thereto enables the court to remit the punishment awarded for
committing the contempt of court on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court. However, an apology should not be rejected
merely on the ground that it is qualified or tempered at a belated stage
if the accused makes it bona fide. A conduct which abuses and makes
a mockery of the judicial process of the court is to be dealt with iron
hands and no person can tinker with it to prevent, prejudice, obstructed
or interfere with the administration of justice. There can be cases where
the wisdom of rendering an apology dawns only at a later stage.
Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification, or an
appropriate punishment for an act which tantamounts to contempt of
court. An apology can be accepted in case where the conduct for which
the apology is given is such that it can be “ignored without
compromising the dignity of the court”, or it is intended to be the
evidence of real contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be
accepted in case it is hollow; there is no remorse; no regret; no
repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such
an apology can merely be termed as “paper apology”.
14. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374, this court
noted that it cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry- and forget'
school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence.
Saying 'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer.
(See also: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot & Anr.,
AIR 2006 SC 2007)
So an apology should not be “paper apology” and expression of
sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it is one
thing to 'say' sorry, it is another to 'feel' sorry.
15. An apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at
the earliest since a belated apology hardly shows the “contrition which
is the essence of the purging of contempt”. Of course, an apology must
be offered and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. However,
even if the apology is not belated but the court finds it to be without
real contrition and remorse, and finds that it was merely tendered as a
weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it. If the apology is
offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to
impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a
cringing coward.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 555 OF 2010
Bal Kishan Giri
Versus
State of U.P.
Dated:May 28, 2014
1. In this appeal, impugned judgment and order dated 5.2.2010
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Contempt
Application (Crl.) No. 15 of 2009, by which the appellant stood
convicted for committing criminal contempt under the provisions of
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’)
and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and to
pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default to undergo simple
imprisonment for two weeks, has been assailed.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:A. An FIR was lodged in P.S. Baleni, District Baghpat on
23.5.2008 by Anil Kumar, appellant in connected Criminal Appeal
No. 686 of 2010 alleging that his younger brother Sunil Kumar
alongwith Puneet Kumar Giri, who were residing in Sitaram Hostel of
the Meerut College, were not traceable and went missing the previous
evening. Another inmate of the same hostel Sudhir Kumar was also
reported untraceable. The very next day, three dead bodies of the said
missing persons were found on the banks of river Hindon. A criminal
case was therefore registered.
B. During investigation, it came to the notice of the police
authorities that the place of occurrence fell within the territorial
jurisdiction of P.S. Kotwali, Meerut, and thus investigation on being
transferred to P.S. Kotwali, Meerut, the case was registered as Case
Crime No.190/2008.
C. During investigation, many accused persons including one Haji
Izlal were arrested. They moved bail applications before the Meerut
Distt. Court which stood rejected. Aggrieved, all the accused persons
filed bail applications before the High Court of Allahabad. It was on
14.8.2009 during the pendency of the said applications that the
2appellant submitted an application to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of
Allahabad High Court alleging that the accused therein were gangsters
and had accumulated assets worth crores of rupees by their criminal
activities. The accused persons were closely related to a local M.L.A.
and Ex. M.P. and they had links with the Judges of the High Court
including Mr. Justice S.K. Jain who had earlier served as a judicial
officer in Meerut Court. The appellant expressed his apprehension that
Mr. Justice S.K. Jain would favour the accused persons to get bail. A
copy of the said complaint was also sent to the Chairman, Bar Council
of U.P.
D. The High Court examined the complaint and placed the matter
on the judicial side on 12.11.2009. The court issued a show cause
notice dated 14.8.2009 to the appellant as to why the criminal
contempt proceedings be not initiated against him under the
provisions of the Act.
E. The appellant submitted an unconditional apology dated
21.11.2009 submitting that the application was sent by him as he had
been misguided by the advocates of District Meerut and he was in
great mental tension as his nephew had been murdered.
3F. The High Court after completing the trial convicted the
appellant vide impugned judgment and order dated 5.2.2010 and
awarded the sentence as referred to hereinabove.
Hence, this appeal.
3. Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant has submitted that the show cause notice was not in
consonance with the provisions of Chapter XXXV-E, Rule 6 of the
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the
Rules). Thus, all subsequent proceedings stood vitiated. More so, the
appellant is a practicing advocate and had written the said complaint
under a mental tension as his nephew had been murdered, and on
being misguided by the advocates of the Meerut Court. Once the
appellant has tendered an absolute and unconditional apology,
punishment was not warranted and fine imposed therein is contrary to
the statutory provisions of the Act. Thus, the appeal deserves to be
allowed.
4. Per contra, Mr. Irshad Ahmad, learned counsel appearing for the
State has opposed the appeal contending that very wild and
scandalous allegations had been made by the appellant not only
against one judge but against various judicial officers and merely
tendering an apology is not enough. As the appellant had accepted that
he had written the letter and also owned its contents, and filed the
reply to the show cause notice issued to him, even if, the statutory
rules have not been complied with, the order would not stand vitiated.
The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The relevant part of the complaint filed by the appellant reads
as under:
“4. That Akhalakh family have good connection with
all judges posted at Meerut. Hon. Mr. Justice S.C. Nigam
was posted in Meerut in the year 1981 to 1984 and
2002-03 on the posts of Addl. Civil Judge/A.C.J.M. and
Addl. District & Sessions Judge respectively. Hon.
Justice Mr. S.K. Jain was also posted at Meerut as
Additional District & Sessions Judge in 2002-03.
5. That all the Hon. Justices V.K. Verma, S.K. Jain
and S.C. Nigam have been promoted as High Court
Judges from the cadre of District Judges. Hon. Justice
Mr. S.K. Jain and Hon. Justice S.C. Nigam remained
posted in Civil Court Meerut as Additional District Judge
together in the year 2002-03 and have been promoted
from Meerut Judgeship to the cadre of District Judge.
They are very good friends. Hon. Mr. Justice V.K. Verma
also has very good intimacy with them. They have made
a caucus with V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate of
5Allahabad High Court for granting major bails to known
accused in criminal cases illegally and with ulterior
motives.
Hon. Justice V.K. Verma has granted bails to two
accused namely Rizwan and Wassim in aforesaid famous
triple murder case of Meerut in bail application No.924
of 2009 and 1238 of 2009 on 17.7.2009 illegally and with
ulterior motives.”
7. The appellant/complainant further expressed his apprehension
of having no confidence and faith in any of the three Judges of the
Allahabad High Court as they could pass any order at the behest of
Shri V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate.
In sum and substance, the offending part of the allegation had
been as under:
(1) Akhlaq had good relations with Mr. Justice S.C.
Nigam from the date since he was posted at Meerut on
three terms, (2) that justice V.K. Verma had good
intimacy with the family of the accused and the accused
have made a clique alongwith one V.P. Srivastava, Senior
Advocate of Allahabad High Court for procuring major
bails illegally and with ulterior motives. Mr. Justice V.K.
Verma has admitted bail to two accused namely Rizwan
and Wasim illegally and with ulterior motives. The three
Judges (V.K. Verma, S.K. Jain and S.C. Nigam) may pass
any order at the behest of V.P. Srivastava, Senior
Advocate.
8. The allegations made by the appellant against the 3 judges of
the High Court are too serious, scandalous and, admittedly, sufficient to
undermine the majesty of law and dignity of court and that is too
without any basis. The appellant is a practicing advocate. Plea taken
by him that he had been misguided by other advocates is an
afterthought. He must have been fully aware of the consequences of
what he has written. The averment to the effect that provisions of
Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules had not been strictly observed remains
insignificant as the appellant had not only admitted transcribing the
complaint but also its contents. The appellant had submitted the reply
to the show cause notice issued by the High Court of Allahabad on the
judicial side. In such a fact-situation, even if, for the sake of argument
it is accepted that the aforesaid Rules have not been complied with
strictly, we are not willing to accept the case of the appellant for the
reason that Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned senior counsel for the appellant
could not show as to what was that material which was not considered
by the High Court that had been put up as a defence by the appellant
resulting in any miscarriage of justice.
9. This Court in M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of
Punjab and Haryana & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 1834, while examining a
similar case observed :
7“The foundation of judicial system which is based
on the independence and impartiality of those who man it
will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks
are made against the presiding judicial officers with
impunity. It is high time that we realise that the much
cherished judicial independence has to be protected not
only from the executive or the legislature but also from
those who are an integral part of the system. An
independent judiciary is of vital importance to any free
society”.
10. In Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta & Ors. AIR 1983 SC
1151, while dealing with the issue, this Court observed as under:
“The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be
allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy
the system of administration of justice by vilification of
judges. It is not that judges need be protected; judges
may well take care of themselves. It is the right and
interest of the public in the due administration of justice
that has to be protected.”
11. In Jennison v. Baker [1972] 1 All E.R. 997, 1006, it was
observed, “[T]he law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those
who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope”
12. The appellant has tendered an absolute and unconditional
apology which has not been accepted by the High Court. The apology
means a regretful acknowledge or excuse for failure. An explanation
offered to a person affected by one’s action that no offence was
8intended, coupled with the expression of regret for any that may have
been given. Apology should be unquestionable in sincerity. It should
be tempered with a sense of genuine remorse and repentance, and not a
calculated strategy to avoid punishment
13. Clause 1 of Section 12 of the Act and Explanation attached
thereto enables the court to remit the punishment awarded for
committing the contempt of court on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court. However, an apology should not be rejected
merely on the ground that it is qualified or tempered at a belated stage
if the accused makes it bona fide. A conduct which abuses and makes
a mockery of the judicial process of the court is to be dealt with iron
hands and no person can tinker with it to prevent, prejudice, obstructed
or interfere with the administration of justice. There can be cases where
the wisdom of rendering an apology dawns only at a later stage.
Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification, or an
appropriate punishment for an act which tantamounts to contempt of
court. An apology can be accepted in case where the conduct for which
the apology is given is such that it can be “ignored without
compromising the dignity of the court”, or it is intended to be the
evidence of real contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be
9accepted in case it is hollow; there is no remorse; no regret; no
repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such
an apology can merely be termed as “paper apology”.
14. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374, this court
noted that it cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry- and forget'
school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence.
Saying 'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer.
(See also: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot & Anr.,
AIR 2006 SC 2007)
So an apology should not be “paper apology” and expression of
sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it is one
thing to 'say' sorry, it is another to 'feel' sorry.
15. An apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at
the earliest since a belated apology hardly shows the “contrition which
is the essence of the purging of contempt”. Of course, an apology must
be offered and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. However,
even if the apology is not belated but the court finds it to be without
real contrition and remorse, and finds that it was merely tendered as a
10weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it. If the apology is
offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to
impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a
cringing coward. (Vide: Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The
State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189; Mulkh Raj v. The
State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1197; The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar
Association v. State of Assam & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; C.
Elumalai & Ors. v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2214;
and Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2010) 11 SCC 493).
16. This Court has clearly laid down that an apology tendered is not
to be accepted as a matter of course and the Court is not bound to
accept the same. The court is competent to reject the apology and
impose the punishment recording reasons for the same. The use of
insulting language does not absolve the contemnor on any count
whatsoever. If the words are calculated and clearly intended to cause
any insult, an apology, if tendered and lack penitence, regret or
contrition, does not deserve to be accepted. (Vide: Shri Baradakanta
Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr., AIR 1974 SC
710; The Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar etc., AIR
1976 SC 242; Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta & Ors., AIR 1983 SC
111151; Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 642;
In Re: Sanjiv Datta, (1995) 3 SCC 619; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai
& Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3016;
and Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC
2275).
17. That the power to punish for contempt is a rare species of
judicial power which is by the very nature calls for exercise with great
care and caution. Such power ought to be exercised only where
“silence is no longer an option.”
(See: In re: S. Mulgaokar AIR 1978 SC 727; H.G. Rangangoud v.
M/s State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2012 SC
490; Maninderjit Singh Bittav. Union of India & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC
273; T.C. Gupta & Anr. v. Hari Om Prakash & Ors., (2013) 10 SCC
658; and Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. through District Judge,
(2013) 14 SCC 127)
Power of courts to punish for contempt is to secure public respect
and confidence in judicial process. Thus, it is a necessary incident to
every court of justice.
1218. Being a member of the Bar, it was his duty not to demean and
disgrace the majesty of justice dispensed by a court of law. It is a case
where insinuation of bias and predetermined mind has been leveled by a
practicing lawyer against three judges of the High Court. Such casting
of bald, oblique, unsubstantiated aspersions against the judges of High
Court not only causes agony and anguish to the judges concerned but
also shakes the confidence of the public in the judiciary in its function
of dispensation of justice. The judicial process is based on probity,
fairness and impartiality which is unimpeachable. Such an act
especially by members of Bar who are another cog in the wheel of
justice is highly reprehensible and deeply regretted. Absence of
motivation is no excuse.
19. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court has not committed any error in not accepting the appellant’s
apology since the same is not bona fide. There might have been an inner
impulse of outburst as the appellant alleges that his nephew had been
murdered, but that is no excuse for a practicing lawyer to raise fingers
against the court.
1320. Section 12(1) of the Act provides that if the court is satisfied
that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish the
contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both.
Section 12(2) further provides that “notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall
impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any
contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.”
Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the court is
subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.
21. Hence, in view of the above, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed on
the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and
order, is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is directed to deposit the said fine
forthwith.
22. We find no force in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
The appellant must surrender to serve out the sentence forthwith,
failing which, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, would
secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the sentence. A
14copy of the order be sent to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Meerut, for information and compliance.
....…….……………………..J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
....……………………………J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
New Delhi,
May 28, 2014
15IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 686 OF 2010
Anil Kumar …Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. Chauhan,J.
In view of the judgment passed today in connected Criminal Appeal No.
555 of 2010, this appeal is dismissed. However, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed
on the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and order, is
reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is directed to deposit the said fine forthwith.
The appellant must surrender to serve out the sentence forthwith, failing
which, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, would secure his custody
and send him to jail to serve out the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, for information and compliance.
....…….……………………..J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
.....……………………………J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
New Delhi,
May 28, 2014
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