Whether Indian penal code provides for vicarious liability for any offence alleged to have committed by company?

Learned counsel for the respondents have not

rebutted this issue in any of his arguments. With the

meticulous understanding of the orders of the Courts

below in the instant case, we can see that general and

bald allegations are made in the context of appellant

No.1 who is a juristic person and not a natural

person. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, does not

provide for vicarious liability for any offence alleged to

be committed by a company. If and when a statue

contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it

provides specifically therefor, e.g. Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881. Further, reliance was made

on S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,

reported in (2008) 5 SCC 662, where at paragraph 16,

this Court observed that “Indian Penal Code, save and

except some provisions specifically providing therefor,

does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part

of a party who is not charged directly for commission of

an offence.” Further in Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of

Gujrat & Ors., reported in (2008) 5 SCC 668, at

paragraph 13, this Court observed that where a

jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed

in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to

apply his mind. Indian Penal Code does not contain

any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the

part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the

Company when the accused is the Company. The

Learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the

correct question viz. as to whether the complaint

petition, even if given face value and taken to be

correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion

that the respondents herein were personally liable for

any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious

liability of the Managing Director and Director would

arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in

the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain

provision fixing such vicarious liability. Even for the

said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the

complainant to make requisite allegations which

would attract the provisions constituting vicarious

liability. 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1213 OF 2016

(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.1913 of 2012)

HDFC Securities Ltd. & Ors 

V

State of Maharashtra & Anr.

Dated:December 9, 2016. 

Citation:(2017)1SCC640

2. This appeal has been filed assailing the judgment and

order dated 16th November, 2011, passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ

Petition No.672 of 2011, whereby the writ petitions

filed by the appellants were dismissed by the High

Court on the ground that the filing of the writ petition

was premature and there was no need for exercising

the powers either under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: appellant No.1 -

HDFC Securities Ltd., is a public liability company

(hereinafter referred to as “the Company” for short),

appellant No.2 is the Managing Director of the

Company, appellant No.3 is Business Head of the

Company, and appellant No.4 is the Regional head of

Mumbai Region of the Company, respectively.

Respondent No.1 is State of Maharashtra and

respondent No.2 is an individual, who held an

account with the Company. The Company is engaged

in the business of dealing in shares and securities on

behalf of its constituents and clients on Brokerage

Charge and it is also a member of National Stock

Exchange of India Limited (NSE) and Bombay Stock

Exchange of India Limited (BSE).

4. Respondent No.2, had registered herself with the

Company as a constituent/client by opening

Securities Trading Account vide No.342889 and was

an imperial customer of the Company for about eight

years. She executed a Member-Client Agreement

dated 28th June, 2005. On 3rd August, 2009,

respondent No.2, through a legal Notice dated

03.08.2009, requested the appellants to make good

the losses caused to her by indulging in unauthorized

and fraudulent trading in her account by one Vinod

Koper (Relationship Manager of the company-”RM” in

short) during the period July, 2008 to June, 2009.

This Notice was also sent to RM and one Rohan Raut,

Assistant Vice President of the Company, on 20th

October, 2009. Thereafter, she filed arbitration

proceedings before NSE Panel of Arbitrators against

the Company for a sum of Rs.48.99 Lacs and costs of

Rs.2.5 Lacs, and chose the Arbitrators of her choice,

being two retired High Court Judges and sought to

call RM as a witness. The Arbitrators passed an award

in favour of the Company on 18th August, 2010,

recording a shift in the stand of respondent No.2,

authorizing her husband to trade on her behalf. In the

meantime, as the Police did not take cognizance of the

matter, albeit she filed a complaint on 31st march,

2010, against the appellants, RM and AVP, on 10th

June, 2010, she also filed a criminal complaint under

Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) before 10th

Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri, bearing Case

No.143/2010, alleging execution of unauthorized

trades in her account without her consent by the

appellants and claimed that she had thereby suffered

losses amounting to Rs.70 Lacs. Specific allegations

were levelled against RM and appellant No.3 as she

was introduced to RM by appellant No.3 and was told

that RM would handle her investment portfolio

honestly and efficiently with her prior instructions.

General allegations of involvement of other appellants

were made. On 25th September, 2010, she preferred

an appeal before NSE Appellate Panel of Arbitrators,

being Arbitration REF No.CM/M-213/2009, wherein

she disputed the trades which had taken place during

the period December 2008 to April 2009. Being

completely oblivious of the Arbitration proceedings,

the award passed therein and the appeal preferred by

respondent No.2, on 04.01.2011, the learned

Metropolitan Magistrate directed registration of FIR

against the appellants and ordered for a report after

investigation.

5. Pursuant to the order of the learned Metropolitan

Magistrate dated 4.01.2011, Juhu Police Station

registered the FIR, being MECR No.7 of 2011 dated

30th January, 2011, under Sections 409, 420, 465,

467 read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the IPC.

Meanwhile, the Appellate Tribunal had decided the

appeal against respondent No.2, vide its Award dated

24th January, 2011. The Appellate tribunal found that

respondent No.2 had not denied the fact of having

received all the necessary documents, including

Contract notes, etc. with regard to the transactions

undertaken by the appellants on her behalf, which

were required to be issued by the trading member to

the investor immediately after the trade is

undertaken. Thereafter, the appellants filed a writ

petition before the Bombay High Court, being

Criminal Writ Petition No.672 of 2011, inter alia

praying for quashing of the said FIR and the same

prayer was also made in Criminal Writ Petition

No.767 of 2011, filed by RM before the High Court.

The High Court by its judgment dated 16.11.2011,

dismissed both the writ petitions as according to it,

the filing of the writ petitions was premature and

there was no need for exercising the powers either

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the aforesaid

judgment of the High Court, the appellants have

approached this Court by filing this appeal by special

leave.

6. The only question that arises for decision in this

appeal is whether the order dated 04.01.2011 passed

by the Court of 10th Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri,

in Private Complaint, C.C. No.143/Misc/2010, filed

by respondent No.2 for the offences punishable under

Sections 409, 420, 465, 467 read with Sections 34,

120(B) IPC, as well as FIR bearing MECR No.7 of 2011

dated 30th January, 2011, registered at Police Station,

Juhu, District Mumbai, are liable to be quashed.

7. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to

first set out the relevant provisions i.e. Sections 156

and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

“156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable

case.

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without

the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case

which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area

within the limits of such station would have power to

inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall

at any stage be called in question on the ground that the

case was one which such officer was not empowered

under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may

order such an investigation as above- mentioned.”

“482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.-

Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or effect the

inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as

may be necessary to give effect to any order under this

Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

8. The High Court dismissed the application filed by the

appellants for quashing and setting aside the order of

the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 4th January, 2011,

on the ground that the appellants had applied before

the stage of issuance of process so to be issued by the

Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the

Criminal Procedure Code. According to the appellants,

the fundamental rights of the appellants would be

compromised if the order so passed by the Magistrate

is allowed to be given effect to. The contention before

the High Court on this question is that the order so

passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is illegal and

amounts to abuse of the process of law. On the

contrary, before the High Court it was submitted on

behalf of respondent No.2 that an order under Section

156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code requiring

investigation by the police does not cause any injury

of irreparable nature which requires quashing of the

investigation. It is further stated that the stage of

cognizance would arise after the investigation report

is filed. Therefore, the application filed by the

appellants before the High Court is nothing but

prematured and thus there is no need for exercising

the powers of the High Court either under Article 227

of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of

the Code. Further contention of the respondent before

the High Court was that the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code should be sparingly used.

9. The High Court held that the direction given to the

police by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the

Code for carrying out the investigation into the

complaint and to submit a report, cannot give a right

to the appellants for quashing the same since such an

order would be based absolutely on speculations upon

the report not filed. Further, it would result in

prejudging the complaint. In these circumstances, the

High Court dismissed the said application.

10. Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that

the initiation of proceedings in the instant case is an

abuse of process of law and is liable to be quashed.

He argued that it is a settled principle that

summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a

serious matter and the criminal law cannot be set in

motion as a matter of course. Therefore, the order of

the magistrate must reflect application of mind to the

facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. In

support of this submission, the learned counsel has

relied upon Anil Kumar Vs. M. K. Aiyappa, (2013)

10 SCC 705, paragraph 11, of which is quoted below:

“11. The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for

consideration before this Court in several cases. This

Court in Maksud Saiyed case examined the requirement of

the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising

jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where

jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of

Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is

required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special

Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section

156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction

order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be

reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has

gone through the complaint, documents and heard the

complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be

sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents

and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the

Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3)

CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed

expression of his views is neither required nor warranted.

We have already extracted the order passed by the

learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no

reasons for ordering investigation.”

11. Learned Magistrate had passed an order on

04.01.2011 holding that:

“The bare reading of the complaint and the accompanying

documents disclose the cognizable offence. Therefore in

view of the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case

of Srinivas Gunduri & Ors. vs. M. S. SEPCO Electric

Power Construction & Anr. In the matter of criminal

appeal No.1377/2010 and 1378/2010 decided on

30.07.2010 when the complaint discloses a cognizable

offence, then the Magistrate instead of applying his mind

to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is

sufficient ground for proceedings may direct the police for

investigation.

Therefore, considering all these aspects, the complaint

discloses the commission of cognizable offence. Therefore,

considering the nature of offence it needs to be sent to

police for investigation under section 156(3) of CrPC.”

12. Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants has relied upon

the following decisions of this Court to assail the

aforesaid order passed by the Magistrate: Devarapall

Lakshminarayana Vs. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors.,

(1976) 3 SCC 252, and Ram Dev Food Products Pvt.

Ltd. Vs. State of Gujrat, reported in (2015) 6 SCC

439.

13. Further, it was submitted by the learned counsel for

the appellants that there is no merit in the

complainant’s (respondent No.2) contention that the

transactions from her trading account were

unauthorized. Trading from the complainant’s trading

account were being carried out by her husband as

admitted by the complainant in the complaint made

before the learned Magistrate, and at the time of

opening the trading account with appellant No.1, she

was made aware of all the risks involved and the

complainant had agreed to the same and understood

that she would be responsible for all the risks and

consequences of entering into trades. The relevant

clause of the Agreement entered into by complainant

is reproduced hereinbelow:

“2.11 The Client agrees and declares as follows: (i) The

Client shall be wholly responsible for all the investment

decisions and trades of the Client; (ii) The Client will pay

receive applicable daily margins; (iii) Payment of margins

by the Client does not necessarily imply complete

satisfaction of all dues; (iv) In spite of consistent having

paid margins, the Client may, on the closing of his trade,

be obliged to pay (or entitled to receive) such further sums

as the market price or an instrument of contract may

dictate; and (v) The failure of a Client to understand the

risk involved or the failure of the member to explain the

risk to the Client shall not render a contract as void or

voidable and the Client shall be and shall continue to be

responsible for all the risks and consequences for entering

into trades in Derivatives.”

14. In the light of the Agreement entered into between

complainant-respondent No.2 and the appellants, the

learned counsel for the appellants further averred

that criminal prosecution of the appellants could not

be allowed to continue because the criminal

prosecution requires a much higher standard of proof

beyond reasonable doubt, whereas civil matters

require lower standard of proof - preponderance of

probabilities. He drew our attention towards a very

recent pronouncement in the case of Lalitha Kumari

Vs. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2014) 2 SCC

1, wherein this Court held:

“Therefore, in view of various counter claims regarding

registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only

that the information given to the police must disclose the

commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation,

registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no

cognizable offence is made out in the information given,

then the FIR need not be registered immediately and

perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary

verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of

ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been

committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions

the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other

option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other

considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration

of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given,

whether the information is genuine, whether the

information is credible etc. These are the issues that have

to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the

stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely

whether the information given ex facie discloses the

commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation,

the information given is found to be false, there is always

an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false

FIR.”

15. We are of the considered opinion that in the

present case a fact finding investigation was directed

by the impugned order. Consequently, FIR was

registered against appellants No.2 to 4 and against

RM (Vinod Kopar). The accused under Indian Criminal

Legal System, unless proved guilty shall always be

given a reasonable space and liberty to defend himself

in accordance with the law. Further, it is always

expected from a person accused of an offence pleading

not guilty that he shall co-operate and participate in

criminal proceedings or proceedings of that nature

before a court of law, or other Tribunal before whom

he may be accused of an ‘offence’ as defined in

Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, i.e., an act

punishable under the Penal Code or any special or

local law. At the same time, courts, taking cognizance

of the offence or conducting a trial while issuing any

order, are expected to apply their mind and the order

must be a well reasoned one.

16. Learned counsel for the appellants has further invited

our attention to the order of the High Court

dismissing the writ petitions. According to the learned

counsel for the appellants, the High Court, relying

upon the decision of this Court in Iqbal Singh

Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr.,

(2005) 4 SCC 370 and Rukhmni Narvekar Vs. Vijya

Statardekar and Ors., (2008) 14 SCC 1, found that

there was no substance in the argument that

respondent No.2 ought to have disclosed the

arbitration proceedings and the outcome thereof in

her complaint and that non-disclosure of the same

amounts to suppression of material facts. Learned

counsel for the appellants further submitted that the

High Court failed to appreciate that it was within its

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to

consider the correspondence exchanged as well as the

admitted documents under the arbitration

proceedings. In the case of All Cargo Movers (India)

(P.) Limited Vs. Dhanesh Badarwal Jain, (2007) 14

SCC 776, relied upon in paragraph 17 thereof, it was

held by this Court:

“We are of the opinion that the allegations made in the

complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be

correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence. For the

said purpose, This Court may not only take into

consideration the admitted facts but it is also permissible

to look into the pleadings of the plaintiff-respondent No.1

in the suit. No allegation whatsoever was made against

the appellants herein in the notice. What was contended

was negligence and/or breach of contract on the part of

the carriers and their agent. Breach of contract simplicitor

does not constitute an offence. For the said purpose,

allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the

necessary ingredients therefor. Where a civil suit is

pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year

after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of

finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima

facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the

parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to

say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the

defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that

for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is

impermissible also to look to the admitted documents.

Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is

found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process

of the Court. Superior Courts while exercising this power

should also strive to serve the ends of justice.

17. Learned counsel for the appellants further relied upon

few more judgments wherein it was well settled that

the test to be applied for quashing is, whether

uncontroverted allegations made, prima facie

establish the offence. This is because the Court

cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where,

in the opinion of the Court, the chances of an

ultimate conviction are bleak, no useful purpose will

be served by allowing the criminal prosecution to

continue. He relied upon the decisions of this Court in

Madhavrao Jiwanrao Scindia & Ors. Vs.

Sambhajirao Chandrajirao Angre & Ors., (1998) 1

SCC 692 (para 7-8); State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal,

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (para 102); Rajiv Thapar &

Ors Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 at para

30; Rishi Pal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &

Anr. (2014) 7 SCC 215, at para 12-13.

18. Learned counsel for the respondents have not

rebutted this issue in any of his arguments. With the

meticulous understanding of the orders of the Courts

below in the instant case, we can see that general and

bald allegations are made in the context of appellant

No.1 who is a juristic person and not a natural

person. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, does not

provide for vicarious liability for any offence alleged to

be committed by a company. If and when a statue

contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it

provides specifically therefor, e.g. Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881. Further, reliance was made

on S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,

reported in (2008) 5 SCC 662, where at paragraph 16,

this Court observed that “Indian Penal Code, save and

except some provisions specifically providing therefor,

does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part

of a party who is not charged directly for commission of

an offence.” Further in Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of

Gujrat & Ors., reported in (2008) 5 SCC 668, at

paragraph 13, this Court observed that where a

jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed

in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to

apply his mind. Indian Penal Code does not contain

any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the

part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the

Company when the accused is the Company. The

Learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the

correct question viz. as to whether the complaint

petition, even if given face value and taken to be

correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion

that the respondents herein were personally liable for

any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious

liability of the Managing Director and Director would

arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in

the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain

provision fixing such vicarious liability. Even for the

said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the

complainant to make requisite allegations which

would attract the provisions constituting vicarious

liability. In Thermax Limited & Ors. Vs. K. M.

Johny & Ors., (2011) 13 SCC 412, and in Sunil

Bharti Mittal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation,

(2015) 4 SCC 609, at para 39, this Court held:

“Apart from the fact that the complaint lacks necessary

ingredients of Sections 405, 406, 420 read with Section

34 IPC, it is to be noted that the concept of `vicarious

liability' is unknown to criminal law. As observed earlier,

there is no specific allegation made against any person

but the members of the Board and senior executives are

joined as the persons looking after the management and

business of the appellant-Company”.

19. Learned counsel for the appellants has lastly argued

in favour of the partial quashment of the FIR against

the appellants on the contention that there was no

criminality on their behalf. It has been further

submitted that the allegations made against them do

not amount to disclosure of an offence and were made

with the purpose of harassing the appellants.

Additionally, learned counsel contends that vicarious

liability cannot be attributed to appellant Nos.2 to 4,

while relying upon R. Kalyani Vs. Janak C. Mehta &

Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 516, wherein it was held:

“Whereas, thus, no allegation whatsoever has been made

against the respondent No.1, the only allegation against

the respondent No.2 was that he had forwarded the said

letter dated 10.1.2002 to National Stock Exchange. The

act of forgery on/or fabrication of the said letter had been

attributed to Respondent No.3.

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein were sought to be

proceeded against on the premise that they are vicariously

liable for the affairs of the company.

As Mr. Mani had time and again referred to the allegations

relating to forgery of the said document dated 10.1.2002,

we may also notice a disturbing fact. Before lodging the

said First Information, a notice was issued by the

appellant against the respondents herein on 15.10.2002,

whereas the address of respondent Nos.1 and 2 were

shown as 404, Embassy Centre, Nariman Point, Mumbai -

400 021 and 302, Veena Chambers, 21, Dalal Street, Fort,

Mumbai - 400 001 respectively. However, in the complaint

petition, they were shown to be residents of Chennai”.

20. In Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangta Rane, reported

in (2015) 12 SCC 781 (para 9-11) it is noted by this

Court:

“The allegations which find place against the Managing

Director in his personal capacity seem to be absolutely

vague. When a complainant intends to rope in a Managing

Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to make

requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious liability.”

21. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2

submitted that the complaint has disclosed the

commission of an offence which is cognizable in

nature and in the light of Lalitha Kumari’s Case,

(supra), registration of FIR becomes mandatory. We

observe that it is clear from the use of the words "may

take cognizance" in the context in which they occur,

that the same cannot be equated with "must take

cognizance". The word "may" gives discretion to the

Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the

complaint he finds that the allegations therein

disclose a cognizable offence and that the forwarding

of the complaint to the police for investigation

under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and

save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being

wasted in enquiring into a matter, which was

primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will

be justified in adopting that course as an alternative

to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. It is

settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint,

he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged

in the complaint, do not disclose the commission of

an offence.

22. Learned counsel for the respondents further

submitted that there is a marked difference between

the civil nature of the arbitration proceedings and the

Criminal nature of the current proceedings and

relieving the RM on the same day when he had

tendered his resignation reflects the conduct whereby

conspiracy could be proved. It was further argued that

respondent No.2 has also sent the legal notice

requesting for making good the losses caused to her

by the appellants of which Criminal Court and the

Arbitration Tribunal took notice of. Thus, allegations

were already made against all the appellants. We find

no substance in the said submission being completely

opposed to the settled legal principles. Nevertheless,

we find patent illegalities which would result in

vitiating the entire investigation which would result in

miscarriage of justice.

23. Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 submitted

that respondent No.2 in her complaint had set out the

conduct of the appellants and alleged that their

conduct had caused wrongful loss to her and

wrongful gain to the appellants and other accused. It

is a fact that at the time of summoning of the

accused, the Courts must be careful to scrutinize the

evidence brought on record and in elicitation of

answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations.

24. It appears to us that the appellants approached the

High Court even before the stage of issuance of

process. In particular, the appellants challenged the

order dated 04.01.2011 passed by the learned

Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. The

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants

after summarizing their arguments in the matter have

emphasized also in the context of the fundamental

rights of the appellants under the Constitution, that

the order impugned has caused grave inequities to the

appellants. In the circumstances, it was submitted

that the order is illegal and is an abuse of the process

of law. However, it appears to us that this order under

Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. requiring investigation by

the police, cannot be said to have caused an injury of

irreparable nature which, at this stage, requires

quashing of the investigation. We must keep in our

mind that the stage of cognizance would arise only

after the investigation report is filed before the

Magistrate. Therefore, in our opinion, at this stage

the High Court has correctly assessed the facts and

the law in this situation and held that filing of the

petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

or under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., at this stage are

nothing but premature. Further, in our opinion, the

High Court correctly came to the conclusion that the

inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C. should be sparingly used. In these

circumstances, we do not find that there is any flaw in

the impugned order or any illegality has been

committed by the High Court in dismissing the

petitions filed by the appellants before the High Court.

Accordingly, we affirm the order so passed by the

High Court dismissing the writ petitions. The appeal

is dismissed.

………………………………….J

(Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

………………………………….J

(Amitava Roy)

New Delhi;

December 9, 2016.