The learned Senior Counsel
on behalf of the petitioners submitted and to my
mind rightly so, that the leave granted to
produce the document as a secondary evidence,
presupposes that there is an original of this
document in existence. Thus, before allowing
such production by way of secondary evidence it
is necessary for the Trial Court to form an
opinion and be satisfied about the existence of
the conditions under Section 65 of the Evidence
Act under which such production can be allowed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO.848 OF 2015
Mr. Prakash Gurudas
Timblo,
V/s
Smt. Hemlatabai Ravikant
Darne alias Hemalatabai
Kamotim Timblo,
CORAM : C.V. BHADANG, J.
Pronounced on:29thJUNE,2016
Citation: 2016 (5) MHLJ 320
2. The challenge in this petition at the
instance of the original defendant nos.1 to 6 is
to the order dated 19/07/2014 passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Margao,
whereby, application dated 29/08/2013 in Special
Civil Suit No.102/2001/A filed by the respondent
nos.1 & 2, who are the original plaintiffs, for
production of the document (D-20) has been
allowed and the same is directed to be “treated
as a secondary evidence”. The respondent nos.3
to 5 are original defendant nos.7 to 9 before
the Trial Court.
3. The brief facts necessary for the disposal
of the petition may be stated thus:
That the respondent nos.1 & 2 have filed the
aforesaid suit for declaration that the final
judgment/order dated 15/03/2000 passed in
inventory proceedings no.72/1998 approving the
partition, be declared as null and void and for
injunction, etc. The respondents no.1 & 2 are
also seeking a declaration that the second
document carrying the oval seal on its front
part at Exhibit 82 allegedly made by Ms. Radha
Timblo, is forged and fabricated.
4. It appears that the learned Trial Court
summoned Ms. Dalia Dias, the Chief Manager of
Corporation Bank, Margao as a Court witness who
was examined on 12/01/2011 purportedly "under
Section 165 of the Evidence Act". The said
witness stated that Advocate Shridhar R.
Chodankar 'may be', one of the panel members of
the Bank, in the year 2002. The witness was
shown Vakalatnama (14-D) of advocate Chodankar,
as representing the Bank and the witness agreed
that the seal appearing on the said Vakalatnama,
is of the Corporation Bank, Margao but she
stated that she cannot identify the signature of
the Manager, who signed the same. In so far as
the material controversy involved in this
petition is concerned the witness was shown
xerox copies of two applications (D-20) in the
file and she stated that the xerox copies were
produced in the Court on 23/07/2004 by Advocate
Chodankar, on behalf of the Bank. The witness
also admitted about a letter dated 23/07/2008
(69-D) sent to the Corporation Bank.
5. The witness stated that as per the letter
dated 23/07/2008, the two original applications
which are now admitted in evidence at exhibit 82
were produced by the Bank. The witness was
thereafter asked to explain the discrepancy
between the xerox copy of the said application
(in respect of Radha Timblo) which is at D-20
and the original of the said applications which
are at exhibit 82. The witness stated that
handwriting is different as also the signature
of the applicant is different and the seal also
differs.
6. Be that as it may, the plaintiffs filed an
application before the learned Trial Court on
29/08/2013, contending that Ms. Dalia Dias,
during the course of her deposition, has
admitted about advocate Chodankar having
produced the xerox copies of the two
applications (D-20) and, therefore, “it stands
proved that the copies were obtained by xeroxing
the originals, which were in the Bank”. It was
contended that no new exhibit number was given
and therefore "by way of abundant caution" a
separate exhibit number be given to the said
copies or alternatively, if it is held that they
are not exhibited, in evidence, then the same
may be exhibited, 'as secondary evidence'.
7. The application was opposed on behalf of the
original defendants no.1 & 2 and the defendants
no.3 to 6 by filing separate replies. It was
denied that the documents can be exhibited or
allowed to be produced by way of secondary
evidence.
8. The learned Trial Court on hearing the
parties passed the following order on the
application filed by the respondent nos.1 &
2/plaintiffs on 19/07/2014:
“Heard both side learned Counsel.
Document marked as Ex. D/20
herein is hereby allowed to
produce with leave by this Court
for reasons stated in the present
application by the learned
Counsel for the plaintiff. The
document at Ex. D/20 is treated
as secondary evidence. Hence,
application is allowed.”
It is this order which is subject matter of
challenge in this petition.
9. I have heard Shri Dhond, the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners and Shri J.E. Coelho
Pereira, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondents no.1 & 2, who are the
contesting respondents.
10. Shri Dhond, the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioners has challenged the impugned
order mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it is
submitted that the order is unreasoned and it
does not show that the learned Trial Court has
considered the reply filed by the petitioners
and/or the objection and the contentions raised
therein. It is submitted that for this reason
alone, the order is vulnerable and has to be set
aside. Secondly, it is submitted that even
otherwise, the order cannot be sustained on
merits. The learned Senior Counsel, points out
that the copies (D-20) which are applications
said to be made by Radha Timblo for obtaining
two demand drafts, cannot be allowed to be
produced, as secondary evidence, inasmuch as the
necessary conditions as required for allowing
such production, under Section 165 of the
Evidence Act, are not satisfied. The learned
Senior Counsel was at pains to point out that
the documents are not exhibited, as such. He
points out that the documents find place in file
D of the Trial Court's record which comprises of
miscellaneous papers. He submits that as the
original applications are already on record at
exhibit 82 there is no question of allowing
production of any xerox copies by way of
secondary evidence. The learned Counsel has
placed reliance on various decisions in the case
of H. Siddiqui (dead) by LR's V/s. A. Ramalingam
reported in (2011) 4 SCC 240, J. Yshoda V/s. K.
Shobha Rani reported in (2007) 5 SCC 730, U.
Sree V/s. U. Srinivas reported in (2013) 2 SCC
114, and of this Court in the case of Bank of
Baroda V/s. Moti Industries & Ors. reported in
2008 (6) Bom.C.R. 659.
11. On the contrary, it is submitted by Shri
Pereira, the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents that the xerox copies which are now
allowed to be produced by way of secondary
evidence are already exhibited at D-20. He
points out that the Court witness Ms. Dalia Dias
has also admitted in her evidence that the said
xerox copies were produced before the Trial
Court on 23/07/2004 by advocate Chodankar on
behalf of the Bank and, as such, the learned
Trial Court was justified in allowing the
production by way of secondary evidence. The
learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that if
the Trial Court has exercised discretion in
allowing the production of the document by way
of secondary evidence, in the absence of such
exercise of discretion, being shown to be either
arbitrary or perverse, this Court may not
interfere with the same. Reliance is placed on
behalf of the respondents no.1 & 2 on the
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of K. Mallesh V/s. K. Narender & Ors. reported
in (2016) 1 SCC 670 and M. Chandra V/s. M.
Thangamuthu & anr. reported on (2010) 9 SCC 712.
12. I have carefully considered the rival
circumstances and the submissions made. At the
outset it is necessary to mention that the
impugned order lacks reasons which has prompted
the learned Trial Court, in directing, the
document D-20 "to be treated as secondary
evidence". Section 65 of the Indian Evidence
Act 1872 provides for cases in which secondary
evidence relating to documents may be given. It
provides that secondary evidence may be given of
the existence, condition or contents of a
document in cases as set out in clauses (a) to
(g) thereof. Section 65 of the Evidence Act may
be reproduced thus:
65. Cases in which secondary evidence
relating to documents may be given
Secondary evidence may be given of
the existence, condition, or contents
of a documents in the following
cases:-
(a) When the original is shown or
appears to be in the possession or
power—
of the person against whom the
document is sought to be proved , or
of any person out of reach of, or not
subject to, the process of the Court
or of any person legally bound to
produce it, and when, after the
notice mentioned in section 66, such
person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or
contents of the original have been
proved to be admitted in writing by
the person against whom it is proved
or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been
destroyed or lost, or when the party
offering evidence of its contents
cannot, for any other reason not
arising from his own default or
neglect, produce it in reasonable
time;
(d) when the original is of such a
nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is public
document within the meaning of
section 74;
(f) when the original is a document
of which a certified copy is
permitted by this Act, or by any
other law in force in 40[India] to be
given in evidence;
(g) when the originals consist of
numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot conveniently be examined
in court and the fact to be proved it
the general result of the whole
collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any
secondary evidence of the contents of
the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is
admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy
of the document, but no other kind of
secondary evidence, admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as
to the general result of the
documents by any person who has
examined them, and who is skilled in
the examination of such documents.
The present case would not be governed by
the the contingencies as specified in Section 65
(a) and (d) to (g). The case made out in the
application filed by the respondents no.1 & 2 is
that the Court witness Ms. Dlia Dias has
admitted about advocate Chodankar having
produced the documents (D-20) on behalf of the
Bank and, therefore, they stand admitted and be
assigned a separate exhibit as 'secondary
evidence'. The impugned order does not show
that the learned Trial Court has adverted to the
requirements of Section 65 of the Evidence Act
and has considered the contentions raised on
behalf of the petitioners, while ordering that
the document (D-20) be treated as a secondary
evidence. It is well settled that even where
order passed is a discretionary order, it is
expected that the Trial Court records some
reasons, may be brief, to show that the
discretion has been exercised in a judicious
manner. A reference in this regard may be made
to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall
V/s. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Others
(2010) 3 SCC 732 in which it is held thus:
“40. It is a settled legal proposition
that not only administrative but also
judicial order must be supported by
reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while
deciding an issue, the Court is bound to
give reasons for its conclusion. It is
the duty and obligation on the part of
the Court to record reasons while
disposing of the case. The hallmark of
an order and exercise of judicial power
by a judicial forum is to disclose its
reasons by itself and giving of reasons
has always been insisted upon as one of
the fundamentals of sound administration
justice - delivery system, to make known
that there had been proper and due
application of mind to the issue before
the Court and also as an essential
requisite of principles of natural
justice. "The giving of reasons for a
decision is an essential attribute of
judicial and judicious disposal of a
matter before Courts, and which is the
only indication to know about the manner
and quality of exercise undertaken, as
also the fact that the Court concerned
had really applied its mind." [Vide
State of Orissa Vs. Dhaniram Luhar,
(2004) 5 SCC 568; and State of Rajasthan
Vs. Sohan Lal & Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 573].”
13. I find that the impugned order lacks
reasoning and for this reason, the impugned
order will have to be set aside and the
application will have to be sent back to the
learned Trial Court for deciding the same afresh
after hearing the parties. In such
circumstances, it would not be necessary to
advert to the judgments cited on behalf of the
parties in details which can be considered by
the Trial Court while deciding the application.
I only propose to make a brief reference to the
decision in the case of K. Mallesh (supra) in
which he Hon'ble Apex Court had found that the
impugned order was passed at an interlocutory
stage during the pendency of the suit about
admissibility of two documents. It was held
that the admissibility, reliability and
registrability of the document can be considered
independently at the time of hearing of the
trial and not prior thereto.
14. It is true that normally this Court would be
slow in interfering with orders at an
interlocutory stage. However, in the present
case, as noticed earlier, the order is totally
unreasoned. It would further appear that the
question is not only about the admissibility and
reliability of the documents but as to whether
they can be allowed to be produced by way of
secondary evidence. The learned Senior Counsel
on behalf of the petitioners submitted and to my
mind rightly so, that the leave granted to
produce the document as a secondary evidence,
presupposes that there is an original of this
document in existence. Thus, before allowing
such production by way of secondary evidence it
is necessary for the Trial Court to form an
opinion and be satisfied about the existence of
the conditions under Section 65 of the Evidence
Act under which such production can be allowed.
15. For this reason, the petition is partly
allowed. The impugned order is hereby set
aside. The application dated 29/08/2013 filed
by the respondents no.1 & 2 is sent back to the
Trial Court for deciding the same afresh, in
accordance with law after hearing the parties.
The Trial Court shall decide the application as
expeditiously as possible, and preferably within
six weeks from the receipt of this order. Rule1
is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no
order as to costs.
C.V. BHADANG, J.
Print Page
on behalf of the petitioners submitted and to my
mind rightly so, that the leave granted to
produce the document as a secondary evidence,
presupposes that there is an original of this
document in existence. Thus, before allowing
such production by way of secondary evidence it
is necessary for the Trial Court to form an
opinion and be satisfied about the existence of
the conditions under Section 65 of the Evidence
Act under which such production can be allowed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO.848 OF 2015
Mr. Prakash Gurudas
Timblo,
V/s
Smt. Hemlatabai Ravikant
Darne alias Hemalatabai
Kamotim Timblo,
CORAM : C.V. BHADANG, J.
Pronounced on:29thJUNE,2016
Citation: 2016 (5) MHLJ 320
2. The challenge in this petition at the
instance of the original defendant nos.1 to 6 is
to the order dated 19/07/2014 passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Margao,
whereby, application dated 29/08/2013 in Special
Civil Suit No.102/2001/A filed by the respondent
nos.1 & 2, who are the original plaintiffs, for
production of the document (D-20) has been
allowed and the same is directed to be “treated
as a secondary evidence”. The respondent nos.3
to 5 are original defendant nos.7 to 9 before
the Trial Court.
3. The brief facts necessary for the disposal
of the petition may be stated thus:
That the respondent nos.1 & 2 have filed the
aforesaid suit for declaration that the final
judgment/order dated 15/03/2000 passed in
inventory proceedings no.72/1998 approving the
partition, be declared as null and void and for
injunction, etc. The respondents no.1 & 2 are
also seeking a declaration that the second
document carrying the oval seal on its front
part at Exhibit 82 allegedly made by Ms. Radha
Timblo, is forged and fabricated.
4. It appears that the learned Trial Court
summoned Ms. Dalia Dias, the Chief Manager of
Corporation Bank, Margao as a Court witness who
was examined on 12/01/2011 purportedly "under
Section 165 of the Evidence Act". The said
witness stated that Advocate Shridhar R.
Chodankar 'may be', one of the panel members of
the Bank, in the year 2002. The witness was
shown Vakalatnama (14-D) of advocate Chodankar,
as representing the Bank and the witness agreed
that the seal appearing on the said Vakalatnama,
is of the Corporation Bank, Margao but she
stated that she cannot identify the signature of
the Manager, who signed the same. In so far as
the material controversy involved in this
petition is concerned the witness was shown
xerox copies of two applications (D-20) in the
file and she stated that the xerox copies were
produced in the Court on 23/07/2004 by Advocate
Chodankar, on behalf of the Bank. The witness
also admitted about a letter dated 23/07/2008
(69-D) sent to the Corporation Bank.
5. The witness stated that as per the letter
dated 23/07/2008, the two original applications
which are now admitted in evidence at exhibit 82
were produced by the Bank. The witness was
thereafter asked to explain the discrepancy
between the xerox copy of the said application
(in respect of Radha Timblo) which is at D-20
and the original of the said applications which
are at exhibit 82. The witness stated that
handwriting is different as also the signature
of the applicant is different and the seal also
differs.
6. Be that as it may, the plaintiffs filed an
application before the learned Trial Court on
29/08/2013, contending that Ms. Dalia Dias,
during the course of her deposition, has
admitted about advocate Chodankar having
produced the xerox copies of the two
applications (D-20) and, therefore, “it stands
proved that the copies were obtained by xeroxing
the originals, which were in the Bank”. It was
contended that no new exhibit number was given
and therefore "by way of abundant caution" a
separate exhibit number be given to the said
copies or alternatively, if it is held that they
are not exhibited, in evidence, then the same
may be exhibited, 'as secondary evidence'.
7. The application was opposed on behalf of the
original defendants no.1 & 2 and the defendants
no.3 to 6 by filing separate replies. It was
denied that the documents can be exhibited or
allowed to be produced by way of secondary
evidence.
8. The learned Trial Court on hearing the
parties passed the following order on the
application filed by the respondent nos.1 &
2/plaintiffs on 19/07/2014:
“Heard both side learned Counsel.
Document marked as Ex. D/20
herein is hereby allowed to
produce with leave by this Court
for reasons stated in the present
application by the learned
Counsel for the plaintiff. The
document at Ex. D/20 is treated
as secondary evidence. Hence,
application is allowed.”
It is this order which is subject matter of
challenge in this petition.
9. I have heard Shri Dhond, the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners and Shri J.E. Coelho
Pereira, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondents no.1 & 2, who are the
contesting respondents.
10. Shri Dhond, the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioners has challenged the impugned
order mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it is
submitted that the order is unreasoned and it
does not show that the learned Trial Court has
considered the reply filed by the petitioners
and/or the objection and the contentions raised
therein. It is submitted that for this reason
alone, the order is vulnerable and has to be set
aside. Secondly, it is submitted that even
otherwise, the order cannot be sustained on
merits. The learned Senior Counsel, points out
that the copies (D-20) which are applications
said to be made by Radha Timblo for obtaining
two demand drafts, cannot be allowed to be
produced, as secondary evidence, inasmuch as the
necessary conditions as required for allowing
such production, under Section 165 of the
Evidence Act, are not satisfied. The learned
Senior Counsel was at pains to point out that
the documents are not exhibited, as such. He
points out that the documents find place in file
D of the Trial Court's record which comprises of
miscellaneous papers. He submits that as the
original applications are already on record at
exhibit 82 there is no question of allowing
production of any xerox copies by way of
secondary evidence. The learned Counsel has
placed reliance on various decisions in the case
of H. Siddiqui (dead) by LR's V/s. A. Ramalingam
reported in (2011) 4 SCC 240, J. Yshoda V/s. K.
Shobha Rani reported in (2007) 5 SCC 730, U.
Sree V/s. U. Srinivas reported in (2013) 2 SCC
114, and of this Court in the case of Bank of
Baroda V/s. Moti Industries & Ors. reported in
2008 (6) Bom.C.R. 659.
11. On the contrary, it is submitted by Shri
Pereira, the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents that the xerox copies which are now
allowed to be produced by way of secondary
evidence are already exhibited at D-20. He
points out that the Court witness Ms. Dalia Dias
has also admitted in her evidence that the said
xerox copies were produced before the Trial
Court on 23/07/2004 by advocate Chodankar on
behalf of the Bank and, as such, the learned
Trial Court was justified in allowing the
production by way of secondary evidence. The
learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that if
the Trial Court has exercised discretion in
allowing the production of the document by way
of secondary evidence, in the absence of such
exercise of discretion, being shown to be either
arbitrary or perverse, this Court may not
interfere with the same. Reliance is placed on
behalf of the respondents no.1 & 2 on the
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of K. Mallesh V/s. K. Narender & Ors. reported
in (2016) 1 SCC 670 and M. Chandra V/s. M.
Thangamuthu & anr. reported on (2010) 9 SCC 712.
12. I have carefully considered the rival
circumstances and the submissions made. At the
outset it is necessary to mention that the
impugned order lacks reasons which has prompted
the learned Trial Court, in directing, the
document D-20 "to be treated as secondary
evidence". Section 65 of the Indian Evidence
Act 1872 provides for cases in which secondary
evidence relating to documents may be given. It
provides that secondary evidence may be given of
the existence, condition or contents of a
document in cases as set out in clauses (a) to
(g) thereof. Section 65 of the Evidence Act may
be reproduced thus:
65. Cases in which secondary evidence
relating to documents may be given
Secondary evidence may be given of
the existence, condition, or contents
of a documents in the following
cases:-
(a) When the original is shown or
appears to be in the possession or
power—
of the person against whom the
document is sought to be proved , or
of any person out of reach of, or not
subject to, the process of the Court
or of any person legally bound to
produce it, and when, after the
notice mentioned in section 66, such
person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or
contents of the original have been
proved to be admitted in writing by
the person against whom it is proved
or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been
destroyed or lost, or when the party
offering evidence of its contents
cannot, for any other reason not
arising from his own default or
neglect, produce it in reasonable
time;
(d) when the original is of such a
nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is public
document within the meaning of
section 74;
(f) when the original is a document
of which a certified copy is
permitted by this Act, or by any
other law in force in 40[India] to be
given in evidence;
(g) when the originals consist of
numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot conveniently be examined
in court and the fact to be proved it
the general result of the whole
collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any
secondary evidence of the contents of
the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is
admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy
of the document, but no other kind of
secondary evidence, admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as
to the general result of the
documents by any person who has
examined them, and who is skilled in
the examination of such documents.
The present case would not be governed by
the the contingencies as specified in Section 65
(a) and (d) to (g). The case made out in the
application filed by the respondents no.1 & 2 is
that the Court witness Ms. Dlia Dias has
admitted about advocate Chodankar having
produced the documents (D-20) on behalf of the
Bank and, therefore, they stand admitted and be
assigned a separate exhibit as 'secondary
evidence'. The impugned order does not show
that the learned Trial Court has adverted to the
requirements of Section 65 of the Evidence Act
and has considered the contentions raised on
behalf of the petitioners, while ordering that
the document (D-20) be treated as a secondary
evidence. It is well settled that even where
order passed is a discretionary order, it is
expected that the Trial Court records some
reasons, may be brief, to show that the
discretion has been exercised in a judicious
manner. A reference in this regard may be made
to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall
V/s. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Others
(2010) 3 SCC 732 in which it is held thus:
“40. It is a settled legal proposition
that not only administrative but also
judicial order must be supported by
reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while
deciding an issue, the Court is bound to
give reasons for its conclusion. It is
the duty and obligation on the part of
the Court to record reasons while
disposing of the case. The hallmark of
an order and exercise of judicial power
by a judicial forum is to disclose its
reasons by itself and giving of reasons
has always been insisted upon as one of
the fundamentals of sound administration
justice - delivery system, to make known
that there had been proper and due
application of mind to the issue before
the Court and also as an essential
requisite of principles of natural
justice. "The giving of reasons for a
decision is an essential attribute of
judicial and judicious disposal of a
matter before Courts, and which is the
only indication to know about the manner
and quality of exercise undertaken, as
also the fact that the Court concerned
had really applied its mind." [Vide
State of Orissa Vs. Dhaniram Luhar,
(2004) 5 SCC 568; and State of Rajasthan
Vs. Sohan Lal & Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 573].”
13. I find that the impugned order lacks
reasoning and for this reason, the impugned
order will have to be set aside and the
application will have to be sent back to the
learned Trial Court for deciding the same afresh
after hearing the parties. In such
circumstances, it would not be necessary to
advert to the judgments cited on behalf of the
parties in details which can be considered by
the Trial Court while deciding the application.
I only propose to make a brief reference to the
decision in the case of K. Mallesh (supra) in
which he Hon'ble Apex Court had found that the
impugned order was passed at an interlocutory
stage during the pendency of the suit about
admissibility of two documents. It was held
that the admissibility, reliability and
registrability of the document can be considered
independently at the time of hearing of the
trial and not prior thereto.
14. It is true that normally this Court would be
slow in interfering with orders at an
interlocutory stage. However, in the present
case, as noticed earlier, the order is totally
unreasoned. It would further appear that the
question is not only about the admissibility and
reliability of the documents but as to whether
they can be allowed to be produced by way of
secondary evidence. The learned Senior Counsel
on behalf of the petitioners submitted and to my
mind rightly so, that the leave granted to
produce the document as a secondary evidence,
presupposes that there is an original of this
document in existence. Thus, before allowing
such production by way of secondary evidence it
is necessary for the Trial Court to form an
opinion and be satisfied about the existence of
the conditions under Section 65 of the Evidence
Act under which such production can be allowed.
15. For this reason, the petition is partly
allowed. The impugned order is hereby set
aside. The application dated 29/08/2013 filed
by the respondents no.1 & 2 is sent back to the
Trial Court for deciding the same afresh, in
accordance with law after hearing the parties.
The Trial Court shall decide the application as
expeditiously as possible, and preferably within
six weeks from the receipt of this order. Rule1
is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no
order as to costs.
C.V. BHADANG, J.
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