A reference in this
regard is made to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Haribox
Swalram and others [(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786]. Their
Lordships have observed that each and every fact pleaded in the
writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those
facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have nexus
or relevance with the lis or dispute involved in the case. Facts
which does not have bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the
case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned.
That apart even if it is assumed for the time being
that small part of cause of action has fallen within the
jurisdiction of this Court also in view of the express agreement
between the parties, that would be of no help to the petitioners. A
reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court
rendered in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
another [(2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 254] the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 30 as under :
“30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself
may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In
appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4217 of 2015
M/s Bhagwati Coke Industries Pvt. Ltd.
V
The Central Coalfields Ltd.,
CORAM: DR. JUSTICE RAVI RANJAN
Date: 27-07-2016.
Citation: AIR 2017 Patna 56
I have heard the parties and perused the records of this
case.
The petitioners initially approached this Court by
filing the present writ application, inter alia, for grant of following
reliefs:
i] For quashing the order communicated to the Petitioners at
Aurangabad bearing No. CCL/HQ/Sales/2014/Price
Noificaiton/11070-184 dt. 05.11.2014, as contained in
Annexure 11, by which the Respondent has intimated
about charging or realization as ad-on price @ Rs.
960/- per Metric Ton as Washery Recovery charge for
supply of Raw Coking Coal from the Petitioners and
similarly situated units, as being wholly without
jurisdiction, unauthorized and illegal;
ii] For a Declaration that the Respondent has got no
authority to change the Notified Price by indirect
means in the name of recovery of Washery Charges, as
the decision of issuing price notification is vested in the
holding company, i.e. Coal India Ltd., and not the
Subsidiary, i.e. the Respondent no. 1;
iii] For a Declaration that the Respondent No.1 and 3 has
got no authority to realize any amount, over and above
the Notified Price, as it will amount to changing the
Notified Price, which the Respondent does not have
any jurisdiction being merely a subsidiary of Coal India
Ltd.;
iv] For a Declaration that the order issued by the
Respondent No. 3 for realizing a sum of Rs. 960/- per
MT on the Notified Base Price of Rs. 1740/- per MT
amounts to realizing more than 50% in the name of Ad
on charge is a camouflage which is hit by the principle
to do something indirectly which cannot be done
directly and hence it is an arbitrary exercise of power,
without any authority of law;
v] For a Declaration that the decision of the Respondent
Nos. 1 & 3 to realize a sum of Rs. 960/- per MT as an
Ad on price over the notified price is contrary to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Case of
Ashoka Smokeless Coal Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs.
the Union of India & Ors. reported in 2007(2) SCC
640.
vi] For a Declaration that the Respondent No. 1 & 3 have
illegally realized the amount of Rs. 960/- per MT with
effect from 05.11.2014 even for the period August,
2014, September, 2014, October, 2014 onwards and as
such the same being not sustainable in law is liable to
be quashed and the amount illegally realized from the
Petitioners is liable to be refunded back.
vii] For a declaration that the Respondent No. 1 & 3 have
realized @ Rs. 960/- per MT as an Ad on price over
and above the notified price of Coal from the
Petitioners for the August, 14 till November, 2014
allocation with retrospective effect, i.e. for the period
prior to the date of issuance of order dt. 5.11.2014,
which cannot sustain in the eyes of law by any stretch
of imagination;
viii] For a direction to the Respondents to refund the
amount illegally realized from the Petitioners or
adjust the same by giving credit of that amount in
future supply of coal to the Petitioners,
ix] For a direction to the Respondents to refund the
amount illegally realized from the Petitioners with
interest and for any other relief[s] for which the
Petitioners may be found entitled to in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
Subsequently, by filing I.A. No. 4826 of 2015, the
petitioners sought amendment in the relief portion of the writ
application by addition of a relief seeking quashment to the order
of the respondent Central Coalfields Ltd (hereinafter referred to as
“the CCL”) dated 4.6.2015, as contained in Annexure 15, which
was allowed vide order dated 3.12.2015 holding that the relief
mentioned in the aforesaid interlocutory application and challenge
to Annexure 15 along with the averments made in that connection
would form part of the writ application.
The petitioners have claimed that they are
Companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and are
engaged in production of smokeless fuel under the technology
developed by the Central Mines, Planning & Design Institute Ltd.
(CMPDI) and Central Fuel Research Institute (CFRI).
It is stated in the writ application that special
smokeless manufacturing unit provides pollution free domestic
fuel to the people of the State of Bihar. Since only raw material to
be used for such production is raw coal, the petitioners applied to
the CCL for firm assurance of supply of the coal as per the
requirement of the petitioners. After joint inspection and other
formalities, the petitioners were granted ad hoc coal linkage and
the petitioners have made huge investment in their unit which fully
depends upon the supply of coal on the basis of linkage granted by
the CCL. It is also stated in the writ application that the CCL
revised the price of coal time to time. It is contended that
suddenly a price notification was issued by the CCL, the subject
matter of which indicates that an add-on price in the name of
washery recovery charge was being charged from all FSA
Consumers against the supply of raw coking coal @ Rs. 960/ MT.
The aforesaid charging of add-on price by the CCL vide Annexure
11 has been challenged by filing this writ application on diverse
grounds. During the pendency of the writ application Annexure 15
dated 4.6.2015 came to be issued by the CCL in which earlier
nomenclature by changing the nomenclature of the add-on price
from washery recovery charges to commitment charge @ Rs.
753/- per MT.
The earlier price notice (Annexure 11) was
challenged on diverse grounds. One of the grounds is that such
charging of add-on price in the name of washery recovery charge
is without jurisdiction, unauthorized and illegal. Further ground of
challenge is that such decision of issuing price notification could
have been taken by the holding company, i.e., Coal India Limited
and not its subsidiary, i.e, respondent no. 1, i.e., CCL.. Apart from
above, it is claimed that it being over and above the notified
price, would be in teeth of the law declared by the Courts. It is
contended that, on an earlier occasion, charging of 20 % over and
above the notified price was put to challenge before Calcutta High
Court in W.P. No. 44 of 2007 (Rahul Industries & ors. V. Coal
India Limited & ors.) which was allowed vide judgment dated
25.11.2010 (Annexure 4) and the appeal preferred against that by
the Coal India Limited was dismissed vide Annexure 5. Similar
view was taken by a learned Single Bench of this Court vide
Annexure 3 which is an order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6530 of
2009 (M/S MAA Mundeshwari Carbon Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The
Central Coalfields Ltd. and ors.). In the aforesaid cases writ
application were allowed and 20 % amount realized over and
above the notified price was directed to be refunded back to the
petitioners. It is submitted that again a decision has been taken by
the CCL of charging add-on washery recovery charges and, as
such, the action would be in the teeth of the aforesaid decisions
rendered by a Single Bench of this Court and Single Judge and
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court specially when the
petitioners are being supplied raw coking coal without being
washed. Similarly, Annexure 15 which was issued during the
pendency of the present writ application has also been challenged
on the aforesaid grounds. Thus, Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned
senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the
aforesaid charge is not being any fee, tax or levy would be wholly
illegal and without jurisdiction.
However, the respondent CCL has raised a
preliminary objection in this matter stating that the present writ
application would not be maintainable before Patna High Court in
view of the Clause 18(4) of the agreement between the respondent
CCL and the petitioner no. 1, a copy of which has been appended
as Annexure R/8 to the counter affidavit. It has been urged that
identical agreement has also been executed with the petitioner no.
2 which has not been disputed. It has been urged on behalf of the
CCL that Clause 18(4) of the agreement lays down in clear terms
that the Court of Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi shall have
exclusive jurisdiction in all matters under the agreement. It has
been contended that agreement having been signed by the
petitioners also, now they cannot maintain a writ petition before
this Court after selecting a forum for convenience being Jharkhand
High Court at Ranchi. It is urged that this issue is no longer res
integra as a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 786 of
2009 (The Central Coalfields Limited and ors Vs. M/s Babul
Smokless Fuel (P) Ltd. has laid down in clear terms that in view
of the Clause 18(4) of the agreement, the Court of Jharkhand at
Ranchi shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters as Clause
18(5) goes to show that this agreement shall supersede all previous
discussions and meetings held and correspondence exchanged
between the seller and the purchaser in respect of this agreement
and any decision arrived before coming into force of this
Agreement shall have no relevance. Mr. K.K.Rai, learned senior
counsel appearing for the CCL, has informed that S.L.P. No.
16777 of 2011 filed by M/S Babul Smokeless Fuel (P) Ltd.
challenging the aforesaid order of the Division Bench was
dismissed in limine by the Apex Court. Thus, it is contended that
this writ application has to be dismissed on the ground of
maintainability.
Mr. Rai has further placed reliance upon several
decisions of the Apex Court in this regard to impress upon this
Court that once the parties of the Contract choose a forum of
convenience under an agreement, both of them are bound by it
and, thus, the writ application would lie only before such selected
forum. That apart, Mr. Rai has submitted that there has been
suppression on the part of the petitioners as the complete form of
sale order has not been appended as the terms and conditions
printed in the back side does not form part of the copy which has
been appended by the petitioners as Annexure 8. A copy of sale
order was produced at the time of hearing by the respondents. It
is contended that even in the sale order, Clause 3 specifically
states that Courts of Ranchi, Jharkhand shall alone have
jurisdiction. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision
of the Apex Court rendered in Swastik Gases Private Limited Vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Limited [ (2013) 9 Supreme Court
Cases 32. It is contended that the three Judges Division Bench of
Apex Court has held in clear terms that, even if the words “only”
“exclusive”, “alone” are missing in the Clause of the agreement
and it is simply written that a particular court would have
jurisdiction, that would have to be read as if the jurisdiction would
lie exclusively before the chosen court, whereas, in the case in
hand, it has categorically been stated in Clause 18(4) of the
agreement that Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi shall have
“exclusive jurisdiction” in all matters under the agreement.
Relevant passage from the aforesaid decision is
extracted as under for better appreciation:
“32. For answer to the above question, we have to
see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which
provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of
the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for
jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like “alone”,
“only’, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” have not been
used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make
any material difference. The intention of the parties - by having
clause 18 in the agreement – is clear and unambiguous that the
courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the
courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because
for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the
agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary.
This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion
of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have
impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the
contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular
place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter,
we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended
to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by
Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither
forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not
offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.”
That apart, it has next been contended that Clause
14 of the Fuel Supply Agreement provides an in-house mechanism
for settlement of disputes or difference arising out of the
agreement. Thus, it is contended that such forum should first have
been chosen by the petitioners for redressal of their grievance.
Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon a
decision of the Apex Court rendered in Pimpri Chinchwad
Municipal Corporation and others Vs. Gayatri Construction
Company and another [(2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 172] in
this regard. According to the respondents, the Apex Court has
held that the High Court ought not have entertained the writ
application as the agreement already provides in-house remedy for
settlement of dispute. It has been urged that in view of that also,
the writ application would not be maintainable.
In view of the preliminary objection raised on behalf
of the respondents, I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners
on that issue also as it would be meaningless to consider and take
a decision on merit of the case if it has finally to be held that the
writ application is not maintainable. However, if it is decided that
the petitioners can maintain this writ application then other points
on merit would have to be considered and decided.
Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently opposed the
submissions made on behalf of the respondents on the issue of
maintainability. It has been contended that the Division Bench of
this Court, without discussing the prevalent judicial
pronouncements of the Apex Court on the issue, had gone to
decide the issue of maintainability only by reading the Clause
18(4) of the agreement. It has not even considered the decision of
the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in
L.Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others [(1997) 3
Supreme Court Cases 261] holding that the jurisdiction conferred
on the High Court under Articles 226 /227 and on the Supreme
Court under Article 32 is a part of basic structure of the
Constitution and, thus, cannot be taken away even by any statute
what to say about an agreement between the parties. Thus, in fact
the Division Bench by writing the decision in The Central
Coalfields Limited Ltd. has not laid down any law. In fact such
issue was neither raised by the CCL nor by the writ petitioner at the
stage of writ proceeding or even at the stage of L.P.A. However, in
course of hearing the Court itself appears to have raised the issue
and without considering it properly has held that the petitioner
would have to avail its remedy at Jharkhand High Court. It is
contended the decision rendered in the aforesaid case is per
incuriam and cannot be treated as a binding precedent. It has
further been urged that Allahabad High Court in M/s
P.R.Transport Agency v. Union of India [ AIR 2006 Allahabad
23] has held that when the parties entered into an agreement
confining themselves to the jurisdiction of one of the several civil
courts having territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit, basically
parties are placing restraint upon themselves from approaching the
other civil courts whose jurisdiction has been excluded. As such,
the jurisdiction of other civil courts get ousted subject to Section
28 of the Contract Act, however, the power of judicial review
given to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
being the basic structure, cannot be curtailed even by statute what
to say by any agreement made between the parties. Thus, the
ouster clauses can only oust territorial jurisdiction of civil courts
and not of High Court. It has been contended that since Annexure
11 and 15 have been sent to the address of the Units of the
petitioners situated in the State of Bihar and, since the drafts have
been prepared in the local branches of the Bank concerned and
also, since whatever decision have been taken by the CCL, has
affected the functioning of the Units of the petitioners situated in
State of Bihar, part of cause of action lies within the territory of
Patna High Court and as such the writ petition would be
maintainable.
Per contra, Mr. Rai contended that the ratio laid
down in L.Chandra Kumar(supra) would not at all be
applicable in the present case as there is no issue of ouster of
powers of High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India rather the issue is of choosing a forum of
convenience by the parties to the contract and, as such, even if part
of action lies in the State of Bihar since, such forum having been
chosen by the parties, the writ petition would be maintainable
before Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi and it would be open to it to
exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, it is not the power of the High Court which is tried to
be taken away by the contract rather the parties have chosen a
particular High Court for their convenience. It is also contended
that the decision of the Division Bench rendered in The Central
Coalfields Limited Ltd. is not per incuriam as it is based upon
the express clause of the agreement. So far cause of action is
concerned it is contended that not even part of the cause of action
lies even in State of Bihar as the agreement was signed at
Ranchi, Jharkhand, the impugned notifications dated 5.11.2014 as
well dated 4.6.2015 have been issued from Ranchi, the registered
Head Officer of the respondent CCL is at Ranchi and the delivery
point of the coal is also in the State of Jharkhand.
It has been submitted on behalf of the writ
petitioners that the demand draft may have been prepared in the
State of Bihar but, in fact, that would not be relevant rather
relevant would be the fact that the demand drafts / banker cheques
were issued in favour of the respondent CCL payable at Ranchi.
It is urged that as per Clause 10.1 of the agreement payment has to
be made in favaour of the seller / respondent on any Nationalised /
Scheduled Bank at Ranchi. It is submitted that the bald statement
that the impugned action has affected the Unit would not be
enough as the writ petitioners have not been able to explain as to
how it is changing the Units. It has to be kept in mind that Patna
increase or decrease of price may always happen as per the policy.
Increase of price of raw material cannot create part of cause of
action as the lis is regarding correctness or otherwise of the price
notification issued by he respondents from their registered office at
Ranchi.
The agreement between the parties which has been
brought on record is not in dispute. Clause 18.4 of the agreement
reads as follows:
“18.4 Governing Law: This Agreement, and
the rights and obligations hereunder shall be interpreted
construed and governed by the laws of India. The court of
Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters under this Agreement. "
It would be manifest from the aforesaid that both
the parties to the contract have chosen their forum convenience.
The Division Bench of this Court in The Central
Coalfields Limited Ltd. has held in clear terms that such being
the admitted clause under the agreement, the Jharkhand High
Court at Ranchi had got exclusive jurisdiction. Special Leave
Petition filed against the order has been dismissed in limine. The
Division Bench decision rendered in the aforesaid case is binding
upon this Court. However, since ground has been raised by the
petitioners stating that the judgment is per incuriam as the
decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court
rendered in L.Chandra Kumar(supra) as well as other decisions
laying down the law in this regard have not been considered, that
issue requires to be addressed. Before proceeding to discuss the
above I must express that once a view has been taken by a Division
Bench of this Court that has to be followed by a Single Judge
Bench. In case it suffers from any glaring error then the judicial
propriety and decorum requires the Single Judge hearing such
matter to refer it to a larger Bench to examine the question.
The issue is whether such question exists in the
present case at all? In my considered opinion, answer has to be in
negative. In Hakam Singh Vs. M/S. Gammon (Indai) Ltd.
[1971(1) Supreme Court Cases 286], the Apex Court struck
down an argument that when two courts have jurisdiction to
entertain a dispute, a choice to forum clause would amount to
restraint of to legal proceedings, or violate public policy, under
Sections 28 and 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In ABC
Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P.Agencies, (1989) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 163] also a view was taken by the Apex Court that even if
the words such as “only”, “alone” and exclusive” are absent from
the contract the maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alterius”
i.e., expression of one is exclusion of the other may be applied,
however, at the same time it was also observed that the implied
exclusion of the other jurisdiction would have to be inferred from
the facts and circumstances of the case as there would not be an
automatic exclusion. That had created an impression that if there
is some ambiguity in such clause of the agreement, unless it can
be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, the
jurisdiction of the other court in which part of cause of action also
falls cannot be ousted. However, in Swastik Gases Private
Limited (supra), the Three Judges Division Bench of the Apex
Court has put the matter at rest by holding that even if the words
“alone”, “only” and “exclusive”, are absent in such clause of
agreement, it has to be read that the parties have agreed for
exclusive jurisdiction of that particular court and such exclusive
clause would neither be hit by section 23 nor would offend section
28 of the Contract Act, 1872.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court rendered in L.Chandra Kumar(supra) but in my view
the issues involved in that case were entirely different. The ratio
decided in the aforesaid is that even by bringing any statute, the
constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be
taken away as the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court
under Article 226 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 is
part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
In the case in hand, the issue is, even assuming
that two courts have territorial jurisdiction, however, by the
contract the parties have chosen forum convenience. The
exercise of power under Article 226 is not being taken away by the
parties rather issue is as to which High Court they would approach
for resolution of their dispute arising out of the agreement.
That apart, I do not find any force in the further
submission made on behalf of the petitioners also that part of cause
of action falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court.
Admittedly, the agreement was inked at Ranchi, Jharkhand,
impugned price notifications dated 5.11.2014 as well dated
4.6.2015 were issued from Ranchi, the registered Head Office of
the respondent CCL is at Ranchi and the delivery point of the coal
is also in the State of Jharkhand. Clause 1(j) of the agreement has
defined the delivery point as meaning the colliery sidings or
colliery loading points, as the case may be, in the designated coal
mine of the seller or the locations or ports identified by the sellers
which, in the present case is admittedly in the State of Jharkhand.
Clause 5 provides that any complaint with respect to the quality
of the coal shall be made at the colliery site / delivery point. Most
importantly Clause 8 declares that the title and risk of coal will
pass from the Seller to the purchaser at the delivery point itself
where the coal is loaded into wagons / containers of the purchaser.
The seller shall have no liability as regards any loss, whatsoever,
thereafter. Clause 10(1) envisages that the demand draft / bankers’
cheque shall be drawn in favour of seller by the purchaser
payable on any Nationalised / Scheduled Bank at Ranchi. Thus, in
my view, simply for the reason that the concerned letters though
are addressed to the petitioners at Aurangabad would not mean
that part of cause of action has fallen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. Even if the claim of the petitioners is
accepted that the seller has a right to examine whether the coal
supplied by it is converted into the end product or not at the Unit
situated in the State of Bihar, that issue having no nexus with the
present lis , would be of no relevance. Other factors also do not
have a nexus with the lis between the parties. A reference in this
regard is made to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Haribox
Swalram and others [(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786]. Their
Lordships have observed that each and every fact pleaded in the
writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those
facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have nexus
or relevance with the lis or dispute involved in the case. Facts
which does not have bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the
case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned.
That apart even if it is assumed for the time being
that small part of cause of action has fallen within the
jurisdiction of this Court also in view of the express agreement
between the parties, that would be of no help to the petitioners. A
reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court
rendered in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
another [(2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 254] the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 30 as under :
“30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself
may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In
appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.
In view of the above discussion, I am of the
considered opinion that this writ application has to fail on the
ground of maintainability, firstly, in view of the decision of the
Division Bench rendered in The Central Coalfields Limited
Ltd., secondly, since the parties to the contract have chosen forum
convenience, thirdly, as per the discussion made above, the cause
of action does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court, fourthly, even if it is assumed that small part of cause of
action falls within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in view
of the forum having been chosen by the parties, this Court would
refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in view of the
doctrine of forum convenience.
Thus, in my considered opinion, in the present
matter Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi would have the exclusive
jurisdiction for consideration of the lis between the parties.
As a result this writ application fails and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
regard is made to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Haribox
Swalram and others [(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786]. Their
Lordships have observed that each and every fact pleaded in the
writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those
facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have nexus
or relevance with the lis or dispute involved in the case. Facts
which does not have bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the
case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned.
That apart even if it is assumed for the time being
that small part of cause of action has fallen within the
jurisdiction of this Court also in view of the express agreement
between the parties, that would be of no help to the petitioners. A
reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court
rendered in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
another [(2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 254] the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 30 as under :
“30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself
may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In
appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4217 of 2015
M/s Bhagwati Coke Industries Pvt. Ltd.
V
The Central Coalfields Ltd.,
CORAM: DR. JUSTICE RAVI RANJAN
Date: 27-07-2016.
Citation: AIR 2017 Patna 56
I have heard the parties and perused the records of this
case.
The petitioners initially approached this Court by
filing the present writ application, inter alia, for grant of following
reliefs:
i] For quashing the order communicated to the Petitioners at
Aurangabad bearing No. CCL/HQ/Sales/2014/Price
Noificaiton/11070-184 dt. 05.11.2014, as contained in
Annexure 11, by which the Respondent has intimated
about charging or realization as ad-on price @ Rs.
960/- per Metric Ton as Washery Recovery charge for
supply of Raw Coking Coal from the Petitioners and
similarly situated units, as being wholly without
jurisdiction, unauthorized and illegal;
ii] For a Declaration that the Respondent has got no
authority to change the Notified Price by indirect
means in the name of recovery of Washery Charges, as
the decision of issuing price notification is vested in the
holding company, i.e. Coal India Ltd., and not the
Subsidiary, i.e. the Respondent no. 1;
iii] For a Declaration that the Respondent No.1 and 3 has
got no authority to realize any amount, over and above
the Notified Price, as it will amount to changing the
Notified Price, which the Respondent does not have
any jurisdiction being merely a subsidiary of Coal India
Ltd.;
iv] For a Declaration that the order issued by the
Respondent No. 3 for realizing a sum of Rs. 960/- per
MT on the Notified Base Price of Rs. 1740/- per MT
amounts to realizing more than 50% in the name of Ad
on charge is a camouflage which is hit by the principle
to do something indirectly which cannot be done
directly and hence it is an arbitrary exercise of power,
without any authority of law;
v] For a Declaration that the decision of the Respondent
Nos. 1 & 3 to realize a sum of Rs. 960/- per MT as an
Ad on price over the notified price is contrary to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Case of
Ashoka Smokeless Coal Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs.
the Union of India & Ors. reported in 2007(2) SCC
640.
vi] For a Declaration that the Respondent No. 1 & 3 have
illegally realized the amount of Rs. 960/- per MT with
effect from 05.11.2014 even for the period August,
2014, September, 2014, October, 2014 onwards and as
such the same being not sustainable in law is liable to
be quashed and the amount illegally realized from the
Petitioners is liable to be refunded back.
vii] For a declaration that the Respondent No. 1 & 3 have
realized @ Rs. 960/- per MT as an Ad on price over
and above the notified price of Coal from the
Petitioners for the August, 14 till November, 2014
allocation with retrospective effect, i.e. for the period
prior to the date of issuance of order dt. 5.11.2014,
which cannot sustain in the eyes of law by any stretch
of imagination;
viii] For a direction to the Respondents to refund the
amount illegally realized from the Petitioners or
adjust the same by giving credit of that amount in
future supply of coal to the Petitioners,
ix] For a direction to the Respondents to refund the
amount illegally realized from the Petitioners with
interest and for any other relief[s] for which the
Petitioners may be found entitled to in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
Subsequently, by filing I.A. No. 4826 of 2015, the
petitioners sought amendment in the relief portion of the writ
application by addition of a relief seeking quashment to the order
of the respondent Central Coalfields Ltd (hereinafter referred to as
“the CCL”) dated 4.6.2015, as contained in Annexure 15, which
was allowed vide order dated 3.12.2015 holding that the relief
mentioned in the aforesaid interlocutory application and challenge
to Annexure 15 along with the averments made in that connection
would form part of the writ application.
The petitioners have claimed that they are
Companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and are
engaged in production of smokeless fuel under the technology
developed by the Central Mines, Planning & Design Institute Ltd.
(CMPDI) and Central Fuel Research Institute (CFRI).
It is stated in the writ application that special
smokeless manufacturing unit provides pollution free domestic
fuel to the people of the State of Bihar. Since only raw material to
be used for such production is raw coal, the petitioners applied to
the CCL for firm assurance of supply of the coal as per the
requirement of the petitioners. After joint inspection and other
formalities, the petitioners were granted ad hoc coal linkage and
the petitioners have made huge investment in their unit which fully
depends upon the supply of coal on the basis of linkage granted by
the CCL. It is also stated in the writ application that the CCL
revised the price of coal time to time. It is contended that
suddenly a price notification was issued by the CCL, the subject
matter of which indicates that an add-on price in the name of
washery recovery charge was being charged from all FSA
Consumers against the supply of raw coking coal @ Rs. 960/ MT.
The aforesaid charging of add-on price by the CCL vide Annexure
11 has been challenged by filing this writ application on diverse
grounds. During the pendency of the writ application Annexure 15
dated 4.6.2015 came to be issued by the CCL in which earlier
nomenclature by changing the nomenclature of the add-on price
from washery recovery charges to commitment charge @ Rs.
753/- per MT.
The earlier price notice (Annexure 11) was
challenged on diverse grounds. One of the grounds is that such
charging of add-on price in the name of washery recovery charge
is without jurisdiction, unauthorized and illegal. Further ground of
challenge is that such decision of issuing price notification could
have been taken by the holding company, i.e., Coal India Limited
and not its subsidiary, i.e, respondent no. 1, i.e., CCL.. Apart from
above, it is claimed that it being over and above the notified
price, would be in teeth of the law declared by the Courts. It is
contended that, on an earlier occasion, charging of 20 % over and
above the notified price was put to challenge before Calcutta High
Court in W.P. No. 44 of 2007 (Rahul Industries & ors. V. Coal
India Limited & ors.) which was allowed vide judgment dated
25.11.2010 (Annexure 4) and the appeal preferred against that by
the Coal India Limited was dismissed vide Annexure 5. Similar
view was taken by a learned Single Bench of this Court vide
Annexure 3 which is an order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6530 of
2009 (M/S MAA Mundeshwari Carbon Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The
Central Coalfields Ltd. and ors.). In the aforesaid cases writ
application were allowed and 20 % amount realized over and
above the notified price was directed to be refunded back to the
petitioners. It is submitted that again a decision has been taken by
the CCL of charging add-on washery recovery charges and, as
such, the action would be in the teeth of the aforesaid decisions
rendered by a Single Bench of this Court and Single Judge and
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court specially when the
petitioners are being supplied raw coking coal without being
washed. Similarly, Annexure 15 which was issued during the
pendency of the present writ application has also been challenged
on the aforesaid grounds. Thus, Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned
senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the
aforesaid charge is not being any fee, tax or levy would be wholly
illegal and without jurisdiction.
However, the respondent CCL has raised a
preliminary objection in this matter stating that the present writ
application would not be maintainable before Patna High Court in
view of the Clause 18(4) of the agreement between the respondent
CCL and the petitioner no. 1, a copy of which has been appended
as Annexure R/8 to the counter affidavit. It has been urged that
identical agreement has also been executed with the petitioner no.
2 which has not been disputed. It has been urged on behalf of the
CCL that Clause 18(4) of the agreement lays down in clear terms
that the Court of Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi shall have
exclusive jurisdiction in all matters under the agreement. It has
been contended that agreement having been signed by the
petitioners also, now they cannot maintain a writ petition before
this Court after selecting a forum for convenience being Jharkhand
High Court at Ranchi. It is urged that this issue is no longer res
integra as a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 786 of
2009 (The Central Coalfields Limited and ors Vs. M/s Babul
Smokless Fuel (P) Ltd. has laid down in clear terms that in view
of the Clause 18(4) of the agreement, the Court of Jharkhand at
Ranchi shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters as Clause
18(5) goes to show that this agreement shall supersede all previous
discussions and meetings held and correspondence exchanged
between the seller and the purchaser in respect of this agreement
and any decision arrived before coming into force of this
Agreement shall have no relevance. Mr. K.K.Rai, learned senior
counsel appearing for the CCL, has informed that S.L.P. No.
16777 of 2011 filed by M/S Babul Smokeless Fuel (P) Ltd.
challenging the aforesaid order of the Division Bench was
dismissed in limine by the Apex Court. Thus, it is contended that
this writ application has to be dismissed on the ground of
maintainability.
Mr. Rai has further placed reliance upon several
decisions of the Apex Court in this regard to impress upon this
Court that once the parties of the Contract choose a forum of
convenience under an agreement, both of them are bound by it
and, thus, the writ application would lie only before such selected
forum. That apart, Mr. Rai has submitted that there has been
suppression on the part of the petitioners as the complete form of
sale order has not been appended as the terms and conditions
printed in the back side does not form part of the copy which has
been appended by the petitioners as Annexure 8. A copy of sale
order was produced at the time of hearing by the respondents. It
is contended that even in the sale order, Clause 3 specifically
states that Courts of Ranchi, Jharkhand shall alone have
jurisdiction. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision
of the Apex Court rendered in Swastik Gases Private Limited Vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Limited [ (2013) 9 Supreme Court
Cases 32. It is contended that the three Judges Division Bench of
Apex Court has held in clear terms that, even if the words “only”
“exclusive”, “alone” are missing in the Clause of the agreement
and it is simply written that a particular court would have
jurisdiction, that would have to be read as if the jurisdiction would
lie exclusively before the chosen court, whereas, in the case in
hand, it has categorically been stated in Clause 18(4) of the
agreement that Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi shall have
“exclusive jurisdiction” in all matters under the agreement.
Relevant passage from the aforesaid decision is
extracted as under for better appreciation:
“32. For answer to the above question, we have to
see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which
provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of
the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for
jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like “alone”,
“only’, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” have not been
used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make
any material difference. The intention of the parties - by having
clause 18 in the agreement – is clear and unambiguous that the
courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the
courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because
for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the
agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary.
This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion
of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have
impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the
contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular
place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter,
we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended
to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by
Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither
forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not
offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.”
That apart, it has next been contended that Clause
14 of the Fuel Supply Agreement provides an in-house mechanism
for settlement of disputes or difference arising out of the
agreement. Thus, it is contended that such forum should first have
been chosen by the petitioners for redressal of their grievance.
Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon a
decision of the Apex Court rendered in Pimpri Chinchwad
Municipal Corporation and others Vs. Gayatri Construction
Company and another [(2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 172] in
this regard. According to the respondents, the Apex Court has
held that the High Court ought not have entertained the writ
application as the agreement already provides in-house remedy for
settlement of dispute. It has been urged that in view of that also,
the writ application would not be maintainable.
In view of the preliminary objection raised on behalf
of the respondents, I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners
on that issue also as it would be meaningless to consider and take
a decision on merit of the case if it has finally to be held that the
writ application is not maintainable. However, if it is decided that
the petitioners can maintain this writ application then other points
on merit would have to be considered and decided.
Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently opposed the
submissions made on behalf of the respondents on the issue of
maintainability. It has been contended that the Division Bench of
this Court, without discussing the prevalent judicial
pronouncements of the Apex Court on the issue, had gone to
decide the issue of maintainability only by reading the Clause
18(4) of the agreement. It has not even considered the decision of
the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in
L.Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others [(1997) 3
Supreme Court Cases 261] holding that the jurisdiction conferred
on the High Court under Articles 226 /227 and on the Supreme
Court under Article 32 is a part of basic structure of the
Constitution and, thus, cannot be taken away even by any statute
what to say about an agreement between the parties. Thus, in fact
the Division Bench by writing the decision in The Central
Coalfields Limited Ltd. has not laid down any law. In fact such
issue was neither raised by the CCL nor by the writ petitioner at the
stage of writ proceeding or even at the stage of L.P.A. However, in
course of hearing the Court itself appears to have raised the issue
and without considering it properly has held that the petitioner
would have to avail its remedy at Jharkhand High Court. It is
contended the decision rendered in the aforesaid case is per
incuriam and cannot be treated as a binding precedent. It has
further been urged that Allahabad High Court in M/s
P.R.Transport Agency v. Union of India [ AIR 2006 Allahabad
23] has held that when the parties entered into an agreement
confining themselves to the jurisdiction of one of the several civil
courts having territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit, basically
parties are placing restraint upon themselves from approaching the
other civil courts whose jurisdiction has been excluded. As such,
the jurisdiction of other civil courts get ousted subject to Section
28 of the Contract Act, however, the power of judicial review
given to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
being the basic structure, cannot be curtailed even by statute what
to say by any agreement made between the parties. Thus, the
ouster clauses can only oust territorial jurisdiction of civil courts
and not of High Court. It has been contended that since Annexure
11 and 15 have been sent to the address of the Units of the
petitioners situated in the State of Bihar and, since the drafts have
been prepared in the local branches of the Bank concerned and
also, since whatever decision have been taken by the CCL, has
affected the functioning of the Units of the petitioners situated in
State of Bihar, part of cause of action lies within the territory of
Patna High Court and as such the writ petition would be
maintainable.
Per contra, Mr. Rai contended that the ratio laid
down in L.Chandra Kumar(supra) would not at all be
applicable in the present case as there is no issue of ouster of
powers of High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India rather the issue is of choosing a forum of
convenience by the parties to the contract and, as such, even if part
of action lies in the State of Bihar since, such forum having been
chosen by the parties, the writ petition would be maintainable
before Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi and it would be open to it to
exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, it is not the power of the High Court which is tried to
be taken away by the contract rather the parties have chosen a
particular High Court for their convenience. It is also contended
that the decision of the Division Bench rendered in The Central
Coalfields Limited Ltd. is not per incuriam as it is based upon
the express clause of the agreement. So far cause of action is
concerned it is contended that not even part of the cause of action
lies even in State of Bihar as the agreement was signed at
Ranchi, Jharkhand, the impugned notifications dated 5.11.2014 as
well dated 4.6.2015 have been issued from Ranchi, the registered
Head Officer of the respondent CCL is at Ranchi and the delivery
point of the coal is also in the State of Jharkhand.
It has been submitted on behalf of the writ
petitioners that the demand draft may have been prepared in the
State of Bihar but, in fact, that would not be relevant rather
relevant would be the fact that the demand drafts / banker cheques
were issued in favour of the respondent CCL payable at Ranchi.
It is urged that as per Clause 10.1 of the agreement payment has to
be made in favaour of the seller / respondent on any Nationalised /
Scheduled Bank at Ranchi. It is submitted that the bald statement
that the impugned action has affected the Unit would not be
enough as the writ petitioners have not been able to explain as to
how it is changing the Units. It has to be kept in mind that Patna
increase or decrease of price may always happen as per the policy.
Increase of price of raw material cannot create part of cause of
action as the lis is regarding correctness or otherwise of the price
notification issued by he respondents from their registered office at
Ranchi.
The agreement between the parties which has been
brought on record is not in dispute. Clause 18.4 of the agreement
reads as follows:
“18.4 Governing Law: This Agreement, and
the rights and obligations hereunder shall be interpreted
construed and governed by the laws of India. The court of
Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters under this Agreement. "
It would be manifest from the aforesaid that both
the parties to the contract have chosen their forum convenience.
The Division Bench of this Court in The Central
Coalfields Limited Ltd. has held in clear terms that such being
the admitted clause under the agreement, the Jharkhand High
Court at Ranchi had got exclusive jurisdiction. Special Leave
Petition filed against the order has been dismissed in limine. The
Division Bench decision rendered in the aforesaid case is binding
upon this Court. However, since ground has been raised by the
petitioners stating that the judgment is per incuriam as the
decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court
rendered in L.Chandra Kumar(supra) as well as other decisions
laying down the law in this regard have not been considered, that
issue requires to be addressed. Before proceeding to discuss the
above I must express that once a view has been taken by a Division
Bench of this Court that has to be followed by a Single Judge
Bench. In case it suffers from any glaring error then the judicial
propriety and decorum requires the Single Judge hearing such
matter to refer it to a larger Bench to examine the question.
The issue is whether such question exists in the
present case at all? In my considered opinion, answer has to be in
negative. In Hakam Singh Vs. M/S. Gammon (Indai) Ltd.
[1971(1) Supreme Court Cases 286], the Apex Court struck
down an argument that when two courts have jurisdiction to
entertain a dispute, a choice to forum clause would amount to
restraint of to legal proceedings, or violate public policy, under
Sections 28 and 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In ABC
Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P.Agencies, (1989) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 163] also a view was taken by the Apex Court that even if
the words such as “only”, “alone” and exclusive” are absent from
the contract the maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alterius”
i.e., expression of one is exclusion of the other may be applied,
however, at the same time it was also observed that the implied
exclusion of the other jurisdiction would have to be inferred from
the facts and circumstances of the case as there would not be an
automatic exclusion. That had created an impression that if there
is some ambiguity in such clause of the agreement, unless it can
be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, the
jurisdiction of the other court in which part of cause of action also
falls cannot be ousted. However, in Swastik Gases Private
Limited (supra), the Three Judges Division Bench of the Apex
Court has put the matter at rest by holding that even if the words
“alone”, “only” and “exclusive”, are absent in such clause of
agreement, it has to be read that the parties have agreed for
exclusive jurisdiction of that particular court and such exclusive
clause would neither be hit by section 23 nor would offend section
28 of the Contract Act, 1872.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court rendered in L.Chandra Kumar(supra) but in my view
the issues involved in that case were entirely different. The ratio
decided in the aforesaid is that even by bringing any statute, the
constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be
taken away as the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court
under Article 226 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 is
part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
In the case in hand, the issue is, even assuming
that two courts have territorial jurisdiction, however, by the
contract the parties have chosen forum convenience. The
exercise of power under Article 226 is not being taken away by the
parties rather issue is as to which High Court they would approach
for resolution of their dispute arising out of the agreement.
That apart, I do not find any force in the further
submission made on behalf of the petitioners also that part of cause
of action falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court.
Admittedly, the agreement was inked at Ranchi, Jharkhand,
impugned price notifications dated 5.11.2014 as well dated
4.6.2015 were issued from Ranchi, the registered Head Office of
the respondent CCL is at Ranchi and the delivery point of the coal
is also in the State of Jharkhand. Clause 1(j) of the agreement has
defined the delivery point as meaning the colliery sidings or
colliery loading points, as the case may be, in the designated coal
mine of the seller or the locations or ports identified by the sellers
which, in the present case is admittedly in the State of Jharkhand.
Clause 5 provides that any complaint with respect to the quality
of the coal shall be made at the colliery site / delivery point. Most
importantly Clause 8 declares that the title and risk of coal will
pass from the Seller to the purchaser at the delivery point itself
where the coal is loaded into wagons / containers of the purchaser.
The seller shall have no liability as regards any loss, whatsoever,
thereafter. Clause 10(1) envisages that the demand draft / bankers’
cheque shall be drawn in favour of seller by the purchaser
payable on any Nationalised / Scheduled Bank at Ranchi. Thus, in
my view, simply for the reason that the concerned letters though
are addressed to the petitioners at Aurangabad would not mean
that part of cause of action has fallen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. Even if the claim of the petitioners is
accepted that the seller has a right to examine whether the coal
supplied by it is converted into the end product or not at the Unit
situated in the State of Bihar, that issue having no nexus with the
present lis , would be of no relevance. Other factors also do not
have a nexus with the lis between the parties. A reference in this
regard is made to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Haribox
Swalram and others [(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786]. Their
Lordships have observed that each and every fact pleaded in the
writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those
facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have nexus
or relevance with the lis or dispute involved in the case. Facts
which does not have bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the
case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned.
That apart even if it is assumed for the time being
that small part of cause of action has fallen within the
jurisdiction of this Court also in view of the express agreement
between the parties, that would be of no help to the petitioners. A
reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court
rendered in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
another [(2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 254] the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 30 as under :
“30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself
may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In
appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.
In view of the above discussion, I am of the
considered opinion that this writ application has to fail on the
ground of maintainability, firstly, in view of the decision of the
Division Bench rendered in The Central Coalfields Limited
Ltd., secondly, since the parties to the contract have chosen forum
convenience, thirdly, as per the discussion made above, the cause
of action does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court, fourthly, even if it is assumed that small part of cause of
action falls within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in view
of the forum having been chosen by the parties, this Court would
refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in view of the
doctrine of forum convenience.
Thus, in my considered opinion, in the present
matter Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi would have the exclusive
jurisdiction for consideration of the lis between the parties.
As a result this writ application fails and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
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