The gist of the above authorities is that every
error or omission in compliance with the provisions of Section
313 does not necessarily vitiate the trial. Such errors fall
within the category of curable irregularities and question,
whether trial is vitiated in each case, depends upon the
degree of error and whether prejudice has been or is likely to
have been caused to the accused. The ultimate test in
determining whether or not the accused has been fairly
examined under this Section is to see whether, having regard
to the questions put to him, he did not get an opportunity to
say what he wanted to say in respect of the prosecution case
against him. Where the non compliance with Section 313
holds the trial to be vitiated, ordinarily the proper course is to
order a retrial from the stage at which the provisions of this
section were not complied with.
21. We have meticulously examined the statement at
Exhibits 127 to 133. We could notice that 66 identical
questions were put to each of the accused by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge though entirely different
incriminating circumstances against each of them were
brought on record.
It is pertinent to note that role played by accused
Nos. 5,6 and 7 even according to prosecution was limited, as
accused Nos. 5 and 6 were guarding at the gate of the
building and accused No.7 passed on the information to
accused No.5, who, executed the plan. Accused No.7 was not
even present on the spot. Therefore, there was no meaning
in putting all 66 questions to each of the accused. As
questions were not put specifically, distinctly and separately,
in our view, it amounts to serious irregularity vitiating the
whole trial, as it is shown that serious prejudice has been
caused to the accused.
22. It is significant to note that since 2007, accused
were facing the trial. Some of the accused remained in jail
throughout. The statements under Section 313 of the Code
were recorded just by cut-copy-paste. Most of the questions
put to each of the accused were irrelevant and misleading.
The accused have demonstrated from the questions put to
them that serious prejudice has occasioned to them as
statements were recorded in the total disregard of the
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In this premise we are
not inclined to order retrial from the stage at which
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. were not complied
with.
23. In the result, appeals succeed. Accordingly, we
pass the following order :-
[a] The impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence in Sessions Case No. 642 of
2007, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Greater Bombay, is hereby quashed and set aside ;
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.415 OF 2010
Swapnali @ Sapana Sharad ]
Mahadik, ]
Versus
The State of Maharashtra
CORAM :- SMT. V. K. TAHILRAMANI AND
SMT. I. K. JAIN, JJ.
PRONOUNCED ON :- APRIL 22, 2015
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)1824
1. These Appeals arise out of the Judgment and
Order dated 20/04/2010 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Greater Mumbai, in Sessions Case No.642 of
2007. By the said Judgment and Order, the trial Court
convicted the Appellants/original accused nos.1 to 7 under
Section 396 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentenced each of them to life imprisonment and fine of
Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only); in default R.I. for
two years.
2. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer the
Respondents as accused as they were referred before the
trial Court.
3. The prosecution case briefly stated is as under :
(i) That Mahendra Mehta, then aged about 30 years,
was residing with his parents, wife Surabhi and a year old son
Amit in Flat No.309, Ravi Kiran Building, Carter Road No.3,
Borivali (E), Mumbai. He was one of the partners in Riddhi
Jewellers situated at 285/305, Krishna Niwas, Office No.22/A,
Zaveri Bazar. PW 3 Rakesh Jain, his brother Manojkumar Jain
and Vimal Mehta, brother of Mahendra Mehta, were the other
partners of Riddhi Jewellers. PW 1 Mukesh Mehta, brother of
Mahendra Mehta, was residing intervening 6-7 buildings from
Ravi Kiran building, Borivali (E), Mumbai where Mahendra
Mehta was residing with his family and parents.
(ii) On 21/03/2007 morning, Mahendra Mehta was to
travel to Gujarat. At about 4.30 a.m., PW 3 Rakesh Jain
returned to Bombay from Baroda. He went to the house of
Mahendra Mehta in Ravi Kiran building. PW 3 Rakesh
delivered two samples of gold to Mahendra. Those samples
were to be taken to Gujarat by Mahendra. That time, Rakesh
also handed over a mobile phone to Mahendra which was
being used by them in Gujarat. At 5.30 a.m., PW 3 Rakesh
went to Ganesh temple which was situated in the compound
of the same building.
(iii) At around 6.00 a.m., Mahendra left the house and
walked down to catch train for Surat which was scheduled at
6.30 a.m. On the way, at some distance from his house in
front of Jain Milk Dairy, four persons came on two
motorcycles and snatched the bag which was being carried
by Mahendra. Mahendra resisted the same, so those persons
assaulted Mahendra by means of choppers over the head
and wrist. That time, one male and one female were loitering
at the gate of Ravi Kiran building. After assault, assailants
ran away on the motorcycles. Mahendra was severely
injured and lying in a pool of blood. PW 3 Mukesh, elder
brother of Mahendra, was informed about the incident. He
rushed to the spot. Devichand, father of Mahendra, also
came to know and he too came to the spot. They shifted
Mahendra to Bhagwati Hospital. Medical Officer at Bhagwati
Hospital declared Mahendra dead at around 7.45 a.m. Matter
was reported to Kasturba Marg Police Station.
(iv) On 20/03/2007, PSI Chandrakant Mandavkar was
on duty from 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m. of 21/03/2007. He
received a telephonic message at around 7.05 a.m. on
21/03/2007 that Mahendra was admitted to hospital as MLC
case. He communicated information to PI Dalvi and
proceeded to hospital. Mahendra was admitted in ICU. He
was not in a condition to give statement. On the death of
Mahendra at 7.45 a.m., PSI Mandavkar recorded report of
Mukesh. He returned to police station and registered
C.R.No.55 of 2007 under Sections 393, 397 and 302 of IPC.
It appears that ADR entry no.22/2007 was also
registered on the basis of report lodged by Mukesh.
Investigation was set into motion. During investigation, it
was revealed that accused no.7 Vishal Jain was serving in
Sejal Jewellers. He was knowing Mahendra Mehta. On
19/03/2007, he met Mahendra in Zaveri Bazar and asked him
why he had not been to Gujarat on 14/03/2007. On that,
Mahendra informed accused no.7 Vishal that he would be
going to Gujarat on 21/03/2007. This information was passed
on by accused no.7 Vishal to accused no.5 Rakesh who, with
the help of accused nos.1 to 4 and 6, executed the plan to
rob Mahendra. It was also revealed that on 21/03/2007 when
Mahendra was on the way, accused nos.1 to 4 snatched
away the bag which was being carried by Mahendra and
when Mahendra resisted, they assaulted him and caused his
death. That time, accused nos. 5 and 6 were guarding
accused nos.1 to 4. Then accused were arrested. On
completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed.
In due course, case was committed to the Court of Sessions.
4. Charge came to be framed against the Appellants
under Sections 396 and 398 of the IPC vide Exh.23. The
Appellants/accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and
claimed to be tried. Their defence was of total denial and
false implication. On going through the evidence of 26
witnesses examined in the case, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the Appellants as
stated in para 1 above. Hence these Appeals.
5. We have heard the learned Advocates for the
Appellants and the learned APP for State. After giving our
anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the
case, arguments advanced by the learned Advocates for the
parties, the Judgment delivered by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge and the evidence on record, for the reasons
stated below, we are of the opinion that on facts prosecution
succeeded but for want of proper compliance of Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, trial vitiates and judgment
and order of conviction and sentence needs to be quashed
and set aside.
6. The fact of homicidal death is seriously in dispute.
As such, exclusive burden lies on the prosecution to not only
overrule the possibility of natural, accidental or suicidal death
but also to prove homicidal death beyond reasonable doubt
by reliable and convincing evidence.
7. To establish the factum of homicidal death,
prosecution has relied upon -
(i) Inquest panchanama,
(ii) Medical evidence and
(iii) Circumstantial evidence.
8. (i) Inquest panchanama -
Accused have not disputed genuineness of inquest
panchanama (Exh.52). It was drawn on 21/03/2007 between
8.40 to 9.30 hours at Bhagwati Hospital dead house, Borivali
(West). It can be seen from the panchanama that several
injuries were noticed on the head, forehead, right hand, right
wrist and right arm. These injuries clearly indicate that the
death in question was unnatural.
9. (ii) Medical evidence -
After inquest panchanama was drawn, dead body
was sent for post-mortem examination. PW 13 Dr.Rambhau
Sanap was the Medical Officer at Borivali PM Centre from
2006 to January 2009.
On 21/03/2007, Dr.Sanap received the dead body
of Mahendra Devichand Mehta through Kasturba Marg Police
Station for post-mortem. On the same day he conducted
post-mortem between 1.30 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. He noticed
the following external injuries on the dead body -
i) Incised wounds over left hand, index finger 1st
phalgnx posteriorly, size 4cm X 2 cm X bone
deep, over ring finger, size 2cm X 2cm X 1cm,
over wrist, size 4cm X 3cm X bone deep and over
thumb, size 3cm X 1cm X bone deep.
ii) Incised wound over left arm size 7cm X 6cm X
muscle deep.
iii) Incised wound over scalp, forehead 3cm X 1cm X
1cm and 5.3cm X 1cm X bone deep and over
occipital area 3cm X 1cm X bone deep.
iv) Incised wound over right shoulder 3cm X 1cm X
muscle deep, over right arm 6cm X 2cm X muscle
deep, over right wrist 7cm X 3cm X muscle deep
and 6cm X 3cm X bone deep, over right dorsam of
hand, thumb cut completely of SBC, size 6.3cm X
5cm X bone deep.
On internal examination, Dr.Sanap noticed the following
injuries -
i) Heamatoma under the scalp,
ii) Fracture of skull frontal area and occipital area,
iii) Sub-dural and sub-aregnoid haemorrhage
present.
According to PW 13 Dr.Sanap, all the injuries were
ante-mortem and caused by sharp and hard cutting object
like chopper, sword, etc. The probable cause of death opined
by PW 13 Dr.Sanap was haemorrhage and shock due to
multiple injuries. PW 13 Dr.Sanap opined that it was an
unnatural death. Post-mortem report was proved at Exh.59A.
The Cause of Death Certificate was proved at Exh.83.
Dr.Sanap stated that such injuries could be possible by
assault with weapon like chopper and spear (Arts.1 and 2).
In this connection, it was vehemently contended
by Mr. Chitnis, learned Senior Advocate for Appellants, that
deceased met with an accidental death. Referring to the
nature of injuries stated by PW 13 Dr.Sanap, it was submitted
that such injuries are possible only in motor vehicular
accident. Mr. Chitnis pointed that ADR entry was deliberately
suppressed as the death was due to accident. He submitted
that had ADR entry been produced, the truth would have
come to the light.
In view of the submissions advanced on behalf of
the Appellants, relevant ADR entry No.22/2007 was called by
us and verified. The learned APP has produced its true copy
on record which shows the history of homicidal death and not
an accidental death, as submitted by the learned Senior
Advocate for Appellants.
On ADR, evidence of PW 19 PSI Chandrakant
Mandavkar is important. On 20/03/2007, PW 19 PSI
Mandavkar was attached to Kasturba Marg Police Station as
Diary Officer from 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m. of 21/03/2007. On
21/03/2007, he received a telephonic message at around
7.05 a.m. that Mahendra was admitted to the hospital for
treatment and it was a MLC case. He communicated the
information to PW 22 PI Dalvi and proceeded to the hospital.
He found Mahendra in ICU undergoing treatment. He stated
that Mahendra was not in a condition to make statement and
expired at 7.45 a.m. His brother PW 1 Mukesh was in the
hospital. PSI Mandavkar inquired from Mukesh. On inquiry,
he recorded the report (Exh.47) as per the say of Mukesh. It
appears that this report was registered as ADR entry
No.22/2007. In view of the evidence of PW 19 PSI Mandavkar
and true copy of ADR entry No.22/2007 which came to be
verified from the original register, we do not find merit in the
contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate for the
Appellants that the death in question was an accidental
death.
Further it is significant to note that before the trial
Court, factum of homicidal death was not seriously in
dispute. The defence set up in cross-examination of PW-13
Dr.Sanap was that injuries which were found during postmortem
could be caused by fall from any height on hard and
blunt object. It indicates that there is no consistency in the
defence raised by the accused.
On the other hand, we find overwhelming
evidence in the form of inquest panchanama, post-mortem
report supported by testimony of PW 13 Dr.Sanap which
exclusively tilts in favour of homicidal death overruling the
complete possibility of natural, accidental or suicidal death.
We, therefore, do not find any reason to take a view different
then taken by the trial Court on the mode and cause of death
of Mahendra Mehta.
10. (iii) Circumstantial evidence -
In addition to uncontroverted inquest
panchanama (Exh.52), post-mortem report (Exh.59A) and
Cause of Death Certificate (Exh.83), prosecution has placed
strong reliance on the following circumstances -
(A) Ocular evidence.
(B) Test identification parade.
(C) Oral dying declaration to PW 1 Mukesh.
(D) Discovery of the incriminating articles.
(E) Recovery of clothes at the instance of
accused no.1 from the flat of accused no.6.
(F) Recovery of motor-bikes.
The elaborate discussion on the above
circumstances would be necessary at an appropriate stage.
Suffice it to state that prosecution could establish the above
circumstances through the evidence of PW1 Mukesh Mehta,
PW3 Rakesh Jain, PW4 Mahesh Vyas, PW6 Mitesh Shah, PW8,
Kishor Nikam, PW11 Manoj Shah, PW-14 Radheshyam Bind,
PW15 Sultan Siddhiqui, PW16 Sandeep Jain, PW17 Ismail
Khan, PW18 Sanjay Jain, PW20 Ankush Chavan, PW22 PI
Raghunath Dalvi, PW23 PI Sunil Darekar and PW26 PI
Ramakant Pimple. These circumstances too indicate that the
death in question was a homicidal death.
To prove the authorship of the accused and to
attribute the specific role to each of them in commission of
act also prosecution relied upon the aforesaid circumstances.
It would be essential here to appreciate the same and find
out whether these circumstances are legally proved and
sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt or not.
11. (A) Ocular evidence.
(B) Test identification parade.
(i) PW 3 Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6
Mitesh Shah are the eye witnesses to the incident. PW 3
Rakesh was one of the partners of Riddhi Jewellers.
According to him on 21/03/2007 at around 4.30 a.m., he
returned to Bombay from Baroda and straight way went to
the house of Mahendra Mehta as Mahendra was to go to
Gujarat at around 6.30 a.m. on the same day. Rakesh
handed over two samples of gold to Mahendra and a cell
phone which was being used for transaction in Gujarat. After
handing over gold samples, Rakesh left the house of
Mahendra at around 5.30 a.m. and went to Ganesh temple
situated in the compound of Ravi Kiran building. On his way
to temple, PW 3 Rakesh saw a lady and a man at the gate of
the building. He proceeded ahead. He then saw two
motorbikes near Saibaba temple. Two persons were sitting
on each motor bike. Thereafter PW 3 Rakesh reached his
residence.
At 6.30 a.m., Rakesh received phone call from
Vimal Mehta informing him that some persons attempted to
snatch away the bag and assaulted Mahendra. He was also
informed that Mahendra was being carried to Bhagwati
Hospital by PW 1 Mukesh and his father Devichand. On
receiving information, PW 3 Rakesh went to Bhagwati
Hospital. Medical Officer declared Mahendra as dead. After
two days, PW 3 Rakesh had been to Dahisar Police Station
and informed police that he saw a lady and a man at the gate
of Ravi Kiran building and also two persons each on two
motor bikes. Accordingly, his statement was recorded at the
police station on 23/03/2007.
(ii) On 08/05/2007, PW 3 Rakesh was called at Thane
prison for identification parade. SEO Ismail Khan conducted
the identification parade. During identification parade, PW 3
Rakesh identified accused no.1 James and accused no.5
Rakesh Bachchawat. PW 3 Rakesh misidentified accused
no.4 Shabbir who was not in the TIP.
(iii) It is further stated by PW 3 Rakesh that on the
same day i.e. on 08/05/2007, he was taken to Byculla prison.
During TIP conducted in Byculla prison, he identified accused
no.6 Swapnali as the same lady to whom he saw at the gate
of Ravi Kiran building. Thereafter on 05/06/2007, TIP was
held at Arthur Road jail. In that TIP, PW 3 Rakesh identified
accused no.7 Vishal as the person sitting on motorbike.
(iv) On 25/06/2007, TIP was held in Arthur Road prison
in respect to accused no.4 Shabbir. PW 3 Rakesh could not
identify accused no.4 Shabbir in TIP and mis-identified
accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya during the parade.
(v) From the entire evidence of PW 3 Rakesh, it is
apparent that he had seen accused nos.5 and 6 at the gate
of Ravi Kiran building and accused no.1 sitting on the
motorbike.
(vi) The next eye witness examined by the
prosecution is PW 4 Mahesh Vyas. He used to go to Jain Milk
Dairy early in the morning for bringing milk. He stated that
on 21/03/2007 at about 6.00 a.m., he was returning home
after purchasing milk. Near Maru General Store, he heard
shouts. He looked to the direction of shouts and saw four
persons snatching away a bag from the hands of one person.
He stated that the person holding the bag was resisting.
According to PW 4 Mahesh, out of four persons, two
assaulted the person with sharp edged weapons and
remaining two caught hold the victim. He saw two
motorbikes parked to the left side of place of incident. He
stated that after assault, assailants ran away with their
motorbikes in the Southern direction. PW 4 Mahesh
identified accused no.2 Vishal in the TIP held on 08/05/2007
and accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya in the TIP conducted on
05/06/2007. However in the Court, he identified accused
no.5 Rakesh Bachchawat holding the victim and accused no.2
Vishal assaulting the victim. So far as accused no.3 Raju @
Dheknya is concerned, PW 4 Mahesh identified him in the TIP
as well as in Court. However in the TIP conducted on
25/06/2007, PW 4 Mahesh identified accused no.4 Shabbir,
he could not name the accused in Court. In respect to
accused no.2 Vishal and accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya, his
evidence is consistent.
(vii) Another eye witness is PW6 Mitesh Shah, who was
going to National Park for morning walk. When he reached
the main road, he heard shouts “Bachao, Bachao”. PW 6
Mitesh turned back and saw two persons holding the victim
and two snatching bag from the victim. He stated that
victim did not leave the bag. The assailants assaulted the
victim with sharp edged weapons. After assault, all four went
away on two motorbikes parked near the place of incident.
Thereafter PW 6 Mitesh went near the victim lying in pool of
blood. After two days, he informed Dahisar police about the
incident.
(viii) In the TIP held on 08/05/2007, PW 6 Mitesh
identified accused no.1 James, on 25/06/2007 he identified
accused no.4 Shabbir during TIP.
(ix) The evidence of PW 3 Rakesh, PW 4 Mahesh and
PW 6 Mitesh is assailed by the defence on several grounds.
Those are -
(i) Vimal Mehta who informed PW 3 Rakesh, not
examined.
(ii) PW 4 Mahesh Vyas introduced a new story that
injured person went to Jain Milk Dairy and made
phone call to his house.
(iii) Delay in recording statements of these witnesses
not explained. In support, reliance is placed on
Lahu Kamlakar Patil and Another V/s. State
of Maharashtra1
(iv) Their evidence on identification of the accused is
confusing, concocted and forged.
1 (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 417
(v) The testimonies of PW 3 Rakesh, PW 4 Mahesh
and PW 6 Mitesh are not consistent and cannot be
relied.
(x) On going through the entire evidence of PW 3
Rakesh, PW 4 Mahesh and PW 6 Mitesh, it can be seen that
their evidence in respect to manner of occurrence of incident
is cogent and consistent. Except a minor contradiction in the
evidence of PW 6 Mitesh, nothing substantial could be
elicited in the piercing cross-examination of the eye
witnesses. Thus, we do not find any reason to disbelieve
their evidence on incident.
(xi) So far as TIP is concerned, it is a matter of record
that the eye witnesses have mis-identified some of the
accused as discussed above. On the close scrutiny of
evidence of PW 3 Rakesh, it is clear that he identified
accused nos.1, 5 and 6 in the TIP conducted on 08/05/2007.
PW 4 Mahesh identified accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya on
05/06/2007 during the TIP. PW 6 Mitesh identified accused
no.4 Shabbir in the TIP held on 25/06/2007.
(xii) The star witness on TIP is PW 17 SEO Ismail Khan.
He stated that PI Darekar called him at Crime Branch office,
Dahisar, and requested to hold identification parade in Crime
No.11/2007 of Crime Branch. Accordingly letter was issued
to him. He conducted TIPs on 08/05/2007, 05/06/2007 and
25/06/2007. It is stated by PW 17 SEO Khan that in the TIP
held on 08/05/2007, Sukhdeo Shinde and Nagesh Jangam
were the two panch witnesses. ASI Deshmane introduced
PW 17 SEO Khan to Jailor. The identifying witnesses i.e. PW 3
Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6 Mitesh Shah were
made to sit in a separate room. This TIP was in respect to
accused no.1 John, accused no.2 Vishal and accused no.5
Rakesh Bachchawat. PW 17 SEO Khan selected 18 dummies.
Out of 18, he asked 12 dummies to stand in a line. He took
care to see that place of identification parade was not visible
to outsiders and particularly to the identifying witnesses.
Initially accused no.1 James and accused no.2
Vishal were called. They were given idea of conducting
identification parade. Accused were given a choice to select
their own place, change the clothes if they desired and take
the position in the line as per their wish. Accused declined to
change the clothes. Accused no.1 James stood between
dummy nos.3 and 4 and accused no.2 Vishal stood between
dummy nos.7 and 8. Thereafter panch witness Sukhdeo was
sent to bring identifying witness PW 3 Rakesh Jain. PW 3
Rakesh identified accused James and Vishal by touching them
with finger. The proceedings were noted by PW 17 SEO
Khan. Then PW 3 Rakesh was sent to different room.
(xiii) Another panch was sent to call PW 6 Mitesh Shah.
He was asked to identify the culprits. PW 6 Mitesh identified
accused James and Vishal by touching their bodies. The
proceedings were accordingly recorded by PW 17 SEO Khan.
The same procedure was followed in respect to the third
identifying witness PW 4 Mahesh Vyas. He too identified
accused James and Vishal. Memorandum of TIP was drawn.
It was proved at Exh.88.
(xiv) In the process of identification, PW 17 SEO Khan
selected six dummies. Accused no.5 Rakesh Bachchawat
was then called. He was identified by PW 3 Rakesh Jain
during TIP. Memorandum of identification was drawn by SEO
Khan. Then dummies, accused and panchanama of TIP were
handed over to the Investigating Officer.
(xv) On the same day, PW 17 SEO Khan conducted
identification parade in Arthur Road prison. In the parade,
PW 3 Rakesh Jain identified accused no.6 Swapnali as the
lady standing at the gate of Ravi Kiran building. Its separate
memorandum was drawn by PW 17 SEO Khan. It was proved
at Exh.89.
(xvi) At the time of second parade held on 05/06/2007,
accused Raju @ Dheknya Thakre was subjected to
identification parade. Shaku Qureshi and Ramsagar were the
panch witnesses. PW 17 SEO Khan stated that 3 identifying
witnesses Rakesh Jain, Mahesh Vyas and Mitesh Shah were
called at Arthur Road prison. He selected six dummies.
Accused no.3 Raju stood in between dummy nos.3 and 4 as
per his wish. Then identifying witnesses were called one by
one. They identified accused no.3 Raju in the identification
parade. Memorandum of identification parade (Exh.90) was
accordingly drawn.
(xvii) On 25/06/2007, another identification parade was
conducted. Tukaram Lokhande and Aba Shirsath were the
panch witnesses. PW 17 SEO Khan took all necessary
precautions. He selected six dummies. This TIP was in
respect of accused no.4 Shabbir @ Khadda. Following the
same procedure as followed in the earlier parades, this
identification parade was held. Identifying witnesses PW 3
Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6 Mitesh Shah
identified accused no.4 Shabbir @ Khadda in the TIP.
Memorandum of TIP was drawn by PW 17 SEO Khan at
Exh.91.
(xviii) It is pertinent to note that identifying witnesses
have attributed specific role to each of the accused.
Memorandum panchanamas are self speaking to that effect.
Considering evidence of PW 17 SEO Khan, Memorandum
panchanamas Exhs.88 to 91 and the ocular version of PW 3
Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6 Mitesh Shah, it can
be seen that the evidence is natural, convincing and cogent.
There is no reason to disbelieve the same. Some minor
contradictions and omissions were bound to be there as the
witnesses were examined in the year 2009 whereas incident
took place in the year 2007. There was no animosity
between identifying witnesses, SEO who conducted TIPs on
one hand and the accused on the other. In our view, the
evidence of eye witnesses and PW 17 SEO Khan inspires
confidence and clearly establishes the manner of incident of
assault on Mahendra and the role played by each of the
accused in occurrence of incident.
13. (C) Oral dying declaration to PW 1 Mukesh -
To prove oral dying declaration, prosecution
examined PW-1 Mukesh Mehta. He is the real brother of
deceased Mahendra.It is stated by Mukesh that on 21.3.2007,
in the morning at around 6.30 a.m. when he was sleeping in
the house, his wife Mamta received a phone call of Veena
Mehta, wife of his real brother Vimal Mehta asking her to
send Mukesh immediately as Mahendra met with an
accident. Therefore, his wife woke him up and informed the
message of Veena. Immediately, Mukesh rushed to the
house of Mahendra. On the way,he saw Mahendra lying in
injured condition on the road near his house. At the same
time, his father arrived there. Mukesh inquired from
Mahendra what had happened. On that, Mahendra told him
that four persons arrived on two motor bikes. They were
snatching his bag and he resisted the same. Those persons
then assaulted him. When Mukesh asked him about identity
of those four persons Mahendra told that they were unknown
to him. Thereafter, Mahendra fell semi-unconscious and he
was taken to Bhagwati Hospital in a rickshaw. He was
declared as dead by Medical Officer. Mukesh proved Exh. 47
report lodged by him after Mahendra was declared dead.
On going through the evidence of Mukesh, it is
apparent that Mahendra did not name accused persons.
From the evidence of Mukesh, at the most it can be said that
Mahendra met with homicidal death. So far as authorship of
the accused to cause death of Mahendra is concerned,
evidence of Mukesh is not helpful to the prosecution as
deceased had not implicated the appellants/accused in the
commission of alleged act.
14. (D) Discovery of incriminating articles -
On discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
the learned Senior Counsel for accused Nos. 1,3 and 4 relied
upon Prabhoo V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh2
in which it has
been held that -
“9. The main difficulty in the case is
that the evidence regarding the recovery
of blood stained axe and blood stained
shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory and
the courts below were wrong in admitting
certain statements alleged to have been
made by the appellant in connection with
that recovery. According to the recovery
memo the two witnesses who were
present when the aforesaid articles were
produced by the appellant were Lal
Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohammad. Lal
Bahadur Singh was examined as
Prosecution Witness 4. He did give
evidence about the production of blood
stained articles from his house by the
appellant. The witness said that the
appellant produced the articles from a tub
on the eastern side of the house. The
witness did not, however, say that the
appellant made any statements relating
to the recovery. Wali Mohammad was not
examined at all. One other witness Dodi
Baksh Singh was examined as
2 (1963) 2 SCR 881 : AIR 1963 SC 1113 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 182
Prosecution Witness 3. This witness said
that a little before the recovery the SubInspector
of Police took the appellant into
custody and interrogated him; then the
appellant gave out that the axe with
which the murder had been committed
and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were
in the house and the appellant was
prepared to produce them. These
statements to which Dobi Baksh (PW 3)
deposed were not admissible in evidence.
They were incriminating statements made
to a police officer and were hit by
Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence
Act. The statement that the axe was one
with which the murder had been
committed was not a statement which led
to any discovery within the meaning of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Nor was
the alleged statement of the appellant
that the blood stained shirt and dhoti
belonged to him was a statement which
led to any discovery within meaning of
Section 27. Section 27 provides that when
any fact is deposed to and discovered in
consequence of information received from
a person accused of any offence, in the
custody of a police officer, so much of
such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovery may be
proved. In Pulukuri Kotayya v. King
Emperor the Privy Council considered the
true interpretation of Section 27 and
said :
"It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the
section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object is
produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this
and the information given must relate distinctly to this
fact. Information as to past user or the past history, of
the object produced is not related to its discovery in the
setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by
a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed
in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of
a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads
to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in
the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the
knife is proved to have been used in the commission of
the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to
the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed
A.', these words are inadmissible since they do not relate
to the discovery of the knife in the house of the
informant." (p. 77)
10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts
below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged
statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to
commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt
and dhoti were his.”
In the present case according to prosecution,
chopper used in commission of act was recovered at the
instance of accused No.3 – Raju @ Dheknya and accused
No.4 – Shabbir @ Khadda. To establish discovery of chopper
at the instance of these accused, prosecution relied upon
evidence of PW 8, PW 18 and PW 23.
On going through the evidence of PW-8 Kishor
Nikam, it can be seen that he was called by Police Officer
Darekar to act as a Panch. Accused No.4 Shabbir was in
police custody that time. It is stated by PW-8 Kishor that
accused Shabbir made a statement to discover chopper and
pant, which was thrown by him near Naigaon. The statement
of Shabbir was accordingly recorded.
It is further stated by PW-8 Kishor that after
memorandum was drawn, Shabbir led them to Naigaon. He
discovered a pant and chopper which were lying between the
trees. Chopper was identified by Kishor at article 3 and pant
at article 8. He proved memorandum and recovery
panchanama accordingly.
Nothing substantial could be elicited in the crossexamination
of this witness which is fully supported by PW-
23, Investigating Officer - Sunil Darekar. The evidence of PI
Darekar shows that accused No.4 Shabbir was arrested on
7.6.2007. On 12.6.2007, he voluntarily gave a memorandum
in the presence of Panch witnesses to discover chopper and
pant. He stated that chopper and pant were recovered at
the instance of Shabbir near a field at Naigaon.
Memorandum and Panchanama exhibits 69 and
70 are duly proved by the Investigating Officer and Panch
Witnesses. There is no reason to disbelieve their
testimonies. Trial Court has properly appreciated the
evidence on discovery and there is no reason for us to
interfere with the same.
So far as accused No.3 Raju @ Dheknya is
concerned, evidence of PW-18 will have to be looked into.
PW-18 Sanjay Jain was standing at Ravindra Hotel on
23.05.2007. One Police Officer requested him to act as
Panch. So he accompanied the Officer to Police Station.
Accused Raju gave memorandum in his presence to discover
a chopper and a pant. Accordingly, memorandum was drawn
vide Exhibit 96. It is stated by PW-18 Sanjay that after
memorandum, accused Raju discovered chopper and clothes
in their presence. Panchama is proved by him at Exhibit 97.
None of the accused persons except accused No.3 crossexamined
this witness. Nothing otherwise could be brought
by accused No.3 in the cross-examination to discard the
testimony of Panch Witness Sanjay. His evidence is fully
corroborated by PW-23 PI Darekar. We are, therefore, not
inclined to take a view different than one taken by the trial
court in this regard.
15. (E) Recovery of clothes at the instance of
accused no.1 from the flat of accused no.6 -
To prove this circumstance reliance is placed by
the prosecution on evidence of PW-11 Manoj Shah. On
28.4.2007, he was called at Unit No XII of DCB, CID.
Accordingly, he went there. He stated that one person in
custody of police gave his name as Jambo. He made a
statement to discover his Shirt, Banyan, Pant and a Mobile.
As stated by Jambo, memorandum was drawn at Exhibit 77.
According to PW-11 Manoj, after memorandum,
Jambo led them in a jeep to a flat in Udisha Apartment, Room
No. 501, owned by accused No.6 – Swapnali. A person by
name Sharad Mahadik was present there. Jambo made
discovery of Jeans Pant, Banyan and a Mobile Phone of Nokia
Company. These articles were seized and Seizure
Panchanama Exhibit 78 was drawn. Witness identified article
9 – Jeans Pant, article 10 – Banyan and article 11 – Mobile
hand set. He could not identify accused Jambo before the
Court. PW-23 – P.I. Darekar identified him in the dock. It is
pertinent to note that accused No.1 Jambo was acquainted
with accused No.6 Swapnali. No plausible explanation was
given by accused No.1 Jambo and accused No.6 Swapnali in
respect of recovery of clothes from the house of accused
No.6 - Swapnali. This is the most clinching circumstance
against accused No.1 Jambo and accused No.6 Swapnali. We
find no reason to disbelieve the same.
16. (F) Recovery of motor bikes -
To establish this circumstance, prosecution
adduced evidence of PW-14, PW-20 and PW-15, PW-22.
PW-14 – Radheshyam Amrutlal Bind was running a
Mechanic Shop of repairing motor bikes. He stated that
motor bike bearing No. MH-02/HA-1715 was sold by him to
accused No.2 Vishal Chauhan for Rs. 20,000/-. He identified
accused No. 2 – Vishal Chauhan in the dock. This motor bike
was recovered at the instance of accused No.2 Vishal
Chauhan.
In this connection, PW-20 ASI Ankush Chavan
stated that on 24.4.2007, the abovesaid motor bike was
recovered at the instance of accused Vishal Chauhan. He
proved memorandum Exhibit 101 and Seizure of motor bike
on the information given by accused No.2 Vishal Chauhan
vide Exhibit 102.
Another motor bike bearing No. MH-01/HA-802
was sold by PW-15 Sultan Siddiqui, who runs a Shop “City
Motors”. According to PW-15 Sultan Siddiqui, he sold the said
motor bike to James @ Jambo for Rs. 12,500/- on 12.1.2007.
PW-15 deals in sales and purchases of old motor bikes. He
identified accused No.1 Jambo in the dock. This motor bike
was recovered at the instance of accused by PW-22 P.I.
Raghunath Dalvi. Memorandum Exhibit 108 given by
accused No.1 to discover the said motor bike and discovery
panchanama of the motor bike Exhibit 109 are proved by PW-
22 - P.I. Raghunath Dalvi. Accused No.1 Jambo and accused
No.2 Vishal Chauhan could not elicit anything adverse in the
cross-examination of these witnesses. Thus, prosecution
succeeded in establishing this circumstance against accused
Nos. 1 and 2.
According to prosecution, deceased Mahendra
Mehta was known to accused No. 7 – Vishal Jain. On
19.3.2007, PW-16 – Sandip Jain alongwith Mahendra Mehta
had been to Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai for purchasing gold chain.
At around 4.00 p.m. when they were proceeding to Zaveri
Bazar, accused No.7 Vishal Jain met them near the shop
where he was working. At that time, accused Vishal Jain
asked Mahendra Mehta reason of not going to Gujarat on
14.3.2007. Mahendra told him that he could not go on
14.3.2007 and he would be going on 21.3.2007. It is alleged
that accused No.7 – Vishal Jain passed on this information to
accused No.5 Rakesh Bacchawat, who then, with the help of
other accused planned to rob Mahendra and accordingly, the
plan was executed on 21.3.2007 when Mahendra was
proceeding towards railway-station to catch the train.
So far as involvement of accused No.7 Vishal Jain
is concerned, prosecution has relied upon the evidence of PW
16 Sandip Jain, who fully supports the prosecution and
confessional statement of accused No.7 Vishal Jain recorded
by PW 21 Metropolitan Magistrate Mr. G.M. Agrawal. Mr.
Agrawal was attached to 23rd Esplanade Court at the relevant
time. He recorded statement of accused Vishal Champalal
Jain under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The trial court has relied upon the confessional statement of
Vishal Jain recorded by learned Magistrate Mr. Agrawal. It is
at Exhibit 106. It is apparent from confessional statement
Exhibit 106 that the same is exculpatory. Accused Vishal Jain
does not implicate him in the entire confession made before
PW-21 Mr. Agrawal.
On this piece of evidence, learned counsel for
accused No.7 Mr. Salgaonkar, relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Harbans Singh Bhan Singh vs.
State of Punjab3
, in which is has been held that
corroboration is necessary to the confessional statement
before convicting an accused person on such a statement.
In the case on hand, we have already observed
that confessional statement Exh. 106 recorded by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate is of no use to the
prosecution as it is exculpatory in nature and, so, we do not
find it necessary to dilate much on this aspect.
If confessional statement is kept out of
consideration, then only circumstance which remains against
accused No.7 Vishal Jain is as stated by PW-16 Sandip Jain
that on 19.3.2007 accused Vishal Jain inquired from
Mahendra Mehta and he told him that he would be going to
Gujarat on 21.3.2007. There is no evidence to show that he
passed on the information to accused No.5 Rakesh
Bacchawat. In the absence of such link, we find that
evidence against accused No.7 is not sufficient to convict
him.
3 AIR (SC) -1957-0-637
17. In view of the role attributed to Accused No.5
Rakesh Bacchawat, learned counsel Mr. Rishikesh Mundargi,
submitted that there is no material to attribute an overt act
to accused Rakesh Bacchawat and in the absence of such
material, his conviction needs to be set aside. On common
intention and common object, learned counsel Mr. Mundargi
referred to the following decisions :
(i) Rambilas Singh and Others V/s. State of
Bihar4
in which it has been held -
“It is true that in order to convict persons
vicariously under Section 34 or Section
149 IPC, it is not necessary to prove that
each and everyone of them had indulged
in overt acts. Even so, there must be
material to show that the overt act or acts
of one or more of the accused was or
were done in furtherance of the common
intention of all the accused or in
prosecution of the common object of the
members of the unlawful assembly. In this
case, such evidence is lacking and hence
the appellants cannot be held liable for
the individual act of A-16.”
4 (1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 605
(ii) Dayashankar V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh5
In this case it was observed that -
“In order to bring home the charge of
common intention, the prosecution has to
establish by evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section
34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be
before the commission of the crime. The
true contents of the Section are that if
two or more persons intentionally do an
act jointly, the position in law is just the
same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself. As observed in
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab6
, the
existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential
element for application of this Section. It
is not necessary that the acts of the
several persons charged with commission
of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common
intention in order to attract the provision.
9. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 did not
5 (2009) 11 Supreme Court Cases 492
6 (1977) 1 SCC 746 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 177 : AIR 1977 SC 109
attribute any overt act to the appellant.
The mere fact that he was in the company
of the accused who were armed would
not be sufficient to attract Section 34 IPC.
It is undisputed that appellant was not
armed and he had no animosity with the
deceased. This position is also accepted
by the prosecution. Additionally, the stand
that he pulled the leg of the deceased has
not been established.”
(iii) Sripathi and Others V/s. State of Karnataka7
in which it was held -
“9. 5. Section 34 has been enacted
on the principle of joint liability in the
commission of a criminal act. The Section
is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The
distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The
liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of
criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 if such
criminal act is done in furtherance of a
common intention of the persons who join
in committing the crime. Direct proof of
common intention is seldom available
and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred form the circumstances
7 (2009) 11 Supreme Court Cases 660
appearing from the proved facts of the
case and the proved circumstances. In
order to bring home the charge of
common intention, the prosecution has to
establish by evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section
34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be
before the commission of the crime. The
true contents of the Section are that if
two or more persons intentionally do an
act jointly, the position in law is just the
same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself. As observed in
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, the
existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential
element for application of this Section. It
is not necessary that the acts of the
several persons charged with commission
of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common
intention in order to attract the
provision.”
On constructive liability, Mr. Salgaonkar, learned
counsel for accused No.7 relied upon Dharam Pal and
Others V/s. State of Haryana8
in which it was held -
“It may be that when some persons start
with a pre-arranged plan to commit a
minor offence, they may in the course of
their committing the minor offence come
to an understanding to commit the major
offence as well. Such an understanding
may appear from the conduct of the
persons sought to be made vicariously
liable for the act of the principal culprit or
from some other incriminatory evidence
but the conduct or other evidence must
be such as not to leave any room for
doubt in that behalf. A criminal Court
fastening vicarious liability must satisfy
itself as to the prior meeting of the minds
of the principal culprit and his
companions who are sought to be
constructively made liable in respect of
every act committed by the former. There
is no law to our knowledge which lays
down that a person accompanying the
principal culprit shares his intention in
respect of every act which the latter
might eventually commit. The existence
or otherwise of the common intention
depends upon the facts and
8 AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 1492
circumstances of each case. The intention
of the principal offender and his
companions to deal with any person who
might intervene to stop the quarrel must
be apparent from the conduct of the
persons accompanying the principal
culprit or some other clear and cogent
incriminating piece of evidence. In the
absence of such material, the companion
or companions cannot justifiably be held
guilty for every offence committed by the
principal offender. As already stated,
there is no evidence to justify the
conclusion that Surta and Samme Singh,
appellants shared the common intention
with Dharam Pal to commit the murder of
Sardara Singh or to make an attempt on
the life of Singh Ram and that the said
acts were committed by Dharam Pal in
furtherance of the common intention of
all the appellants. The common intention
denotes action in concert and necessarily
postulates a pre-arranged plan or prior
meeting of minds and an element of
participation in action. As pointed out
above, the common intention to commit
an offence graver than the one originally
designed may develop during the
execution of the original plan e. g. during
the progress of an attack on the person
who is intended to be beaten but the
evidence in that behalf should be clear
and cogent for suspicion, however strong,
cannot take place of the proof which is
essential to bring home the offence to the
accused.”
18. In respect of the role attributed to accused Nos.
5,6 and 7, we have elaborately discussed the evidence of
prosecution witnesses in the foregoing paragraphs. It is
crystal clear from the evidence that at the relevant time,
accused No.5 – Rakesh Bacchawat and accused No.6 –
Swapnali were guarding on the gate of the building. So far as
accused No.7 Vishal Jain is concerned, it is not disputed that
he was not present at that time. The authorities referred by
the learned counsel for accused Nos. 5 and 7 reiterated the
settled propositions of law that absence of material
companion or companions cannot justifiably be held guilty for
every offence committed by the principal offender. The
provisions of Sections 34 and 149 are squarely applicable in
the circumstances of the case in view of the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and, therefore, the authorities relied
upon as above, by the learned counsel for the accused No.5
and 7 would not come to their rescue.
19. In the light of the above, on facts, in fact,
conviction of accused Nos. 1 to 6 was required to be
maintained. But the crucial question before us is, whether
conviction recorded by the trial court would legally sustain.
In this respect the learned Senior Counsel for the accused
drew our attention to the statement of accused persons
recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at Exhibits 127
to 133. Referring to various questions and particularly
questions 22 and 62 it was submitted that questions though
not related were asked which caused grave prejudice to
them.
On the applicability and scope of Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Senior Counsel for
accused Nos. 1,3 and 4 vehemently relied upon the following
decisions :-
(i) Tara Singh V/s. State9
in which it has been held
that -
“32. I cannot stress too strongly the
importance of observing faithfully and
fairly the provisions of section Criminal
Procedure Code. It is not a proper
compliance to read out a long string of
questions and answers made in the
9 1951 SCR 729 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491
Committal Court and ask whether the
statement is correct. A question of that
kind is misleading. It may mean either
that the questioner wants to know
whether the recording is correct, or
whether the answers given are true, or
whether there is some mistake or
misunderstanding despite the accurate
recording. In the next place, it is not
sufficient compliance to string together a
long series of facts and ask the accused
what he has to say about them. He must
be questioned separately about each
material circumstance which is intended
to be used against him. The whole object
of the section is to afford the accused a
fair and proper opportunity of explaining
circumstances which appear against him.
The questioning must therefore be fair
and must be couched in a form which an
ignorant or illiterate person will be able to
appreciate and understand. Even when an
accused person is not illiterate, his mind
is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a
charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit
position to understand the significance of
a complex question. Fairness therefore
requires that each material circumstance
should be put simply and separately in a
way that an illiterate mind, or one which
is perturbed or confused, can readily
appreciate and understand. I do not
suggest that every error or omission in
this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial
because I am of opinion that errors of this
type fall within the category of curable
irregularities. Therefore, the question in
each case depends upon the degree of
the error and upon whether pre-judice has
been occasioned or is likely to have been
occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard
of the provisions of Section 342 of
Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in
this case that I feel there is grave
likelihood of prejudice.”
(ii) Narain Singh V/s. State of Punjab10 in which it
has been held that -
“5. Under Section 342 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure by the first subsection,
insofar as it is material, the Court
may at any stage of the enquiry or trial
and after the witnesses for the
prosecution have been examined and
before the accused is called upon for his
defence shall put questions to the
accused person for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any circumstance
appearing in the evidence against him.
Examination under Section 342 is
primarily to be directed to those matters
10 (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730
on which evidence has been led for the
prosecution, to ascertain from the
accused his version or explanation, if any,
of the incident which forms the subjectmatter
of the charge and his defence. By
sub-section (3), the answers given by the
accused may "be taken into
consideration" at the enquiry or the trial.
If the accused person in his examination
under Section 342 confesses to the
commission of the offence charged
against him the court may, relying upon
that confession, proceed to convict him,
but if he does not confess and in
explaining circumstance appearing in the
evidence against him sets up his own
version and seeks to explain his conduct
pleading that he has committed no
offence, the statement of the accused can
only be taken into consideration in its
entirety. It is not open to the Court to
dissect the statement and to pick out a
part of the statement which may be
incriminative, and then to examine
whether the explanation furnished by the
accused for his conduct is supported by
the evidence on the record. If the accused
admits to have done an act which would
but for the explanation furnished by him
be an offence, the admission cannot be
used against him divorced from the
explanation.”
(iii) Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma V/s. State of
Uttarakhand.11 in which it has been held that -
“A criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein
one is free to give flight to one's
imagination and fantasy. Crime is an
event in real life and is the product of an
interplay between different human
emotions. In arriving at a conclusion
about the guilt of the accused charged
with the commission of a crime, the court
has to judge the evidence by the
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic
worth and the animus of witnesses. Every
case, in the final analysis, would have to
depend upon its own facts. The court
must bear in mind that "human nature is
too willing, when faced with brutal crimes,
to spin stories out of strong suspicions."
Though an offence may be gruesome and
revolt the human conscience, an accused
can be convicted only on legal evidence
and not on surmises and conjectures. The
law does not permit the court to punish
the accused on the basis of a moral
conviction or suspicion alone. "The
burden of proof in a criminal trial never
shifts and it is always the burden of the
prosecution to prove its case beyond
11 (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 439
reasonable doubt on the basis of
acceptable evidence." In fact, it is a
settled principle of criminal jurisprudence
that the more serious the offence, the
stricter the degree of proof required,
since a higher degree of assurance is
required to convict the accused. The fact
that the offence was committed in a very
cruel and revolting manner may in itself
be a reason for scrutinizing the evidence
more closely, lest the shocking nature of
the crime induce an instinctive reaction
against dispassionate judicial scrutiny of
the facts and law.”
21. An accused can be questioned under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of
enabling him personally to explain any
circumstance appearing in the evidence
against him. No matter how weak or
scanty the prosecution evidence is in
regard to certain incriminating material, it
is the duty of the Court to examine the
accused and seek his explanation on
incriminating material which has surfaced
against him.
22. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the
fundamental principle of fairness. The
attention of the accused must specifically
be brought to inculpatory pieces of
evidence to give him an opportunity to
offer an explanation if he chooses to do
so. Therefore, the court is under a legal
obligation to put the incriminating
circumstances before the accused and
solicit his response. This provision is
mandatory in nature and casts an
imperative duty on the court and confers
a corresponding right on the accused to
have an opportunity to offer an
explanation for such incriminatory
material appearing against him.
Circumstances which were not put to the
accused in his examination under Section
313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him
and have to be excluded from
consideration. (Vide Sharad
Birdhichand12 and State of
Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh13
.
23. In S. Harnam Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.)
14, this Court held that
non-indication of inculpatory material and
its relevant facts by the trial court to the
accused adds to the vulnerability of the
prosecution case. The recording of the
statement of the accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise.
24. If any appellate Court or revisional
court comes across the fact that the trial
Court had not put any question to an
accused, even if it is of a vital nature,
12 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487
13 (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705
14 (1976) 2 SCC 819 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 324 : AIR 1976 SC 2140
such an omission alone should not result
in the setting aside of the conviction and
sentence as an inevitable consequence.
An inadequate examination cannot be
presumed to have caused prejudice.
Every error or omission in compliance of
the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., does
not necessarily vitiate trial. Such errors
fall within category of curable
irregularities and the question as to
whether the trial is vitiated, in each case
depends upon the degree of error and
upon whether prejudice has been or is
likely to have been caused to accused.
Efforts should be made to undo or correct
the lapse. (Vide: Wasim Khan v. State
of U.P.15
, Bhoor Singh v. State of
Punjab16, Labhchand Dhanpat Singh
Jain v. State of Maharashtra17, State
of Punjab v. Naib Din18 and Parsuram
Pandey v. State of Bihar19
.
25. In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam20
,
this Court observed:
“21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on
the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to
the accused for the purpose of enabling him to
explain any of the circumstances appearing in the
evidence against him. It follows as a necessary
15 AIR 1956 SC 400 : 1956 Cri LJ 790
16 (1974) 4 SCC 754 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 664 : AIR 1974 SC 1256
17 (1975) 3 SCC 385 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 11 : AIR 1975 SC 182
18 (2001) 8 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 33
19 (2004) 13 SCC 189 : 2005 SC (Cri) 113
20 (2008) 16 SCC 328 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 278
corollary therefrom that each material
circumstance appearing in the evidence against
the accused is required to be put to him
specifically, distinctly and separately and failure
to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating
trial, if it is shown that the accused was
prejudiced.” (emphasis supplied).
26. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra21, this Court
observed as under:
“16. ....It is trite law, nevertheless
fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should
be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to
enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness
of a criminal trial and failures in this area may
gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if
consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed.
However, where such an omission has occurred it
does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and
prejudice occasioned by such defect must be
established by the accused. In the event of
evidentiary material not being put to the accused,
the court must ordinarily eschew such material
from consideration. It is also open to the appellate
court to call upon the counsel for the accused to
show what explanation the accused has as regards
the circumstances established against him but not
put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the
appellate court any plausible or reasonable
explanation of such circumstances, the court may
assume that no acceptable answer exists and that
21 (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : AIR 1973 SC 2622
even if the accused had been questioned at the
proper time in the trial court he would not have
been able to furnish any good ground to get out of
the circumstances on which the trial court had
relied for its conviction.” (Emphasis
added).
27. In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of
Assam22 this Court, relying upon its
earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil v.
State of Karnataka23, held that the
provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not
meant to nail the accused to his
disadvantage but are meant for his
benefit. The provisions are based on the
salutary principles of natural justice and
the maxim "audi alteram partem" has
been enshrined in them. Therefore, an
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has
to be of utmost fairness.
28. In Sk. Maqsood v. State of
Maharashtra24 and Ranvir Yadav v.
State of Bihar25, this Court held that it is
the duty of the trial court to indicate
incriminating material to the accused.
Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty
formality. An improper
examination/inadequate questioning
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. amounts to a
serious lapse on the part of the trial Court
22 (2009) 7 SCC 404 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 421
23 (2000) 8 SCC 740 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 87
24 (2009) 6 SCC 583 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 82
25 (2009) 6 SCC 595 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 92
and is a ground for interference with the
conviction.
29. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State
of Bihar26, this Court rejected the
submission that as no question had been
put to the accused on motive, no motive
for the commission of the crime could be
attributed to the accused, nor the same
could be reckoned as circumstance
against him observing that it could not be
pointed out as to what in fact was the real
prejudice caused to the accused by
omission to question the accused on the
motive for the crime. No material was
placed before the court to show as to
what and in what manner the prejudice, if
any, was caused to the accused. More so,
the accused/appellant was aware of
accusation and charge against him.
30. Thus, it is evident from the above
that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C.
make it obligatory for the court to
question the accused on the evidence and
circumstances against him so as to offer
the accused an opportunity to explain the
same. But, it would not be enough for the
accused to show that he has not been
questioned or examined on a particular
circumstance, instead he must show that
such non-examination has actually and
26 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60
materially prejudiced him and has
resulted in the failure of justice. In other
words, in the event of an inadvertent
omission on the part of the court to
question the accused on any
incriminating circumstance cannot ipso
facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown
that some material prejudice was caused
to the accused by the omission of the
court.”
20. The gist of the above authorities is that every
error or omission in compliance with the provisions of Section
313 does not necessarily vitiate the trial. Such errors fall
within the category of curable irregularities and question,
whether trial is vitiated in each case, depends upon the
degree of error and whether prejudice has been or is likely to
have been caused to the accused. The ultimate test in
determining whether or not the accused has been fairly
examined under this Section is to see whether, having regard
to the questions put to him, he did not get an opportunity to
say what he wanted to say in respect of the prosecution case
against him. Where the non compliance with Section 313
holds the trial to be vitiated, ordinarily the proper course is to
order a retrial from the stage at which the provisions of this
section were not complied with.
21. We have meticulously examined the statement at
Exhibits 127 to 133. We could notice that 66 identical
questions were put to each of the accused by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge though entirely different
incriminating circumstances against each of them were
brought on record.
It is pertinent to note that role played by accused
Nos. 5,6 and 7 even according to prosecution was limited, as
accused Nos. 5 and 6 were guarding at the gate of the
building and accused No.7 passed on the information to
accused No.5, who, executed the plan. Accused No.7 was not
even present on the spot. Therefore, there was no meaning
in putting all 66 questions to each of the accused. As
questions were not put specifically, distinctly and separately,
in our view, it amounts to serious irregularity vitiating the
whole trial, as it is shown that serious prejudice has been
caused to the accused.
22. It is significant to note that since 2007, accused
were facing the trial. Some of the accused remained in jail
throughout. The statements under Section 313 of the Code
were recorded just by cut-copy-paste. Most of the questions
put to each of the accused were irrelevant and misleading.
The accused have demonstrated from the questions put to
them that serious prejudice has occasioned to them as
statements were recorded in the total disregard of the
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In this premise we are
not inclined to order retrial from the stage at which
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. were not complied
with.
23. In the result, appeals succeed. Accordingly, we
pass the following order :-
[a] The impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence in Sessions Case No. 642 of
2007, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Greater Bombay, is hereby quashed and set aside ;
[b] The accused are acquitted of the offence
punishable under Section 396 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code.
[c] Accused Nos.1 to 5 and 7 who are in jail shall
be released forthwith, if not otherwise required in any
other case.
[d] Bail bonds of accused No.6 shall stand
cancelled and she is set at liberty forthwith.
[e] Registry to communicate this order to the
accused in jail through the concerned jail authorities.
[f] We quantify fees to be paid by the High
Court Legal Services Committee to the appointed
Advocate Mr. A.V. Bedekar at Rs. 5000/-.
[SMT. I.K. JAIN, J] [SMT. V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J]
Print Page
error or omission in compliance with the provisions of Section
313 does not necessarily vitiate the trial. Such errors fall
within the category of curable irregularities and question,
whether trial is vitiated in each case, depends upon the
degree of error and whether prejudice has been or is likely to
have been caused to the accused. The ultimate test in
determining whether or not the accused has been fairly
examined under this Section is to see whether, having regard
to the questions put to him, he did not get an opportunity to
say what he wanted to say in respect of the prosecution case
against him. Where the non compliance with Section 313
holds the trial to be vitiated, ordinarily the proper course is to
order a retrial from the stage at which the provisions of this
section were not complied with.
21. We have meticulously examined the statement at
Exhibits 127 to 133. We could notice that 66 identical
questions were put to each of the accused by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge though entirely different
incriminating circumstances against each of them were
brought on record.
It is pertinent to note that role played by accused
Nos. 5,6 and 7 even according to prosecution was limited, as
accused Nos. 5 and 6 were guarding at the gate of the
building and accused No.7 passed on the information to
accused No.5, who, executed the plan. Accused No.7 was not
even present on the spot. Therefore, there was no meaning
in putting all 66 questions to each of the accused. As
questions were not put specifically, distinctly and separately,
in our view, it amounts to serious irregularity vitiating the
whole trial, as it is shown that serious prejudice has been
caused to the accused.
22. It is significant to note that since 2007, accused
were facing the trial. Some of the accused remained in jail
throughout. The statements under Section 313 of the Code
were recorded just by cut-copy-paste. Most of the questions
put to each of the accused were irrelevant and misleading.
The accused have demonstrated from the questions put to
them that serious prejudice has occasioned to them as
statements were recorded in the total disregard of the
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In this premise we are
not inclined to order retrial from the stage at which
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. were not complied
with.
23. In the result, appeals succeed. Accordingly, we
pass the following order :-
[a] The impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence in Sessions Case No. 642 of
2007, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Greater Bombay, is hereby quashed and set aside ;
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.415 OF 2010
Swapnali @ Sapana Sharad ]
Mahadik, ]
Versus
The State of Maharashtra
CORAM :- SMT. V. K. TAHILRAMANI AND
SMT. I. K. JAIN, JJ.
PRONOUNCED ON :- APRIL 22, 2015
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)1824
1. These Appeals arise out of the Judgment and
Order dated 20/04/2010 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Greater Mumbai, in Sessions Case No.642 of
2007. By the said Judgment and Order, the trial Court
convicted the Appellants/original accused nos.1 to 7 under
Section 396 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentenced each of them to life imprisonment and fine of
Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only); in default R.I. for
two years.
2. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer the
Respondents as accused as they were referred before the
trial Court.
3. The prosecution case briefly stated is as under :
(i) That Mahendra Mehta, then aged about 30 years,
was residing with his parents, wife Surabhi and a year old son
Amit in Flat No.309, Ravi Kiran Building, Carter Road No.3,
Borivali (E), Mumbai. He was one of the partners in Riddhi
Jewellers situated at 285/305, Krishna Niwas, Office No.22/A,
Zaveri Bazar. PW 3 Rakesh Jain, his brother Manojkumar Jain
and Vimal Mehta, brother of Mahendra Mehta, were the other
partners of Riddhi Jewellers. PW 1 Mukesh Mehta, brother of
Mahendra Mehta, was residing intervening 6-7 buildings from
Ravi Kiran building, Borivali (E), Mumbai where Mahendra
Mehta was residing with his family and parents.
(ii) On 21/03/2007 morning, Mahendra Mehta was to
travel to Gujarat. At about 4.30 a.m., PW 3 Rakesh Jain
returned to Bombay from Baroda. He went to the house of
Mahendra Mehta in Ravi Kiran building. PW 3 Rakesh
delivered two samples of gold to Mahendra. Those samples
were to be taken to Gujarat by Mahendra. That time, Rakesh
also handed over a mobile phone to Mahendra which was
being used by them in Gujarat. At 5.30 a.m., PW 3 Rakesh
went to Ganesh temple which was situated in the compound
of the same building.
(iii) At around 6.00 a.m., Mahendra left the house and
walked down to catch train for Surat which was scheduled at
6.30 a.m. On the way, at some distance from his house in
front of Jain Milk Dairy, four persons came on two
motorcycles and snatched the bag which was being carried
by Mahendra. Mahendra resisted the same, so those persons
assaulted Mahendra by means of choppers over the head
and wrist. That time, one male and one female were loitering
at the gate of Ravi Kiran building. After assault, assailants
ran away on the motorcycles. Mahendra was severely
injured and lying in a pool of blood. PW 3 Mukesh, elder
brother of Mahendra, was informed about the incident. He
rushed to the spot. Devichand, father of Mahendra, also
came to know and he too came to the spot. They shifted
Mahendra to Bhagwati Hospital. Medical Officer at Bhagwati
Hospital declared Mahendra dead at around 7.45 a.m. Matter
was reported to Kasturba Marg Police Station.
(iv) On 20/03/2007, PSI Chandrakant Mandavkar was
on duty from 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m. of 21/03/2007. He
received a telephonic message at around 7.05 a.m. on
21/03/2007 that Mahendra was admitted to hospital as MLC
case. He communicated information to PI Dalvi and
proceeded to hospital. Mahendra was admitted in ICU. He
was not in a condition to give statement. On the death of
Mahendra at 7.45 a.m., PSI Mandavkar recorded report of
Mukesh. He returned to police station and registered
C.R.No.55 of 2007 under Sections 393, 397 and 302 of IPC.
It appears that ADR entry no.22/2007 was also
registered on the basis of report lodged by Mukesh.
Investigation was set into motion. During investigation, it
was revealed that accused no.7 Vishal Jain was serving in
Sejal Jewellers. He was knowing Mahendra Mehta. On
19/03/2007, he met Mahendra in Zaveri Bazar and asked him
why he had not been to Gujarat on 14/03/2007. On that,
Mahendra informed accused no.7 Vishal that he would be
going to Gujarat on 21/03/2007. This information was passed
on by accused no.7 Vishal to accused no.5 Rakesh who, with
the help of accused nos.1 to 4 and 6, executed the plan to
rob Mahendra. It was also revealed that on 21/03/2007 when
Mahendra was on the way, accused nos.1 to 4 snatched
away the bag which was being carried by Mahendra and
when Mahendra resisted, they assaulted him and caused his
death. That time, accused nos. 5 and 6 were guarding
accused nos.1 to 4. Then accused were arrested. On
completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed.
In due course, case was committed to the Court of Sessions.
4. Charge came to be framed against the Appellants
under Sections 396 and 398 of the IPC vide Exh.23. The
Appellants/accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and
claimed to be tried. Their defence was of total denial and
false implication. On going through the evidence of 26
witnesses examined in the case, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the Appellants as
stated in para 1 above. Hence these Appeals.
5. We have heard the learned Advocates for the
Appellants and the learned APP for State. After giving our
anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the
case, arguments advanced by the learned Advocates for the
parties, the Judgment delivered by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge and the evidence on record, for the reasons
stated below, we are of the opinion that on facts prosecution
succeeded but for want of proper compliance of Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, trial vitiates and judgment
and order of conviction and sentence needs to be quashed
and set aside.
6. The fact of homicidal death is seriously in dispute.
As such, exclusive burden lies on the prosecution to not only
overrule the possibility of natural, accidental or suicidal death
but also to prove homicidal death beyond reasonable doubt
by reliable and convincing evidence.
7. To establish the factum of homicidal death,
prosecution has relied upon -
(i) Inquest panchanama,
(ii) Medical evidence and
(iii) Circumstantial evidence.
8. (i) Inquest panchanama -
Accused have not disputed genuineness of inquest
panchanama (Exh.52). It was drawn on 21/03/2007 between
8.40 to 9.30 hours at Bhagwati Hospital dead house, Borivali
(West). It can be seen from the panchanama that several
injuries were noticed on the head, forehead, right hand, right
wrist and right arm. These injuries clearly indicate that the
death in question was unnatural.
9. (ii) Medical evidence -
After inquest panchanama was drawn, dead body
was sent for post-mortem examination. PW 13 Dr.Rambhau
Sanap was the Medical Officer at Borivali PM Centre from
2006 to January 2009.
On 21/03/2007, Dr.Sanap received the dead body
of Mahendra Devichand Mehta through Kasturba Marg Police
Station for post-mortem. On the same day he conducted
post-mortem between 1.30 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. He noticed
the following external injuries on the dead body -
i) Incised wounds over left hand, index finger 1st
phalgnx posteriorly, size 4cm X 2 cm X bone
deep, over ring finger, size 2cm X 2cm X 1cm,
over wrist, size 4cm X 3cm X bone deep and over
thumb, size 3cm X 1cm X bone deep.
ii) Incised wound over left arm size 7cm X 6cm X
muscle deep.
iii) Incised wound over scalp, forehead 3cm X 1cm X
1cm and 5.3cm X 1cm X bone deep and over
occipital area 3cm X 1cm X bone deep.
iv) Incised wound over right shoulder 3cm X 1cm X
muscle deep, over right arm 6cm X 2cm X muscle
deep, over right wrist 7cm X 3cm X muscle deep
and 6cm X 3cm X bone deep, over right dorsam of
hand, thumb cut completely of SBC, size 6.3cm X
5cm X bone deep.
On internal examination, Dr.Sanap noticed the following
injuries -
i) Heamatoma under the scalp,
ii) Fracture of skull frontal area and occipital area,
iii) Sub-dural and sub-aregnoid haemorrhage
present.
According to PW 13 Dr.Sanap, all the injuries were
ante-mortem and caused by sharp and hard cutting object
like chopper, sword, etc. The probable cause of death opined
by PW 13 Dr.Sanap was haemorrhage and shock due to
multiple injuries. PW 13 Dr.Sanap opined that it was an
unnatural death. Post-mortem report was proved at Exh.59A.
The Cause of Death Certificate was proved at Exh.83.
Dr.Sanap stated that such injuries could be possible by
assault with weapon like chopper and spear (Arts.1 and 2).
In this connection, it was vehemently contended
by Mr. Chitnis, learned Senior Advocate for Appellants, that
deceased met with an accidental death. Referring to the
nature of injuries stated by PW 13 Dr.Sanap, it was submitted
that such injuries are possible only in motor vehicular
accident. Mr. Chitnis pointed that ADR entry was deliberately
suppressed as the death was due to accident. He submitted
that had ADR entry been produced, the truth would have
come to the light.
In view of the submissions advanced on behalf of
the Appellants, relevant ADR entry No.22/2007 was called by
us and verified. The learned APP has produced its true copy
on record which shows the history of homicidal death and not
an accidental death, as submitted by the learned Senior
Advocate for Appellants.
On ADR, evidence of PW 19 PSI Chandrakant
Mandavkar is important. On 20/03/2007, PW 19 PSI
Mandavkar was attached to Kasturba Marg Police Station as
Diary Officer from 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m. of 21/03/2007. On
21/03/2007, he received a telephonic message at around
7.05 a.m. that Mahendra was admitted to the hospital for
treatment and it was a MLC case. He communicated the
information to PW 22 PI Dalvi and proceeded to the hospital.
He found Mahendra in ICU undergoing treatment. He stated
that Mahendra was not in a condition to make statement and
expired at 7.45 a.m. His brother PW 1 Mukesh was in the
hospital. PSI Mandavkar inquired from Mukesh. On inquiry,
he recorded the report (Exh.47) as per the say of Mukesh. It
appears that this report was registered as ADR entry
No.22/2007. In view of the evidence of PW 19 PSI Mandavkar
and true copy of ADR entry No.22/2007 which came to be
verified from the original register, we do not find merit in the
contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate for the
Appellants that the death in question was an accidental
death.
Further it is significant to note that before the trial
Court, factum of homicidal death was not seriously in
dispute. The defence set up in cross-examination of PW-13
Dr.Sanap was that injuries which were found during postmortem
could be caused by fall from any height on hard and
blunt object. It indicates that there is no consistency in the
defence raised by the accused.
On the other hand, we find overwhelming
evidence in the form of inquest panchanama, post-mortem
report supported by testimony of PW 13 Dr.Sanap which
exclusively tilts in favour of homicidal death overruling the
complete possibility of natural, accidental or suicidal death.
We, therefore, do not find any reason to take a view different
then taken by the trial Court on the mode and cause of death
of Mahendra Mehta.
10. (iii) Circumstantial evidence -
In addition to uncontroverted inquest
panchanama (Exh.52), post-mortem report (Exh.59A) and
Cause of Death Certificate (Exh.83), prosecution has placed
strong reliance on the following circumstances -
(A) Ocular evidence.
(B) Test identification parade.
(C) Oral dying declaration to PW 1 Mukesh.
(D) Discovery of the incriminating articles.
(E) Recovery of clothes at the instance of
accused no.1 from the flat of accused no.6.
(F) Recovery of motor-bikes.
The elaborate discussion on the above
circumstances would be necessary at an appropriate stage.
Suffice it to state that prosecution could establish the above
circumstances through the evidence of PW1 Mukesh Mehta,
PW3 Rakesh Jain, PW4 Mahesh Vyas, PW6 Mitesh Shah, PW8,
Kishor Nikam, PW11 Manoj Shah, PW-14 Radheshyam Bind,
PW15 Sultan Siddhiqui, PW16 Sandeep Jain, PW17 Ismail
Khan, PW18 Sanjay Jain, PW20 Ankush Chavan, PW22 PI
Raghunath Dalvi, PW23 PI Sunil Darekar and PW26 PI
Ramakant Pimple. These circumstances too indicate that the
death in question was a homicidal death.
To prove the authorship of the accused and to
attribute the specific role to each of them in commission of
act also prosecution relied upon the aforesaid circumstances.
It would be essential here to appreciate the same and find
out whether these circumstances are legally proved and
sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt or not.
11. (A) Ocular evidence.
(B) Test identification parade.
(i) PW 3 Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6
Mitesh Shah are the eye witnesses to the incident. PW 3
Rakesh was one of the partners of Riddhi Jewellers.
According to him on 21/03/2007 at around 4.30 a.m., he
returned to Bombay from Baroda and straight way went to
the house of Mahendra Mehta as Mahendra was to go to
Gujarat at around 6.30 a.m. on the same day. Rakesh
handed over two samples of gold to Mahendra and a cell
phone which was being used for transaction in Gujarat. After
handing over gold samples, Rakesh left the house of
Mahendra at around 5.30 a.m. and went to Ganesh temple
situated in the compound of Ravi Kiran building. On his way
to temple, PW 3 Rakesh saw a lady and a man at the gate of
the building. He proceeded ahead. He then saw two
motorbikes near Saibaba temple. Two persons were sitting
on each motor bike. Thereafter PW 3 Rakesh reached his
residence.
At 6.30 a.m., Rakesh received phone call from
Vimal Mehta informing him that some persons attempted to
snatch away the bag and assaulted Mahendra. He was also
informed that Mahendra was being carried to Bhagwati
Hospital by PW 1 Mukesh and his father Devichand. On
receiving information, PW 3 Rakesh went to Bhagwati
Hospital. Medical Officer declared Mahendra as dead. After
two days, PW 3 Rakesh had been to Dahisar Police Station
and informed police that he saw a lady and a man at the gate
of Ravi Kiran building and also two persons each on two
motor bikes. Accordingly, his statement was recorded at the
police station on 23/03/2007.
(ii) On 08/05/2007, PW 3 Rakesh was called at Thane
prison for identification parade. SEO Ismail Khan conducted
the identification parade. During identification parade, PW 3
Rakesh identified accused no.1 James and accused no.5
Rakesh Bachchawat. PW 3 Rakesh misidentified accused
no.4 Shabbir who was not in the TIP.
(iii) It is further stated by PW 3 Rakesh that on the
same day i.e. on 08/05/2007, he was taken to Byculla prison.
During TIP conducted in Byculla prison, he identified accused
no.6 Swapnali as the same lady to whom he saw at the gate
of Ravi Kiran building. Thereafter on 05/06/2007, TIP was
held at Arthur Road jail. In that TIP, PW 3 Rakesh identified
accused no.7 Vishal as the person sitting on motorbike.
(iv) On 25/06/2007, TIP was held in Arthur Road prison
in respect to accused no.4 Shabbir. PW 3 Rakesh could not
identify accused no.4 Shabbir in TIP and mis-identified
accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya during the parade.
(v) From the entire evidence of PW 3 Rakesh, it is
apparent that he had seen accused nos.5 and 6 at the gate
of Ravi Kiran building and accused no.1 sitting on the
motorbike.
(vi) The next eye witness examined by the
prosecution is PW 4 Mahesh Vyas. He used to go to Jain Milk
Dairy early in the morning for bringing milk. He stated that
on 21/03/2007 at about 6.00 a.m., he was returning home
after purchasing milk. Near Maru General Store, he heard
shouts. He looked to the direction of shouts and saw four
persons snatching away a bag from the hands of one person.
He stated that the person holding the bag was resisting.
According to PW 4 Mahesh, out of four persons, two
assaulted the person with sharp edged weapons and
remaining two caught hold the victim. He saw two
motorbikes parked to the left side of place of incident. He
stated that after assault, assailants ran away with their
motorbikes in the Southern direction. PW 4 Mahesh
identified accused no.2 Vishal in the TIP held on 08/05/2007
and accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya in the TIP conducted on
05/06/2007. However in the Court, he identified accused
no.5 Rakesh Bachchawat holding the victim and accused no.2
Vishal assaulting the victim. So far as accused no.3 Raju @
Dheknya is concerned, PW 4 Mahesh identified him in the TIP
as well as in Court. However in the TIP conducted on
25/06/2007, PW 4 Mahesh identified accused no.4 Shabbir,
he could not name the accused in Court. In respect to
accused no.2 Vishal and accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya, his
evidence is consistent.
(vii) Another eye witness is PW6 Mitesh Shah, who was
going to National Park for morning walk. When he reached
the main road, he heard shouts “Bachao, Bachao”. PW 6
Mitesh turned back and saw two persons holding the victim
and two snatching bag from the victim. He stated that
victim did not leave the bag. The assailants assaulted the
victim with sharp edged weapons. After assault, all four went
away on two motorbikes parked near the place of incident.
Thereafter PW 6 Mitesh went near the victim lying in pool of
blood. After two days, he informed Dahisar police about the
incident.
(viii) In the TIP held on 08/05/2007, PW 6 Mitesh
identified accused no.1 James, on 25/06/2007 he identified
accused no.4 Shabbir during TIP.
(ix) The evidence of PW 3 Rakesh, PW 4 Mahesh and
PW 6 Mitesh is assailed by the defence on several grounds.
Those are -
(i) Vimal Mehta who informed PW 3 Rakesh, not
examined.
(ii) PW 4 Mahesh Vyas introduced a new story that
injured person went to Jain Milk Dairy and made
phone call to his house.
(iii) Delay in recording statements of these witnesses
not explained. In support, reliance is placed on
Lahu Kamlakar Patil and Another V/s. State
of Maharashtra1
(iv) Their evidence on identification of the accused is
confusing, concocted and forged.
1 (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 417
(v) The testimonies of PW 3 Rakesh, PW 4 Mahesh
and PW 6 Mitesh are not consistent and cannot be
relied.
(x) On going through the entire evidence of PW 3
Rakesh, PW 4 Mahesh and PW 6 Mitesh, it can be seen that
their evidence in respect to manner of occurrence of incident
is cogent and consistent. Except a minor contradiction in the
evidence of PW 6 Mitesh, nothing substantial could be
elicited in the piercing cross-examination of the eye
witnesses. Thus, we do not find any reason to disbelieve
their evidence on incident.
(xi) So far as TIP is concerned, it is a matter of record
that the eye witnesses have mis-identified some of the
accused as discussed above. On the close scrutiny of
evidence of PW 3 Rakesh, it is clear that he identified
accused nos.1, 5 and 6 in the TIP conducted on 08/05/2007.
PW 4 Mahesh identified accused no.3 Raju @ Dheknya on
05/06/2007 during the TIP. PW 6 Mitesh identified accused
no.4 Shabbir in the TIP held on 25/06/2007.
(xii) The star witness on TIP is PW 17 SEO Ismail Khan.
He stated that PI Darekar called him at Crime Branch office,
Dahisar, and requested to hold identification parade in Crime
No.11/2007 of Crime Branch. Accordingly letter was issued
to him. He conducted TIPs on 08/05/2007, 05/06/2007 and
25/06/2007. It is stated by PW 17 SEO Khan that in the TIP
held on 08/05/2007, Sukhdeo Shinde and Nagesh Jangam
were the two panch witnesses. ASI Deshmane introduced
PW 17 SEO Khan to Jailor. The identifying witnesses i.e. PW 3
Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6 Mitesh Shah were
made to sit in a separate room. This TIP was in respect to
accused no.1 John, accused no.2 Vishal and accused no.5
Rakesh Bachchawat. PW 17 SEO Khan selected 18 dummies.
Out of 18, he asked 12 dummies to stand in a line. He took
care to see that place of identification parade was not visible
to outsiders and particularly to the identifying witnesses.
Initially accused no.1 James and accused no.2
Vishal were called. They were given idea of conducting
identification parade. Accused were given a choice to select
their own place, change the clothes if they desired and take
the position in the line as per their wish. Accused declined to
change the clothes. Accused no.1 James stood between
dummy nos.3 and 4 and accused no.2 Vishal stood between
dummy nos.7 and 8. Thereafter panch witness Sukhdeo was
sent to bring identifying witness PW 3 Rakesh Jain. PW 3
Rakesh identified accused James and Vishal by touching them
with finger. The proceedings were noted by PW 17 SEO
Khan. Then PW 3 Rakesh was sent to different room.
(xiii) Another panch was sent to call PW 6 Mitesh Shah.
He was asked to identify the culprits. PW 6 Mitesh identified
accused James and Vishal by touching their bodies. The
proceedings were accordingly recorded by PW 17 SEO Khan.
The same procedure was followed in respect to the third
identifying witness PW 4 Mahesh Vyas. He too identified
accused James and Vishal. Memorandum of TIP was drawn.
It was proved at Exh.88.
(xiv) In the process of identification, PW 17 SEO Khan
selected six dummies. Accused no.5 Rakesh Bachchawat
was then called. He was identified by PW 3 Rakesh Jain
during TIP. Memorandum of identification was drawn by SEO
Khan. Then dummies, accused and panchanama of TIP were
handed over to the Investigating Officer.
(xv) On the same day, PW 17 SEO Khan conducted
identification parade in Arthur Road prison. In the parade,
PW 3 Rakesh Jain identified accused no.6 Swapnali as the
lady standing at the gate of Ravi Kiran building. Its separate
memorandum was drawn by PW 17 SEO Khan. It was proved
at Exh.89.
(xvi) At the time of second parade held on 05/06/2007,
accused Raju @ Dheknya Thakre was subjected to
identification parade. Shaku Qureshi and Ramsagar were the
panch witnesses. PW 17 SEO Khan stated that 3 identifying
witnesses Rakesh Jain, Mahesh Vyas and Mitesh Shah were
called at Arthur Road prison. He selected six dummies.
Accused no.3 Raju stood in between dummy nos.3 and 4 as
per his wish. Then identifying witnesses were called one by
one. They identified accused no.3 Raju in the identification
parade. Memorandum of identification parade (Exh.90) was
accordingly drawn.
(xvii) On 25/06/2007, another identification parade was
conducted. Tukaram Lokhande and Aba Shirsath were the
panch witnesses. PW 17 SEO Khan took all necessary
precautions. He selected six dummies. This TIP was in
respect of accused no.4 Shabbir @ Khadda. Following the
same procedure as followed in the earlier parades, this
identification parade was held. Identifying witnesses PW 3
Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6 Mitesh Shah
identified accused no.4 Shabbir @ Khadda in the TIP.
Memorandum of TIP was drawn by PW 17 SEO Khan at
Exh.91.
(xviii) It is pertinent to note that identifying witnesses
have attributed specific role to each of the accused.
Memorandum panchanamas are self speaking to that effect.
Considering evidence of PW 17 SEO Khan, Memorandum
panchanamas Exhs.88 to 91 and the ocular version of PW 3
Rakesh Jain, PW 4 Mahesh Vyas and PW 6 Mitesh Shah, it can
be seen that the evidence is natural, convincing and cogent.
There is no reason to disbelieve the same. Some minor
contradictions and omissions were bound to be there as the
witnesses were examined in the year 2009 whereas incident
took place in the year 2007. There was no animosity
between identifying witnesses, SEO who conducted TIPs on
one hand and the accused on the other. In our view, the
evidence of eye witnesses and PW 17 SEO Khan inspires
confidence and clearly establishes the manner of incident of
assault on Mahendra and the role played by each of the
accused in occurrence of incident.
13. (C) Oral dying declaration to PW 1 Mukesh -
To prove oral dying declaration, prosecution
examined PW-1 Mukesh Mehta. He is the real brother of
deceased Mahendra.It is stated by Mukesh that on 21.3.2007,
in the morning at around 6.30 a.m. when he was sleeping in
the house, his wife Mamta received a phone call of Veena
Mehta, wife of his real brother Vimal Mehta asking her to
send Mukesh immediately as Mahendra met with an
accident. Therefore, his wife woke him up and informed the
message of Veena. Immediately, Mukesh rushed to the
house of Mahendra. On the way,he saw Mahendra lying in
injured condition on the road near his house. At the same
time, his father arrived there. Mukesh inquired from
Mahendra what had happened. On that, Mahendra told him
that four persons arrived on two motor bikes. They were
snatching his bag and he resisted the same. Those persons
then assaulted him. When Mukesh asked him about identity
of those four persons Mahendra told that they were unknown
to him. Thereafter, Mahendra fell semi-unconscious and he
was taken to Bhagwati Hospital in a rickshaw. He was
declared as dead by Medical Officer. Mukesh proved Exh. 47
report lodged by him after Mahendra was declared dead.
On going through the evidence of Mukesh, it is
apparent that Mahendra did not name accused persons.
From the evidence of Mukesh, at the most it can be said that
Mahendra met with homicidal death. So far as authorship of
the accused to cause death of Mahendra is concerned,
evidence of Mukesh is not helpful to the prosecution as
deceased had not implicated the appellants/accused in the
commission of alleged act.
14. (D) Discovery of incriminating articles -
On discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
the learned Senior Counsel for accused Nos. 1,3 and 4 relied
upon Prabhoo V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh2
in which it has
been held that -
“9. The main difficulty in the case is
that the evidence regarding the recovery
of blood stained axe and blood stained
shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory and
the courts below were wrong in admitting
certain statements alleged to have been
made by the appellant in connection with
that recovery. According to the recovery
memo the two witnesses who were
present when the aforesaid articles were
produced by the appellant were Lal
Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohammad. Lal
Bahadur Singh was examined as
Prosecution Witness 4. He did give
evidence about the production of blood
stained articles from his house by the
appellant. The witness said that the
appellant produced the articles from a tub
on the eastern side of the house. The
witness did not, however, say that the
appellant made any statements relating
to the recovery. Wali Mohammad was not
examined at all. One other witness Dodi
Baksh Singh was examined as
2 (1963) 2 SCR 881 : AIR 1963 SC 1113 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 182
Prosecution Witness 3. This witness said
that a little before the recovery the SubInspector
of Police took the appellant into
custody and interrogated him; then the
appellant gave out that the axe with
which the murder had been committed
and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were
in the house and the appellant was
prepared to produce them. These
statements to which Dobi Baksh (PW 3)
deposed were not admissible in evidence.
They were incriminating statements made
to a police officer and were hit by
Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence
Act. The statement that the axe was one
with which the murder had been
committed was not a statement which led
to any discovery within the meaning of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Nor was
the alleged statement of the appellant
that the blood stained shirt and dhoti
belonged to him was a statement which
led to any discovery within meaning of
Section 27. Section 27 provides that when
any fact is deposed to and discovered in
consequence of information received from
a person accused of any offence, in the
custody of a police officer, so much of
such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovery may be
proved. In Pulukuri Kotayya v. King
Emperor the Privy Council considered the
true interpretation of Section 27 and
said :
"It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the
section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object is
produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this
and the information given must relate distinctly to this
fact. Information as to past user or the past history, of
the object produced is not related to its discovery in the
setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by
a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed
in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of
a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads
to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in
the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the
knife is proved to have been used in the commission of
the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to
the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed
A.', these words are inadmissible since they do not relate
to the discovery of the knife in the house of the
informant." (p. 77)
10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts
below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged
statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to
commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt
and dhoti were his.”
In the present case according to prosecution,
chopper used in commission of act was recovered at the
instance of accused No.3 – Raju @ Dheknya and accused
No.4 – Shabbir @ Khadda. To establish discovery of chopper
at the instance of these accused, prosecution relied upon
evidence of PW 8, PW 18 and PW 23.
On going through the evidence of PW-8 Kishor
Nikam, it can be seen that he was called by Police Officer
Darekar to act as a Panch. Accused No.4 Shabbir was in
police custody that time. It is stated by PW-8 Kishor that
accused Shabbir made a statement to discover chopper and
pant, which was thrown by him near Naigaon. The statement
of Shabbir was accordingly recorded.
It is further stated by PW-8 Kishor that after
memorandum was drawn, Shabbir led them to Naigaon. He
discovered a pant and chopper which were lying between the
trees. Chopper was identified by Kishor at article 3 and pant
at article 8. He proved memorandum and recovery
panchanama accordingly.
Nothing substantial could be elicited in the crossexamination
of this witness which is fully supported by PW-
23, Investigating Officer - Sunil Darekar. The evidence of PI
Darekar shows that accused No.4 Shabbir was arrested on
7.6.2007. On 12.6.2007, he voluntarily gave a memorandum
in the presence of Panch witnesses to discover chopper and
pant. He stated that chopper and pant were recovered at
the instance of Shabbir near a field at Naigaon.
Memorandum and Panchanama exhibits 69 and
70 are duly proved by the Investigating Officer and Panch
Witnesses. There is no reason to disbelieve their
testimonies. Trial Court has properly appreciated the
evidence on discovery and there is no reason for us to
interfere with the same.
So far as accused No.3 Raju @ Dheknya is
concerned, evidence of PW-18 will have to be looked into.
PW-18 Sanjay Jain was standing at Ravindra Hotel on
23.05.2007. One Police Officer requested him to act as
Panch. So he accompanied the Officer to Police Station.
Accused Raju gave memorandum in his presence to discover
a chopper and a pant. Accordingly, memorandum was drawn
vide Exhibit 96. It is stated by PW-18 Sanjay that after
memorandum, accused Raju discovered chopper and clothes
in their presence. Panchama is proved by him at Exhibit 97.
None of the accused persons except accused No.3 crossexamined
this witness. Nothing otherwise could be brought
by accused No.3 in the cross-examination to discard the
testimony of Panch Witness Sanjay. His evidence is fully
corroborated by PW-23 PI Darekar. We are, therefore, not
inclined to take a view different than one taken by the trial
court in this regard.
15. (E) Recovery of clothes at the instance of
accused no.1 from the flat of accused no.6 -
To prove this circumstance reliance is placed by
the prosecution on evidence of PW-11 Manoj Shah. On
28.4.2007, he was called at Unit No XII of DCB, CID.
Accordingly, he went there. He stated that one person in
custody of police gave his name as Jambo. He made a
statement to discover his Shirt, Banyan, Pant and a Mobile.
As stated by Jambo, memorandum was drawn at Exhibit 77.
According to PW-11 Manoj, after memorandum,
Jambo led them in a jeep to a flat in Udisha Apartment, Room
No. 501, owned by accused No.6 – Swapnali. A person by
name Sharad Mahadik was present there. Jambo made
discovery of Jeans Pant, Banyan and a Mobile Phone of Nokia
Company. These articles were seized and Seizure
Panchanama Exhibit 78 was drawn. Witness identified article
9 – Jeans Pant, article 10 – Banyan and article 11 – Mobile
hand set. He could not identify accused Jambo before the
Court. PW-23 – P.I. Darekar identified him in the dock. It is
pertinent to note that accused No.1 Jambo was acquainted
with accused No.6 Swapnali. No plausible explanation was
given by accused No.1 Jambo and accused No.6 Swapnali in
respect of recovery of clothes from the house of accused
No.6 - Swapnali. This is the most clinching circumstance
against accused No.1 Jambo and accused No.6 Swapnali. We
find no reason to disbelieve the same.
16. (F) Recovery of motor bikes -
To establish this circumstance, prosecution
adduced evidence of PW-14, PW-20 and PW-15, PW-22.
PW-14 – Radheshyam Amrutlal Bind was running a
Mechanic Shop of repairing motor bikes. He stated that
motor bike bearing No. MH-02/HA-1715 was sold by him to
accused No.2 Vishal Chauhan for Rs. 20,000/-. He identified
accused No. 2 – Vishal Chauhan in the dock. This motor bike
was recovered at the instance of accused No.2 Vishal
Chauhan.
In this connection, PW-20 ASI Ankush Chavan
stated that on 24.4.2007, the abovesaid motor bike was
recovered at the instance of accused Vishal Chauhan. He
proved memorandum Exhibit 101 and Seizure of motor bike
on the information given by accused No.2 Vishal Chauhan
vide Exhibit 102.
Another motor bike bearing No. MH-01/HA-802
was sold by PW-15 Sultan Siddiqui, who runs a Shop “City
Motors”. According to PW-15 Sultan Siddiqui, he sold the said
motor bike to James @ Jambo for Rs. 12,500/- on 12.1.2007.
PW-15 deals in sales and purchases of old motor bikes. He
identified accused No.1 Jambo in the dock. This motor bike
was recovered at the instance of accused by PW-22 P.I.
Raghunath Dalvi. Memorandum Exhibit 108 given by
accused No.1 to discover the said motor bike and discovery
panchanama of the motor bike Exhibit 109 are proved by PW-
22 - P.I. Raghunath Dalvi. Accused No.1 Jambo and accused
No.2 Vishal Chauhan could not elicit anything adverse in the
cross-examination of these witnesses. Thus, prosecution
succeeded in establishing this circumstance against accused
Nos. 1 and 2.
According to prosecution, deceased Mahendra
Mehta was known to accused No. 7 – Vishal Jain. On
19.3.2007, PW-16 – Sandip Jain alongwith Mahendra Mehta
had been to Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai for purchasing gold chain.
At around 4.00 p.m. when they were proceeding to Zaveri
Bazar, accused No.7 Vishal Jain met them near the shop
where he was working. At that time, accused Vishal Jain
asked Mahendra Mehta reason of not going to Gujarat on
14.3.2007. Mahendra told him that he could not go on
14.3.2007 and he would be going on 21.3.2007. It is alleged
that accused No.7 – Vishal Jain passed on this information to
accused No.5 Rakesh Bacchawat, who then, with the help of
other accused planned to rob Mahendra and accordingly, the
plan was executed on 21.3.2007 when Mahendra was
proceeding towards railway-station to catch the train.
So far as involvement of accused No.7 Vishal Jain
is concerned, prosecution has relied upon the evidence of PW
16 Sandip Jain, who fully supports the prosecution and
confessional statement of accused No.7 Vishal Jain recorded
by PW 21 Metropolitan Magistrate Mr. G.M. Agrawal. Mr.
Agrawal was attached to 23rd Esplanade Court at the relevant
time. He recorded statement of accused Vishal Champalal
Jain under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The trial court has relied upon the confessional statement of
Vishal Jain recorded by learned Magistrate Mr. Agrawal. It is
at Exhibit 106. It is apparent from confessional statement
Exhibit 106 that the same is exculpatory. Accused Vishal Jain
does not implicate him in the entire confession made before
PW-21 Mr. Agrawal.
On this piece of evidence, learned counsel for
accused No.7 Mr. Salgaonkar, relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Harbans Singh Bhan Singh vs.
State of Punjab3
, in which is has been held that
corroboration is necessary to the confessional statement
before convicting an accused person on such a statement.
In the case on hand, we have already observed
that confessional statement Exh. 106 recorded by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate is of no use to the
prosecution as it is exculpatory in nature and, so, we do not
find it necessary to dilate much on this aspect.
If confessional statement is kept out of
consideration, then only circumstance which remains against
accused No.7 Vishal Jain is as stated by PW-16 Sandip Jain
that on 19.3.2007 accused Vishal Jain inquired from
Mahendra Mehta and he told him that he would be going to
Gujarat on 21.3.2007. There is no evidence to show that he
passed on the information to accused No.5 Rakesh
Bacchawat. In the absence of such link, we find that
evidence against accused No.7 is not sufficient to convict
him.
3 AIR (SC) -1957-0-637
17. In view of the role attributed to Accused No.5
Rakesh Bacchawat, learned counsel Mr. Rishikesh Mundargi,
submitted that there is no material to attribute an overt act
to accused Rakesh Bacchawat and in the absence of such
material, his conviction needs to be set aside. On common
intention and common object, learned counsel Mr. Mundargi
referred to the following decisions :
(i) Rambilas Singh and Others V/s. State of
Bihar4
in which it has been held -
“It is true that in order to convict persons
vicariously under Section 34 or Section
149 IPC, it is not necessary to prove that
each and everyone of them had indulged
in overt acts. Even so, there must be
material to show that the overt act or acts
of one or more of the accused was or
were done in furtherance of the common
intention of all the accused or in
prosecution of the common object of the
members of the unlawful assembly. In this
case, such evidence is lacking and hence
the appellants cannot be held liable for
the individual act of A-16.”
4 (1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 605
(ii) Dayashankar V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh5
In this case it was observed that -
“In order to bring home the charge of
common intention, the prosecution has to
establish by evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section
34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be
before the commission of the crime. The
true contents of the Section are that if
two or more persons intentionally do an
act jointly, the position in law is just the
same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself. As observed in
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab6
, the
existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential
element for application of this Section. It
is not necessary that the acts of the
several persons charged with commission
of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common
intention in order to attract the provision.
9. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 did not
5 (2009) 11 Supreme Court Cases 492
6 (1977) 1 SCC 746 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 177 : AIR 1977 SC 109
attribute any overt act to the appellant.
The mere fact that he was in the company
of the accused who were armed would
not be sufficient to attract Section 34 IPC.
It is undisputed that appellant was not
armed and he had no animosity with the
deceased. This position is also accepted
by the prosecution. Additionally, the stand
that he pulled the leg of the deceased has
not been established.”
(iii) Sripathi and Others V/s. State of Karnataka7
in which it was held -
“9. 5. Section 34 has been enacted
on the principle of joint liability in the
commission of a criminal act. The Section
is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The
distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The
liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of
criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 if such
criminal act is done in furtherance of a
common intention of the persons who join
in committing the crime. Direct proof of
common intention is seldom available
and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred form the circumstances
7 (2009) 11 Supreme Court Cases 660
appearing from the proved facts of the
case and the proved circumstances. In
order to bring home the charge of
common intention, the prosecution has to
establish by evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section
34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be
before the commission of the crime. The
true contents of the Section are that if
two or more persons intentionally do an
act jointly, the position in law is just the
same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself. As observed in
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, the
existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential
element for application of this Section. It
is not necessary that the acts of the
several persons charged with commission
of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common
intention in order to attract the
provision.”
On constructive liability, Mr. Salgaonkar, learned
counsel for accused No.7 relied upon Dharam Pal and
Others V/s. State of Haryana8
in which it was held -
“It may be that when some persons start
with a pre-arranged plan to commit a
minor offence, they may in the course of
their committing the minor offence come
to an understanding to commit the major
offence as well. Such an understanding
may appear from the conduct of the
persons sought to be made vicariously
liable for the act of the principal culprit or
from some other incriminatory evidence
but the conduct or other evidence must
be such as not to leave any room for
doubt in that behalf. A criminal Court
fastening vicarious liability must satisfy
itself as to the prior meeting of the minds
of the principal culprit and his
companions who are sought to be
constructively made liable in respect of
every act committed by the former. There
is no law to our knowledge which lays
down that a person accompanying the
principal culprit shares his intention in
respect of every act which the latter
might eventually commit. The existence
or otherwise of the common intention
depends upon the facts and
8 AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 1492
circumstances of each case. The intention
of the principal offender and his
companions to deal with any person who
might intervene to stop the quarrel must
be apparent from the conduct of the
persons accompanying the principal
culprit or some other clear and cogent
incriminating piece of evidence. In the
absence of such material, the companion
or companions cannot justifiably be held
guilty for every offence committed by the
principal offender. As already stated,
there is no evidence to justify the
conclusion that Surta and Samme Singh,
appellants shared the common intention
with Dharam Pal to commit the murder of
Sardara Singh or to make an attempt on
the life of Singh Ram and that the said
acts were committed by Dharam Pal in
furtherance of the common intention of
all the appellants. The common intention
denotes action in concert and necessarily
postulates a pre-arranged plan or prior
meeting of minds and an element of
participation in action. As pointed out
above, the common intention to commit
an offence graver than the one originally
designed may develop during the
execution of the original plan e. g. during
the progress of an attack on the person
who is intended to be beaten but the
evidence in that behalf should be clear
and cogent for suspicion, however strong,
cannot take place of the proof which is
essential to bring home the offence to the
accused.”
18. In respect of the role attributed to accused Nos.
5,6 and 7, we have elaborately discussed the evidence of
prosecution witnesses in the foregoing paragraphs. It is
crystal clear from the evidence that at the relevant time,
accused No.5 – Rakesh Bacchawat and accused No.6 –
Swapnali were guarding on the gate of the building. So far as
accused No.7 Vishal Jain is concerned, it is not disputed that
he was not present at that time. The authorities referred by
the learned counsel for accused Nos. 5 and 7 reiterated the
settled propositions of law that absence of material
companion or companions cannot justifiably be held guilty for
every offence committed by the principal offender. The
provisions of Sections 34 and 149 are squarely applicable in
the circumstances of the case in view of the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and, therefore, the authorities relied
upon as above, by the learned counsel for the accused No.5
and 7 would not come to their rescue.
19. In the light of the above, on facts, in fact,
conviction of accused Nos. 1 to 6 was required to be
maintained. But the crucial question before us is, whether
conviction recorded by the trial court would legally sustain.
In this respect the learned Senior Counsel for the accused
drew our attention to the statement of accused persons
recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at Exhibits 127
to 133. Referring to various questions and particularly
questions 22 and 62 it was submitted that questions though
not related were asked which caused grave prejudice to
them.
On the applicability and scope of Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Senior Counsel for
accused Nos. 1,3 and 4 vehemently relied upon the following
decisions :-
(i) Tara Singh V/s. State9
in which it has been held
that -
“32. I cannot stress too strongly the
importance of observing faithfully and
fairly the provisions of section Criminal
Procedure Code. It is not a proper
compliance to read out a long string of
questions and answers made in the
9 1951 SCR 729 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491
Committal Court and ask whether the
statement is correct. A question of that
kind is misleading. It may mean either
that the questioner wants to know
whether the recording is correct, or
whether the answers given are true, or
whether there is some mistake or
misunderstanding despite the accurate
recording. In the next place, it is not
sufficient compliance to string together a
long series of facts and ask the accused
what he has to say about them. He must
be questioned separately about each
material circumstance which is intended
to be used against him. The whole object
of the section is to afford the accused a
fair and proper opportunity of explaining
circumstances which appear against him.
The questioning must therefore be fair
and must be couched in a form which an
ignorant or illiterate person will be able to
appreciate and understand. Even when an
accused person is not illiterate, his mind
is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a
charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit
position to understand the significance of
a complex question. Fairness therefore
requires that each material circumstance
should be put simply and separately in a
way that an illiterate mind, or one which
is perturbed or confused, can readily
appreciate and understand. I do not
suggest that every error or omission in
this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial
because I am of opinion that errors of this
type fall within the category of curable
irregularities. Therefore, the question in
each case depends upon the degree of
the error and upon whether pre-judice has
been occasioned or is likely to have been
occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard
of the provisions of Section 342 of
Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in
this case that I feel there is grave
likelihood of prejudice.”
(ii) Narain Singh V/s. State of Punjab10 in which it
has been held that -
“5. Under Section 342 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure by the first subsection,
insofar as it is material, the Court
may at any stage of the enquiry or trial
and after the witnesses for the
prosecution have been examined and
before the accused is called upon for his
defence shall put questions to the
accused person for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any circumstance
appearing in the evidence against him.
Examination under Section 342 is
primarily to be directed to those matters
10 (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730
on which evidence has been led for the
prosecution, to ascertain from the
accused his version or explanation, if any,
of the incident which forms the subjectmatter
of the charge and his defence. By
sub-section (3), the answers given by the
accused may "be taken into
consideration" at the enquiry or the trial.
If the accused person in his examination
under Section 342 confesses to the
commission of the offence charged
against him the court may, relying upon
that confession, proceed to convict him,
but if he does not confess and in
explaining circumstance appearing in the
evidence against him sets up his own
version and seeks to explain his conduct
pleading that he has committed no
offence, the statement of the accused can
only be taken into consideration in its
entirety. It is not open to the Court to
dissect the statement and to pick out a
part of the statement which may be
incriminative, and then to examine
whether the explanation furnished by the
accused for his conduct is supported by
the evidence on the record. If the accused
admits to have done an act which would
but for the explanation furnished by him
be an offence, the admission cannot be
used against him divorced from the
explanation.”
(iii) Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma V/s. State of
Uttarakhand.11 in which it has been held that -
“A criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein
one is free to give flight to one's
imagination and fantasy. Crime is an
event in real life and is the product of an
interplay between different human
emotions. In arriving at a conclusion
about the guilt of the accused charged
with the commission of a crime, the court
has to judge the evidence by the
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic
worth and the animus of witnesses. Every
case, in the final analysis, would have to
depend upon its own facts. The court
must bear in mind that "human nature is
too willing, when faced with brutal crimes,
to spin stories out of strong suspicions."
Though an offence may be gruesome and
revolt the human conscience, an accused
can be convicted only on legal evidence
and not on surmises and conjectures. The
law does not permit the court to punish
the accused on the basis of a moral
conviction or suspicion alone. "The
burden of proof in a criminal trial never
shifts and it is always the burden of the
prosecution to prove its case beyond
11 (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 439
reasonable doubt on the basis of
acceptable evidence." In fact, it is a
settled principle of criminal jurisprudence
that the more serious the offence, the
stricter the degree of proof required,
since a higher degree of assurance is
required to convict the accused. The fact
that the offence was committed in a very
cruel and revolting manner may in itself
be a reason for scrutinizing the evidence
more closely, lest the shocking nature of
the crime induce an instinctive reaction
against dispassionate judicial scrutiny of
the facts and law.”
21. An accused can be questioned under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of
enabling him personally to explain any
circumstance appearing in the evidence
against him. No matter how weak or
scanty the prosecution evidence is in
regard to certain incriminating material, it
is the duty of the Court to examine the
accused and seek his explanation on
incriminating material which has surfaced
against him.
22. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the
fundamental principle of fairness. The
attention of the accused must specifically
be brought to inculpatory pieces of
evidence to give him an opportunity to
offer an explanation if he chooses to do
so. Therefore, the court is under a legal
obligation to put the incriminating
circumstances before the accused and
solicit his response. This provision is
mandatory in nature and casts an
imperative duty on the court and confers
a corresponding right on the accused to
have an opportunity to offer an
explanation for such incriminatory
material appearing against him.
Circumstances which were not put to the
accused in his examination under Section
313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him
and have to be excluded from
consideration. (Vide Sharad
Birdhichand12 and State of
Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh13
.
23. In S. Harnam Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.)
14, this Court held that
non-indication of inculpatory material and
its relevant facts by the trial court to the
accused adds to the vulnerability of the
prosecution case. The recording of the
statement of the accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise.
24. If any appellate Court or revisional
court comes across the fact that the trial
Court had not put any question to an
accused, even if it is of a vital nature,
12 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487
13 (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705
14 (1976) 2 SCC 819 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 324 : AIR 1976 SC 2140
such an omission alone should not result
in the setting aside of the conviction and
sentence as an inevitable consequence.
An inadequate examination cannot be
presumed to have caused prejudice.
Every error or omission in compliance of
the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., does
not necessarily vitiate trial. Such errors
fall within category of curable
irregularities and the question as to
whether the trial is vitiated, in each case
depends upon the degree of error and
upon whether prejudice has been or is
likely to have been caused to accused.
Efforts should be made to undo or correct
the lapse. (Vide: Wasim Khan v. State
of U.P.15
, Bhoor Singh v. State of
Punjab16, Labhchand Dhanpat Singh
Jain v. State of Maharashtra17, State
of Punjab v. Naib Din18 and Parsuram
Pandey v. State of Bihar19
.
25. In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam20
,
this Court observed:
“21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on
the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to
the accused for the purpose of enabling him to
explain any of the circumstances appearing in the
evidence against him. It follows as a necessary
15 AIR 1956 SC 400 : 1956 Cri LJ 790
16 (1974) 4 SCC 754 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 664 : AIR 1974 SC 1256
17 (1975) 3 SCC 385 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 11 : AIR 1975 SC 182
18 (2001) 8 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 33
19 (2004) 13 SCC 189 : 2005 SC (Cri) 113
20 (2008) 16 SCC 328 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 278
corollary therefrom that each material
circumstance appearing in the evidence against
the accused is required to be put to him
specifically, distinctly and separately and failure
to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating
trial, if it is shown that the accused was
prejudiced.” (emphasis supplied).
26. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra21, this Court
observed as under:
“16. ....It is trite law, nevertheless
fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should
be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to
enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness
of a criminal trial and failures in this area may
gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if
consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed.
However, where such an omission has occurred it
does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and
prejudice occasioned by such defect must be
established by the accused. In the event of
evidentiary material not being put to the accused,
the court must ordinarily eschew such material
from consideration. It is also open to the appellate
court to call upon the counsel for the accused to
show what explanation the accused has as regards
the circumstances established against him but not
put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the
appellate court any plausible or reasonable
explanation of such circumstances, the court may
assume that no acceptable answer exists and that
21 (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : AIR 1973 SC 2622
even if the accused had been questioned at the
proper time in the trial court he would not have
been able to furnish any good ground to get out of
the circumstances on which the trial court had
relied for its conviction.” (Emphasis
added).
27. In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of
Assam22 this Court, relying upon its
earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil v.
State of Karnataka23, held that the
provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not
meant to nail the accused to his
disadvantage but are meant for his
benefit. The provisions are based on the
salutary principles of natural justice and
the maxim "audi alteram partem" has
been enshrined in them. Therefore, an
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has
to be of utmost fairness.
28. In Sk. Maqsood v. State of
Maharashtra24 and Ranvir Yadav v.
State of Bihar25, this Court held that it is
the duty of the trial court to indicate
incriminating material to the accused.
Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty
formality. An improper
examination/inadequate questioning
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. amounts to a
serious lapse on the part of the trial Court
22 (2009) 7 SCC 404 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 421
23 (2000) 8 SCC 740 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 87
24 (2009) 6 SCC 583 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 82
25 (2009) 6 SCC 595 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 92
and is a ground for interference with the
conviction.
29. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State
of Bihar26, this Court rejected the
submission that as no question had been
put to the accused on motive, no motive
for the commission of the crime could be
attributed to the accused, nor the same
could be reckoned as circumstance
against him observing that it could not be
pointed out as to what in fact was the real
prejudice caused to the accused by
omission to question the accused on the
motive for the crime. No material was
placed before the court to show as to
what and in what manner the prejudice, if
any, was caused to the accused. More so,
the accused/appellant was aware of
accusation and charge against him.
30. Thus, it is evident from the above
that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C.
make it obligatory for the court to
question the accused on the evidence and
circumstances against him so as to offer
the accused an opportunity to explain the
same. But, it would not be enough for the
accused to show that he has not been
questioned or examined on a particular
circumstance, instead he must show that
such non-examination has actually and
26 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60
materially prejudiced him and has
resulted in the failure of justice. In other
words, in the event of an inadvertent
omission on the part of the court to
question the accused on any
incriminating circumstance cannot ipso
facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown
that some material prejudice was caused
to the accused by the omission of the
court.”
20. The gist of the above authorities is that every
error or omission in compliance with the provisions of Section
313 does not necessarily vitiate the trial. Such errors fall
within the category of curable irregularities and question,
whether trial is vitiated in each case, depends upon the
degree of error and whether prejudice has been or is likely to
have been caused to the accused. The ultimate test in
determining whether or not the accused has been fairly
examined under this Section is to see whether, having regard
to the questions put to him, he did not get an opportunity to
say what he wanted to say in respect of the prosecution case
against him. Where the non compliance with Section 313
holds the trial to be vitiated, ordinarily the proper course is to
order a retrial from the stage at which the provisions of this
section were not complied with.
21. We have meticulously examined the statement at
Exhibits 127 to 133. We could notice that 66 identical
questions were put to each of the accused by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge though entirely different
incriminating circumstances against each of them were
brought on record.
It is pertinent to note that role played by accused
Nos. 5,6 and 7 even according to prosecution was limited, as
accused Nos. 5 and 6 were guarding at the gate of the
building and accused No.7 passed on the information to
accused No.5, who, executed the plan. Accused No.7 was not
even present on the spot. Therefore, there was no meaning
in putting all 66 questions to each of the accused. As
questions were not put specifically, distinctly and separately,
in our view, it amounts to serious irregularity vitiating the
whole trial, as it is shown that serious prejudice has been
caused to the accused.
22. It is significant to note that since 2007, accused
were facing the trial. Some of the accused remained in jail
throughout. The statements under Section 313 of the Code
were recorded just by cut-copy-paste. Most of the questions
put to each of the accused were irrelevant and misleading.
The accused have demonstrated from the questions put to
them that serious prejudice has occasioned to them as
statements were recorded in the total disregard of the
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In this premise we are
not inclined to order retrial from the stage at which
provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. were not complied
with.
23. In the result, appeals succeed. Accordingly, we
pass the following order :-
[a] The impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence in Sessions Case No. 642 of
2007, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Greater Bombay, is hereby quashed and set aside ;
[b] The accused are acquitted of the offence
punishable under Section 396 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code.
[c] Accused Nos.1 to 5 and 7 who are in jail shall
be released forthwith, if not otherwise required in any
other case.
[d] Bail bonds of accused No.6 shall stand
cancelled and she is set at liberty forthwith.
[e] Registry to communicate this order to the
accused in jail through the concerned jail authorities.
[f] We quantify fees to be paid by the High
Court Legal Services Committee to the appointed
Advocate Mr. A.V. Bedekar at Rs. 5000/-.
[SMT. I.K. JAIN, J] [SMT. V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J]
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