Law Web: Whether suit for recovery of money is maintainable against sick industry without consent of BIFR ?

Insofar as the recovery of money is concerned, the matter

is completely covered by Section 22(1) of the Act. The language

employed in Section 22(1) of the Act refers to the entirety of the

period beginning from the inquiry under Section 16 till the

implementation of sanctioned scheme for revival. Section 22(1)

bars any suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any

security against the industrial company without the express

consent of the Board. Reference in Section 22(1) is to “an

Industrial Company” and not to “the sick Industrial Company” as

found in later sub-sections of the same Section. This also throws

light that the bar is during the period contemplated in said

Section 22(1). Such bar is period specific and sub-section (5) of

Section 22 entitles exclusion of such period while computing

limitation. During the entirety of that period the Act grants

protection to the company and leaves it to the discretion of the

BIFR whether to permit filing and maintaining of suit or other

proceedings. In the present case the BIFR was considering Draft

Rehabilitation Scheme which is a stage under Section 18(3) and

is completely covered by the period under Section 22 of the Act.

The suit in the instant case as framed for recovery of money filed

without the consent of the BIFR was not competent and

maintainable. We may at this stage refer to the decisions

rendered by this Court with regard to Section 22(1) of the Act. In

Managing Director, Bhoruka Textiles Limited Vs. Kashmiri

Rice Industries1

, after quoting sub-section (1) of Section 22 of

the Act, it was observed:-

“A plain reading of the aforementioned provision

would clearly go to show that a suit is barred when

an enquiry under Section 16 is pending. It is also

not in dispute that prior to institution of the suit,

the respondent did not obtain consent of the Board.

9. the provision of the Act and, in particular,

Chapter III thereof, provides for a complete code.

The Board has a wide power in terms of the

provisions of the Act, although it is not a court.

Sub-section (4) of Section 20 as also Section 32 of

the Act provides for non obstante caluses. It

envisages speedy disposal of the enquiry and

preferably within the time framed provided for

thereafter. Section 17 empowers the court to make

suitable orders on the completion of enquiry.

Preparation and sanction of the scheme is also

contemplated under the Act.”

In para 12 of the said decision, it was further

stated:

“If the civil court’s jurisdiction was ousted in

terms of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act,

any judgment rendered by it would be coram non

judice. It is a well settled principle of law that a

judgment and decree passed by a court or tribunal

lacking inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity.”

Similarly, in Raheja Universal Limited Vs. NRC

Limited2

it was observed as under:

“49. BIFR has been vested with wide powers and,

being an expert body, is required to perform duties

and functions of wide-ranged nature. If one looks

into the legislative intent in relation to a sick

industrial company, it is obvious that BIFR has to

first make an effort to provide an opportunity to

the sick industrial company to make its net worth

exceed the accumulated losses within a reasonable

time, failing which BIFR has to formulate a

scheme for revival of the company, even by

providing financial assistance in cases wherein

BIFR in its wisdom deems it necessary and finally

only when both these options fail and the public

interest so requires, BIFR may recommend

winding up of the sick industrial company. So long

as the scheme is under consideration before BIFR

or it is being implemented after being sanctioned

and is made operational from a given date, it is the

legislative intent that such scheme should not be

interjected by any other judicial process or

frustrated by the impediments created by third

parties and even by the management of the sick

industrial company, in relation to the assets of the

company.”

The suit in the instant case, insofar as it relates to the claim

for recovery of money, could lie or be proceeded with only after

express consent of the BIFR.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10221 OF 2014 @

(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.5249 OF 2014)

GHANSHYAM SARDA

M/S SHIV SHANKAR

TRADING CO. & ORS.

UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.

Citation: AIR 2015 SC 403

Dated:November 13, 2014

1. Permission to file SLP granted in SLP(C) Nos.8611-

12/2014. Leave to appeal granted in all Special Leave Petitions.

2. All these Special Leave Petitions arise out of a common

judgment and order dt. 06.01.2014 passed by the High Court of

Gauhati in FAO No. 10 of 2013 and Writ Petition Nos. 4303 of

2013 and 6286 of 2013 and are being disposed by this common

judgment and order. These petitions raise questions regarding

scope and ambit of Sections 22(1), 26 and 32(1) of the Sick

Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985, hereinafter

referred to as the Act.

3. A company named J.K. Jute Mill Company Ltd.

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the company’) having its registered

office at Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh filed Reference No. 149 of 1994

before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction

(“BIFR” for short) under the provisions of the Act. Though the

scheme was initially sanctioned for reconstruction, the BIFR

subsequently held the scheme to have failed and directed the

company to be wound up. These orders were stayed by the

Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction

(“AAIFR” for short) and further proceedings before the BIFR

continued. While the matter was thus pending, “Sarda Group”

took over the Company through Rainey Park Suppliers Private

Ltd. (RPSPL) in 2007. BIFR by its order dated 17.12.2008

approved such take over of the management. The management

of the company was handed over to Shri Govind Sarda. It

appears that in 2009, Shri Govind Sarda assigned the debt held

by RPSPL in favour of an entity named Libra Retailer Pvt. Ltd.

(LRPL) and he is stated to have handed over Jute Mill of the

company to a third party. As he failed to revive the company,

show cause notice for winding up was issued by the BIFR. This

5Page 6

action was challenged by the Company by filing Appeal No. 186

of 2009 before the AAIFR which appeal is still pending.

4. At this stage, Shri Ghanshyam Sarda, (hereinafter referred

to as the present appellant) filed an application for impleading

himself in the proceedings which application was accepted by

AAIFR. Upon this order being challenged, the High Court of

Delhi in W.P. No.2839 of 2010 held the present appellant to be

entitled to present his point of view in the form of

proposal/scheme, which order was confirmed by this Court by

dismissing Special Leave Petition filed at the instance of the

Company. In terms of the aforesaid orders the BIFR impleaded

the present appellant who thereafter submitted a proposal for

revival of the company and also filed MA No.162 of 2012 in the

BIFR for restoration of shareholding pattern. On 18.02.2013 the

BIFR issued directions to the operating agency to consider the

scheme of the present management and the scheme submitted by

the present Appellant and thereafter submit a fully tied up Draft

Revival Scheme (“DRS” for short). The BIFR fixed the next

date for hearing of MA 162 of 2012 on 04.04.2013. In the

proceedings dated 27.02.2013, it was decided that the DRS be

6Page 7

circulated seeking objections and suggestions from all the

concerned.

5. On 03.04.2013, two applications were filed before the

BIFR by M/S Shyam Jute Supplier, Chindwara M.P. and M/S

Shiv Shankar Tranding Co. & Ors, Gauhati Assam (hereinafter

referred to as ‘SSTC’) signed by the same person through same

Counsel stating that they were unsecured creditors and sought

permission from the BIFR to institute Civil Suit for recovery of

money stated to be recoverable from the company. On

04.04.2013 the BIFR held a hearing to consider the change in the

share holding pattern of the company without due permission

from BIFR. At that stage Counsel appearing for the Company

submitted that Application No. 162 of 2012 could not be

considered as the BIFR no longer retained jurisdiction over the

Company. It was submitted that in the Audited Balance-Sheet

for the period of nine months i.e. 01.04.2012 to 31.12.2012 the

net worth of the Company having turned positive, the Company

ought to be discharged from the BIFR. Learned counsel

appearing for Shyam Jute Supplier and SSTC supported such

submissions.

7Page 8

6. Paragraphs (4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.8, 4.12 and 4.13) of the

proceedings dated 04.04.2013 are quoted here under which are

self eloquent.

“4.1. Today’s hearing (04.04.2013) was fixed for

consideration of MA No. 162/BC/2012 filed by

Shri Ghanshyam Sarda praying as under:

a) Declare that the change in shareholding

pattern to the extent the same reduces the

shareholding of RPSPL from 86.23% to 5.34%

without approval of BIFR as null and void;

b) Restore the management and the

shareholding pattern of JKJMCL as approved by

the learned BIFR vide its order dated 18.09.2008.

c) Initiate action under section 33 read with

section 34 against the management for changing

the shareholding pattern of the sick company

without seeking permission from BIFR; and

d) Appoint a special director (BIFR Nominee)

in the Board of the Company to look into and

monitor its affairs;

e) Pass such other further order(s) as this

Hon’ble BIFR may deem fit and proper in the facts

and circumstances of the case;

4.3. Shri Sudhansu Batra, Sr. Advocate appearing

on behalf of the Sick Company intervened and

stated the MA NO. 162/BC/2012 cannot be

considered today since BIFR no longer retains

jurisdiction over the company. Shri Batra, Sr.

Advocate stated that the Balance sheet as on

31.12.2012 has been audited which shows that the

networth of the company has turned positive and

the company has to be discharged from BIFR.

Upon a query from the Bench, Shri Sudhansu

8Page 9

Batra, Sr. Advocate stated that the company has

already filed a letter dated 25.03.2013 with the

BIFR informing that the networth of the company

as on 31.12.2012 has turned positive. Upon a

query from the Bench, Shri Sudhansu Batra, Sr.

Advocate stated that the financial period of the

company is normally for 12 months but this year

the accounts have been closed by auditing the

balance sheet for 9 months period from 01.04.2012

to 31.12.2012. The Ld. Senior Advocate prayed

that in view of the networth turning positive the

company should be discharged from the BIFR. The

Ld. Senior advocate argued that there are no

provision under SICA for deregistration of a

reference when the net worth becomes positive and

the Sick Company is not required to make a formal

application to the BIFR for discharge when the

company’s net worth becomes positive. The Ld.

Advocate further stated that the sickness of the

company is to be decided ex facie on the basis of

the audited Balance Sheet and as the Audited

Balance Sheet as at 31.12.2012 is showing positive

Networth, BIFR ceases to have any jurisdiction.

The Ld. Senior Advocate to support of this

submissions referred to and relied upon the

judgment passed by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in

the case of: Cahtolic Syrian Bank V/s BIFR & Ors.

On a query from the bench that assuming the

networth has turned positive whether BIFR would

automatically lose its jurisdiction or BIFR still has

the powers to examine the audited balance sheet

and formally pass an order of discharge, Shri

Sudhansu Batra Sr. Advocate agreed and in

fairness conceded that before discharging the

company, the BIFR can examine the audited

balance sheet as on 31.12.2012 by all means and

methods and satisfy itself. Shri Sudhansu Batra, Sr.

Advocate stated that his clients is not required to

file an application seeking discharge and BIFR on

9Page 10

its own may examine the audited Balance Sheet

and discharge the company from BIFR.

4.4. Shri Ashish Mohan, Advocate appearing for

an unsecured creditor stated that his clients have

filed application seeking impleadment as well as

permission under section 22(1) of SICA to file

recovery proceedings against the management of

the company; but in view of the networth of the

company turning positive the company may be

discharged from BIFR so that his clients may file

recovery suit against the company. The learned

Advocate stated that since the networth of the Sick

Company has turned positive, he would not be

pressing any of his application (s) and would take

legal recourse against the company in court of law.

4.8 The representatives of IDBI (OA) stated that

they are not in a position to comment upon the

Audited Balance Sheet as on 31.12. 2012 without

examining the same. The OA further stated that the

ASC is going ahead as per its schedule and the

next meeting of the ASC is on 16.04.2013. The

Bench observed that the ASC may go ahead with

its schedule and that ASC should do nothing more

at present except opening and evaluating the bids

and submit its report on such evaluation to the

BIFR and that BIFR shall take a final view upon

the bids and the sale of assets at the time of

approval of DRS. The bench further observed that

DRS has already been circulated on 26.02.2013

and the objections & suggestions shall be

considered on 20.05.2013. Till such time either the

Bench considers the DRS or discharge the

company from SICA; the Bench shall safeguard

the assets of the company and retain its jurisdiction

over the company/its assets.

4.12. The Bench stated that they would consider

the arguments of the parties including the

1Page 11

arguments of Mr. Aggarwal on the next date of

hearing. The Bench also observed that as per the

Company’s ABS as on 31.03.2012, (12 months)

the networth of the company is Rs. 5.71 crores and

the accumulated losses are Rs. 36.23 crores and it

would like to satisfy itself about the Balance Sheet

as at 31.12.2012 to which Mr. Batra agreed that the

BIFR could undertake such an exercise. Since the

issue of lack of jurisdiction has been raised; the

Bench would decide the said issue alongwith MA

No. 162/BC/2012.

4.13. Having considered the submissions made in

the hearing, materials on record, the Bench issued

the following directions:

(i)The company to submit certified copy of its

ABS as on 31.12.2012 along with all relevant

papers & documents in support of its networth

within one week from today with copy to the IDBI

(OA) and all concerned parties alongwith

documentary evidence;

(ii) The ASC would go-ahead as per its schedule

and confirmation of sell, if any will take place

upon approval of DRS on 20.05.2013, with the

consent of Bench.

(iii) The Bench fixed the next date of hearing on

26.04.2013 at 11.30 AM for considering the

submission of the Company that its networth has

turned positive as on 31.12.2012 and also hear the

MA No. 162/BC/2012 on the said date.”

7. At this stage some of the other proceedings need a

mention. J.K. Jute Mazdoor Sabha filed Writ Petition No. 22897

of 2013 before the Allahabad High Court on 25.04.2013

challenging the BIFR’s order dated 04.04.2013. Said Writ

1Page 12

Petition having been dismissed by a Single Judge, in an appeal

therefrom the Division Bench in its order dated 01.05.2013

observed that the BIFR would be in a better position to assess the

net worth position of the company. In the meantime, Shyam

Jute Suppliers approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by

filing Writ Petition No.7534 of 2013 questioning the order dated

04.04.2013 of the BIFR. The petition was dismissed by a Single

Judge on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction which order

was approved in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court.

8. On 22.04.2013, SSTC filed Title Suit No. 166 of 2013 in

Civil Court at Kamroop, Gauhati against the Company adding

BIFR as proforma defendant. It was inter alia averred

“…. Now it appears from the balance sheet of the

defendant company filed before the proforma

defendant that its net worth had become positive.

In view of the said admission on the part of the

defendant No. 2 it is no longer a sick establishment

under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special

Provisions) Act, 1985 and consequently the

proforma defendant No. 2 has ceased to have

jurisdiction over the defendant No. 1 and as such

the defendant No. 1 is no longer entitled to any

benefit under the Sick Industrial Companies

(Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Thus the defendant

No. 1 under the aforesaid facts and circumstances

has become liable to be sued in a Civil Court of

competent jurisdiction with effect from the date

1Page 13

the 2012 balance sheet as submitted by it before

the proforma defendant No. 2 and the proforma

defendant ceased to have any jurisdiction

whatsoever.”

The plaintiff prayed for declaration, inter alia, that the

company was no longer a sick company within the meaning of

the Act and that the BIFR ceased to have jurisdiction over the

company and all the proceedings in BIFR after filing of positive

balance-sheet be declared without jurisdiction. The Civil Court

by its order dated 23.04.2014 while issuing notices to the

defendants directed that status-quo be maintained in respect of

the BIFR case till the next date of hearing.

9. The company filed its written objections on 13.05.2013.

Though the claim of the plaintiff and its entitlement to recover

the sum stated to be due was denied, the company accepted that it

was no longer a sick company. The relevant averments were to

the following effect.

“……. That the answering opposite party humbly

states that the statements made in paragraph

number 1 of Misc. (J) Case No. 254/13 are to the

extent that the opposite party is no longer a sick

establishment is not denied.”

1Page 14

“ …. That the answering opposite party admits the

statement made in paragraph number 10 and admit

that on and from the financial year 2012-2013 it is

no longer a sick company. The balance sheet is

also admitted. The rest of the statements regard

jurisdiction is a matter of fact and law and the

opposite party has no comment to offer.”

10. The matter came up before the Civil Court on 13.05.2013.

It noted the aforementioned stand and in view of such admitted

position held that the BIFR ceased to have any jurisdiction over

the defendant company. It was observed:-

“…. But a question that is still required to be

answered at this juncture is as to whether this

Court has the jurisdiction to grant the relief of

temporary injunction as sought for in the instant

case. Section 26 of the SICA, which provides inter

alia that no injunction shall be granted by any

court or other authority in respect of any action

taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power

conferred by or under this Act, shall not be

applicable to the opposite party no. 1 company any

more as it is no more a sick industrial company

admittedly and the provisions of the SICA are not

applicable to it anymore, and, therefore, the civil

court will definitely have jurisdiction over it.

Hence, this Court has jurisdiction to grant the

relief as sought for in the instant case….”

In the premises, the Civil Court restrained the defendants

including the BIFR from proceeding with BIFR case no. 149 of

1994. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Company at any stage placed

1Page 15

on record before the Civil Court the proceedings dated

04.04.2013 of the BIFR nor was the Civil Court appraised of the

fact that the Plaintiff had sought leave under Section 22 (1) of the

Act from the BIFR to file the Civil Suit.

11. In the meantime while dealing with appeals preferred

against the orders of the BIFR including one dated 27.02.2013,

the AAIFR was appraised that the issue of Net worth was under

consideration of the BIFR, so vide its order dt.16.05.2013 it

preferred to await such decision. In the subsequent

proceedings of the same day i.e. 16.05.2013 the aforesaid order

of the Civil Court was placed before the BIFR which observed

that it had not given any permission under Section 22 (1) of the

Act to SSTC to file any recovery suit against the company and

the matter was adjourned in the presence of the counsel

concerned for considering the submission of the parties on the

issue of net worth as on 31.12.2012. It was further observed that

in the absence of permission under Section 22 (1) the suit filed by

SSTC was not competent and that, the company had not yet been

de-registered from BIFR and a filing of Civil Suit without taking

permission was violative of the Act. Taking note of the order of

1Page 16

the AAIFR dated 16.05.2013 and the order passed by the High

Court of Allahabad dated 01.05.2013, it was observed that it had

to decide the issue whether the net worth of the company had

turned positive or not. The BIFR thus directed the parties to file

their written submission on the aspect of the net worth of the

company as on 31.12.2012.

12. On 30.05.2013, the present appellant filed an application

for impleadment as defendant in the aforesaid Suit. Adverting to

the orders passed by the BIFR and AAIFR impleading him in the

proceedings before the BIFR and the subsequent orders passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and this Court

on his impleadment and the fact that he had submitted a proposal

for revival, the present appellant prayed that he be impleaded in

said suit as a defendant. The present appellant thereafter filed

FAO No.10 of 2013 before Gauhati High Court challenging the

Civil Court’s order dated 13.05.2013. A learned Single Judge

after preliminary hearing by his order dated 14.06.2013 admitted

the appeal for hearing and also passed interim order to the effect

that no third party rights in respect of the property of the

1Page 17

respondents/defendants be created during the pendency of the

appeal.

13. In the meantime, the matter appeared before the BIFR on

01.07.2013. It prima facie was of the view that the Audited

Balance-Sheet as on 31.12.2012 of the company did not reflect

true and fair view and that the matter required examination as to

how the net worth of the company, all of a sudden, turned

positive. It was observed that SSTC was not granted any

permission by the BIFR under Section 22 (1) of the Act and the

suit of SSTC was not competent, that SSTC had suppressed the

fact from the Civil Court and that the order passed by the Civil

Court being without jurisdiction was a nullity in the eyes of law

and not binding upon the BIFR. It was further observed that the

BIFR had to satisfy itself whether the net worth had turned

positive due to some positive development and not merely by

manipulation of the accounts. In the premises it directed the

State Bank of India to appoint independent auditor for Special

Investigative Audit and to file its report about net worth position

of the company as on 31.12.2012.

1Page 18

14. SSTC who was the original plaintiff in the aforesaid Suit

filed Writ Petition No. 4303 of 2013 in Gauhati High Court

challenging the orders dated 16.05.2013 and 01.07.2013 of the

BIFR. Said Writ Petition came up before the Single Judge who

by his order dated 01.08.2013 impleaded the present appellant as

Respondent No. 3 in the Writ Petition and further directed that

till the next date of hearing further proceedings in BIFR case No.

149 of 2014 shall remain stayed. Subsequently, the matter

appeared before the Single Judge again who, on 14.08.2013

directed that the matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief

Justice for directions whether the Writ Petition could be heard

along with FAO No.10 of 2013.

15. On 04.09.2013, State Bank of India as directed by the

BIFR submitted the Report of the Special Investigative Audit

pointing out the manipulation in the balance-sheet submitted by

the company and that the net worth of the company as on

31.12.2012 was in fact on the negative side by Rs.36 crores in

nine months. In the proceedings before the BIFR dated

05.09.2013, the aforesaid Report was taken on record and

comments from the parties were invited.

1Page 19

16. Immediately the company filed Writ Petition No.4286 of

2013 before Gauhati High Court questioning the order dated

05.09.2013 of the BIFR. The matter came up before a Single

Judge on 30.09.2013 who issued rule in the Writ Petition and by

way of interim order directed that further proceedings in BIFR

case No.194 of 1994 shall remain stayed. This order was vacated

by Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeals vide its

order dated 14.11.2013. These three matters namely FAO No.10

of 2013 and Writ Petition Nos.4303 and 6286 of 2013 were

thereafter clubbed and posted before the Single Judge on

21.11.2013, who adjourned the matters to 04.12.2013 and

observed that since the Court was in seisin of the matter it was

expected that the BIFR may not proceed further with the case till

conclusion of the hearing before the learned Single Judge. In

deference to the aforesaid order dated 21.11.2013, the BIFR

adjourned the case.

17. These three matters then came up before the High Court

which observed that FAO No.10 of 2013 was filed by the present

appellant who was not yet a party before the Civil Court and that

1Page 20

said FAO which was filed without seeking appropriate leave of

the Appellate Court was not maintainable and as such it was not

necessary to enter upon deliberations on merits of the matter.

The High Court was of the view that since the application for

impleadment was still pending before the Civil Court, as and

when the present appellant was impleaded as defendant in the

suit, it would then be open to him to file such application for

variation or setting aside of the order of injunction. It was held

that in the absence of any challenge, the order of injunction was

still in operation and that until and unless such order was vacated

and recalled by appropriate judicial forum, the same had to be

respected and given effect to. The High Court also disposed of

Writ Petitions on the ground that since all the proceedings before

BIFR stood stayed, further proceeding in BIFR would be of no

legal consequence. It was further observed that one of the

members of BIFR having recused himself from hearing the case

on the earlier occasions as noted in the order dated 31.01.2013, of

the BIFR, said member ought not to have participated in any

further proceedings.

2Page 21

18. This common order passed by the High Court has given

rise to six Special Leave Petitions, three by present appellant

namely SLP No. 5249, 5897 and 6412 challenging the order of

the High Court in respect of FAO No.10 of 2013, Writ Petition

No.4303 of 2013 and Writ Petition No.6286 of 2013 respectively.

The other three petitions are by J.K. Jute Mill Mazdur Ekta

Unions being Special Leave Petition Nos. 8610, 8611 and 8612

of 2014 against the aforesaid order in respect of three

proceedings as stated above respectively. This Court issued

notice in the matter on 24.03.2014 on which date the company

had appeared on caveat. By order dated 08.05.2014, it was

directed that till further orders the capital assets of the Company

shall not be disposed of without taking permission of this court.

Soon thereafter Civil Contempt Petition Nos.338 and 375 of 2014

were filed by the present appellant and J.K. Jute Mills Mazdoor

Union contending inter alia that in violation of order dated

08.05.2014, the contemnors in the petition had caused certain

properties of the Company to be transferred. During the

pendency of these matters SSTC assigned in favour of M/s

2Page 22

Goodlife Merchants Pvt. Ltd. all the rights in respect of the debt

of the Company.

19. All the aforesaid matters were taken up for hearing together

by this Court. Appearing for the present appellant, Mr. Kapil

Sibal, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Act is a

complete code in itself and given the true scope and purport of

Sections 22 , 26 and 32 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the BIFR

over any company in question would continue till its formal

discharge by BIFR either after the net worth of the company

turned positive by successful implementation of the scheme or by

the order of winding up passed in respect of such company. It

was further submitted that the BIFR alone will have competence

and jurisdiction to declare a company which was once a sick

company, to be no longer sick and discharge it from the purview

of the Act and that the Civil Court will not have jurisdiction or

competence to decide these questions. It was further submitted

that the Civil Court is not the appropriate forum and lacks

jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the annual accounts and

conclude whether the company in question was no longer

amenable to be dealt with under the Act. In support of his

2Page 23

submissions, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in

Managing Director Bhoruka Textiles Limited Vs. Kashmiri

Rice Industries1

and Raheja Universal Limited Vs. NRC

Limited & Ors.2

Appearing for J.K. Jute Mill Mazdur Ekta

Union, Shri Krishnan Venugopal and Shri R.P. Bhatt, learned

Senior Counsel adopted the submissions of Shri Sibal. Shri

Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel also invited the attention of

this Court to the report of the State Bank of India to show how

the net worth of the company was still on the negative side. Shri

Kapil Sibal and Shri Sanjeev Sen, learned Senior counsel also

invited the attention of the Court and submitted that the alleged

contemnors in aforementioned Contempt Petitions had flagrantly

violated orders of this Court.

20. Shri Guru Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for SSTC original plaintiff and the transfree M/s

Goodlife Merchants Pvt. Ltd. in all the matters submitted that

since the audited balance-sheet as on 31.12.2012 showed the net

worth of the company on positive side, the company was out of

the purview of the provisions of the Act and it was competent for

2009(7) SCC 521

2012 (2) SCC 148

2Page 24

the company to claim itself to be no longer amenable to the

jurisdiction of the BIFR. It was submitted that it was open to

assert, upon the net worth being positive, that the company ipso

facto was no longer amenable to the jurisdiction of the BIFR. In

support, reliance was placed on the view taken by the High

Courts of Calcutta3

, Madras4

and Delhi5

. Dr. A.M. Singhvi and

Shri Harin Rawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

company submitted inter alia that while the matters were

pending before this Court, the Trial Court by its order dated

29.08.2014 had allowed the application for impleadment filed by

present appellant in Title Suit No.166 of 2013 and that it was

now open to the present appellant to go before the Trial Court

and ask for variation and modification of the order of injunction

passed by it. It was submitted that BIFR which is a Tribunal with

limited jurisdiction could not have disobeyed the order of the

Civil Court. Relying on the views taken by the High Courts of

Calcutta, Madras and Delhi in the aforestated cases it was

submitted that there was no provision in the Act under which

3. Dated 08.08.1995 in Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd. & Anr Vs. The Industrial Credit and

Investment Corporation of India & Ors. in Matter No.362 of 1995 (OS).

4. Dated 19.12.2007 in Dunlop India Ltd. Vs. Container Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr.

in Writ Petition No.24422 of 2006.

5. Dated 21.10.2009 in Catholic Syrian Bank Vs. BIFR & Ors. in W.P. (C) No.8361 of

2008.

2Page 25

BIFR could pass an order discharging a company under the Act

and as such the matter could lie in the domain of the Civil Court.

Shri C.U. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for LRPL,

one of the secured creditors, adopted the submissions and further

submitted that various proceedings before the BIFR actually

showed that the members of the BIFR were biased against the

Company.

21. Before we deal with the legal issues involved in the matter

certain factual facets of the matter need clarification and

assessment. During the course of submissions, it was submitted

that the Counsel appearing for the company had never agreed

before the BIFR on 04.04.2013 that the BIFR could examine the

audited balance sheet itself to satisfy whether the net worth of the

company had turned positive or not. In support, reliance was

placed on letter dated 18.04.2013 stated to have been written on

behalf of the company to the Secretary Bench 3, BIFR, copy of

which letter was also placed on record. Said letter purportedly

stated that the recording of such submission was wrong and that

the learned counsel had never submitted that before discharging

the company the BIFR could examine the audited balance sheet

2Page 26

and satisfy itself. Be it noted that the letter was not written by

the learned counsel nor any affidavit was sworn by the learned

counsel denying such factum. Furthermore, in none of the

subsequent proceedings after 04.04.2013, as per the record of the

BIFR, any argument disputing or denying such submission

appears to have been made, nor is there any reference in the

subsequent proceedings to the letter dated 18.04.2013. In the

circumstances we deem it appropriate to proceed on the basis that

the submission was in fact made by the learned counsel and it

was so rightly recorded by the BIFR in its proceedings dated

04.04.2013.

Secondly, it has been accepted by the company that

property at Saif Ganj, Katihar belonging to the company has in

fact been sold. At this stage, it may be useful to quote from the

written submissions filed on behalf of the company and the

relevant portion reads as under:

“A sale deed of the Kathihar property was

executed on 2.4.2013 for Rs.3.55 crores in favour

of Thapar Herbs & spices Ltd. and the sale

consideration was received on 4.4.2013. On

16.4.2013, the constructive possession was handed

over and registration fee of Rs.35.00 lacs was paid

by the Purchaser. As per the Revenue Department,

the stamp duty was higher than affixed and the

2Page 27

matter was pending adjudication and thereafter,

final registration was done on 16.4.2014. Under

the Bihar local stamp laws, since over a year had

lapsed, a fresh sale deed was presented. The

difference of registration fee was paid by the

purchaser on 16.6.2014. On 2.7.2014, the sale

deed was presented which act of presentation was

only ministerial.”

This would mean that even before the hearing of the matter

before the BIFR on 04.04.2013 the property was sold. The

record does not indicate anywhere that the factum of such sale

was ever brought to the notice of the BIFR on 04.04.2013 or

thereafter nor was it disclosed that the Rs.3.55 crores were

received by way of consideration. Furthermore, when this Court

issued notice on 24.03.2014 when the company had appeared on

caveat and subsequently passed interim order on 08.05.2014,

nothing was disclosed to this Court that the property had been

sold.

22. We may also at this stage deal with submission regarding

effect of order dated 29.08.2014 of the Civil Court impleading

the present appellant as defendant. Confining itself to the

question of competence of the present appellant to file the appeal

without leave of the court, the High Court had not dealt with

legal issues, namely what shall be the effect of sections 22, 26

and 32 of the Act insofar as the present controversy is concerned.

It was therefore submitted on behalf of the company that since

the appellant now stands impleaded, he be left to pursue

appropriate remedies before the Trial Court. We are not

persuaded to agree with this submission to relegate the matter to

the Trial Court and we proceed to deal with the legal issues

involved in the matter inasmuch as the matter raises basic issues

concerning jurisdiction of the Civil Court itself. The learned

Counsel appearing for the Original Plaintiff as well as the

company have also advanced submissions on the legal issues in

question and we therefore deem it appropriate to deal with such

issues.

23. At this juncture the question regarding maintainability of

the appeal before the High Court needs to be dealt with. As the

facts indicate, FAO was admitted after hearing the respondents.

Neither at that stage nor at any subsequent stage anything was

filed by way of formal opposition to the filing of such appeal

without the leave of the Court. Further the status of the present

appellant to present his point of view in the form of proposal or

scheme before the BIFR was accepted right up to this Court and

he had thereafter been represented before the BIFR. The

proceedings dated 04.04.2013 also indicate that the BIFR was in

seisin of MA NO.162 of 2012 preferred by him. He was also

impleaded as respondent in the writ petitions which were dealt

with along with the said FAO. The present appellant was thus

not a stranger to the controversy. There is nothing in Order

XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure that leave to appeal

has to be applied for in any particular format. In the

circumstances, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the

appeal on a technical ground and it ought to have considered the

merits of the matter. We hold the appeal preferred by the present

appellant to be maintainable and proceed to consider the basic

issues involved in the matter.

24. Sections 22(1), 26 and 32(1) of the Act, the ambit and

scope of which fall for our consideration are quoted hereunder:

22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts,

etc.—

1) Where in respect of an industrial company,

an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any

scheme referred to under section 17 is under

preparation or consideration or a sanctioned

scheme is under implementation or where an

appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial

company is pending, then, notwithstanding

anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956

(1 of 1956), or any other law or the

memorandum and articles of association of the

industrial company or nay other instrument

having effect under the said Act or other law,

no proceedings for the winding up of the

industrial company or for execution, distress or

the like against any of the properties of the

industrial company or for the appointment of a

receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the

recovery of money or for the enforcement of

any security against the industrial company or

of any guarantee in respect of any loans or

advance granted to the industrial company shall

lie or be proceeded with further, except with the

consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the

Appellate Authority.

26. Bar of Jurisdiction—No order passed or

proposal made under this Act shall be

appealable except as provided therein and no

civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of

any matter which the Appellate Authority or the

Board is empowered by, or under, this Act to

determine and no injunction shall be granted by

any court or other authority in respect of any

action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any

power conferred by or under this Act.

32.Effect of the Act on other laws.—(1) The

provisions of this Act and of any rules or

schemes made thereunder shall have effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith

contained in any other law except the provisons

of the Foregin Exchange Regulation Act, 1973

(46 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and

Regulation ) Act, 1976 (33of 1976) for the time

being in force or in the Memorandum or

Articles of Association of an industrial

company or in any other instrument having

effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

25. Chapter III of the Act details out various stages at which

inquiry into the working and status of sick industrial companies

and the scheme for revival is undertaken. Upon a reference to the

Board or upon information received with respect to financial

conditions of any industrial company, the Board is empowered

under Section 16 to conduct such inquiry as it may deem fit for

determining whether such company has become a sick industrial

company. After being so satisfied, the measures which could be

taken up to enable the company to make its net worth exceed the

accumulated losses that is to say to make it positive are

postulated in Section 17. Under Section 17(1) the Board may by

order in writing allow an industrial company to revive itself, if it

is practicable so to do within a reasonable time. If it is not so

practicable, it may direct any operating agency to prepare a

scheme for the revival of such company. In other words, once

the reference is registered, it is the BIFR which supervises the

aspects leading to the revival of such company. Subsequent

sections deal with the preparation and sanction of scheme for

revival of such company and empower the Board to have

dominion over such company to enable the revival of that

Company and in cases where such revival is not possible, to

recommend the winding up of such company. It is clear that after

a reference is registered by the Board, all throughout the

subsequent stages, the BIFR has complete supervisory control

over the affairs of such company till it is revived or the decision

to wind up such company is taken. In our view, the ambit and

extent of such control means and includes determination of such

measures to achieve revival of the sick company and to check

whether by such measures the revival is being achieved or not.

This must cover the power to decide at any stage subsequent to

the registration of reference under Section 16 whether such

company has ceased to be sick company or not. Cessation of the

status as a sick company can be under Section 17(1) or as a result

of scheme for revival being implemented and determination of

such issue, in our view, is in the exclusive domain of the BIFR.

26. In Raheja Universal Limited Vs. NRC Limited2

, it was

observed in para 48 thus:

“Chapter III, in fact, is the soul and essence of

SICA 1985 and it provides for the methodology

that is to be adopted for the purpose of detecting,

reviving or even winding up a sick industrial

company. Provisions under SICA 1985 also

provide for an appeal against the orders of BIFR

before another specialized body i.e. AAIFR. To

put it simply, this is a self-contained code and

because of the non obstnace provisions, contained

therein,it has an overriding effect over the other

laws. As per Section 32 of SICA 1985, the Act is

required to be enforced with all its vigour and in

precedence to other laws.”

The Act is a self-contained Code and has conferred upon

the BIFR complete supervisory control over a sick industrial

company to adopt such methodology as provided in Chapter III

for detecting, reviving or winding up such sick company. The

authority to determine the existence and extent of sickness of

such company and to adopt methodology for its revival are, in the

exclusive domain of the BIFR and by virtue of Section 26 there is

an express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in that

behalf.

27. As laid down by this Court the Act is a complete Code in

itself. The Act gives complete supervisory control to the BIFR

over the affairs of a sick Industrial Company from the stage of

registration of reference and questions concerning status of

sickness of such company are in the exclusive domain of the

BIFR. Any submission or assertion by anyone including the

Company that by certain developments the Company has revived

itself and/or that its net worth since the stage of registration

having become positive no such scheme for revival needs to be

undertaken, must be and can only be dealt with by the BIFR.

Any such assertion or claim has to be made before the BIFR and

only upon the satisfaction of the BIFR that a sick company is no

longer sick, that such company could be said to have ceased to be

amenable to its supervisory control under the Act. The aspects of

revival of such company being completely within its exclusive

domain, it is the BIFR alone, which can determine the issue

whether such company now stands revived or not. The

jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of these matters stands

completely excluded.

28. Unlike cases where the existence of jurisdictional fact or

facts, on the basis of which alone a Tribunal can invoke and

exercise jurisdiction, is or are doubted, stand on a different

footing from the one where invocation and exercise of

jurisdiction at the initial stage is not disputed but what is

projected is that by subsequent or supervening circumstances the

concerned Tribunal has lost jurisdiction. In the present case the

fact that the company was registered as a sick company is not

doubted nor has it been contended that the BIFR had wrongly

assumed initial jurisdiction. But what is projected is that the net

worth having become positive the BIFR has now lost jurisdiction

over the company. In our view, the BIFR having correctly

assumed jurisdiction and when all the financial affairs of such

company were directly under the supervisory control of the

BIFR, the power to decide whether it has since then lost the

jurisdiction or not, is also in the exclusive domain of the BIFR.

The BIFR alone is empowered to determine whether net worth

has become positive as a result of which it would cease to have

such jurisdiction. Any inquiry into such issue regarding net

worth by anyone outside the Act including civil court, would be

against the express intent of the Act and would lead to

incongruous and undesired results. The suit as framed seeking

declaration that the company was no longer a sick company

within the meaning of the Act, was therefore not competent and

maintainable. The Civil Court was not right and justified in

issuing injunction as it did. The counsel who represented the

company before the BIFR on 04.04.2013, correctly submitted

that before discharging the company the BIFR can examine the

audited balance sheet and satisfy itself whether the net worth had

turned positive.

29. Insofar as the recovery of money is concerned, the matter

is completely covered by Section 22(1) of the Act. The language

employed in Section 22(1) of the Act refers to the entirety of the

period beginning from the inquiry under Section 16 till the

implementation of sanctioned scheme for revival. Section 22(1)

bars any suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any

security against the industrial company without the express

consent of the Board. Reference in Section 22(1) is to “an