petitioner that the petitioner industry has been declared as a
sick industry under the provisions of the SIC Act. Therefore,
by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 22(3) of the SIC
Act, the award is not executable and the execution proceeding
deserves to be dropped. The award of the Facilitation Council
being an award deemed to have been made under the Act of
1996, is executable under Section 36 of the said Act.
29. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jay Engineering Works
Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council and another (2006) 8 SCC 677 has held
that once the awarded amount is included in the scheme
approved by the Board, Section 22 of the SIC Act would apply.
30. Very recently, in the matter of Ghanshyam Sarda v. Shiv
Shankar Trading Company and others (2015) 1 SCC 298, the Supreme Court
has held that the SIC Act is a self-contained code and has
conferred upon BIFR complete supervisory control over a sick
industrial company to adopt such methodology as provided in
Chapter III for detecting, reviving or winding up such sick
company. The authority to determine the existence and extent
of sickness of such company and to adopt methodology for its
revival are, in the exclusive domain of BIFR and by virtue of
Section 26 there is an express exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the civil court in that behalf. The Supreme Court further held
as under in paragraph 30: -
“30. As laid down by this Court the Act is a
complete code in itself. The Act gives complete
supervisory control to BIFR over the affairs of a
sick industrial company from the stage of
registration of reference and questions concerning
status of sickness of such company are in the
exclusive domain of BIFR. Any submission or
assertion by anyone including the company that by
certain developments the company has revived
itself and/or that its net worth since the stage of
registration having become positive no such
scheme for revival needs to be undertaken, must
be and can only be dealt with by BIFR. Any such
assertion or claim has to be made before BIFR
and only upon the satisfaction of BIFR that a sick
company is no longer sick, that such company
could be said to have ceased to be amenable to its
supervisory control under the Act. The aspects of
revival of such company being completely within
its exclusive domain, it is BIFR alone, which can
determine the issue whether such company now
stands revived or not. The jurisdiction of the civil
court in respect of these matters stands
completely excluded.”
31. In light of the principles laid down herein-above, if the facts of
the present case are examined, it is quite vivid that the
petitioner has simply said that the petitioner industry is a sick
industry, it has not been demonstrated that whether the
awarded amount has been included in the scheme approved
by the BIFR. Section 26 of the SIC Act bars the jurisdiction of
the civil court, as held by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam
Sarda (supra).
32. Therefore, the petitioner's plea in regard to applicability of the
SIC Act is not complete in itself, rather halfhearted, it has
neither been established that the awarded amount has been
included in the scheme approved by the BIFR nor it has been
shown how the civil court has jurisdiction in view of Section 26
of the SIC Act and the judgment rendered by the Supreme
Court in Ghanshyam Sarda (supra).
33. As a fallout and consequence of aforesaid discussion, I hold
that the learned executing court is absolutely justified in
rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner herein in
execution and no error of jurisdiction has been committed while
rejecting those objections raised by way of applications.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Writ Petition (Art. 227) No.699 of 2015
Order delivered on: 25-11-2016
M/s. I.C.S.A. (India Limited),
V
M/s. Swastik Wires,
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Citation: AIR 2017 Chhatisgarh 70
1. The Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council
constituted under Section 20 of the Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short 'the Act of 2006')
arbitrated the arbitrable dispute between the parties and
delivered an award on 12-3-2014 granting Rs.80,02,528/- in
favour of the respondent herein and against the petitioner
herein/defendant.
2. Feeling aggrieved against the award passed by the Facilitation
Council, the petitioner defendant filed an application under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for
short 'the Act of 1996') before the District Court, Raipur, but the
petitioner defendant did not deposit the mandatory deposit
under Section 19 of the Act of 2006, therefore the learned
District Judge on 14-7-2015 directed for deposit of 75% of the
award amount and further directed that till the amount is
deposited, the proceedings shall remain in abeyance and that
order has attained finality as it has not been sought to be
challenged by the petitioner till it is denied. Execution was
levied by the respondent herein. The petitioner herein filed two
applications, one under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151
of the CPC stating inter alia that since the petitioner Company
has been declared sick industry, no execution is maintainable.
Second application was filed under Section 151 of the CPC
that since the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
for setting aside the award is pending consideration, therefore,
by virtue of Section 36 of the Act of 1996, execution of the
award shall remain suspended automatically. The learned
District Judge by its impugned order rejected both the
applications feeling aggrieved against which this writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by
the petitioner.
3. Mr. Raghavendra Pradhan, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, would submit as under: -
1. The learned District Judge has committed legal error in
not properly appreciating the fact that once an application
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is filed, by virtue of
Section 36 of the Act of 1996, proceeding for execution
shall stand automatically suspended.
2. The petitioner Company is a sick industry and by virtue of
the provisions contained in Section 22(1) of the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for
short 'the SIC Act'), execution proceedings cannot
proceed against a sick industry / petitioner as held by the
Supreme Court in the matter of LML Ltd. v. Union of
India and others1
.
4. Mr. B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent decree holder, would submit as under: -
1. The provisions of Section 36 of the Act of 1996 would not
be applicable in the instant case, as the Act of 2006 has
overriding effect over the provisions contained in Section
34 of the Act of 1996. Therefore, the execution would
continue as it has an overriding effect over the provisions
of the Act of 1996 as well as the SIC Act and Section 19
of the Act of 2006 is mandatory.
2. In alternative, Mr. B.P. Sharma submits that unless 75%
mandatory deposit is made, the application under Section
1 (2014) 13 SCC 375
34 of the Act of 1996 filed by the petitioner herein is not
maintainable and therefore, unless application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is duly constituted by
mandatory deposit as required under Section 19 of the
Act of 2006, the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of
1996 are not attracted and the order of the District Judge
suspending the proceeding of Section 34 of the Act of
1996 for non-compliance of Section 19 of the Act of 2006
has not been challenged and same has become final and
as such, the writ petition has no merit and deserves to be
dismissed.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and cautiously
analysed the submissions made therein and also gone through
the records with utmost circumspection extensively.
6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, following two
questions arise for consideration: -
1) Whether mere filing of execution under Section 34 of
the Act of 1996 for setting aside the award passed under
the Act of 2006, the execution filed under Section 36 of the
Act of 1996 would stand suspended or Section 19 of the Act
of 2006 would prevail over the Act of 1996 and 75% of the
deposit under Section 19 of the Act of 2006 is mandatory to
make an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
maintainable?
2) Whether in view of the objection filed under Section
22(3) of the SIC Act by the petitioner, the executing court
has no jurisdiction to execute the award?
Re. Question No.1
7. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be
appropriate to consider the provisions contained in the Interest
on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial
Undertakings Act, 1993 (for short 'the Interest Act of 1993')
which was repealed by Section 32 of the Act of 2006.
8. The Interest Act of 1993 was enacted to provide for and
regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small
scale and ancillary industrial undertakings as it was a beneficial
piece of legislation, tended to expedite timely payment of
money owed to Small Scale Industries. The Interest Act of
1993 was repealed by the Act of 2006.
9. The Act of 2006 has been enacted to provide for facilitating the
promotion and development and enhancing the
competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It is a
central enactment which came into force on 2-10-2006. The
Act of 2006 is intended to provide single legal framework to
small and medium enterprises' sector by intending to make
further improvements to the Interest Act of 1993 and to ensure
timely and smooth flow of credit to small and medium
enterprises as well as minimising the incidence of sickness
among them.
10.Chapter V of the Act of 2006 provides for the consequences
and remedies for delayed payments to Micro and Small
Enterprises. Section 15 of the said Act provides for the liability
of the buyer to make payment to the supplier within the
stipulated period. Section 16 enables the supplier to claim
compound interest from the buyer on delayed payment
notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between
the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in
force. Section 17 provides for recovery of amount due for any
goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier along with
interest thereon as provided under Section 16. Section 18
enables the party to the dispute with regard to any amount due
under Section 17 to approach the Council in reference, the
Council upon such reference shall either itself conduct
conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any
institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution
services, upon conciliation initiated not being successful and
stands terminated without any settlement between the parties,
the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration
or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute
resolution services for such arbitration. The Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 shall then apply to the dispute as if the
arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement
referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 2006.
Sub-section (4) of Section 18 of the Act of 2006 confers
jurisdiction on the Council, notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force to act as an
Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between
the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located
anywhere in India. Section 19 provides for moving an
application for setting aside decree, award or order which
reads as follows: -
“19. Application for setting aside decree, award
or order.—No application for setting aside any
decree, award or other order made either by the
Council itself or by any institution or centre
providing alternate dispute resolution services to
which a reference is made by the Council, shall be
entertained by any court unless the appellant (not
being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five
per cent of the amount in terms of the decree,
award or, as the case may be, the other order in
the manner directed by such court:
Provided that pending disposal of the
application to set aside the decree, award or order,
the court shall order that such percentage of the
amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as
it considers reasonable under the circumstances
of the case subject to such conditions as it deems
necessary to impose.”
11. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would clearly state
that no application for setting aside any decree or award or
order made by the Council constituted under Section 20 of the
Act of 2006 shall be entertained by any court unless the
appellant therein has deposited 75% of the amount in terms of
the decree or award, as the case may be, or the other order in
the manner indicated by the High Court. Thus, the
requirement of depositing 75% of the amount is mandatory to
entertain the application for setting aside the award. Proviso to
Section 19 empowers the court to pass appropriate order with
respect to disbursement of the amount to the supplier on the
condition as it considers reasonable under the circumstances
of the case. Therefore, deposit of 75% of the amount is
mandatory and court has the discretion to indicate the manner
of depositing 75% of the amount and it can be in installments,
if required.
12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Snehadeep Structures
Private Limited v. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries
Development Corporation Limited2
while dealing with the
Interest Act of 1993 also considered Section 19 of the Act of
2006 and held in paragraph 58 that Section 19 of the Act
requires the deposit to be made before an application under
Section 34 of the Arbitration is filed. Similarly, the Supreme
Court in the matter of Goodyear India Limited v. Norton
Intech Rubbers Private Limited and another3
has relied
upon Snehadeep Structures Private Limited (supra) and has
held that court has no discretion to either waive or reduce the
amount of 75% of award as a predeposit for filing of
2 (2010) 3 SCC 34
3 (2012) 6 SCC 345
application/appeal, however, court has direction to allow
predeposit to be made in installments, if required, while
considering the phrase “in the manner directed by such court”
employed in Section 19 of the Act of 2006.
13. Thus, the condition of predeposit of 75% while filing an
application for setting aside an award is mandatory in nature
and only the manner of deposit can be directed by the court
hearing the application for setting aside the award passed by
the Facilitation Council constituted under Section 20 of the Act
of 2006.
14. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 24 of the
Act of 2006 which provides as under: -
“24. Overriding effect.—The provisions of
sections 15 to 23 shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force.”
15. Section 24 of the Act of 2006 is a non obstante clause.
According to "Principles of Statutory Interpretation", 12th Edition
2010, a clause beginning with 'notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act
or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in
force', is sometimes appended to a section in the beginning,
with a view to give the enacting part of the section, in case of
conflict, an overriding effect over the provision or Act
mentioned in the non obstante clause. It is equivalent to
saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non
obstante clause, the enactment following it will have its full
operation or that the provisions embraced in the non obstante
clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the
enactment. Thus, a non obstante clause may be used as
legislative device to modify the ambit of the provision or law
mentioned in the non obstante clause or to override it in
specified circumstances.
16. Way back, in the matter of Union of India and another v.
G.M. Kokil and others4
, the Supreme Court has considered
the nature and effect of non obstante clause by holding it as a
legislative device and observed as under: -
"A non obstante clause is a legislative device which
is usually employed to give overriding effect to
certain provisions over some contrary provisions
that may be found either in the same enactment or
some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the
operation and effect of all contrary provisions."
17. Similar is the proposition laid down in the matter of State of
Bihar and others v. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh
and others5
in which the Supreme Court has held in
paragraphs 45 to 47 as under: -
"45. A non obstante clause is generally appended
to a section with a view to give the enacting part of
the section, in case of conflict, an overriding effect
over the provision in the same or other Act
mentioned in the non obstante clause. It is
4 1984 (Supp) SCC 196
5 (2005) 9 SCC 129
equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions of
the Act mentioned in the non obstante clause, the
provision following it will have its full operation or
the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause
will not be an impediment for the operation of the
enactment or the provision in which the non
obstante clause occurs. (See Principles of
Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., by Justice G.P.
Singh -- Chapter V, Synopsis IV at pp. 318 and
319.)
46. When two or more laws or provisions operate
in the same field and each contains a non obstante
clause stating that its provision will override those
of any other provisions or law, stimulating and
intricate problems of interpretation arise. In
resolving such problems of interpretation, no settled
principles can be applied except to refer to the
object and purpose of each of the two provisions,
containing a non obstante clause. Two provisions
in same Act, each containing a non obstante
clause, require a harmonious interpretation of the
two seemingly conflicting provisions in the same
Act. In this difficult exercise, there are involved
proper considerations of giving effect to the object
and purpose of two provisions and the language
employed in each. (See for relevant discussion in
para 20 in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal6
.)
47. Normally the use of a phrase by the
legislature in a statutory provision like
"notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this Act" is equivalent to saying that the Act shall
be no impediment to the measure (see Law
6 (1977) 1 SCC 750.
Lexicon words "notwithstanding anything in this Act
to the contrary"). Use of such expression is
another way of saying that the provision in which
the non obstante clause occurs usually would
prevail over other provisions in the Act. Thus, non
obstante clauses are not always to be regarded as
repealing clauses nor as clauses which expressly
or completely supersede any other provision of the
law, but merely as clauses which remove all
obstructions which might arise out of the provisions
of any other law in the way of the operation of the
principal enacting provision to which the non
obstante clause is attached. (See Bipathumma v.
Mariam Bibi7
, Mys LJ at p. 165.)"
18. Recently, in the matter of JIK Industries Ltd. v. Amarlal V.
Jumani8
it has been held by the Supreme Court that the
insertion of a non obstante clause is a well-known legislative
device and in olden times it had the effect of non obstante
aliquo statuto in contrarium (notwithstanding any statute to the
contrary). Under the Stuart reign in England the Judges then
sitting in Westminster Hall accepted that the statutes were
overridden by the process but this device of judicial surrender
did not last long. Under the scheme of the modern legislation,
non obstante clause has a contextual and limited application.
The impact of a "non obstante clause" on the Act concerned
must be kept measured by the legislative policy and it has to
be limited to the extent it is intended by Parliament and not
7 (1966) 1 Mys LJ 162
8 (2012) 3 SCC 255
beyond that.
19. Nature and effect of non obstante clause as held in G.M.
Kokil's case (supra) has been followed with approval by the
Supreme Court very recently in the matters of State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Sanjay9
and Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar10
.
20. The Act of 2006 is a Special Act and as per the provisions of
Section 24 of the said Act, the provisions of Sections 15 to 23
shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Therefore, Section 18/19 of the Act of 2006 would have
overriding effect on any other law for the time being in force
including the Act of 1996 and therefore if there is any dispute
between the parties governed by the Act of 2006, the said
dispute is to be resolved only through the procedure as
provided under Section 18 of the Act of 2006.
21. Thus, by virtue of Section 24 of the Act of 2006, it is quite vivid
that the Act of 2006 does not provide for any mechanism for
enforcement of the award. Therefore, the award has to be
enforced under the provisions of the Act of 1996 as mandated
by Section 18 of the Act of 2006.
22. Section 36 of the Act of 1996 provides that the award
enforceable upon expiry of time provided for making an
application to set aside arbitral award under Section 34 or
upon such application having been made, it has been refused,
9 (2014) 9 SCC 772
10 (2015) 10 SCC 241
the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court.
23. The Allahabad High Court in the matter of U.P. Rajya
Karmchari Kalyan Nigam v. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar
and others11 while considering Section 7 of the Interest Act of
1993, which also provides for the mandatory deposit of 75% of
amount awarded, it has been held that the provisions of
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would have to be read along with
the provisions of Section 7 of the Interest Act of 1993.
Therefore, the requirement of mandatory deposit of 75% of the
amount awarded is a condition precedent for entertaining the
application for setting aside the award under the Act of 1996.
24. A Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of R.S.
Avtar Singh and Co. v. Vindyachal Air Products Pvt. Ltd.
and another12 has also held that deposit of 75% in the manner
directed by the Court is mandatory requirement for entertaining
an application for setting aside the award.
25. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Snehadeep
Structures Private Limited (supra) has clearly held that
deposit of 75% of the award amount in terms of Section 7 of
the Interest Act of 1993 is the condition precedent for hearing
an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and further
held that the word “appeal” appearing in Section 7 of the
Interest Act of 1993 is referring to application filed under
11 AIR 2013 Allahabad 77
12 2009(3) M.P.L.J. 392
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and the word “award” includes
the arbitral award. It was also held that the Interest Act of
1993 governing small scale industries is a special enactment in
order to protect the industries and would have overriding effect.
26. As noticed herein-above, in Goodyear India Limited (supra),
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have relied upon
Snehadeep Structures Private Limited (supra) and did not
approve the order of the High Court and held that predeposit of
75% under the Act of 1996 is the condition precedent for
maintaining application to set aside the award under Section
34 of the Act of 1996, only the Court has no discretion to either
waive or reduce the amount of 75% of the award as a
predeposit for filing of application or appeal. Thus, legal view
in this regard is clearly crystallised that the application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be maintainable for setting
aside the award passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council constituted under Section 20 of the Act of
2006 but while filing an application, the appellant has to
deposit 75% of the amount in terms of the award in the manner
indicated by such court and as such, the application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 challenging the award passed by
the Facilitation Council has to be read along with Section 19 of
the Act of 2006 and in order to make the application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 maintainable and duly
constituted, a mandatory deposit of 75% of awarded amount
has to be made in the manner directed by the court trying that
application.
27. In light of the principles laid down by Their Lordships of the
Supreme Court and legal analysis made herein-above, if the
facts of the instant case are examined, it is quite vivid that in
the present case, the award was passed by the Facilitation
Council on 12-3-2014, the respondent herein filed application
for execution of award on 21-8-2014 and thereafter on 19-2-
2015, application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was filed
by the petitioner for setting aside the award in which the
respondent herein objected that compliance of mandatory
provision of Section 19 of the Act of 2006 has not been made
therefore application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
cannot be maintained. The trial Court by its order dated 14-7-
2015 has held that application of the petitioner under Section
of the Act of 1996 is not entertainable as the mandatory
deposit (75% of the award as mandated under Section 19 of
the Act of 2006) has not been made. That order has attained
finality and that has not been challenged by the petitioner
herein. The objection raised before the trial Court was that in
view of the pendency of application, award passed by the
Facilitation Council cannot be executed. As held herein-above,
application for setting aside the award passed by the
Facilitation Council, filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
has to be read along with Section 19 of the Act of 2006 and
unless while filing such application, 75% of the award amount
is predeposited, the application for setting aside the award
filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would not be
entertainable and maintainable. The trial Court has already
held that the petitioner's application under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996 is not maintainable for want of prerequisite deposit
under Section 19 of the Act of 2006 as such, the award is
clearly executable, as the petitioner's application under Section
34 of the Act of 1996 is not duly constituted and not liable to be
entertained, and rightly held so by the trial Court and the
petitioner's application has rightly been rejected by the trial
Court.
Re. Question No.2
28. This would bring me to the next objection raised by the
petitioner that the petitioner industry has been declared as a
sick industry under the provisions of the SIC Act. Therefore,
by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 22(3) of the SIC
Act, the award is not executable and the execution proceeding
deserves to be dropped. The award of the Facilitation Council
being an award deemed to have been made under the Act of
1996, is executable under Section 36 of the said Act.
29. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jay Engineering Works
Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council and another13 has held
that once the awarded amount is included in the scheme
13 (2006) 8 SCC 677
approved by the Board, Section 22 of the SIC Act would apply.
30. Very recently, in the matter of Ghanshyam Sarda v. Shiv
Shankar Trading Company and others14, the Supreme Court
has held that the SIC Act is a self-contained code and has
conferred upon BIFR complete supervisory control over a sick
industrial company to adopt such methodology as provided in
Chapter III for detecting, reviving or winding up such sick
company. The authority to determine the existence and extent
of sickness of such company and to adopt methodology for its
revival are, in the exclusive domain of BIFR and by virtue of
Section 26 there is an express exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the civil court in that behalf. The Supreme Court further held
as under in paragraph 30: -
“30. As laid down by this Court the Act is a
complete code in itself. The Act gives complete
supervisory control to BIFR over the affairs of a
sick industrial company from the stage of
registration of reference and questions concerning
status of sickness of such company are in the
exclusive domain of BIFR. Any submission or
assertion by anyone including the company that by
certain developments the company has revived
itself and/or that its net worth since the stage of
registration having become positive no such
scheme for revival needs to be undertaken, must
be and can only be dealt with by BIFR. Any such
assertion or claim has to be made before BIFR
and only upon the satisfaction of BIFR that a sick
14 (2015) 1 SCC 298
company is no longer sick, that such company
could be said to have ceased to be amenable to its
supervisory control under the Act. The aspects of
revival of such company being completely within
its exclusive domain, it is BIFR alone, which can
determine the issue whether such company now
stands revived or not. The jurisdiction of the civil
court in respect of these matters stands
completely excluded.”
31. In light of the principles laid down herein-above, if the facts of
the present case are examined, it is quite vivid that the
petitioner has simply said that the petitioner industry is a sick
industry, it has not been demonstrated that whether the
awarded amount has been included in the scheme approved
by the BIFR. Section 26 of the SIC Act bars the jurisdiction of
the civil court, as held by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam
Sarda (supra).
32. Therefore, the petitioner's plea in regard to applicability of the
SIC Act is not complete in itself, rather halfhearted, it has
neither been established that the awarded amount has been
included in the scheme approved by the BIFR nor it has been
shown how the civil court has jurisdiction in view of Section 26
of the SIC Act and the judgment rendered by the Supreme
Court in Ghanshyam Sarda (supra).
33. As a fallout and consequence of aforesaid discussion, I hold
that the learned executing court is absolutely justified in
rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner herein in
execution and no error of jurisdiction has been committed while
rejecting those objections raised by way of applications. This
Court is of the considered opinion that this writ petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India has no merit and
deserves to be and is accordingly, dismissed leaving the
parties to bear their own cost(s).
Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
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