As a matter of fact, having regard to the nature
of controversy involved in the suit and the issues
arising in the case, the questions raised in the
second appeal did constitute substantial questions
of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code.
14) Indeed, in our considered view, the questions,
viz., whether the suit seeking a declaration that the
demand of House Tax raised under the Act is
maintainable, whether such suit is barred and, if
so, by virtue of which provision of the Act, whether
plaintiff has any alternative statutory remedy
available under the Act for adjudication of his
grievance and, if so, which is that remedy, and
lastly, whether the plaintiff has properly valued the
suit and, if so, whether they have paid the proper
Court fees on the reliefs claimed in the suit were
legal questions arising in the appeal and involved
jurisdictional issues requiring adjudication on
merits in accordance with law. The High Court
unfortunately did not examine any of these issues
much less in its proper perspective in the light of
relevant provisions of the Act governing the
controversy.
15) The High Court thus, in our view, committed
jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second
appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the
approach of the High Court.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1182 OF 2007
Faridabad Complex
Administration
V
M/s Iron Master India (P) Ltd.
Citation: (2017) 4 SCC 136
1) This appeal is filed by the appellant(defendant)
against the final judgment and order dated
16.02.2004 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 530 of 2004
by which the High Court dismissed the regular
second appeal filed by the appellant herein in limine
against the judgment and decree dated 22.10.2003
passed by the Additional District Judge, Faridabad
in C.A. No. 166 of 2002 whereby the appeal filed by
the respondent(plaintiff) was allowed, the judgment
and decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside
and the suit of the respondent was decreed.
2) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to
appreciate the issued involved in this appeal.
3) The respondent is a Limited Company having
their place of business in Faridabad. The appellant
is a Municipal Corporation, Faridabad as defined
under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”).
4) The respondent is subjected to payment of
various taxes including House Tax under the Act on
the properties owned by them at Faridabad. The
respondent filed a civil suit seeking permanent
injunction against the appellant restraining them
from recovering the House Tax for the years
1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 from the
respondent on their properties. The appellant also
sought a declaration that a demand notice dated
20.11.1993 raised by the appellant calling upon the
respondent to pay Rs.48,599.40 towards the House
Tax on their properties is illegal.
5) The appellant filed written statement and
defended the aforementioned demands on various
grounds. The appellant also raised an objection
about the maintainability of the Suit.
6) The Trial Court framed issues. Parties adduced
evidence. Vide judgment and decree dated
20.09.2002 in Case No. 1483 of 1995, the Trial
Court dismissed the Suit. Felt aggrieved, the
respondent filed appeal being Civil Appeal No. 166
of 2002 before the Additional District Judge,
Faridabad. By order dated 22.10.2003, the
Additional District Judge allowed the appeal, set
aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
and decreed the respondent's suit against the
appellant.
7) Felt aggrieved, the appellant(defendant) filed
second appeal before the High Court wherein the
appellant had proposed several substantial
questions of law arising in the case. The High
Court, however, dismissed the second appeal in
limine by impugned judgment/order holding that
the second appeal does not involve any substantial
question of law. It is against this judgment, the
appellant(defendant) has filed this appeal by way of
special leave petition before this Court.
8) It is unfortunate that no one appeared for the
appellant to argue the appeal before this Court
when the case was called on for hearing twice. We,
however, refrained ourselves from dismissing the
appeal in default and instead perused the record
with the assistance of Mr. A.K. Singla, learned
senior counsel for the respondent with a view to
decide the appeal on merits.
9) Having heard learned senior counsel for the
respondent and on perusal of the record of the case,
we are inclined to allow the appeal and remand the
case to the High Court for deciding the second
appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.
10) The question, which arises for consideration in
this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified
in dismissing the second appeal of the
appellant(defendant) in limine holding that it does
not involve any substantial question of law?
11) The learned Single Judge while dismissing the
appeal passed the following order:
“This Regular Second Appeal has been
filed by the defendant against the judgment
and decree dated 22.10.2003, passed by the
Additional District Judge, whereby the appeal
filed by the plaintiff was accepted, the
judgment and decree passed by the trial
Court were set aside and the suit of the
plaintiff was decreed.
While decreeing the suit of the plaintiff,
it was found by the learned Additional
District Judge that before fixing the annual
value and imposing the house tax, the
defendant had failed to decide the objections
filed by the plaintiff against the proposed
amendment of the assessment list. It was
found that in fact the case of the defendant
was that no objections were filed. However,
when a copy of the objections and the notice
for personal hearing were shown to DW1
(produced by the defendant), he had to admit
that those documents were issued by the
defendant. It was found that from those
documents, it was clear that the plaintiff had
filed objections against the proposed
amendment of the assessment list and there
is nothing on the record to show that the
objections were decided before the annual
value was fixed and the house tax was
imposed. This finding of the learned
Additional District Judge, in my opinion, is a
finding of fact based on the evidence led by
the parties, especially when there is nothing
on the record to show that there is any
misreading of evidence or that any material
evidence had been ignored by the learned
Additional District Judge while giving this
finding. Once it is found that the defendant
had failed to follow the procedure laid down
under the Act while imposing the house tax,
in my opinion, the civil Court certainly had
the jurisdiction to entertain the present suit
and the finding of the learned Additional
District Judge in this regard also has to be
affirmed.
In this view of the matter, in my
opinion, there is no scope for interference in
the present appeal, especially when no
question of law much less substantial
question of law arises for determination in
this appeal.
Hence, the present appeal is
dismissed.”
12) As observed supra, we do not agree with the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court in the impugned order. In our considered
view, the appeal did involve the substantial question
of law and, therefore, the High Court should have
admitted the appeal by first framing proper
substantial questions of law arising in the case,
issued notice to the respondent for its final hearing
as provided under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”) and disposed it of on merits.
13) As a matter of fact, having regard to the nature
of controversy involved in the suit and the issues
arising in the case, the questions raised in the
second appeal did constitute substantial questions
of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code.
14) Indeed, in our considered view, the questions,
viz., whether the suit seeking a declaration that the
demand of House Tax raised under the Act is
maintainable, whether such suit is barred and, if
so, by virtue of which provision of the Act, whether
plaintiff has any alternative statutory remedy
available under the Act for adjudication of his
grievance and, if so, which is that remedy, and
lastly, whether the plaintiff has properly valued the
suit and, if so, whether they have paid the proper
Court fees on the reliefs claimed in the suit were
legal questions arising in the appeal and involved
jurisdictional issues requiring adjudication on
merits in accordance with law. The High Court
unfortunately did not examine any of these issues
much less in its proper perspective in the light of
relevant provisions of the Act governing the
controversy.
15) The High Court thus, in our view, committed
jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second
appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the
approach of the High Court.
16) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set
aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court
for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with
law.
17) We, however, request the High Court to admit
the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial
questions of law as required under Section 100 of
the Code keeping in view the pleadings and findings
of the two courts below. Needless to say, the
questions to be framed should be specific.
18) Before parting, we consider it proper to
mention here that we have not expressed any
opinion on merits of the controversy and confined
our inquiry only to examine whether the second
appeal involved any substantial question of law
within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code?
19) Since none appeared for the
appellant(defendant) in this Court, the High Court
would issue notice to the appellant before it is
finally heard. We request the High Court to decide
the appeal expeditiously.
20) Record of the case, if requisitioned, be sent
back to the High Court forthwith by the Registry.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]
…...
……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
March 07, 2017
of controversy involved in the suit and the issues
arising in the case, the questions raised in the
second appeal did constitute substantial questions
of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code.
14) Indeed, in our considered view, the questions,
viz., whether the suit seeking a declaration that the
demand of House Tax raised under the Act is
maintainable, whether such suit is barred and, if
so, by virtue of which provision of the Act, whether
plaintiff has any alternative statutory remedy
available under the Act for adjudication of his
grievance and, if so, which is that remedy, and
lastly, whether the plaintiff has properly valued the
suit and, if so, whether they have paid the proper
Court fees on the reliefs claimed in the suit were
legal questions arising in the appeal and involved
jurisdictional issues requiring adjudication on
merits in accordance with law. The High Court
unfortunately did not examine any of these issues
much less in its proper perspective in the light of
relevant provisions of the Act governing the
controversy.
15) The High Court thus, in our view, committed
jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second
appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the
approach of the High Court.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1182 OF 2007
Faridabad Complex
Administration
V
M/s Iron Master India (P) Ltd.
Citation: (2017) 4 SCC 136
1) This appeal is filed by the appellant(defendant)
against the final judgment and order dated
16.02.2004 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 530 of 2004
by which the High Court dismissed the regular
second appeal filed by the appellant herein in limine
against the judgment and decree dated 22.10.2003
passed by the Additional District Judge, Faridabad
in C.A. No. 166 of 2002 whereby the appeal filed by
the respondent(plaintiff) was allowed, the judgment
and decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside
and the suit of the respondent was decreed.
2) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to
appreciate the issued involved in this appeal.
3) The respondent is a Limited Company having
their place of business in Faridabad. The appellant
is a Municipal Corporation, Faridabad as defined
under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”).
4) The respondent is subjected to payment of
various taxes including House Tax under the Act on
the properties owned by them at Faridabad. The
respondent filed a civil suit seeking permanent
injunction against the appellant restraining them
from recovering the House Tax for the years
1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 from the
respondent on their properties. The appellant also
sought a declaration that a demand notice dated
20.11.1993 raised by the appellant calling upon the
respondent to pay Rs.48,599.40 towards the House
Tax on their properties is illegal.
5) The appellant filed written statement and
defended the aforementioned demands on various
grounds. The appellant also raised an objection
about the maintainability of the Suit.
6) The Trial Court framed issues. Parties adduced
evidence. Vide judgment and decree dated
20.09.2002 in Case No. 1483 of 1995, the Trial
Court dismissed the Suit. Felt aggrieved, the
respondent filed appeal being Civil Appeal No. 166
of 2002 before the Additional District Judge,
Faridabad. By order dated 22.10.2003, the
Additional District Judge allowed the appeal, set
aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
and decreed the respondent's suit against the
appellant.
7) Felt aggrieved, the appellant(defendant) filed
second appeal before the High Court wherein the
appellant had proposed several substantial
questions of law arising in the case. The High
Court, however, dismissed the second appeal in
limine by impugned judgment/order holding that
the second appeal does not involve any substantial
question of law. It is against this judgment, the
appellant(defendant) has filed this appeal by way of
special leave petition before this Court.
8) It is unfortunate that no one appeared for the
appellant to argue the appeal before this Court
when the case was called on for hearing twice. We,
however, refrained ourselves from dismissing the
appeal in default and instead perused the record
with the assistance of Mr. A.K. Singla, learned
senior counsel for the respondent with a view to
decide the appeal on merits.
9) Having heard learned senior counsel for the
respondent and on perusal of the record of the case,
we are inclined to allow the appeal and remand the
case to the High Court for deciding the second
appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.
10) The question, which arises for consideration in
this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified
in dismissing the second appeal of the
appellant(defendant) in limine holding that it does
not involve any substantial question of law?
11) The learned Single Judge while dismissing the
appeal passed the following order:
“This Regular Second Appeal has been
filed by the defendant against the judgment
and decree dated 22.10.2003, passed by the
Additional District Judge, whereby the appeal
filed by the plaintiff was accepted, the
judgment and decree passed by the trial
Court were set aside and the suit of the
plaintiff was decreed.
While decreeing the suit of the plaintiff,
it was found by the learned Additional
District Judge that before fixing the annual
value and imposing the house tax, the
defendant had failed to decide the objections
filed by the plaintiff against the proposed
amendment of the assessment list. It was
found that in fact the case of the defendant
was that no objections were filed. However,
when a copy of the objections and the notice
for personal hearing were shown to DW1
(produced by the defendant), he had to admit
that those documents were issued by the
defendant. It was found that from those
documents, it was clear that the plaintiff had
filed objections against the proposed
amendment of the assessment list and there
is nothing on the record to show that the
objections were decided before the annual
value was fixed and the house tax was
imposed. This finding of the learned
Additional District Judge, in my opinion, is a
finding of fact based on the evidence led by
the parties, especially when there is nothing
on the record to show that there is any
misreading of evidence or that any material
evidence had been ignored by the learned
Additional District Judge while giving this
finding. Once it is found that the defendant
had failed to follow the procedure laid down
under the Act while imposing the house tax,
in my opinion, the civil Court certainly had
the jurisdiction to entertain the present suit
and the finding of the learned Additional
District Judge in this regard also has to be
affirmed.
In this view of the matter, in my
opinion, there is no scope for interference in
the present appeal, especially when no
question of law much less substantial
question of law arises for determination in
this appeal.
Hence, the present appeal is
dismissed.”
12) As observed supra, we do not agree with the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court in the impugned order. In our considered
view, the appeal did involve the substantial question
of law and, therefore, the High Court should have
admitted the appeal by first framing proper
substantial questions of law arising in the case,
issued notice to the respondent for its final hearing
as provided under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”) and disposed it of on merits.
13) As a matter of fact, having regard to the nature
of controversy involved in the suit and the issues
arising in the case, the questions raised in the
second appeal did constitute substantial questions
of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code.
14) Indeed, in our considered view, the questions,
viz., whether the suit seeking a declaration that the
demand of House Tax raised under the Act is
maintainable, whether such suit is barred and, if
so, by virtue of which provision of the Act, whether
plaintiff has any alternative statutory remedy
available under the Act for adjudication of his
grievance and, if so, which is that remedy, and
lastly, whether the plaintiff has properly valued the
suit and, if so, whether they have paid the proper
Court fees on the reliefs claimed in the suit were
legal questions arising in the appeal and involved
jurisdictional issues requiring adjudication on
merits in accordance with law. The High Court
unfortunately did not examine any of these issues
much less in its proper perspective in the light of
relevant provisions of the Act governing the
controversy.
15) The High Court thus, in our view, committed
jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second
appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the
approach of the High Court.
16) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set
aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court
for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with
law.
17) We, however, request the High Court to admit
the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial
questions of law as required under Section 100 of
the Code keeping in view the pleadings and findings
of the two courts below. Needless to say, the
questions to be framed should be specific.
18) Before parting, we consider it proper to
mention here that we have not expressed any
opinion on merits of the controversy and confined
our inquiry only to examine whether the second
appeal involved any substantial question of law
within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code?
19) Since none appeared for the
appellant(defendant) in this Court, the High Court
would issue notice to the appellant before it is
finally heard. We request the High Court to decide
the appeal expeditiously.
20) Record of the case, if requisitioned, be sent
back to the High Court forthwith by the Registry.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]
…...
……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
March 07, 2017
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