Saturday, 22 October 2016

When making allegations of corruption and bias against Judge amounts contempt of court?

Every citizen has a fundamental right to speech,
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Contempt of Court is one of the restrictions on such
right. We are conscious that the power under the Act has
to be exercised sparingly and not in a routine manner. If
there is a calculated effort to undermine the judiciary,
the Courts will exercise their jurisdiction to punish the
offender for committing contempt. We approve the

findings recorded by the High Court that the Appellants
have transgressed all decency by making serious
allegations of corruption and bias against the High Court.
The caustic comments made by the Appellants cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be termed as fair criticism.
The statements made by the Appellants, accusing the
judiciary of corruption lower the authority of the Court.
The Explanation to sub-Section 12 (1) of the Act provides
that an apology should not be rejected merely on the
ground that it is qualified or tendered at a belated stage,
if the accused makes it bona fide. The stand taken by the
Appellants in the contempt petition and the affidavit filed
in this Court does not inspire any confidence that the
apology is made bona fide. After a detailed consideration
of the submissions made by both sides and the evidence
on record, we are in agreement with the judgment of the
High Court that the Appellants are guilty of committing
contempt of Court.
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 463 of 2006
HET RAM BENIWAL & ORS.

V
RAGHUVEER SINGH & ORS.
Dated:October 21, 2016


The Appellants were found guilty of committing
contempt by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan

at Jodhpur. Simple imprisonment of two months and
fine of Rs. 2,000/- each was imposed. Aggrieved by the
said judgment, the Appellants have filed these Criminal
Appeals.
2. The Appellants along with Sheopat Singh belong to
the Marxist Communist Party. Sheopat Singh died
during the pendency of these proceedings. It is relevant
to mention that Appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are advocates. A
prominent trade union activist of Sri Ganganagar District
Shri Darshan Koda was murdered on 18.12.2000. Some
of the accused were granted anticipatory bail in
February, 2001 by the High Court of Rajasthan. The
Appellants addressed a huge gathering of their party
workers in front of the Collectorate at Sri Ganganagar on
23.02.2001. While addressing the gathering, the
Appellants made scandalous statements against the
High Court which were published in Lok Sammat
newspaper on 24.02.2001. The offending statements
made by the Appellants (from the translated version) are
summarized as under:

Appellant No. 1 - “Ex MLA Het Ram Beniwal said that,
there are two types of justice in the courts. A thief of
Rs.100/- cannot get bail, if the lathi and gandasi is hit
then the courts ask for the statements of the witnesses
and diary, but Miglani and Gurdayal Singh committed
the murder, even then anticipatory bail had been taken
on the application without diary.”
Appellant No. 2 - “Navrang Chaudhary, Advocate, District
President, CITU said that the general public has lost
confidence in the law and justice.”
Appellant No. 3 - “MCP Leader Bhuramal Swami naming
the judge of the High Court said in attacking way that all
around there is rule of rich people whether it is
bureaucracy or judiciary.”
Appellant No. 4 - “Sarpanch Hardeep Singh told that
there was influence of money behind the anticipatory bail
of the accused.”
The Advocate General gave his consent to Respondent
No.1 for initiation of contempt proceedings on
16.01.2002. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 filed a
Contempt Petition in the High Court. It was stated by
Respondent No. 1 in the contempt petition that baseless

allegations of bias and corruption were made by the
Appellants against the judiciary. He also alleged that
the Appellants were guilty of a systematic campaign to
destroy the public confidence in the judiciary.
3. The Appellants filed a common counter denying the
allegations made against them. The appointment of the
Special Public Prosecutor in the case of the murder of
Shri Darshan Koda was in dispute and the Appellants
contended that they were agitating for appointment of
another competent lawyer as Special Public Prosecutor.
They accused Respondent No.1 of initiating contempt
proceedings only to harass and victimize them as they
were agitating for a change of the Special Public
Prosecutor. They denied making any defamatory
statements against the judiciary. A compact disc (CD)
was produced on 15.07.2003 which was a video
recording of a press conference held on 15.05.2002 at Sri
Ganganagar by the third Appellant and Sheopat Singh.
The said press conference was also telecast on ETV
4Page 5
(Rajasthan). The High Court viewed the CD after taking
consent from both sides in the presence of the third
Appellant and Sheopat Singh. The High Court directed a
transcript of the video to be prepared and be kept on
record.
4. The High Court framed three questions for
consideration which are as follows:
i. “Whether statement published in “Lok
Sammat” dtd. 24.2.2001 published from Sri
Ganganagar amounts to criminal contempt?
ii. Whether editor’s liability for whatever is
published in the newspaper is absolute or he
is not liable for faithful reproduction of the
statement made by somebody else in the
news reporting?
iii. Whether it is proved beyond reasonable doubt
on the basis of material on record that
respondents No.2 to 6 did make the
statements attributed to them respectively so
as to hold them liable for contempt?”
5. In view of the disparaging remarks made by the
Appellants against the judges of the Rajasthan High
5Page 6
Court, the High Court held that the statement published
in Lok Sammat on 24.02.2001 amounts to criminal
contempt. The scathing remarks made by the Appellants
have a tendency of creating a doubt in the minds of the
public about the impartiality, integrity and fairness of the
High Court in administering justice. According to the
High Court, the scurrilous attack made by the Appellants
against the judiciary lowers the authority of the Court.
6. In view of the unconditional apology tendered at the
earliest point of time by Respondent No. 1, the Editor of
Lok Sammat, the High Court discharged the notices
against him in the contempt petition. The High Court
answered the third point against the Appellants and held
them guilty of contempt as the case was proved against
them beyond reasonable doubt. The entire evidence on
record was scrutinized carefully by the High Court to
reach this conclusion. The press conference held by the
third Appellant was highlighted by the High Court to
conclude that the highly objectionable statements were,
6Page 7
in fact, made by the Appellants on 23.02.2001. As the
Appellants denied having made any statements against
the judiciary in their reply to the contempt petition, the
journalists demanded an explanation. The third
Appellant stated that they stood by what was said on
23.02.2001. The High Court held the Appellants guilty of
committing criminal contempt and sentenced them to
simple imprisonment of two months and fine of Rs.
2000/- each.
7. We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate for
the Appellants. As Respondent No. 1 who was the
petitioner in the contempt petition was unrepresented,
we requested Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Advocate to assist the
Court to which she readily agreed. Apart from making
oral submissions Ms. Bhati also gave a written note. Mr.
Bhushan submitted that statements attributed to the
Appellants only represent fair criticism which would not
amount to contempt. According to him, the Appellants
were in an agitated mood due to the murder of one of
7Page 8
their leaders and the mishandling of the criminal case
connected to that murder. Criticism of class bias and
improper administration of justice cannot be considered
to be contempt. He referred to a statement attributed to
the fourth Appellant who alleged influence of money in
the grant of anticipatory bail to the accused and
explained that statement as having been made in a
different context altogether. He stated that the influence
of money was against the authorities and police force and
not attributed to the judiciary. He also stated that the
statement made by the third Appellant who named the
judge who granted anticipatory bail and accused the
judiciary of being partial to rich people does not
tantamount to contempt. Strong reliance was placed on
Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R. K. Jain,
reported in (2010) 8 SCC 281 by Mr. Bhushan to
contend that the Courts should not be sensitive to fair
criticism. He also stated that the power of punishing for
contempt has to be exercised sparingly.
8Page 9
8. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Amicus Curiae,
submitted that the judgment of the High Court does not
warrant any interference as the entire evidence was dealt
with in detail. She submitted that all the relevant factors
were taken into account by the High Court including the
statements made by the Appellants which ex facie
demonstrated contempt, the stand of the editor of the
newspaper that they have scrupulously and correctly
reported the statements in the newspaper and non denial
of the Appellants addressing the public meeting at the
Collectorate of Sri Ganganagar. She also submitted that
the High Court took note of the press conference of the
third Appellant and Sheopat Singh on 15.05.2002 and
the affidavits of 5 journalists and one deed writer who
were witness to the meeting on 23.02.2001. She placed
reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in Bal
Kishan Giri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in
(2014) 7 SCC 280 to contend that vituperative
comments undermining the judiciary would amount to
contempt. She also relied upon Vijay Kumar Singh v.
9Page 10
Union of India, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 460 to
contend that the apology was made only for the purpose
of avoiding punishment and was not bona fide. To avoid
prolixity, we are not referring to other judgments cited by
the learned Amicus Curiae. She referred to the affidavits
filed by the Appellants in this Court apologizing for the
statements and even they do not demonstrate any
genuine contrition. She submitted that an apology by
the contemnors should be tendered at the earliest
opportunity and it should be unconditional.
9. Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) defines criminal
contempt as follows:
“2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,
(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by
signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise)
of any matter or the doing of any other act
whatsoever which –
10Page 11
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or
lowers or tends to lower the authority of,
any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to
interfere with, the due course of any
judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or
obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other
manner;”

10. Section 5 of the Act is as under:
 “5.Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.
“A person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing any fair comment on
the merits of any case which has been
heard and finally decided.”
11. Section 12 of the Act is as under:
“12. Punishment for contempt of court (1)
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act or in any other law, a contempt of court
may be punished with simple imprisonment for
a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to two thousand
rupees, or with both.
Provided that the accused may be
discharged or the punishment awarded may
11Page 12
be remitted on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court.
Explanation.-An apology shall not be
rejected merely on the ground that it is
qualified or conditional if the accused makes it
bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any law for the time being in force, no court
shall impose a sentence in excess of that
specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt
either in respect of itself or of a court
subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this section, where a person is found guilty of a
civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a
fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a
sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall,
instead of sentencing him to simple
imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a
civil prison for such period not exceeding six
months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt
of court in respect of any undertaking given to
a court is a company, every person who, at the
time the contempt was committed, was in
12Page 13
charge of, and was responsible to, the
company for the conduct of the business of the
company, as well as the company, shall be
deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the
punishment may be enforced, with the leave of
the court, by the detention in civil prison of
each such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this
sub-section shall render any such person liable
to such punishment if he proves that the
contempt was committed without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due
diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (4), where the contempt of court
referred to therein has been committed by a
company and it is proved that the contempt
has been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect
on the part of, any director, manager, secretary
or other officer of the company, such director,
manager, secretary or other officer shall also
be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the
punishment may be enforced with the leave of
the court, by the detention in civil prison of
13Page 14
such director, manager, secretary or other
officer.
Explanation.-For the purpose of
sub-sections (4) and (5),-
(a)" company” means anybody corporate and
includes a firm or other association of
individuals ; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a
partner in the firm.
12. We are, in the present case, concerned with Section
2(c)(i) of the Act which deals with scandalizing or lowering
the authority of the Court. It has been held by this Court
that judges need not be protected and that they can take
care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the
public in the due administration of justice that have to be
protected. See Asharam M. Jain v. A. T. Gupta,
 reported in (1983) 4 SCC 125. Vilification of judges
would lead to the destruction of the system of
administration of justice. The statements made by the
Appellants are not only derogatory but also have the
propensity to lower the authority of the Court. Accusing
14Page 15
judges of corruption results in denigration of the
institution which has an effect of lowering the confidence
of the public in the system of administration of justice. A
perusal of the allegations made by the Appellants cannot
be termed as fair criticism on the merits of the case. The
Appellants indulged in an assault on the integrity of the
judges of the High Court by making baseless and
unsubstantiated allegations. They are not entitled to
seek shelter under Section 5 of the Act.
13. The oft-quoted passage from Ambard v.
Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C.
322 is that “[j]ustice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be
allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though
outspoken comments of ordinary men.” The Privy Council
in the same judgment held as follows: “The path of
criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted
to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain
from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the
administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a
15Page 16
right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to
impair the administration of justice, they are immune.”
[Emphasis ours]
In Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R. K. Jain
(supra) this Court held in paragraph 23 as follows:
“Ordinarily, the Court would not use the power
to punish for contempt for curbing the right of
freedom of speech and expression, which is
guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the
Constitution. Only when the criticism of judicial
institution transgresses all limits of decency and
fairness or there is total lack of objectivity or
there is deliberate attempt to denigrate the
institution then the court would use this power.”

14. Every citizen has a fundamental right to speech,
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Contempt of Court is one of the restrictions on such
right. We are conscious that the power under the Act has
to be exercised sparingly and not in a routine manner. If
there is a calculated effort to undermine the judiciary,
the Courts will exercise their jurisdiction to punish the
offender for committing contempt. We approve the

findings recorded by the High Court that the Appellants
have transgressed all decency by making serious
allegations of corruption and bias against the High Court.
The caustic comments made by the Appellants cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be termed as fair criticism.
The statements made by the Appellants, accusing the
judiciary of corruption lower the authority of the Court.
The Explanation to sub-Section 12 (1) of the Act provides
that an apology should not be rejected merely on the
ground that it is qualified or tendered at a belated stage,
if the accused makes it bona fide. The stand taken by the
Appellants in the contempt petition and the affidavit filed
in this Court does not inspire any confidence that the
apology is made bona fide. After a detailed consideration
of the submissions made by both sides and the evidence
on record, we are in agreement with the judgment of the
High Court that the Appellants are guilty of committing
contempt of Court. After considering the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case including the fact that the
contemptuous statements were made in 2001, we modify

the sentence to only payment of fine of Rs. 2,000/- each.
The Appeal is dismissed with the said modification.
15. Criminal Appeal No. 464 of 2006, which concerns
the same facts as reported in another newspaper, stands
disposed of in terms of Criminal Appeal No.463 of 2006.
16. We record our appreciation for the assistance
rendered by Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Advocate as Amicus
Curiae.
.…............................J.
 [ANIL R. DAVE]
 ................................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi,
October 21, 2016

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