for the appellant/defendant No.2, submits that the office be given
direction not to list the matters in which he is appearing for any of the
parties before this Court. In other words, he submits that I should
recuse from taking up the matters wherein Shri V.V. Bhangde is
appearing for any of the parties. The submission shocks my
conscience, particularly when it suddenly came from a regular
practitioner from this Court, who was being looked at as an
experienced and responsible officer of the Court. The entire
arguments in this matter went on smoothly, patiently and with
interest. After conclusion of the arguments, both the learned counsels
were asked as to whether they intend to make any additional
submissions, and thereafter the dictation commenced as per the usual
practice. I need not delve upon any further and I refrain from making
any comments against Shri V.V. Bhangde. However, the increasing
trend need to be commented upon; so as to caution the lawyers and
the litigants about the consequences of it, which can be avoided.
15. A lawyer has his own choice of appearing before the Court
presided over by a particular Judge to conduct the matter. If his
matter is listed before the Court where he does not want to appear, he
is at liberty *to return such matter and/or fees to his client and can
ask him to engage some other lawyer or he may refuse to accept the
matter if he has not already filed his vakalatnama. A Judge may also
recuse himself from taking up the matters of the lawyers with whom
he is closely related or where his conscious does not permit him to
take up the matters of some lawyers. In these situations, there may
not be any problem either with a Judge or a lawyer, but where the
Court passed an order against a particular lawyer not to appear in his
Court, it takes a colour of penalty or punishment to such a lawyer,
which may result in taking some disciplinary action against him by the
Bar Council of India or of State, which issued him a Sanad of Practice.
Such a stage by a Court may be construed of blacklisting of a lawyer.
Seldom, such event occurs, and the Courts also normally avoid it.
16. A tendency has started growing amongst lawyers to dictate a
Judge to recuse from taking up his matters when the decision goes
against his client or his wavelength does not match with the Judge or
he does not find comfort in conducting the matter or for some such
reasons. This is an insult personally to a Judge. Such reactions are
normally experienced when the lawyers take heavy fees from their
clients with an assurance to bring the result of the cases in their favour
or to impress upon the clients sitting in the court room during the
course of hearing, the boldness which he possesses to browbeat the
Court. If a lawyer exercises his choice of not conducting the matter,
he loses his client and fees, which he does not want to do. If a Judge
accedes to such demand of a lawyer for recusal, the effect is
threefold (i) the confidence of a lawyer to browbeat the Court is
boosted, (ii) a lawyer gets rid of the Court where he finds discomfort
in conducting the matter, and (iii) it creates an additional source of
income for him, from the other lawyers and the litigants, who do not
want their matters listed or dealt with by such a Judge. This promotes
the practice of benchhunting. No system of justice can tolerate such
practice by a lawyer and the same is required to be curbed and
deprecated.
17. Recently, in the judgment, which I have delivered in Civil
Revision Application No.26 of 2016 on 662016 (Satish Mahadeorao
Uke v. The Registrar, High Court of Bombay, Bench at Nagpur, Nagpur),
I have observed in para 25 thereof as under :
“25. A Judge may recuse at his own choice from a case
entrusted to him by the Chief Justice and it would be a matter
of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of the litigating
party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. This is what
the Apex Court has held recently in NJAC case instituted by the
Supreme Court AdvocatesonRecord Association and another
v. Union of India, reported in 2015 (11) SCALE 1. The
question of recusal is normally decided by a Judge on the basis
of his personal or private interest in the subjectmatter of the
litigation, his intimacy with the party/parties to a lis before
him, his perception about conflict of interest in taking up the
matter, and his own conscience. Such decision does not depend
upon the dictates of lawyers or litigants. ...”
18. Recusal to take the matters to be conducted by some lawyers,
is a matter of Judge's own choosing and it cannot be at the dictates of
the lawyers. What a Judge has to see is that he performs his duty of
deciding the matters before him without fear or favour, affection or
illwill. He has to keep in mind the principle that the justice should
not only be done, but it must appear to have been done. The decision
of recusal to take the matters of lawyers, depends upon the Judge's
personal relations or intimacy with such lawyers, and his own
conscience to decide a case by observing the oath which he has taken
while occupying the position as a Judge. Ultimately, a Judge is also a
humanbeing and the Judges come from different strata of the Society,
having their own views, ideas, angle or perception, based on the
varied individual experience in life, which may or may not match with
each others or with some lawyers or litigants. However, this cannot be
a reason to avoid conducting the matters listed before such a Judge or
the Judges. Once the constitutional authority of a Judge or the Judges
to adjudicate the matters is accepted, it cannot be lowered down by
asking him or them to recuse to hear and decide the matter.
19. To prevent a Judge or the Judges from performing his or
their duties in this fashion causes distraction of attention in the
judicial proceedings, which amounts to interference in the course of
justice. Merely because a lawyer, litigant or public at large feels that
the approach adopted or a decision is wrong, the authority or the force
of the decision does not get eroded. A wrong decision in the matter is
equally enforceable like a correct decision. If the Constitution and the
laws provide a remedy to get such decision corrected in a higher
forum, such a remedy can be availed. Even a wrong decision becomes
final, binding and enforceable like a correct decision, if there is no
remedy available. The lawyers, litigants or public at large cannot run
away from such decision and they have to be cautioned about the
authority of the Courts.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
Second Appeal No.24 of 2002
Ganesh s/o Ramkisan Bairagi,
V
Yeshoda wd/o Purushottam Landge,
Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Dated : 16th June, 2016
Citation: 2016(6) MHLJ 393
1. Regular Civil Suit No.63 of 1986 filed for eviction and
possession of the suit property from the tenant on the basis of the
notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
was dismissed by the Trial Court on 2371993. The plaintiff preferred
Regular Civil Appeal No.172 of 1993, which has been allowed by the
learned Joint District Judge, Amravati, on 7112001 by setting aside
the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and granting a
decree for eviction and possession of the suit property in favour of the
plaintiff along with the arrears of Rs.810/ and ordering an enquiry
under Order XX, Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure for
determination of the future mesne profits from the date of filing of the
suit till the delivery of the possession. Hence, the original defendant
No.2 is before this Court in this second appeal.
2. The Trial Court recorded a finding that the tenancy between
the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 in respect of the suit property
created on 1641984 has not been proved by the plaintiff, so also the
claim regarding arrears of rent of Rs.810/ for the period from
1571985 to 1441986. The lower Appellate Court has reversed this
finding and it is held that the plaintiff has established the relationship
of “Landlord and Tenant” between him and the defendant No.1, and
the tenancy was validly terminated, and hence the decree for
possession as well as for arrears of rent of Rs.810/ has been passed.
3. This Court framed the following substantial questions of law
while admitting this second appeal on 772015 :
“1. Whether the document styled as agreement of lease
(Ex.50) is sufficient to hold that the present appellant
surrendered his tenancy and therefor his father i.e. original
defendant No.1 became tenant of suit property.
2. Whether Ex.50 was inadmissible in evidence.
3. Whether evidence of P.W.2 – Govindrao Dharam can
be relied upon to hold that the agreement of lease at Ex.50 is
proved.”
4. The plaintiff came up before the Trial Court with the case
that an agreement was entered into for creation of monthly tenancy
between him and the defendant No.1Ramkisan Motidas Bairagi on
1641984 on rent of Rs.90/ per month. The defendant No.1 failed to
make the payment of rent for the period of nine months from
1571985 to 1441986 at the rate of Rs.90/ per month, and hence
by issuing the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
on 2621986, the tenancy of the defendant No.1 was terminated. The
suit was filed on 1641986. The defendant No.2Ganesh Bairagi is
the son of the defendant No.1, and as per the averment made in the
plaint, he was joined as the party to avoid the further complications.
5. The defendant No.2 filed his written on 30101986 denying
the case of the plaintiff and taking the stand that he is the tenant and
in possession of the suit property since the year 1977 on the monthly
rent of Rs.60/ (Rs.30/ to be paid towards rent and Rs.30/ to be paid
towards supply of electricity and water). The defendant No.2 came up
with the stand in one place in his written statement that since last two
years, he is paying the rent of Rs.90/ per month, and in another
place, that from the month of February 1986, he is compelled to pay
the rent of Rs.90/, as the water and electricity supply to the premises
was stopped. However, the money order sent came back to him.
6. The defendant No.1, who is the father of the defendant No.2,
filed his written statement on 28111986 denying the averments
made in the plaint and also the tenancy, as was alleged by the
plaintiff. It was the specific stand taken by the defendant No.1 in the
written statement that it is the defendant No.2, who is the tenant in
respect of the suit property and the defendant No.1 is not at all
concerned with it.
7. The original plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit
and his daughterinlaw came on record and entered the witnessbox
to depose that the agreement dated 1641984 was at Exhibit 50 was
entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. The
plaintiff proved the notice at Exhibit 47 and its acknowledgement by
the defendant No.1 at Exhibit 48. The plaintiff also examined
PW 2Govindrao Waindeshkar, the attesting witness, to agreement of
lease at Exhibit 50. The defendant No.1 did not enter the witnessbox,
but the defendant No.2 entered the witnessbox and stated that in the
month of February 1986, the rent was increased to Rs.90/, which was
sent by money order and accepted by the plaintiff. The said receipt is
produced on record at Exhibit 55. He further stated that in the month
of March 1986, he sent Rs.60/ by way of money order to the plaintiff,
because the plaintiff stopped the supply of water and electricity, which
returned to him, as it was refused.
8. Before the Trial Court, the following issues were framed and
answered as under :
Sr.No. Issues Findings
i Does the plaintiff prove that he leased out
the suit premises to the defendant no.1 on
15.4.1984 and deft. executed the
agreement to that effect.
No
ii Does he further prove that the deft.no.1 is
in arrears of Rs.810/ towards the rent for
the period 15.7.85 to 14.4.86?
No
iii Does he prove that he validly and legally
terminated the tenancy of the defendant
with effect from the midnight
of 14.4.86?
No
iv (Deleted) Does the deft. 2 prove that the
deft. no.1 alone is the tenant of suit
premises?
Deleted
v Does the deft. no.2 prove that he paid
Rs.1000/ to the plaintiff as Pagdi
(Advance)?
No
vi Does he prove that he paid the rent upto
the month of February 1986?
Yes
vii Does he further prove that the rent was
enhanced to Rs.90/ from Rs.60/ p.m.
from the month of February 1986?
Yes
viii Is plaintiff entitled to claim the possession
of suitpremises?
No
ix Is he entitled to reliefs claimed? No
x What decree, order and costs? As per final order
Issue No.(iv) was deleted by consent of the parties. The Trial Court
answered Issue No.(v) in the negative to the effect that the defendant
No.2 has failed to prove that he has paid Rs.1,000/ to the plaintiff as
Pagdi (Advance). The Trial Court also recorded the finding in the
affirmative on Issue No.(vi) holding that the defendant No.2 has
proved that he paid the rent upto the month of February 1986. The
defendant No.2 denied in his written statement the enhancement of
rent from Rs.60/ to Rs.90/ per month, and the Trial Court recorded
the finding that the rent was at the rate of Rs.90/ per month.
9. On the substantial question of law at Serial No.1, though the
Trial Court recorded the finding that the tenancy between the plaintiff
and the defendant No.1 with effect from 1641984 has not been
established, the lower Appellate Court reverses this finding and it is
held that such a tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1
has been established. The reliance is placed upon Exhibit 50, the
agreement of lease. The plaintiff was not alive to lead evidence to
prove the document at Exhibit 50. The daughterinlaw, who came on
record, could not depose about the execution of this document.
PW 2Govindrao Deshkar, the attesting witness, has deposed that the
agreement bears his signature and the defendant No.1 has also signed
the said document in his presence and he identifies the signature of
the defendant No.1. He says that the rent note was written by one
scribeBapu Deshmukh and it bears his own signature, the signature of
the plaintiff, and that of the defendant No.1.
Shri V.V. Bhangde, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant/defendant No.2, has invited my attention to the
crossexamination of this witness where he states that at the time of
writing the document at Exhibit 50, he was present along with the
plaintiff and the scribeBapu Deshmukh. He states in the
crossexamination that except Bapu Deshmukh, no other person has
signed the document in his presence.
10. The lower Appellate Court has recorded the finding that the
defendant No.1 has not entered the witnessbox to refute the
document at Exhibit 50. The execution of this document has been
spoken about by the plaintiff in her evidence at Exhibit 46 and the
document goes to show that from 1641984 onwards, it is the
defendant No.1, who represented the leasehold rights in respect of
the suit property. The lower Appellate Court has taken into
consideration the evidence of the attesting witness. It has also taken
into consideration that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 are the father and
son and this relationship cannot be forgotten. On such findings, the
lower Appellate Court has held that the document at Exhibit 50 has
been proved. Apart from this, the Trial Court has recorded the finding
that the defendant No.2 has failed to prove that he has paid
Rs.1,000/ to the plaintiff as Pagdi (Advance) and the rent at the rate
of Rs.90/ per month was paid upto the month of February 1986. It is
not the case of the defendant No.2 that he paid the rent at the rate of
Rs.90/ till February 1986. Thus, there is other evidence available on
record in support of the findings of the lower Appellate Court. The
findings are based on evidence available and its appreciation. At any
rate it is a possible view of the matter and no substantial question of
law arises for consideration out of such findings.
11. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff has pleaded in his plaint
by way of amendment that the defendant No.2 was initially the
tenant, who surrendered his tenancy on 1541984, and with effect
from 1641984, the defendant No.1 was considered as the tenant in
respect of the suit property. This was introduced in view of the stand
taken by the defendant Nos.1 and 2 in their separate written
statement that it is the defendant No.2 who is the tenant and not the
defendant No.1. In fact, the Trial Court deleted the issue as to whether
the defendant No.2 proves that the defendant No.1 alone is the tenant
of the suit property. Since the defendant No.2 has surrendered such
an issue, the consequential amendment of pleadings by the plaintiff
loses its significance. It was, therefore, not necessary for the lower
Appellate Court to decide the question as to whether the surrender of
tenancy was proved or not. The substantial questions of law at Serial
Nos.1 and 3 are, therefore, answered accordingly.
12. So far as the substantial question of law at Serial No.2
regarding admissibility of document at Exhibit 50 in evidence is
concerned, though such document is an unregistered document, it can
be used for collateral purposes and the decision of the Apex Court in
the case of Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop & Sons and others, reported in
(2000) 6 SCC 394, throws light in para 16 thereof on such issue,
which is reproduced below :
“16. Taking a different view would be contrary to the
reality when parties clearly intended to create a lease though
the document which they executed had not gone into processes
of registration. That lacuna had affected the validity of the
document, but what had happened between the parties in
respect of the property became a reality. Nonregistration of
the document had caused only two consequences. One is that
no lease exceeding one year was created. Second is that the
instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is
concerned. Nonetheless the presumption that a lease not
exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains
unrebutted.”
In view of above, the nonregistration of document would not come in
the way of the Court to hold that the relationship of “Landlord and
Tenant” between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 in the present
case has been established, coupled with the other evidence available
on record. The substantial questions of law at Serial No.2 is answered
accordingly.
There is no substance in this second appeal, and the same is
dismissed. No order as to costs.
13. At this stage, Shri V.V. Bhangde, the learned counsel for the
appellant/defendant No.2, submits that his arguments that the
document at Exhibit 50 has not been proved, the view taken by the
lower Appellate Court is not even a possible view of the matter, and
the findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court are perverse, have
not been dealt with in this judgment, which is dictated in open Court.
He, therefore, insisted that the said points be dealt with. I think
whatever arguments have been understood are dealt with in this
judgment. If any points are left out, Shri Bhangde was asked to place
on record the written notes of arguments, which can be dealt with
subsequently while checking the judgment. Since there is insistence
on the part of Shri Bhangde to deal with such points now, I make it
clear that the consciousness of this Court about such admissions of the
attesting witness is reflected in the judgment. This Court has held that
it is a possible view of the matter which is taken by the lower
Appellate Court and such, the argument that the findings of the lower
Appellate court are perverse, has also been dealt with. There is no
other point which Shri Bhangde has urged.
14. Again, at this stage, Shri V.V. Bhangde, the learned counsel
for the appellant/defendant No.2, submits that the office be given
direction not to list the matters in which he is appearing for any of the
parties before this Court. In other words, he submits that I should
recuse from taking up the matters wherein Shri V.V. Bhangde is
appearing for any of the parties. The submission shocks my
conscience, particularly when it suddenly came from a regular
practitioner from this Court, who was being looked at as an
experienced and responsible officer of the Court. The entire
arguments in this matter went on smoothly, patiently and with
interest. After conclusion of the arguments, both the learned counsels
were asked as to whether they intend to make any additional
submissions, and thereafter the dictation commenced as per the usual
practice. I need not delve upon any further and I refrain from making
any comments against Shri V.V. Bhangde. However, the increasing
trend need to be commented upon; so as to caution the lawyers and
the litigants about the consequences of it, which can be avoided.
15. A lawyer has his own choice of appearing before the Court
presided over by a particular Judge to conduct the matter. If his
matter is listed before the Court where he does not want to appear, he
is at liberty *to return such matter and/or fees to his client and can
ask him to engage some other lawyer or he may refuse to accept the
matter if he has not already filed his vakalatnama. A Judge may also
recuse himself from taking up the matters of the lawyers with whom
he is closely related or where his conscious does not permit him to
take up the matters of some lawyers. In these situations, there may
not be any problem either with a Judge or a lawyer, but where the
Court passed an order against a particular lawyer not to appear in his
Court, it takes a colour of penalty or punishment to such a lawyer,
which may result in taking some disciplinary action against him by the
Bar Council of India or of State, which issued him a Sanad of Practice.
Such a stage by a Court may be construed of blacklisting of a lawyer.
Seldom, such event occurs, and the Courts also normally avoid it.
16. A tendency has started growing amongst lawyers to dictate a
Judge to recuse from taking up his matters when the decision goes
against his client or his wavelength does not match with the Judge or
he does not find comfort in conducting the matter or for some such
reasons. This is an insult personally to a Judge. Such reactions are
normally experienced when the lawyers take heavy fees from their
clients with an assurance to bring the result of the cases in their favour
or to impress upon the clients sitting in the court room during the
course of hearing, the boldness which he possesses to browbeat the
Court. If a lawyer exercises his choice of not conducting the matter,
he loses his client and fees, which he does not want to do. If a Judge
accedes to such demand of a lawyer for recusal, the effect is
threefold (i) the confidence of a lawyer to browbeat the Court is
boosted, (ii) a lawyer gets rid of the Court where he finds discomfort
in conducting the matter, and (iii) it creates an additional source of
income for him, from the other lawyers and the litigants, who do not
want their matters listed or dealt with by such a Judge. This promotes
the practice of benchhunting. No system of justice can tolerate such
practice by a lawyer and the same is required to be curbed and
deprecated.
17. Recently, in the judgment, which I have delivered in Civil
Revision Application No.26 of 2016 on 662016 (Satish Mahadeorao
Uke v. The Registrar, High Court of Bombay, Bench at Nagpur, Nagpur),
I have observed in para 25 thereof as under :
“25. A Judge may recuse at his own choice from a case
entrusted to him by the Chief Justice and it would be a matter
of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of the litigating
party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. This is what
the Apex Court has held recently in NJAC case instituted by the
Supreme Court AdvocatesonRecord Association and another
v. Union of India, reported in 2015 (11) SCALE 1. The
question of recusal is normally decided by a Judge on the basis
of his personal or private interest in the subjectmatter of the
litigation, his intimacy with the party/parties to a lis before
him, his perception about conflict of interest in taking up the
matter, and his own conscience. Such decision does not depend
upon the dictates of lawyers or litigants. ...”
18. Recusal to take the matters to be conducted by some lawyers,
is a matter of Judge's own choosing and it cannot be at the dictates of
the lawyers. What a Judge has to see is that he performs his duty of
deciding the matters before him without fear or favour, affection or
illwill. He has to keep in mind the principle that the justice should
not only be done, but it must appear to have been done. The decision
of recusal to take the matters of lawyers, depends upon the Judge's
personal relations or intimacy with such lawyers, and his own
conscience to decide a case by observing the oath which he has taken
while occupying the position as a Judge. Ultimately, a Judge is also a
humanbeing and the Judges come from different strata of the Society,
having their own views, ideas, angle or perception, based on the
varied individual experience in life, which may or may not match with
each others or with some lawyers or litigants. However, this cannot be
a reason to avoid conducting the matters listed before such a Judge or
the Judges. Once the constitutional authority of a Judge or the Judges
to adjudicate the matters is accepted, it cannot be lowered down by
asking him or them to recuse to hear and decide the matter.
19. To prevent a Judge or the Judges from performing his or
their duties in this fashion causes distraction of attention in the
judicial proceedings, which amounts to interference in the course of
justice. Merely because a lawyer, litigant or public at large feels that
the approach adopted or a decision is wrong, the authority or the force
of the decision does not get eroded. A wrong decision in the matter is
equally enforceable like a correct decision. If the Constitution and the
laws provide a remedy to get such decision corrected in a higher
forum, such a remedy can be availed. Even a wrong decision becomes
final, binding and enforceable like a correct decision, if there is no
remedy available. The lawyers, litigants or public at large cannot run
away from such decision and they have to be cautioned about the
authority of the Courts.
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