedly, in the present case the son and daughter of the defendant were not impleaded as parties.
16. I will first deal with the judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent of this Court. In the case of Laxmidas Morarji cited supra the question was as to whether the respondent no. 5 therein who was residing as a tenant at the time of her death as a member of tenant's family would be entitled to inherit the tenancy of the suit premises or not? The learned Judge held that since the said respondent was residing as adopted daughter, she was also entitled to inherit right to tenancy. As such the said judgment on facts would not be applicable to the present case. Insofar as judgment in the case of Moro Vinayak Sathe Trust cited supra is concerned, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that in view of the judgment of the Textile Association of India cited supra the suit filed only against the widow without impleading the two sons and daughter of Mohanlal was not maintainable. As such the learned Counsel for the respondent is right in relying on the said judgment.
17. The question before the learned Single Judge of this Court at Nagpur Bench in the case of Guruprasad cited supra was as to whether the tenancy of the tenant would be inherited by a person who never stayed with his father and never participated in the said business. As such the said judgment is also not applicable to the facts of the present case.
18. The learned Counsel for the respondent is relying on the following paragraph of the judgment of Hon'ble three Judges of the Apex Court in the case of Textile Association cited supra. The said paragraph reads thus:
4. Mr. Lalit, counsel for the appellants argued that the ex parte decree obtained against the joint tenants was equally binding on the respondent. Reference was made in this context to the decisions of this Court in Kanji Manji v. The Trustees of the port of Bombay and H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul MANU/SC/0209/1989 : [1989] 2 SCR 769. Both the cases relate to the validity of the notice issued to one of the joint tenants. It was held that the notice issued to one of them would be valid. We do not think that the principle stated in those cases on the facts obtained are relevant to the present case. There is a finding in this case that the respondent was as much a tenant as the mother and the other brother. That being the position the ex parte decree for eviction obtained against his mother and brother without impleading him in that suit has to be set aside. It is not sufficient as the Courts below have said that the decree was not binding upon the respondent. That decree cannot be kept alive against two other tenants and possession of the premises could be exclusively given to the respondent. The respondent cannot be put into exclusive possession of the premises since his mother and brother are also equally entitled to. It seems to us, therefore, the ex parte decree for eviction should be set aside and the petitioner should be impleaded as a party to that suit and it should proceed on merits.
It is to be noted that the said judgment was considered by Bench of Hon'ble two Judges of the Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum v/s. Mohd. Usman & ors. In the said case the Apex Court was considering two appeals. In one appeal Surayya Begum was claiming herself as one of the nine legal representatives of Khalil Raza, the original tenant of the premises. She had objected to the execution of the decree of eviction obtained by the landlord-respondent no. 1 against respondents 2-9 who were sons, daughter and wife of Khalil Raza. Her case was that she was also a daughter of Khalil Raza which fact was denied by respondent no. 1. It was contended on her behalf that since she was not impleaded as party to the eviction proceedings started by the respondent, her right in the tenancy which is an independent right, cannot be put to an end by permitting the decree obtained to be executed. The said Surayya Begum had relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Textile Association cited supra in support of her claim that she was as much the tenant of the suit premises as her mother, brother and sisters.
19. In another appeal one Shri Shivkumar Sharma was the original tenant. He died in the year 1982 leaving behind his widow, three sons and four daughters as his heirs and legal representatives. The eviction proceedings were initiated by the landlord in the year 1985 impleading only the wife and sons of the deceased. Out of the four daughters, two were married and remaining two daughters i.e. the appellants before the Apex Court were staying in the tenanted house but not joined as party. The suit was contested by the mother and the brothers of the appellant. After contest the decree was passed. In execution the unmarried daughters filed an objection, inter alia contending that they have independent title in the tenancy and decree obtained against the other members of the family would not bind them. The said appellants had also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Textile Association cited supra. The Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum observed thus in paras 8 and 9:-
8. So far Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act is concerned, when it directs that the heirs of a Hindu dying intestate shall take his property as tenants-in-common, it is dealing with the rights of the heirs inter se amongst them, and not with their relationship with a stranger having a superior or distinctly separate right therein. The relationship between the stranger and the heirs of a deceased tenant is not the subject matter of the section. Similar is the situation when the tenant is a Mohammedan. However, it is not necessary for us to elaborate this aspect in the present appeals. The main dispute between the parties, as it appears from their respective stands in the courts below, is whether the heirs of the original tenants who were parties to the proceeding, represented the objector-heirs also. According to the decree holder in Miss Renu Sharma's case their interest was adequately represented by their mother and brothers and they are as much bound by the decree as the named judgment debtors. In Surayya Begum's case the respondent No. 1 has denied the appellant's claim of being one of the daughters of Khalil Raza, and has been contending that the full estate of Khalil Raza which devolved upon his heirs on his death was completely represented by the respondent Nos. 2 to 9. In other words, even if the appellant is held to be a daughter of Khalil Raza the further question as to whether her interest was represented by the other members of the family will have to be answered.
9. The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A Karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the CPC;-
Explanation VI-Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
This, of course, is subject to the essential condition that the interest of a person concerned has really been represented by the others; in other words, his interest has been looked after in a bona fide manner. If there be any clash of interests between the person concerned and his assumed representative or if the latter due to collusion or for any other reason, malafide neglects to defend the case, he can not be considered to be a representative. The issue, when it becomes relevant, has, therefore, to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty; but in other cases the issue may have to be decided with reference to relevant evidence to be led by the parties. Surraya Begum's case is of this class while Renu Sharma's appeal belongs to the first category.
The Apex Court in the aforesaid case, therefore, has in unequivocal terms observed that principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in the judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. The Apex Court has further observed that this is of course subject to the essential condition, that interest of the person concerned has really been represented by others. The Apex Court observed that the test would be whether the interest of such unknown person had been looked after in a bonafide manner or not? The Apex Court had further observed that if on account of clash of interest between the persons concerned and his assumed representative or if the latter, due to collusion or any other reason, malafide neglects to defend the case, cannot be considered to be representative. The Apex Court has further observed that issue, therefore, has to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Though the Apex Court observed that in Surayya Begum's case disputed questions of facts were involved, which require leading of evidence and as such remitted the matter to the Executing Court for decision, the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Renu Sharma would be relevant:
11. So far Renu Sharma's matter is concerned, the situation is very different. The judgments of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi and the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, indicate that although the adequate liberty was given to the present appellant to lead evidence in support of their cases, they never availed of the same and went on delaying the proceedings by repeated prayers of adjournment. They have also pointed out to the other circumstances adverse to the case of the appellants, including the facts that the rent was paid to the landlord by their mother and brothers and never by them, and they are young girls in the family who are being looked after by the elders. We are, in the circumstances, of the view that they must be held to be effectively represented by the named judgment-debtors. Their appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
20. The facts in the present case are almost similar to the facts in the case of Renu Sharma. In the present case the defendant and her two children Amol and Bhakti had addressed a notice to the plaintiff, stating therein that after the death of the defendant's husband namely Ramesh, they have become joint tenants. They have themselves informed that, after the death of the defendant's husband the rent receipts which were given in the name of the defendant's husband should be given in the name of the defendant. It is not in dispute that at the time of the suit, the defendant's son and daughter were minor and taking education and their interest was looked after by the defendant. Not only that, even according to the defendant, the rent was attempted to be paid by her. In this respect it would also be relevant to refer to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Kanti Bhattacharya & ors. v/s. K.S. Parmeshwaran & anr. {MANU/MH/0659/1993 : 1994 (3) Bom. C.R. 100}. In the said case also, it was sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioners therein, that notice was sent only to the widow of the original tenant and not to the legal heirs and as such decree passed was not tenable. The learned Single Judge on the facts of said case also came to the conclusion that from the various circumstances narrated, it was clear that there was an agreement between members of the tenant's family and Usha Rani Devi (original tenant's widow) was treated as a tenant by the tenant's family. Therefore, the notice served upon him is binding on all the members.
21. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Textile Association cited supra was also pressed into service before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge had called for the original copy of the petition in the Court. After perusal of the original petition, the learned Single Judge has observed thus:
20. In view of the findings recorded by the two courts below which is accepted by me, I need not go to the other question raised by the petitioners and the respondents regarding the concept of tenancy in common and the joint tenancy. Though Shri Angal tried to rely upon MANU/SC/0358/1990 : AIR 1990 SC 2053 (supra), since all the facts were not stated in the judgment, I called for the original copy of the petition in the Court and from the petition I could verify and find out that the person against whom the suit was instituted was not residing in the suit premises as a member of the tenant's family at the suit address. In fact he was residing somewhere else. The landlord filed the suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and default in payment of rent. The suit was decreed exparte against the son and decree was put into execution and the possession was recovered by the landlord. The matter went to Supreme Court which arose as a result of the dispute raised by the other members of the tenant's family, viz., the widow and son who were not only the heirs of the tenant but who were members of the tenant's family residing at the suit address at the time of death of tenant who were not joined as party defendants and therefore in fact under the circumstances the suit was not instituted or filed against the tenant. Thus it was held that under section 5(11)(c) the landlord cannot choose amongst the members of the tenant's family who is not residing at the time of the death along with the tenant. Therefore in the facts of that case the decree and order passed by the Supreme Court appears to be correct. The question that arose before me is totally different. I see no substance in this petition. I therefore reject the petition, discharge the rule. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
(emphasis supplied)
22. It can thus be seen that in the National Textile case cited supra the facts were totally different. The defendant who was impleaded in the suit was not residing in the suit premises as a member of tenant's family at the suit address. In fact he was residing somewhere else. The suit filed against such a person, was decreed and the exparte decree was put into execution and possession was taken by the landlord. The matter went before the Apex Court at the instance of the other members of the tenant's family i.e. widow and her son, who were not only the heirs of the tenants, but were members of the tenant's family residing at the suit address, at the time of the death of the tenant. It is thus clear that in the case before the Supreme Court, the landlord instead of impleading the members of the tenants family who were residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his death in the tenanted premises, had impleaded member of the tenant's family who was not residing in the tenanted premises but residing at some other place and obtained an exparte decree.
23. It will be appropriate to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of The Regional Manager & anr. v/s. Pawan Kumar Dubey {MANU/SC/0464/1976 : (1976) 3 SCC 334}.
It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.
It could thus clearly be seen from the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court that rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case is the one which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. It has further been held by the Apex Court that one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.
24. In the light of the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, we will have to examine the facts in the case of National Textile cited supra and the facts in the case of Surayya Begum cited supra. As already discussed herein above in the case of National Textile the plaintiff had filed a suit against the member of the family, who was not residing in the tenanted premises at the time of death of tenant, but was residing separately and had obtained a decree without impleading the members of the family residing in the suit premises. Such are not the facts in the present case. In the case of Surayya Begum, though a SLP was allowed insofar as appeal of Surayya Begum, it will be relevant to refer to the decision of the said Court in the case of Renu Sharma. The Apex Court found that since said Renu Sharma and her sister were residing with her mother and brother and that they were the young girls in the family who have been looked after by the elders and that the rent was paid by the mother and brothers, it will have to be held that their interest was effectively represented by the judgment debtors and accordingly their appeals can be dismissed. The facts in the present case are almost identical. The defendant alongwith her children had addressed a notice which is at exhibit 38 stating therein that after the death of her husband, she and her children have become tenant but the rent receipt should be given in her name alone. The rent even according to her, was attempted to be paid by her. It is not in dispute that at the relevant time, her children were minor, taking education and looked after by her. It can be seen that not only the suit is effectively defended, the appeal is also diligently prosecuted by the present defendant. In that view of the matter, it will have to be held that interest of children of the defendant was effectively represented by the defendant. It is nobody's case that interest of the defendant is not common with interest of her children or that it is hostile to each other. As held by the Apex Court, it is the rule deducible from application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case that will operate as ratio decidendi. It has further been held that some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar would not amount to ratio decidendi, since one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases, even when same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. The facts in the present case are not even remotely near the facts to the case of National Textile cited supra, but are almost identical to the case of Surayya Begum (Renu Sharma) cited supra. In that view of the matter, I find that the present case would be governed by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum and not the Textile Association.
25. With respect I may note that though the judgment in the case of Textile Association cited supra is decided by three Hon'ble Judges and judgment in the case of Surayya Begum cited supra is delivered by two Hon'ble Judges, there will be no conflict in the said two judgments in as much as the factual position in both the matters is totally different. In that view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that suit was not maintainable in view of the judgment of the National Textiles. I am of the considered view that the suit as filed was maintainable in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum cited supra. Though the learned Counsel is relying on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Moro Vinayak Sathe Trust cited supra, the said judgment does not notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum and as such view taken therein is in ignorance of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Surayya Begum.
26. In that view of the matter, I find that finding of the Appellate Court that suit is not maintainable is not correct in law.
27. Since I have held that finding of the Appellate Court that the suit was not maintainable in law is not sustainable, I will have to now consider the question as to whether the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court while reversing the finding on the ground of nuisance, alteration of permanent nature, bonafide requirement and comparative hardship require interference or not?
28. Insofar as the ground regarding change of user is concerned, the perusal of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that insofar as finding regarding change of user and nuisance is concerned, the learned trial Judge has elaborately considered this aspect in paragraphs 10-22 of his judgment. Insofar as this ground is concerned, it is the case of the plaintiff that defendant is using the suit premises for the purpose of creche and since about 18-20 children are using the same, nuisance is caused to the plaintiff as well as the neighbourer. The learned trial Judge has relied on the evidence of the Constituted Attorney of the plaintiff namely Rekha, the evidence of defendant i.e. DW-2 Dattatray and DW-3 Suchita. The PW-1 had specifically states that the premises are being used by the defendant for the purpose of creche. PW-3 Pushpa is an independent witness. She knows the defendant as well as the plaintiff and had stated that she used to visit the plaintiff and defendant on an interval of 1 or 2 days, since she was residing in the nearby vicinity. She has stated that she has seen 10-15 children in the house of the defendant. However, though she was cross-examined her evidence in this regard had gone unsheltered. The learned trial Judge has also considered the evidence of DW-2 and DW-3. Though these witnesses have been examined by the defendant, they have themselves stated that since nobody was in their house to take care of their children, the defendant was taking care of them. DW-3 Suchita had further stated that her son used to stay in the house of the defendant between 1.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. and she used to pay Rs. 150 per month to the defendant. It can thus clearly be seen that the evidence of these witnesses supports the case of the plaintiff, rather than that of the defendants. Insofar as nuisance is concerned, it seems that even the Society wherein the plaintiff's house is situated, had addressed a communication to the plaintiff regarding nuisance caused to the members of the Society and asking her to take steps. The said complaint of the Society is duly exhibited at exhibit 37. In that view of the matter, the findings given by the learned Appellate Court that the premises were being put for commercial use and nuisance was caused due to the activities of the defendant could not have been faulted with. However, the learned Appellate Court relying on various judgments, regarding the premises a part of which were used for holding music classes or for tailoring purpose, reversed the well reasoned finding of the learned trial Court regarding change of user. Insofar as nuisance is concerned, the learned Appellate Court holds that if the parents of the children are coming to the suit premises by scooter or auto rickshaw, some nuisance is bound to occur to the plaintiff or neighbouring occupants, however, such a nuisance is not an actionable nuisance. I find that learned Appellate Judge was not justified in reversing a well reasoned finding in that regard by the learned trial Court.
29. Insofar as the finding on the issue of carrying out permanent construction in the suit premises without written consent of the plaintiff is concerned, the learned trial Judge has taken into consideration the evidence of the Constituted Attorney of the plaintiff, wherein she has stated that defendant has closed the western side gallery by putting the grill and the door and removed the old doors. She has further stated that for access to the said premises, there was door from eastern side and defendant has put new doors from western side for access to the suit premises. The learned trial Judge also relied on the photographs, which are at exhibit 41 to 46 and negatives are at exhibit 47. The learned trial Judge has further considered the evidence of the plaintiff, that the construction on the western side gallery is on the land a measuring 13X4 feet and the construction of northern gallery is on the land admeasuring 14X4 feet. It is to be noted that defendant has flatly denied making such construction. It is to be noted that it is the case of the defendant that the plaintiff and her son permitted the defendant to put iron rods to the galleries and windows of the suit premises. However, the learned trial Judge found that, what was required under Section 13(1)(b) of the said Act was a written consent and since the defendant had not placed on record any such written consent, the contention of the defendant could not be accepted. The learned trial Judge in this respect has relied on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court Somnath Krishnaji Gangal vs. Moreshwar K. Kale & ors. {MANU/MH/0707/1994 : 1995 MLJ 675}. However, the learned Appellate Court coming to an erroneous conclusion has observed that, the said grills were for safety purpose and the same are not permanently injurious to the suit premises and saved by explanation to Section 13(1)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dr. C.C. Yi vs. Smt. Jankidevi An. Gupta & ors. {MANU/MH/0324/2001 : 2001 (3) ALL MR. 324}. The learned Judge observed in paras 24 and 25 thus:
24. Apart from the aforesaid endorsement of the findings of the Courts below, if, each item of construction is taken into account separately, even then no fault can be found with the findings of the Courts below. The construction and erection of loft, if viewed, taking into account the mode, degree of annexation and intention of the parry putting up the structure, it can hardly be said that it is not a construction of permanent nature or a permanent structure. It has brought a substantial improvement and change in the nature and form of the accommodation. The loft appears to have been constructed without prior permission of the Municipal Authorities. As a matter of fact, under the Standardised Building Byelaws and Development Control Rules for A Class Municipal Councils of Maharashtra, such construction needs prior permission of the Municipal Council. No material was placed on record to show that any such prior or subsequent permission was obtained. The construction of Potmala or loft has an effect of increasing load on the wall on which it was constructed and can prove fatal to the wall or the structure on which additional load was created. This single act of permanent construction is sufficient to sustain the findings of both the Courts below in this behalf.
25. The second item of construction i.e. removal of wooden doors and replacement thereof by plywood doors; even if considered separately, the result cannot be different. Once the door is fitted to the permanent structure, it becomes part of the immovable property, viz. building. It does not remain a movable item or a distinct item of furniture. Therefore, removal of door or replacement thereof is nothing but a change in the permanent structure. The judicial note can always be taken of the fact that durability of wooden doors is much more than that of the plywood doors. Life of the plywood doors cannot match with that of wooden doors. Thus, this act of tenant has also been prejudicial to the interest of the landlord and has diminished the value and life of the doors and consequently of the suit premises. As such, the act of replacement of the wooden doors with that of plywood doors that too without written permission of the landlord has rightly been treated as an act in violation of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act by both the Courts below.
The construction which has been carried out by the defendant has been reproduced by me in earlier paragraph 4 of this judgment. In view of the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court cited supra, even removal of wooden door and replacing them by plywood door without consent and construction of loft by making Potmala, has been held to be a construction of permanent nature. Undisputedly, since the construction referred herein above was made by the defendant without obtaining the written consent of the landlord, the finding of the learned trial Court in that regard could not have been unseated by the learned Appellate Court.
30. That leave us to the last question, as to whether the learned Appellate Court, was justified in interfering with the finding of learned trial Court on the ground of bonafide requirement and the finding regarding comparative hardship. The learned trial Judge while arriving at a finding that the suit premises were required for bonafide and reasonable requirement of the landlady has relied on the evidence of the Constituted Attorney of the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge has found that family of the landlady was consisting of the landlady, her widowed daughter, her son, daughter in law and two grand children. Taking into consideration these aspects, the learned trial Judge found that the accommodation in occupation of the plaintiffs was not sufficient to meet their requirement and as such held that the plaintiff had proved the case regarding bonafide requirement. Insofar as the ground regarding comparative hardship is concerned, the learned trial Judge has relied on the admission given by the defendant herself that she was owing a building at Dombivali. The learned Appellate Court while reversing the said finding has relied on the additional evidence which is placed on record i.e. a document regarding acquisition of flat in the name of the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff at Badlapur. The learned Appellate Judge has observed that the plaintiffs and her daughter can reside on the first floor of the building owned by her at Thane and the son and daughter-in-law alongwith their children can reside at Badlapur. While arriving at a finding that the test of comparative hardship was in the favour of the tenant, the learned Appellate Court totally ignores the admission given by the tenant that she owns a building at Dombivali. In my considered view the finding of the learned Appellate Court in this respect is nothing but pervert.
31. By now it is settled principle of law that neither the tenant nor the Court can dictate the landlord as to what is bonafide and reasonable need. It is equally settled that landlord is the best Judge of his requirement. Reliance in this respect could be placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Meenal E. Kshrisagar vs. Traders & Agencies & anr. {1997 (1) Mh. L.J.}. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court
As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the Courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises.
32. It is to be noted that learned Appellate Court has totally ignored the evidence of the father of the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff, namely Dinkar Gopal Deshpande. In any case it was not for the Appellate Court to have directed that the plaintiff's family should be separated and plaintiff and her daughter should stay at Thane and other members be shifted at Badlapur. As observed by the Apex Court, it is not for the Court to dictate to the landlord, as to how he should use the property. The learned trial Court considering that present accommodation was not sufficient for accommodating family of six members has rightly granted the decree on the said ground. It is further to be noted that the petitioner has brought on record subsequent developments which are not disputed by the respondents. During the pendency of the proceedings the original plaintiff has died. Her divorced daughter is now aged and suffering from severe arthritis, two grand children of the plaintiff namely Ameya and Anuja who were at the relevant time taking education are now of marriageable age. It is the case of the landlord that on account of paucity of accommodation their marriage could not be solemnized. Even taking into consideration that an area of 200 sq. feet has become vacant during the pendency of the present petitioner, it cannot be said that area in occupation of the petitioners would be sufficient to accommodate the family consisting of plaintiff's daughter, son, daughter in law and their two children. It is to be noted that family is a growing family and as such requirement cannot be said to be fanciful. In that view of the matter, I find that the interference by the learned Appellate Court on the ground of bonafide requirement was also not justified.
33. I find that the findings given by the learned Appellate Court on the ground of comparative hardship is totally pervert. The learned Appellate Court finds that the flat ad measuring 540 sq. feet in the name of plaintiff's daughter-in-law is available wherein daughter-in-law alongwith her husband and children can shift and further finds that defendant has no accommodation and will be thrown out on road. The learned Appellate Court, therefore, finds that test of comparative hardship is in favour of the defendant. It is to be noted that finding in this regard recorded by the learned trial Court, was on the basis of the admission which was given by the defendant herself in her evidence. However, the same has been totally ignored and overlooked by the learned Appellate Court. The defendant in her cross-examination has stated that:
(It is true that I have a building at Dombivali).
Had the Appellate Court noticed this admission, may be the finding which is recorded by him, could not have been recorded. The learned Appellate Court wants the plaintiff's family to be separated, some members to reside at Thane and others to reside at Badlapur, when they have a house of their own at Thane. It is to be noted that Dombivali is a much better location as compared to Badlapur. It is difficult to understand as to how the plaintiff landlady's family be directed to be separated and the defendant-tenant be permitted to reside in the tenanted premises, when on own admission of the defendant she owns a building at Dombivali. In that view of the matter, findings in that regard also in my considered view are not sustainable in law.
34. In the totality of the circumstances, the view taken by the learned Appellate Court is not permissible in law. The learned Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the well reasoned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. I am of the considered view that the findings as recorded by the learned Appellate Court are totally upon mis-appreciation of material placed on record and not sustainable in law and as such this is a fit case wherein the Court is required to set aside the judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court and restore the order passed by the learned trial Court.
35. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is restored.
36. In view of disposal of petition, nothing survives for consideration in the civil application, the same is disposed of accordingly. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the respondent has requested for stay of this order. Shri Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner makes a statement that petitioner shall not execute the decree for a period of ten weeks from today. In that view of the matter, no order is necessary.
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