power to quash the criminal proceedings in cases which are not
compoundable should be exercised sparingly and with caution. The guiding
factors in such cases would be to secure the ends of justice, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. In the facts of the present case, neither of
the aforesaid two objectives would be achieved if the criminal proceedings/
FIR in the present case were to be quashed. There is nothing to show that
the accident was providential, and that it occurred despite due care and
precaution being taken by the petitioner. There is also nothing to show that
the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner are a result of mala
fides of any person, or an abuse of the process of the Court. The accident
has, undoubtedly, taken place in which one labourer has lost his life. The
nature of the accident itself is, prima-facie, suggestive of gross negligence.
In my view, it would defeat the ends of justice if the criminal proceedings
were to be quashed. The present endeavour of the petitioner to seek
quashing of the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom – premised on a
settlement with respondents No.2 to 9, itself tantamounts to an abuse of the
process of this Court. In a case like the present, even though respondents
No.2 to 9 may have entered into a settlement with the petitioner, it cannot be
said that the possibility of conviction is remote. It cannot be said that the
petitioner would be put to great oppression and prejudice, or that extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case.
32. In my view, quashing the FIR in question at this stage would certainly
send a very wrong signal not only to the petitioner, but the whole society at
large and particularly to other builders, contractors and other agencies
engaged in undertaking construction work, that even if they are grossly
negligent in taking preventive measures so as to prevent predictable
accidents – which may lead to serious injury and even loss of life, they could
get away by paying some compensation to the heirs of the injured/ deceased.
In fact, such like contractors/ builders/ agencies may find it more
economical to risk the lives of their workforce, and in the eventuality of an
accident occurring, to pay compensation, than to undertake all safety
measures which, if taken, would prevent such accidents in the first place.
33. As observed by the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan (supra),
criminal proceedings are not a proceeding for vindication of private
grievance. They are initiated for the punishment of the offender in the
interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the
society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right given to any
citizen to set the machinery of criminal law into motion for the purpose of
bringing the offender to book.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: 01.08.2016
W.P.(CRL) 1280/2016 and Crl. M.A. No.6706/2016
BHAJAN LAL SHARMA
v
STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) & ORS .
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI
Citation: 2016 SCCONLINEDEL4234
1. The present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner to seek
the quashing of FIR No. 619/2015 dated 25.12.2015 registered at PS New
Friends Colony under Sections 288/337/304A IPC and the proceedings
arising therefrom.
2. The case of the petitioner is that petitioner is a building contractor.
He was engaged to carry out construction work on Plot No. D-1093, New
Friends Colony, New Delhi. The aforesaid FIR came to be registered in
pursuance of DD No. 8A dated 25.12.2015 recorded at Police Station New
Friends Colony regarding collapse of a building at New Friends Colony,
resulting in people getting buried under the debris.
3. The case of the prosecution is that after reaching the spot, on
investigation by the police it was revealed that during excavation of
basement in a dangerous manner, debris and soil fell on the labourers. On
search in the debris, one of the labourer Badri Prasad, son of Keram, aged 65
years, was removed. He was removed to the hospital. He was declared
brought dead by the hospital. Several other labourers i.e. respondent Nos. 5
to 9 herein were also injured in the accident, and were taken to AIIMS for
treatment. Investigations revealed that the construction of basement was
being carried out without any safety measures. The crime team reported the
commission of an offence under Sections 288/337/304A IPC. The deceased
Badri Prasad is survived by respondent No.2-his wife, and respondent Nos.
3 and 4-his sons.
4. The present petition is premised on a settlement arrived at between
the petitioner on the one hand, and respondent Nos. 2 to 9 on the other hand,
before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, South District, Government of
NCT of Delhi. The petitioner has paid a sum of Rs. 4,50,000/- as
compensation and Rs. 20,600/- as ambulance charges, totaling Rs.
4,70,600/-, against receipt dated 26.12.2015 to the LRs of the deceased
Badri Prasad, namely, respondent Nos. 2 to 4. Respondent Nos. 5 to 9 made
a statement before the Deputy Labour Commissioner that they had not
received any injury and that they do not want any compensation from the
petitioner. Respondent Nos. 2 to 9 also filed their affidavits before the
Labour Court in the aforesaid terms. The petitioner submits that respondent
Nos. 2 to 9 do not want any further action in the matter, and that the said
respondents have no objection if the said FIR and the proceedings arising
there from are quashed, as no useful purpose would be served in continuing
with the same.
5. Along with the petition, the affidavits of respondent Nos. 2 to 9 have
also been filed, stating that an amicable settlement of all disputes has been
reached with petitioner No. 1 without any pressure or coercion, and that
each of the said respondent has no objection if the FIR and the proceedings
arising there from are quashed.
6. The State has filed its counter affidavit seriously opposing the
quashing of the FIR and the proceedings arising there from.
7. The submission of Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
is that, firstly, there is nothing to show that there was any negligence, much
less grave negligence on the part of the petitioner in carrying out the
construction work, which led to the accident resulting in death of the
labourer Badri Prasad. Mr. Sethi submits that the petitioner is concerned
about the well-being of his labour force, and the petitioner did not take any
time to assuage the suffering of the LRs of the deceased Badri Prasad. He
submits that without any delay, the payment of compensation amounting to
Rs. 4,70,600/- was made on 26.12.2015 itself. Mr. Sethi submits that there
was no mens rea to commit the offences of which the petitioner has been
accused. Mr. Sethi further submits that since the respondent Nos. 2 to 9
have supported the petition, no useful purpose would be served in keeping
the said FIR and the proceedings there under pending any further.
8. Mr. Sethi submits that in a large number of other cases under Section
304A, where the accusation was that the accused had caused the death of a
person by doing any rash or negligent act – not amounting to culpable
homicide, the Courts have quashed the criminal proceedings on the basis of
settlement reached with the LRs of the deceased. In this regard, he places
reliance on Lalit Gupta Vs. State & Ors., 2009(2) JCC 890 - which was a
case under Section 288/304A IPC; Vishal Arora Vs. State & Ors. 2014(4)
JCC 2867-which was a case under Section 279/ 337 and 304A IPC; Ram
Karan Vs. State & Ors., 2015(3) JCC 1685-which was a case under Section
279/304A IPC, Saheb Mandal Vs. State of National Capital Territory of
Delhi & Anr., 2015(4) JCC 2600-which was a case under Section
288/304A; and Manjeet Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2016 (1) JCC 574-which
was a case under Section 279, 337 and 304A IPC, wherein the Court
quashed the FIR and the proceedings arising thereunder, on account of the
settlement reached between the accused and the complainants/heirs of the
deceased-victim. Mr. Sethi submits that the stand taken by the respondent in
the present case is discriminatory inasmuch, as, the State cannot raise an
objection to the FIR and the proceedings there under being quashed in the
present case-which also alleges commission of offences under Sections
288/337/304A IPC, when the State did not object to the FIRs being quashed
in other similar cases, such as the aforesaid.
9. Mr. Sethi submits that in the aforesaid cases, this Court noticed the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2012)
10 SCC 303 for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can
be quashed on the ground of a settlement between the offenders and the
victim if the circumstances so warrant. The Courts also took notice of
Narinder Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr., 2014(2) Crimes
27(SC). Mr. Sethi submits that in Narinder Singh (supra), the Supreme
Court had, inter alia, held that the inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings lies with the High Court even in respect of cases which are not
compoundable. The guiding factor, in such circumstances, is to secure the
ends of justice; or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court. Mr. Sethi
submits that such power cannot be exercised in cases where the prosecution
is in respect of heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity etc. This is because such offences are not private
in nature, and have a serious impact on society. Offences under special
Statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity also cannot be quashed,
merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
However, criminal cases which are overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly
civil in character, particularly, those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be
quashed where the parties have resolved their entire disputes. Mr. Sethi
submits that this Court should also examine as to whether the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak, and continuation of criminal case would put
the accused to great oppression, prejudice and extreme injustice if the
criminal case is not quashed. Mr. Sethi submits that in the present case,
since the complainant and the other injured, as also the legal heirs of the
deceased Badri Prasad have entered into a compromise with the petitioner,
the possibility of the petitioner being convicted is remote. Mr. Sethi submits
that in such cases, the timing of the settlement plays a crucial role. In the
present case, settlement has been arrived at at the initial stage itself. The
Supreme Court has held in Narinder Singh (supra), that where a settlement
is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence, and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court could be liberal in
accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation.
Cases where the charge is framed, but the evidence is yet to start, or
evidence is still at initial stage, may also be considered benevolently by the
High Court but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/materials
brought on record.
10. On the other hand, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State
has submitted that the death of a person in an accident like the present can
never be a private affair. He submits that the mere fact that while digging
the basement, the mud collapsed, resulting in one of the labourer Badri
Prasad getting buried and others, namely, respondent Nos. 5 to 9 also getting
injured, itself speaks for the fact that the said digging was being undertaken
by the petitioner-contractor in a grossly negligent manner, i.e. without due
and adequate protection. He submits that the fact that such an accident
speaks for itself, that sufficient support to prevent the earth from collapsing
on the labour force working on the excavated ground had not been provided.
Such negligence is gross, as collapse of earth/ mud, gravity, unless the same
is adequately supported, is known to be highly likely.
11. Mr. Singh, learned ASC submits that the deceased Badri Prasad was a
poor person and his LRs respondent Nos. 2 to 4 i.e. his widow and the two
sons are equally poor. So far as respondent Nos. 5 to 9 are concerned, they
really have no choice but to settle with the petitioner, as he is their employer
and they are dependent upon him for their livelihood. Mr. Singh submits
that the present case does not fall within the parameters laid down by the
Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, (1992)
SCC (Cri) 426, wherein the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines with
regard to exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for
quashing of a FIR. In particular, he has referred to para 102 and 103 of the
said decision.
12. Here itself, I may observe that the reliance place on Bhajan Lal
(supra) is misplaced, for the reason that the Supreme Court was not
considering a situation where the complainant/ victim/ heirs of the victim
had entered into a settlement with the accused. The categories of cases,
enumerated in paragraph 102 of the decision in Bhajan Lal (supra) is
illustrative, and all the said categories of cases are where the quashing of the
FIR may be ordered by the Court on merits, and not on account of a
settlement.
13. Mr. Singh has also relied on Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh
(supra) to submit that the offence in the present case is not one of civil
nature, and cannot be quashed merely on the basis of settlement. The
offences involved in the present case cannot be described as private in
nature. The same have a serious impact on the society, and the quashing of
the FIR in the present case would send a message to the petitioner as well as
the society at large that contractors/ authorities/ entities can get away with
their gross negligence – which may even result in loss of innocent lives, by
merely paying compensation to the victim/ his legal heirs. Mr. Singh
submits that even in Narinder Singh (supra), the Court has observed that the
power to quash an FIR is to be sparingly exercised with caution.
14. Mr. Singh also submits that the possibility of conviction in the present
case cannot be said to be remote, considering the facts and circumstances of
the present case. Mr. Singh submits that the draft charge-sheet has already
been prepared in the matter.
15. He places reliance on Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab & Another,
(2005) 6 SCC 1, and in particular to conclusion drawn by the Court as
contained in paragraph 48 (5), wherein the Supreme Court held that for
negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown
to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of
negligence should be much higher, i.e. gross, or of a very high degree.
Negligence which is neither gross, nor of a high degree, may provide a
ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. The
Supreme Court held that the word “gross” has not been used in Section
304A IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law, negligence or recklessness, to
be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be “gross”. The expression
“rash or negligent act” as occurring in Section 304A IPC has to be read as
qualified to be read “grossly”.
16. He also places reliance on Sushil Ansal Vs. State, (2014) 6 SCC 173,
wherein the Supreme Court observed:
“Enforcement of laws is as important as their enactment,
especially where such laws deal with safety and security
of citizens and create continuing obligations that call for
constant vigil by those entrusted with their
administration. Callous indifference and apathy,
extraneous influence or considerations and the cynical
“chalta hai” attitude more often than not costs the
society dearly in man-made tragedies whether in the
form of fire incidents, collapse of buildings and bridges,
poisonous gas leaks or the like. Short-lived media
attention followed by the investigations that at times
leave the end result flawed and a long-winding criminal
trial in which the witnesses predecease their depositions
or switch sides under pressure or for gain and where
even the victims or their families lose interest brings the
sad saga to an uncertain end.”
17. Mr. Singh submits that the Supreme Court in Sushil Ansal (supra)
echoed the same callous indifference, apathy and cynical chalta hai attitude
which the petitioner has displayed in the present case. Merely because the
complainant and the injured and LRs of the deceased Badri Prasad have
settled with the petitioner, does not mean that the crime against the State can
be condoned or compounded.
18. He also places reliance on Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar &
Others, (1987) 1 SCC 288, wherein the Supreme Court, inter alia, observed
as follows:
“14. …. …. …. It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding
is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it
is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the
offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining
stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are
constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set
the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of
bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri)
277] this Court pointed out that (SCC p. 509, para 6)
“punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being
one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good
of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled
down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket
formula of locus standi .…”
… … ….
If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an
offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong,
any member of the society must have locus to initiate a
prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if
initiated. …. …. …”.
19. Mr. Singh has also referred to Section 357A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. He submits that quashing of the FIR at this stage would mean
that the possibility of the victims being compensated, in the event of the
petitioner/ accused being convicted, would be extinguished.
20. Mr. Singh relies on State of Karnataka Vs. Sharanappa
Basanagouda Aregoudar, (2002) 3 SCC 738, to submit that the aspect of
deterrence, which goes into the prosecution and punishment for such
offences would be completely lost, if all cases involving Section 304A IPC
were permitted to be quashed on the basis of a compromise. This was also a
case under Section 304A IPC. The respondent had been found guilty of
offences under Section 279/ 337/ 338/ 304 A IPC. The appeal before the
Supreme Court arose on account of the learned Single Judge of the High
Court, while upholding the conviction, reducing the sentence to payment of
fine of Rs.5,000/-, and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment
for 3 month for the offence under Section 304A. In respect of the offence
under Section 337 IPC, the learned Single Judge imposed a sentence with a
fine of Rs.500/-, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15
days. Similarly, for the offence under Section 338 IPC, the sentence was
fine of Rs.550/-, and in default, a simple imprisonment for 15 days. There
was no separate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 279 IPC.
The Supreme Court interfered with the judgment of the learned Single Judge
of the High Court, insofar as the High Court had reduced the sentence. The
Supreme Court observed that, in view of the serious nature of the accident,
which resulted in death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not
have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court below. The
Supreme Court observed:
“6. … … … It may create and set an unhealthy precedent
and send wrong signals to the subordinate courts which have to
deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found
guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard
to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very
lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have
deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers and it should
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence…. ….”.
21. He also places reliance on Raj Pal Vs. State, 1992 Crl.L.J. 1470, to
submit that this Court denied the benefit of probation in a case of rash and
negligent driving by the accused bus driver, on the wrong side on a high
speed resulting in loss of two lives and grievous injury to the third. Mr.
Singh submits that this shows the seriousness with which offences of gross
negligence resulting in death are viewed by the Court.
22. Having heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner as well as the
learned ASC, I am not inclined to quash the FIR in question and the criminal
proceedings arising therefrom in the facts of the present case.
23. The decision relied upon by Mr. Sethi in Lalit Gupta (supra) is
distinguishable inasmuch, as, the State was agreeable to the FIR in that case
under Sections 288 and 304A IPC being quashed. The decision itself does
not show the nature of the accident which resulted in “accidental death” in
that case.
24. Vishal Arora (supra) was a case where one of the labourers sitting on
the top of the truck fell on the road and died when the truck met with an
accident with a Maruti SX4 car. In this case as well, the State did not
oppose the quashing of the FIR on account of the settlement being reached
between the petitioner/ accused and the legal heirs of the deceased.
25. It would be seen that the nature of the accident was quite different
from the one involved in the present case. The deceased was sitting on top
of the truck, which was hit by the car of the accused. He fell off the truck on
the road and died. The nature of the accident itself did not prima-facie
indicate the culpability of the accused. Whether or not the accident took
place due to the gross negligence of the accused; the accident was the
immediate cause of the fatality, and; whether there was any contributory
negligence were all issues that were still at large. The nature of the accident
did not indicate, prima facie, that culpability of the accused could be said to
be probable.
26. Ramkaran (supra) was also a case under Section 279/ 304A IPC. In
this case as well, the State did not raise any objection to the settlement and
consequential quashing of the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom.
The Court was informed that the incident in question was purely accidental,
and the petitioner, therefore, could not be held to be wholly responsible for
the said incident in question. It was in this background that the Court
proceeded to quash the FIR in that case.
27. Saheb Mandal (supra) was a case under Section 288/ 304A IPC. In
this case as well, the State gave its no objection to the quashing of the FIR
and the proceedings arising therefrom. The decision in Saheb Mandal
(supra) does not disclose the nature of the accident. It is not clear whether
the death of the victim was purely attributable to gross negligence on the
part of the accused or, whether the accident occurred was providential or a
result of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.
28. Manjeet (supra) was a case under Section 279/ 337/ 304A IPC. In
this case as well, the State had no objection to the quashing of the FIR and
the proceedings arising therefrom, since the heirs of the deceased victim had
settled their dispute with the petitioner/ accused. Once again, perusal of the
decision does not rule out the possibility of the accident being providential,
or due to or contributory negligence of the victim/ deceased. The culpability
of the accused/ petitioner, prima-facie, is not evident from the decision, as
those facts have not been recorded.
29. The submission of Mr. Sethi that the State cannot distinguish one case
under Section 304A IPC from another, and that the State is bound to agree to
the quashing of the FIR in the present case, since they have agreed to
quashing of the FIR in other cases involving Section 288/ 337/ 304A IPC,
has no merit. The State cannot be accused of discrimination merely because
the State may chose to give its consent to quashing of the FIR in one case,
and may not do so in another case, though the two cases may allege
commission of offence under the same legal provision, as no two cases are
comparable on facts. It would have to be decided on the facts of each case
by the State, whether or not to consent to the quashing of the criminal
proceedings on consent. Even if it were to be assumed that the State was
remiss in consenting to quashing of FIR in any other case, the same would
not afford a ground to raise a plea of discrimination and claim similar
treatment by a petitioner/ accused in another case. Each case would have to
be examined by the Court on its own merits, and the Court is not bound to
quash the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom, even if it has done so
in other cases involving the same offences on consent by the State. The
Court is also not dependent for its decision to quash the FIR and the
proceedings arising therefrom, on the consent being granted by the State. In
appropriate case, the State may not grant its consent, yet the Court may – for
reasons to be recorded, and upon considerations which are germane and
have been taken note of in Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra),
quash the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom.
30. The submission of Mr. Sethi that the concern of the petitioner for his
workforce is demonstrated by the fact that the petitioner paid compensation
to the LRs of the deceased Badri Prasad without any delay whatsoever, has
no merit. The said concern was exhibited post the occurrence of the fatal
accident. What needs to be examined is, as to whether the fatal accident was
a result of gross negligence and callousness on the part of the petitioner. It
needs to be examined whether the petitioner had taken adequate measures to
prevent the accident from occurring – which could have been reasonably
foreseen without such protection being taken. Prima-facie, it appears that
the petitioner may have been grossly negligent in not providing adequate
protection/ supports to prevent the earth from collapsing and falling upon the
labourers who may have been working on the basement floor.
31. The Supreme Court in Narinder Singh (supra) has observed that the
power to quash the criminal proceedings in cases which are not
compoundable should be exercised sparingly and with caution. The guiding
factors in such cases would be to secure the ends of justice, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. In the facts of the present case, neither of
the aforesaid two objectives would be achieved if the criminal proceedings/
FIR in the present case were to be quashed. There is nothing to show that
the accident was providential, and that it occurred despite due care and
precaution being taken by the petitioner. There is also nothing to show that
the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner are a result of mala
fides of any person, or an abuse of the process of the Court. The accident
has, undoubtedly, taken place in which one labourer has lost his life. The
nature of the accident itself is, prima-facie, suggestive of gross negligence.
In my view, it would defeat the ends of justice if the criminal proceedings
were to be quashed. The present endeavour of the petitioner to seek
quashing of the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom – premised on a
settlement with respondents No.2 to 9, itself tantamounts to an abuse of the
process of this Court. In a case like the present, even though respondents
No.2 to 9 may have entered into a settlement with the petitioner, it cannot be
said that the possibility of conviction is remote. It cannot be said that the
petitioner would be put to great oppression and prejudice, or that extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case.
32. In my view, quashing the FIR in question at this stage would certainly
send a very wrong signal not only to the petitioner, but the whole society at
large and particularly to other builders, contractors and other agencies
engaged in undertaking construction work, that even if they are grossly
negligent in taking preventive measures so as to prevent predictable
accidents – which may lead to serious injury and even loss of life, they could
get away by paying some compensation to the heirs of the injured/ deceased.
In fact, such like contractors/ builders/ agencies may find it more
economical to risk the lives of their workforce, and in the eventuality of an
accident occurring, to pay compensation, than to undertake all safety
measures which, if taken, would prevent such accidents in the first place.
33. As observed by the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan (supra),
criminal proceedings are not a proceeding for vindication of private
grievance. They are initiated for the punishment of the offender in the
interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the
society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right given to any
citizen to set the machinery of criminal law into motion for the purpose of
bringing the offender to book.
34. In A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr., (1984) 2 SCC
500, the Supreme Court held that punishment of the offender in society is in
the interest of the society. It is one of the objects of the penal statutes
enacted for the larger good of the society.
35. I am of the view that quashing of criminal proceedings in the present
case would create and set an unhealthy precedent, and send wrong signals to
the society at large.
36. For all the aforesaid reasons, the present petition is dismissed. It is,
however, made clear that the observations made in this order on the merits
of the case, are prima facie in nature, and made only for the purpose of the
present discussion and the same shall not come in the way of either party at
the trial. The Trial Court shall proceed to deal with the case on its own
merits.
(VIPIN SANGHI)
JUDGE
AUGUST 01, 2016
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