by the petitioner is that the petitioner was made aware of the
same through the website at his native place within the State of
Kerala and that these created a disability on the petitioner from
any further engagement with the Governments throughout the
territory of India and he being so aggrieved, could raise the
contention before the High Court of Kerala. Immediately it is to
be noticed that the petitioner has not pleaded that the disability
created on him by Exhibit P2, has divested him of any post or
even an opportunity for such an engagement within the State of
Kerala. The mere fact that the petitioner was made aware of
Exhibit P1 & P2, only through the website, at Kerala would not be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. To assume jurisdiction on such a
pleading would be specious, since then, with the accessibility to
the website through the internet, the petitioner could as well
plead that the same was accessed anywhere in India to confer
jurisdiction in any High Court within the territories of India. The
report of the High Level Team and Exhibits P2 and P3 have an
inextricable link and the "cause of action" arose for the petitioner,
on his being served with the order at Exhibit P3, which he would
have to take recourse by a writ petition filed before the High
Court within whose jurisdiction such cause of action or any other
arose.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:-
MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
WEDNESDAY,THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2016/
W.P.(C).No.30342 of 2014 (P)
G.MADHAVAN NAIR Vs UNION OF INDIA,
The petitioner is an eminent Scientist, who worked in
the Department of Space from its very inception in the year 1972
and headed the Indian Space Research Organisation [for brevity
"ISRO"] as its Chairman for about half-a-dozen years. The
petitioner has been honoured with doctorates by Universities and
decorated by the Country itself. The petitioner challenges Exhibits
P1, P2 and P3 orders which so to say, placed him in the dock and
blacklisted him from any Governmental engagement. The issue
assumes poignancy, since the Space programme is the most
prestigious initiative in any developing or developed country of
today's world; for reasons of the significant ramification it has on
the defence of the Country and the tantalizing temptation it offers
in unravelling the secrets of the beyond; often termed as the next
frontier of mankind. The report at Exhibit P1 and the orders at
Exhibits P2 and P3 are issued on the ground that an agreement
entered into with a private company has been done in such
manner as to cast a shadow on the post the petitioner occupied,
which directly reflects on his persona and credibility.
2. The Central Government has filed a detailed
counter affidavit; but, however, demurred through the learned
Additional Solicitor General of India, Sri.G.Rajagopalan, insofar
as conceding to the jurisdiction of this Court, since no part of the
cause of action arose within the State. The learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioner Sri.P.Ramakrishnan, however, sought
to sustain the writ petition before this Court itself; on the words
employed in Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and the
binding precedents on this point. This Court heard both learned
Counsel on the issue of maintainability and reserved the issue
for consideration. For the present, this Court is saved from
looking into the unpleasant facts, for reason of the parties having
consented to the question of maintainability being answered first.
It goes without saying, that, if the answer is against the
petitioner, the writ petition would stand dismissed and if it is held
in his favour, the matter would have to be heard fully.
3. The petitioner had retired from service on
31.10.2009 as Chairman of ISRO and was, thereafter, awarded
the position of Vikram Sarabhai Distinguished Professor in the
Department of Space/ISRO as per Exhibit P4 for a period of four
years. The same stood terminated by Exhibit P3. The
Professorship was awarded by the Department of Space,
Government of India from its office at Bangalore, within the State
of Karnataka, and the tenure was to be spent in Bangalore itself,
from where the termination too was effected. Exhibit P2 was the
direct cause of Exhibit P3, since the Department of Space,
considering the report of the Committees, which examined the
controversial agreement entered into, directed that the four
officers, one of whom being the petitioner, be divested of any
current assignment/consultancy and they be excluded from
re-employment, inclusion in Committees and any other important
role under the Government. Exhibit P1 is the report based on
which Exhibit P2 has been issued. The petitioner would
contend that the petitioner was never issued with Exhibit P1 or
P2 and that the same were available in the website of the
Department, which he happened to be confronted with, at his
residence at Thiruvananthapuram, to which place he had retired
after being divested of the Professorship. The petitioner being a
native of the State of Kerala and having his permanent residence
at Kerala, is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, is the
contention.
4. The legal question of maintainability alone arising
preliminarily for consideration, this Court would first look into the
precedents placed on record by the learned Counsel. The
learned Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on
Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh v. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 532] and
Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India [(2014) 9 SCC 329],
both of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Two decisions of the Division
Bench of this Court relied on by the petitioner are
Officer-in-Charge, Army Medical Corps Records and Others
v. Rajesh.U [2009 (4) KHC 395] and Sukumar N.Oommen v.
Secretary to the Government of India and Another [2012 (3)
KHC 430]. The learned Assistant Solicitor General would place
reliance on Oil & Natural Gas commission v. Utpal Kumar
Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711], C.B.I. Anti-Corruption Branch v.
Narayan Diwakar [(1999) 4 SCC 656], Union of India v. Adani
Exports Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 567], Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.
v. Union of India [(2004) 6 SCC 254], and Addl.General
Manager - Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v.
Suresh Ramkrishna Burde [(2007) 5 SCC 336].
5. Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh (supra) is a decision
rendered on Article 226 of the Constitution, prior to the
amendment, by which clause (2) was introduced. Article 226 as it
stood originally did not import the principle of "cause of action"
and, hence, the jurisdiction of a High Court was held to be
impossible of invocation on the basis of any part of cause of
action having arisen within the jurisdiction of a particular High
Court. Article 226 was held to be possible of invocation only
against persons/authorities whose presence had to be found
within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises
jurisdiction. The aforesaid decision was cited only to bring out the
stark distinction made by introduction of clause (2) to Article 226,
which permitted a High Court to issue directions, orders or writs
to any Government, authority or person who resides outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, in cases where the cause
of action wholly or in part arises within such territories. Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra) is strongly relied on by the petitioner to
urge the contention of jurisdiction and the same being the latest
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, of the few cited, would
be dealt with later.
6. Rajesh.U (supra) was an appeal to the Division
Bench from a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court,
wherein there was a direction to the Government to consider and
pass orders on a revision filed by the petitioner. In appeal, for the
first time the question of jurisdiction was taken. The Division
Bench found that since Union of India functions throughout the
territory of India, its inaction in relation to an appeal filed from the
State of Kerala, would confer jurisdiction on this Court. The
further objections were with respect to there being available no
remedy of revision before the Central Government and the
impossibility of being afforded a personal hearing to the
petitioner. This Court found that even if no revision is available,
the Government could direct consideration if the facts reveal
grounds for intervention. The necessity for a personal hearing
was also taken away. The Division Bench has not noticed any
facts arising in the case and this Court also does not find any
binding precedent in the aforesaid decision. There can also be
no reliance placed on the said decision since the issue has been
answered in the negative by a Full Bench of this Court in Indian
Maritime University v. Viswanathan [2014 (4) KLT 798 (F.B.)].
7. Sukumar N.Oommen (supra) was again a
decision by a Division Bench of this Court, which invoked the
jurisdiction under Article 226 since the Central Government,
acting from New Delhi, sought for recovery of certain sums paid
to the petitioner while he was serving as the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Madras Fertilizers Ltd. in Chennai. The
recovery notice itself was issued against the petitioner, who was
spending his retired life in Kerala, which could be executed only
against his assets situated in the State of Kerala. The said
decision would also, on facts, be liable to be distinguished.
8. Now we come to the decisions placed on record by
the learned Assistant Solicitor General. Narayan Diwakar
(supra) was an officer of the Indian Administrative Service, who
was officiating as Collector of Daman and then transferred to
Arunachal Pradesh. Even prior to the transfer, three First
Information Reports were lodged by the Central Bureau of
Investigation, at Bombay. The Superintendent of Police, CBI,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bombay issued a wireless message to
the Chief Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh to advise the IAS Officer
to meet the Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB, Bombay in connection
with the investigation of one of the FIRs. The IAS Officer
challenged the same before the High Court at Guwahati, which
invoked its jurisdiction under Article 226(2) and quashed the
summons. The Supreme Court considered the matter on the
question of jurisdiction after the appeal was dismissed at the
admission stage by the Division Bench of the High Court. Before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the IAS Officer agreed to approach
the appropriate High Court, untrammelled by any observations
made by the Guwahati High Court. Despite the fact that the
appeal was allowed on consent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 9 -
that the Guwahati High Court was clearly in error in deciding the
question of jurisdiction in favour of the officer.
9. ONGC (supra), through its consultant, Engineers
India Ltd. (EIL), brought out an advertisement calling for tenders
to set up a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at Hazira
Complex in Gujarat. The respondent, based in Calcutta, came to
know of the floating of such tender from a newspaper circulated
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court;
applied for the same and later on being denied of consideration,
approached the Calcutta High Court against the grant sought to
be made in favour of another tenderer. Assuming jurisdiction, the
High Court passed an order in favour of the petitioner, which was
challenged by the ONGC before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The
grounds on which the tenderer sought to maintain the writ
petition before the High Court of Calcutta were that the tenderer
came to know of the tender through the newspaper published in
Calcutta, submitted its tender and revised price bid from its
Registered Office at Calcutta and had made representations to
various authorities and agencies with respect to the defect in the
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 10 -
tender process from the State of West Bengal. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court found that the said facts pleaded in the writ
petition in support of the cause of action should be considered
without embarking upon an enquiry about the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. The settled meaning of the
expression "cause of action" being the bundle of facts which the
petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in
his favour; was referred to. On that principle it was found that
none of the facts pleaded to invoke the jurisdiction constitute
facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. The fact that
the advertisement was read in Calcutta and that the tender and
related messages were sent from Calcutta were found to be
irrelevant insofar as considering the issue raised in the lis. The
three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court came down
very heavily on the Calcutta High Court, as is seen from
paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgment.
"12. Pointing out that after the issuance of
the notification by the State Government under
Section 52(1) of the Act, the notified land became
vested in the State Government free from all
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 11 -
encumbrances and hence it was not necessary for
the respondents to plead the service of notice
under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate
direction or order under Article 226 for quashing
the notification acquiring the land. This Court,
therefore, held that no part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
Court. This Court deeply regretted and deprecated
the practice prevalent in the High Court of
exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory
orders in matters where it lacked territorial
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong
observations made by this Court in the aforesaid
decision and in the earlier decisions referred to
therein, we are distressed that the High Court of
Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in
cases where no part of the cause of action arose
within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great
pity that one of the premier High Courts of the
country should appear to have developed a
tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground
that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on
business from a registered office in the State of
West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that
notwithstanding the observations of this Court
made time and again, some of the learned Judges
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 12 -
continue to betray that tendency. Only recently
while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos.
10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University v.
Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1994) 4
SCC 710] , this Court observed:
"We are surprised, not a little, that the
High Court of Calcutta should have
exercised jurisdiction in a case where it
had absolutely no jurisdiction."
In that case, the contract in question was executed
at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried
out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the
event of dispute the Aligarh court alone will have
jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh
and was to function at Aligarh and yet merely
because the respondent was a Calcutta-based
firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High
Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction
where it had none whatsoever. It must be
remembered that the image and prestige of a court
depends on how the members of that institution
conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground
that even in cases which fall outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the
court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the
plea that some event, however trivial and
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 13 -
unconnected with the cause of action had occurred
within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants
would seek to abuse the process by carrying the
cause before such members giving rise to
avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of
the institution and put the entire system to ridicule.
We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not
strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will,
we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution
and the system of administration of justice. We do
hope that we will not have another occasion to deal
with such a situation".
10. Adani Exports Ltd. (supra) invoked the
jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court, claiming the benefit of a
scheme introduced under the Import Export Policy on grounds
that they carried on the business from Ahmedabad, their order of
export and import were placed from Ahmedabad, the documents
and payments for exports and imports were made at
Ahmedabad. The credit of duty, claimed in respect of exports,
were handled from Ahmedabad, the denial of credit in the
passbook under the Scheme would affect the business carried
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 14 -
out at Ahmedabad and the guarantee agreement was also
executed at Ahmedabad. It was held that each and every fact
pleaded in an application does not ipso facto lead to a
conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action unless
those facts are facts which have a nexus or relevance with the lis
involved in the case. The facts which have no bearing with the
lis or the dispute involved, as was held in ONGC (supra)
also; was held to be not a "cause of action" so as to confer
territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. It was held so in
paragraph 17:-
"It is seen from the above that in order to
confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a
writ petition or a special civil application as in this
case, the High Court must be satisfied from the
entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of
action that those facts do constitute a cause so as
to empower the court to decide a dispute which
has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It
is clear from the above judgment that each and
every fact pleaded by the respondents in their
application does not ipso facto lead to the
conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 15 -
action within the court's territorial jurisdiction
unless those facts pleaded are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in
the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis
or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise
to a cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this
principle then we see that none of the facts
pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion,
falls into the category of bundle of facts which
would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a
dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on
the courts at Ahmedabad".
11. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra), a Company
having its Registered Office at Mumbai, obtained a loan from
Bhopal and challenged the vires of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (for short "SARFAESI Act") before the Delhi
High Court when proceedings were taken by the creditor Bank
under the said Act. The jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was
invoked on the ground that the seat of the Union Government
was in Delhi and the High Court of Delhi has the requisite
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 16 -
jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the
jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be invoked to determine a
Constitutional question in a vacuum and the same has to be
agitated before the High Court, within whose territorial
jurisdiction,the injury was occasioned.
12. Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) was heavily
relied on by the petitioner, the facts of which have to be noticed.
The appellant was a seaman, registered as such by the
Department of Shipping, Government of India, at Mumbai. He
was declared unfit for sea faring activities due to his heart
condition and his registration was cancelled. On being so
discharged, the appellant settled down at his native place, within
the State of Bihar, and made representations raising financial
claims, as per the statutory provisions and the terms of the
contract. The disability compensation claim was answered by the
official respondents pointing out his entitlement to severance
compensation; but declining any disability compensation as
such, which, according to the official respondents, was an
entitlement to persons who were disabled in the course of
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 17 -
seafaring activities. The dismissal of the writ petition by the High
Court of Patna was found to be bad, on the specific facts arising
in the aforesaid case. It is also pertinent that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court also relied on two of its earlier decisions in Om
Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 207] and
Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R.K.Mishra [(2010) 1 SCC 457], to
draw support. Pausing here for a moment, the said decisions are
also to be examined.
13. Om Prakash Srivastava (supra) was a case in
which the appellant was extradited on the basis of a treaty; the
violation of which was one of the grounds on which the
jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was invoked. The appellant
had contended that he was facing trial in 8 cases, which was in
complete violation of the provisions of Section 21 of the
Extradition Act, 1962 and he was kept in solitary confinement
without proper medical care in the Central Jail within the State of
Uttar Pradesh. The Delhi High Court observed that the issue of
conditions of prisoners in the State of Uttar Pradesh could be
more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court and
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 18 -
rejected the writ petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that
the Delhi High Court ought to have dealt with the question
whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition. The
observation of the Delhi High Court was found to be of effect that
though there is no absolute lack of jurisdiction, but the
grievances could be dealt with more effectively by the other High
Court. It was only in such circumstance that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court found that it was not a correct way of dealing
with the aspect of jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the
High Court at Delhi for consideration.
14. Rajendran Chingaravelu (supra) was a case in
which the appellant approached the Andhra Pradesh High Court
and the official respondents took a contention that the seizure of
cash, which led to the proceedings under the Income Tax Act,
1961 and eventually the writ petition, took place at the Airport at
Chennai and hence the Andhra Pradesh High Court did not have
the jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the
appellant had travelled to Chennai from Hyderabad and he had
disclosed the cash carried by him to the security personnel at the
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 19 -
boarding point and the subsequent seizure at Chennai was on
the basis of the information passed on by the officials of the
Airport at Hyderabad. The consequential income-tax proceedings
were also initiated at Hyderabad and, hence, the writ petition was
found to be maintainable before the Andhra Pradesh High Court
itself. Both these decisions indicate that the facts pleaded to
invoke the jurisdiction of the respective High Courts had an
inextricable link with the lis and they form an integral part of the
facts which had to be proved by the petitioner-litigant to get a
judgment in his favour. Those inextricable facts having occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of the respective High Courts, the
said High Courts were said to have jurisdiction to deal with the
issue under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
15. Coming back to Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the cancellation of
registration of the appellant as a seaman was sent to the
appellant in his native address at Bihar. The appellant had sent
representations from his home at Bihar and the rejections were
also communicated to him in his residential address. The
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 20 -
communication of refusal of disability compensation was
received by him in the State of Bihar, which was a fraction of the
cause of action which was said to arise within the jurisdiction of
the Patna High Court. It was also found that on issuance of
notice by the Patna High court, the respondents had appeared
before the High Court and participated in the proceedings. After
hearing Counsel for both sides, the High Court passed an interim
order directing payment of Rs.2,75,000/-, which was remitted by
the respondent-Shipping Corporation of India to the bank
account of the appellant. Only when the matter was taken up for
final hearing, the High Court declined jurisdiction. It was only on
consideration of the aforesaid facts peculiar to the case and also
the interim order passed by the High Court, to which the
respondent acquiesced, that the Patna High Court was found to
have jurisdiction.
16. However, in the instant case, this Court is of the
opinion that the facts distinguishes it from Nawal Kishore
Sharma (supra). In Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) itself
another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 21 -
Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [(1985) 3 SCC 217] was
referred to. There again, the Calcutta High Court had invoked
jurisdiction under Article 226 with respect to acquisition of land
which occurred in the State of Rajasthan. Paragraph 8 of the
said decision is apposite for reference here:
"The expression 'cause of action' is tersely
defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure:
'The "cause of action" means every
fact which, if traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to
support his right to a judgment of the court.'
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with
the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to
relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice
under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at
their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road,
Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of
West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action
within that territory unless the service of such notice
was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire
cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the
land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the
State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 22 -
answer to the question whether service of notice is an
integral part of the cause of action within the meaning
of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon
the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause
of action. The Notification dated 8.2.1984 issued by the
State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act
became effective the moment it was published in the
Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became
vested in the State Government free from all
encumbrances. It was not necessary for the
respondents to plead the service of notice on them by
the Special Officer Town Planning Department, Jaipur
under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ,
direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution
for quashing the notification issued by the State
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the
respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their
lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the
validity of the notification issued by the State
Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the
Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such
relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before
the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the
cause of action wholly or in part arose".
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 23 -
17. Reference can also be usefully made to paragraphs
20, 21 and 22 of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra):
"20. A distinction between a legislation and
executive action should be borne in mind while
determining the said question.
21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives
the assent of the President of India and is published in
the Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will
apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a
legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition
questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in
any High Court of the country. It is not so done because
a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of
the Act or some of them which were implemented shall
give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner.
A writ court, it is well settled, would not determine a
constitutional question in a vacuum.
22. The Court must have the requisite territorial
jurisdiction. An order passed on a writ petition
questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act,
whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions
contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India
subject of course to the applicability of the Act".
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 24 -
18. Herein, definitely it is an executive action which is
challenged by the petitioner. Exhibit P1 is the report of a High
Level Team, with respect to an agreement entered into between
M/s.Antrix Corporation Limited, a subsidiary of ISRO, and
M/s.DEVAS Multimedia Private Limited, which resulted in Exhibits
P2 and P3. The agreement, which was the subject matter of the
enquiry by the High Level Team, was not entered into within the
jurisdiction of this High Court; nor did any of the consequences of
the agreement arise within this jurisdiction. The High Level Team
concluded in Exhibit P1 that there have been serious
administrative and procedural lapses and also there is a collusive
behaviour on the part of certain individuals who were involved
with the execution of the agreement. No part of the enquiry at
any time extended to any incident which occurred within the
State of Kerala and the enquiry was carried out, outside the
jurisdiction of this Court. Exhibits P2 and P3 are identically dated
and was, hence, issued on the same day. Exhibit P3, in fact, was
the consequence of Exhibit P2. Exhibit P2 was the order which
directed the petitioner, along with three others, to be divested of
WP(C) No.30342 of 2014 - 25 -
the current assignments with the Government, as a consequence
of which Exhibit P3 was issued terminating the Professorship
with the Department of Space. As was noticed at the outset, the
Professorship was to be carried on in Bangalore under the
Department of Space/ISRO and the order too was served on the
petitioner at Bangalore. In such circumstance, definitely Exhibit
P3 cannot be challenged before this Court, since none of the
facts leading to conferment of a cause of action on the petitioner
could be traced to anywhere within the territorial jurisdiction of
this High court. The residence of the petitioner is inconsequential
and is not a fact, if traversed, the petitioner would be liable to
prove, to obtain a favourable judgment.
19. As far as Exhibit P1 and P2, the contention raised
by the petitioner is that the petitioner was made aware of the
same through the website at his native place within the State of
Kerala and that these created a disability on the petitioner from
any further engagement with the Governments throughout the
territory of India and he being so aggrieved, could raise the
contention before the High Court of Kerala. Immediately it is to
be noticed that the petitioner has not pleaded that the disability
created on him by Exhibit P2, has divested him of any post or
even an opportunity for such an engagement within the State of
Kerala. The mere fact that the petitioner was made aware of
Exhibit P1 & P2, only through the website, at Kerala would not be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. To assume jurisdiction on such a
pleading would be specious, since then, with the accessibility to
the website through the internet, the petitioner could as well
plead that the same was accessed anywhere in India to confer
jurisdiction in any High Court within the territories of India. The
report of the High Level Team and Exhibits P2 and P3 have an
inextricable link and the "cause of action" arose for the petitioner,
on his being served with the order at Exhibit P3, which he would
have to take recourse by a writ petition filed before the High
Court within whose jurisdiction such cause of action or any other
arose.
20. In this context, useful reference can be made to
Suresh Ramkrishna Burde (supra), who was terminated from
service from Hyderabad for reason of the Scrutiny Committee at
Nagpur having invalidated the Caste Certificate on which basis
he obtained employment, on reservation. Apposite would be
reference to paragraph 15:
"Before parting with the case we would like to
observe that the order invalidating the caste
certificate had been passed by the Scrutiny
Committee at Nagpur and, therefore, the earlier two
writ petitions filed by the respondent were
maintainable before the Nagpur Bench of the
Bombay High Court. However, in the third and final
writ petition the order under challenge was the order
of termination of service which was passed by the
appellant on 16.7.2004 at Hyderabad as the
respondent was working with Bharat Heavy Electrical
Ltd.'s Heavy Power Equipment Plant, Hyderabad.
Therefore, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition
wherein challenge was raised to the said order.
However, in order to cut short the litigation and settle
the controversy we have decided the case on
merits".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though the invalidation of
the caste certificate could have been challenged before the
Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, the consequential
termination passed at Hyderabad could have only been agitated
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. This Court is unable to
find any part of the cause of action in the case of the petitioner
herein having arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. In such
circumstance, there would be absolutely no reason why this
Court should go into the facts.
21. The petitioner, as is seen from the records, has
been consistently knocking at the wrong doors, since he had
earlier approached the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Ernakulam Bench, which jurisdiction was declined for reason of
the petitioner, when served with Ext.P3; found to be not holding a
civil post under the Union. The Division Bench of this Court also
confirmed the view of the Tribunal. This Court would notice these
facts only since the learned Assistant Solicitor General had, at
the commencement of the proceedings itself, raised the question
of jurisdiction with a certain amount of deferment for having had
to raise a technical objection of jurisdiction. Despite the drastic
consequences visited on the petitioner, who had led many Space
projects of the country and had been decorated with "Padma
Bhooshan" and "Padma Vibhooshan"; that alone would not
enable this Court to assume jurisdiction, where there is none.
Technicalities too have its own role to play as was noticed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court coming down heavily on the conduct of a
High Court, with strong words. It would not be proper for this
Court to brush aside a ground of lack of jurisdiction merely on the
finding of the same to be a technical ground. It is not as if the
petitioner does not have a remedy before the appropriate forum
and this Court having not examined any facts leading to the
impugned orders, the petitioner would not be curtailed in invoking
such remedy before the appropriate Court.
The writ petition would stand rejected for reason of
lack of jurisdiction. Parties are directed to suffer their respective
costs.
Sd/-
K.Vinod Chandran
Judge.
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