Whether Denial of employment to married daughter of affected family is violative of constitutional principles?

In the matter of National Legal Services Authority v. Union
of India Manu/SC/0309/2014 : (2014) 5 SCC 438, the Supreme Court recognized that gender identity,
is an integral part of sex within the meaning of Articles 15 and
16 of the Constitution of India and no citizen can be
discriminated on the ground of gender. The Supreme Court
observed as follows:

“We, therefore, conclude that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
includes any discrimination, exclusion, restriction
or preference, which has the effect of nullifying
or transposing equality by the law or the equal
protection of laws guaranteed under our
Constitution, and hence we are inclined to give
various directions to safeguard the constitutional
rights of the members of the TG community.”
34. Thus, from the aforesaid cases it is quite vivid that marriage is
a social circumstance and basic civil right of man and woman,
and marriage by itself is not a disqualification. A daughter
remains a daughter after her marriage and does not cease to
be a daughter of her father or mother. Thus, denial of
employment, included in the rehabilitation, to married daughter
of an affected family (land oustee) is gender-biased and
unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 & 15 of the
Constitution of India as well as Article 21, as rehabilitation of a
land oustee is logical corollary of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Writ Petition (S) No.1762 of 2014
Smt. Sadhna Bai, V State of Chhattisgarh, 
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Citation; AIR 2016(NOC)286 CHHAT

1. Magnificent question of law that has cropped up for
consideration in this writ petition is whether the State
Government is justified in impliedly excluding married
daughter of the affected/displaced family from consideration
for employment under the Chhattisgarh State Model
Rehabilitation Policy, 2007, as amended, on the ground of her
marriage.
2. The above-stated question of law arises for consideration in
the following factual matrix of the case: -
3. The petitioner's father Itwar Singh was the owner of land
bearing Khasra Nos.73/2, 105/1 and 106/2, total area
admeasuring 1.16 acres situate at Village Madwamouha,
Tahsil Katghora, District Korba. These lands were acquired by
the State Government in exercise of the provisions contained
in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the LA Act') for
dumping ash products oozing out from the power unit owned
by respondent No.2 Chhattisgarh State Electricity Production
Company Limited and ultimately, award was passed on 29-8-
2007 and thereafter, lands vested with the State Government.
4. Apart from payment of compensation to the affected family
under the LA Act, the State Government has also framed the
Chhattisgarh State Model Rehabilitation Policy, 2007 (for short
'the R&R Policy') highlighting the object of rehabilitation policy
and defining the affected family under the policy.
5. The petitioner being married daughter of the land oustee,
made an application in terms of the R&R Policy stating inter
alia that she is entitled for employment as her father's land has
been subjected to acquisition and as per the R&R policy, she
is eligible being daughter to be considered for employment
being the member of affected family. The said application has
been rejected by respondents No.2 & 3 on the ground that as
per the R&R Policy, being married daughter she is not
included and therefore, she is not entitled for employment.
6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied against the rejection of her
application, the petitioner herein has filed the instant writ
petition stating inter alia that exclusion of married daughter
from consideration for employment only on the ground that
she is married, suffers from gender discrimination. It has
further been stated that the object of providing employment to
the affected/displaced person is to rehabilitate the family
whose sole means of earning i.e. land has been subjected to
acquisition and to provide them food, shelter and other
facilities so as to lead a better life than the life which the land
oustee was leading before the acquisition of his/her land.
Thus, reading down the R&R Policy to exclude married
daughter from consideration only on the ground of marriage is
not only gender discrimination but also against the object of
the R&R Policy to provide food, shelter and other facilities to
the members of the affected family to lead a dignified life.
Therefore, clause 2.1 (c) of the R&R Policy to the extent of
excluding married daughter from consideration for
employment, be declared void and inoperative and rejection of
the petitioner's application be also struck down.
7. Return on behalf of the State/respondents No.1 & 5 has been
filed holding that married daughter is not entitled for
employment.
8. Respondents No.2 to 4 have also filed their separate return
stating inter alia that by virtue of clause 2.1 (c) of the R&R
Policy, married daughter is not entitled to get employment, as
she does not come within the purview of affected family and
as such, she is not entitled to claim employment as a matter of
right. Marriage brings about separation of married daughter
from her biological parents and her inclusion as a member of
her matrimonial home, as she ceases to be dependent
member of the family of her parents after marriage. Therefore,
the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
9. Mr. Sanjay Patel, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
would submit that the object of promulgation of the
Chhattisgarh State Model Rehabilitation Policy, 2007 is to
restore status and position of the affected family by providing
food, shelter and employment as it was before the acquisition
of their land which was the sole means of earning their
livelihood so that they can again come back to the main
stream of the society. Elaborating his submission, he would
further submit that marriage is a social circumstance and
excluding married daughter from consideration for
employment is based on gender discrimination. He would also
submit that daughter remains a daughter of her parents even
after marriage and marriage can never be considered to be a
disqualification for a daughter to which she is otherwise
entitled for. It is further submitted that in the present case, the
land oustee has only two daughters, both are married and
therefore, he has no other choice except to nominate the
petitioner, one of his daughters, for employment, as she is
residing with her father even after marriage to look after her
parents. Therefore, implied exclusion of married daughter
from consideration for employment only on the basis of
marriage is not only violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution of India, but also violates the nature and object for
which the welfare State has formulated the Model
Rehabilitation Policy for land oustee, as such, it be held that
the petitioner, even though is a married daughter, is included
in the R&R Policy and is entitled for consideration for
employment under the said R&R Policy.
10. Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, learned Deputy Govt. Advocate
appearing for the State/respondents No.1 and 5, would submit
that the State Government in exercise of power conferred
under Article 162 of the Constitution of India i.e. the executive
power of the State, has framed the Chhattisgarh State Model
Rehabilitation Policy, 2007 for the benefit of members of land
oustees as a consequence of they are being affected by
acquisition of their lands and it is a policy decision of the
Government to exclude married daughter as dependent of
person whose land has been acquired. The scope of
interference in the policy decision of the Government is
extremely limited and it has not to be interfered with unless it
is arbitrary and is grossly illegal.
11. Mr. K.R. Nair, learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 4
would submit that the petitioner has no right whatsoever, much
less an enforceable right, under the R&R Policy of the State
Government to claim employment. He would further submit
that the said policy permits employment to a dependent family
member and from time immemorial, institution of family in
India is governed by certain unbroken customs. One of the
customs is that once a daughter is married and leaves for her
matrimonial home, she is not treated as dependent on her
natural parents, she is treated as dependent on her husband
and his family. Since she is not dependent on the family of
land oustee after marriage, she is denied employment under
the R&R Policy. It is, therefore, on account of her nondependency,
she is denied employment which is available to a
dependent member and as such, the contention that she has
been discriminated on the basis of her gender is a far-fetched
submission which deserves to be rejected.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, thoughtfully
considered the submissions raised herein and also gone
through the record with utmost circumspection.
13. The State Government in exercise of power conferred under
Article 162 of the Constitution of India has framed the
Chhattisgarh State Model Rehabilitation Policy, 2007 (as
amended) to restore the status and dignity of land oustee
whose land has been subjected to acquisition for the projects
of Governmental and private institutions in addition to payment
of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and to
provide for their shelter and employment also. Clause 1.1.3 of
the R&R Policy is one of the objectives to provide permanent
employment. Likewise, clause 1.2.7 of the R&R Policy
provides that if 75% of land of the last oustee / Bhumi Swami
has been acquired for industrial purpose then as per
qualification, employment will be provided to one of the
members of his/her family. Clause 2 of the R&R Policy
defines affected person / affected family. Clause 2.1 (c) of the
R&R Policy provides as under: -
ß¼x½ izHkkfor ifjokj %& izHkkfor ifjokj e sa 'kkfey gS dkSbZ
izHkkfor O;fDr] mldh ifRu ;k ifr RkFkk ukckfyx cPp s
vkSj izHkkfor O;fDr ij vkfJr o`) ekrk& firk] fo/kok eka ¡
;k cgu RkFkk vfookfgr iq=hAÞ
14. Meaning of “affected family” has been defined. The definition
of “affected family” includes wife or husband, minor children,
old parents dependent on the affected person, widow mother
or sister and unmarried daughter. Thus, the aforesaid policy
expressly provides that unmarried daughter is the member of
the affected family, but married daughter has not been
expressly included as member of the affected family, in other
words, she has been impliedly excluded as a member of the
affected family.
15. The question as formulated in the opening paragraph of this
judgment is whether exclusion of married daughter in the R&R
policy is just and fair. The word 'rehabilitation' has been
defined in the Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition). It means,
“Investing or clothing again with some right, authority, or
dignity. Restoring person or thing to a former capacity,
reinstating, qualifying again. Restoration of an individual to his
greatest potential, whether physically, mentally, socially, or
vocationally.”
16. The Supreme Court has occasion to define the meaning of
rehabilitation in its judgments. Some of them may be noticed
herein usefully and profitably.
17. Way back in the year 1986, in the matter of The Collector of
24 Parganas and others v. Lalit Mohan Mullick and others1
while defining the meaning of “rehabilitation”, the Supreme
Court highlighting the object of rehabilitation observed as
under: -
“13. In Collins Dictionary of the English
1 AIR 1986 SC 622 
Language, the meaning for the word 'rehabilitate'
is given as "to help a person (who is physically
or mentally disabled or has just been released
from prison) to readapt to society or a new job as
by vocational guidance, retraining or
thereby.......". By rehabilitation what is meant is
not to provide shelter alone. The real purpose of
rehabilitation can be achieved only if those who
are sought to be rehabilitated are provided with
shelter, food and other necessary amenities of
life. It would be too much to contend, much less
to accept, that providing medical facilities would
not come within the concept of the word
'rehabilitation'. ......”
18. In the matter of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of
India2
, the Supreme Court noticed that displacement of people
living on the proposed project sites and the areas to be
submerged is an important issue and a properly drafted R&R
plan would improve the living standards of displaced persons
after displacement, and held as under in paragraph 241: -
“241. Displacement of people living on the
proposed project sites and the areas to be
submerged is an important issue. Most of the
hydrology projects are located in remote and
inaccessible areas, where local population is,
like in the present case, either illiterate or having
marginal means of employment and the per
capita income of the families is low. It is a fact
that people are displaced by projects from their
ancestral homes. Displacement of these people
would undoubtedly disconnect them from their
past, culture, custom and traditions, but then it
becomes necessary to harvest a river for the
larger good. A natural river is not only meant for
the people close by but it should be for the
benefit of those who can make use of it, being
away from it or near by. Realising the fact that
displacement of these people would disconnect
them from their past, culture, custom and
traditions, the moment any village is earmarked
for takeover for dam or any other developmental
2 (2000) 10 SCC 664
activity, the project-implementing authorities
have to implement R&R programmes. The R&R
plans are required to be specially drafted and
implemented to mitigate problems whatsoever
relating to all, whether rich or poor, landowner or
encroacher, farmer or tenant, employee or
employer, tribal or non-tribal. A properly drafted
R&R plan would improve the living standards of
displaced persons after displacement.”
19. Similar is the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the
matter of N.D. Jayal and another v. Union of India and
others3
 in which Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have
held that the land oustees have a right under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India to lead a decent life and earn livelihood in
the rehabilitated locations, and further held that rehabilitation
of the land oustees is a logical corollary of Article 21.
Paragraph 60 of the report reads as follows: -
“60. Rehabilitation is not only about providing
just food, clothes or shelter. It is also about
extending support to rebuild livelihood by
ensuring necessary amenities of life.
Rehabilitation of the oustees is a logical corollary
of Article 21. The oustees should be in a better
position to lead a decent life and earn livelihood
in the rehabilitated locations. Thus observed
this Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan case2
.
The overarching projected benefits from the dam
should not be counted as an alibi to deprive the
fundamental rights of oustees. They should be
rehabilitated as soon as they are uprooted. And
none of them should be allowed to wait for
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation should take place
before six months of submergence. Such a
time-limit was fixed by this Court in B.D. Sharma
v. Union of India4
 and this was reiterated in
Narmada1
. This prior rehabilitation will create a
sense of confidence among the oustees and
they will be in a better position to start their life
3 (2004) 9 SCC 362
4 1992 Supp (3) SCC 93
by acclimatizing themselves with the new
environment.”
20. Likewise, in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Narmada Bachao Andolan and another5
, the Supreme Court
has clearly held that the land oustees are entitled to
resettlement and rehabilitation as per the policy framed for the
oustees of the project concerned and observed as under: -
“Thus, from the abovereferred judgments, it is
evident that acquisition of land does not violate
any constitutional / fundamental right of the
displaced persons. However, they are entitled to
resettlement and rehabilitation as per the policy
framed for the oustees of the project concerned.”
21. Thus, having examined object and nature of the rehabilitation
policy which clearly provides that rehabilitation is not confined
to extend the benefit of food, cloth and shelter, but it also
further extends to provide all necessary amenities of life which
also include employment to member of the land oustee /
affected family. The member of the affected family is entitled
for resettlement and rehabilitation as per the policy framed in
that behalf by the Government and as such, the policy framed
for rehabilitation of a land oustee must be just, fair, reasonable
and consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India,
particularly Articles 14 and 15.
22. As pointed out in foregoing paragraphs that married daughter
has been impliedly excluded to be member of affected family
as defined in clause 2 of the R&R Policy appears to be on the
5 (2011) 7 SCC 639
ground that upon marriage, daughter ceases to be member of
her parental family and she becomes member of her
matrimonial family.
23. It is well settled that marriage is an institution/sacred union not
only legally permissible but also basic civil right of a man and
woman. One of the most important inevitable consequences
of marriage is the reciprocal support and marriage is an
institution has great legal significance. Right to marry is
necessary concomitant of right to life guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India as right to life includes right to
lead a healthy life. Marriage does not bring about a severance
of the relationship between a father and mother and their son
or between parents and their daughter. These relationships
are not governed or defined by marital status.
24. Marriage is the sacred union, legally permissible, of two
healthy bodies of opposite sexes. It has to be mental,
psychological and physical Union. When two souls thus unite,
a new soul comes into existence. That is how, the life goes on
and on, on this planet. (See Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’6
.)
25. In the matter of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma7 Their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that
marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man/woman and
observed pertinently in paragraphs 24 & 25 as under:-
6 (1998) 8 SCC 296
7 (2013) 15 SCC 755
“24. Marriage is often described as one of the
basic civil rights of man/woman, which is
voluntarily undertaken by the parties in public in
a formal way, and once concluded, recognizes
the parties as husband and wife. Three elements
of common law marriage are (1) agreement to
be married (2) living together as husband and
wife, (3) holding out to the public that they are
married. Sharing a common household and duty
to live together form part of the Consortium
Omnis Vitae which obliges spouses to live
together, afford each other reasonable marital
privileges and rights and be honest and faithful
to each other. One of the most important
invariable consequences of marriage is the
reciprocal support and the responsibility of
maintenance of the common household, jointly
and severally. Marriage is an institution has
great legal significance and various obligations
and duties flow out of marital relationship, as per
law, in the matter of inheritance of property,
successionship, etc. Marriage, therefore,
involves legal requirements of formality,
publicity, exclusivity and all the legal
consequences flow out of that relationship.
25. Marriages in India take place either following
the personal Law of the Religion to which a party
is belonged or following the provisions of the
Special Marriage Act. Marriage, as per the
Common Law, constitutes a contract between a
man and a women, in which the parties
undertake to live together and support each
other. Marriage, as a concept, is also nationally
and internationally recognized. O’Regan, J., in
Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs (2000) 3 SA
936 (CC) noted as follows:
“Marriage and the family are social
institutions of vital importance. Entering
into and sustaining a marriage is a matter
of intense private significance to the parties
to that marriage for they make a promise to
one another to establish and maintain an
intimate relationship for the rest of their
lives which they acknowledge obliges them
to support one another, to live together and
to be faithful to one another. Such
relationships are of profound significance
to the individuals concerned. But such
relationships have more than personal
significance at least in part because human
beings are social beings whose humanity
is expressed through their relationships
with others. Entering into marriage
therefore is to enter into a relationship that
has public significance as well. The
institutions of marriage and the family are
important social institutions that provide for
the security, support and companionship of
members of our society and bear an
important role in the rearing of children.
The celebration of a marriage gives rise to
moral and legal obligations, particularly the
reciprocal duty of support placed upon
spouses and their joint responsibility for
supporting and raising children born of the
marriage. These legal obligations perform
an important social function. This
importance is symbolically acknowledged
in part by the fact that marriage is
celebrated generally in a public ceremony,
often before family and close friends....””
26. In a very recent decision in the matter of Malathi Ravi, M.D. v.
B.V. Ravi, M.D.8
, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have
held as under: -
“Marriage as a social institution is an affirmance
of civilised social order where two individuals,
capable of entering into wedlock, have pledged
themselves to the institutional norms and values
and promised to each other a cemented bond to
sustain and maintain the marital obligation. It
stands as an embodiment for continuance of the
human race.
27. In the matter of Miss C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India and
others9
 in the context of Indian Foreign Service (Conduct and
Discipline) Rules, 1961, which prohibited appointment of
married woman to such service, the Supreme Court has held
as under:-
8 (2014) 7 SCC 640
9 AIR 1979 SC 1868
“6.…..Our women is a said reflection on the
distance between Constitution in the book and
Law in action. And if the book and Law in
action. And if the Executive as the surrogate of
Parliament, makes rules in the teeth of Part III,
especially when high political office, even
diplomatic assignment has been filled by
women, the inference of die-hard allergy to
gender parity is inevitable.”
28. In the matter of Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashi
Rao Rajaram Sawai and another10, Their Lordships of the
Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have held that a
daughter after her marriage does not cease to be a daughter
of her father or mother.
29. In the matter of Savita Samvedi (Ms) and another v. Union
of India and others11, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court
have quoted the following saying with approval: -
“6. A common saying is worth pressing into
service to blunt somewhat the Circular. It is —
“A son is a son until he gets a wife. A
daughter is a daughter throughout her
life.””
Their Lordships further held that provision in Railway Board
Circular restricting the eligibility of married daughter, of the
retiring official, only to cases where such official has no son or
the daughter is the only person prepared to maintain the
parents and the sons are not in a position to do so, suffers
from gender discrimination by holding as under: -
“7. The retiring official’s expectations in old age
10 (1987) 2 SCC 278
11 (1996) 2 SCC 380
for care and attention and its measure from one
of his children cannot be faulted, or his hopes
dampened, by limiting his choice. That would be
unfair and unreasonable. If he has only one
married daughter, who is a railway employee,
and none of his other children are, then his
choice is and has to be limited to that railway
employee married daughter. He should be in an
unfettered position to nominate that daughter for
regularisation of railway accommodation. It is
only in the case of more than one children in
railway service that he may have to exercise a
choice and we see no reason why the choice be
not left with the retiring official’s judgment on the
point and be not respected by the Railway
authorities irrespective of the gender of the child.
There is no occasion for the Railways to be
regulating or bludgeoning the choice in favour of
the son when existing and able to maintain his
parents. The Railway Ministry’s Circular in that
regard appears thus to us to be wholly unfair,
gender-biased and unreasonable, liable to be
struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The eligibility of a married daughter must be
placed on a par with an unmarried daughter (for
she must have been once in that state), so as to
claim the benefit of the earlier part of the
Circular, referred to in its first paragraph, abovequoted.”
30. In the matter of Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee
Merchant12
, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held
that the discrimination only on the basis of sex is not
permissible subject to one exception and observed as under:-
“41. In English law “but-for-sex” test has been
developed to mean that no less favourable
treatment is to be given to women on genderbased
criterion which would favour the opposite
sex and women will not be deliberately selected
for less favourable treatment because of their
sex. It is on this “but-for-sex” test, it appears in
Nergesh Meerza case the three-Judge Bench of
this Court did not find the lower retirement age
from flying duties of air hostesses as
12 (2003) 6 SCC 277
discrimination only based on sex. It found that
the male and female members of crew are
distinct cadres with different conditions of
service. The service regulation based on the
agreements and settlement fixing lower
retirement age of air hostesses was not struck
down.
42. The constitutional prohibition to the State not
to discriminate citizens only on sex, however,
does not prohibit a special treatment to the
women in employment on their own
demand…………..”
31. In the matter of Shreejith L. v. Director of Education,
Kerala13
, Their Lordships have held that marriage by itself
does not disqualify the person concerned from seeking
employment and held as under:-
“28. …While it is true that marriage by itself does
not in view of the language employed in the
scheme, disqualify the person concerned from
seeking a compassionate appointment…”
32. Very recently, in the matter of Charu Khurana v. Union of
India14
, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while
considering the question of gender justice observed as under:
“33. ... On a condign understanding of clause
(e), it is clear as a cloudless sky that all practices
derogatory to the dignity of women are to be
renounced. Be it stated, dignity is the
quintessential quality of a personality and a
human frame always desires to live in the
mansion of dignity, for it is a highly cherished
value. Clause (j) has to be understood in the
backdrop that India is a welfare State and,
therefore, it is the duty of the State to promote
justice, to provide equal opportunity to all
citizens and see that they are not deprived of by
reasons of economic disparity. It is also the duty
of the State to frame policies so that men and
women have the right to adequate means of
13 (2012) 7 SCC 248
14 (2015) 1 SCC 192
livelihood. It is also the duty of the citizen to
strive towards excellence in all spheres of
individual and collective activity so that the
nation constantly rises to higher levels of
endeavour and achievement.
41. The aforesaid pronouncement clearly
spells out that there cannot be any
discrimination solely on the ground of gender. It
is apt to note here that reservation of seats for
women in panchayats and municipalities have
been provided under Articles 243(d) and 243(t)
of the Constitution of India. The purpose of the
constitutional amendment is that the women in
India are required to participate more in a
democratic set-up especially at the grass root
level. This is an affirmative step in the realm of
women empowerment. The 73rd and 74th
Amendments of the Constitution which deal with
the reservation of women has the avowed
purpose, that is, the women should become
parties in the decision-making process in a
democracy that is governed by the rule of law.
Their active participation in the decision-making
process has been accentuated upon and the
secondary role which was historically given to
women has been sought to be metamorphosed
to the primary one. The sustenance of gender
justice is the cultivated achievement of intrinsic
human rights. Equality cannot be achieved
unless there are equal opportunities and if a
woman is debarred at the threshold to enter into
the sphere of profession for which she is eligible
and qualified, it is well-nigh impossible to
conceive of equality. It also clips her capacity to
earn her livelihood which affects her individual
dignity.”
33. In the matter of National Legal Services Authority v. Union
of India15, the Supreme Court recognized that gender identity,
is an integral part of sex within the meaning of Articles 15 and
16 of the Constitution of India and no citizen can be
discriminated on the ground of gender. The Supreme Court
observed as follows:
15 Manu/SC/0309/2014 : (2014) 5 SCC 438
“We, therefore, conclude that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
includes any discrimination, exclusion, restriction
or preference, which has the effect of nullifying
or transposing equality by the law or the equal
protection of laws guaranteed under our
Constitution, and hence we are inclined to give
various directions to safeguard the constitutional
rights of the members of the TG community.”
34. Thus, from the aforesaid cases it is quite vivid that marriage is
a social circumstance and basic civil right of man and woman,
and marriage by itself is not a disqualification. A daughter
remains a daughter after her marriage and does not cease to
be a daughter of her father or mother. Thus, denial of
employment, included in the rehabilitation, to married daughter
of an affected family (land oustee) is gender-biased and
unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 & 15 of the
Constitution of India as well as Article 21, as rehabilitation of a
land oustee is logical corollary of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
35. As a fallout and consequence of aforesaid discussion, the writ
petition is allowed and consequently, clause 2.1 (c) of the R&R
Policy regarding employment being violative and
discriminatory to the extent of excluding married daughter from
consideration for employment, is hereby declared void and
inoperative. The impugned order dated 22-11-2012
(Annexure P-5) is hereby quashed. Clause 2.1 (c) of the
Chhattisgarh State Model Rehabilitation Policy, 2007 be read
in the manner to include the married daughter as one of the
eligibles subject to fulfillment of other conditions. As a
consequence, the respondents are directed to consider the
claim of the petitioner for being appointed afresh in
accordance with law keeping in view that her father's land was
acquired way back in the year 2007 and her application was
rejected on 22-11-2012, preferably within a period of forty-five
days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. No
order as to cost(s).
 Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal)

HEAD NOTE
Denial of benefit of rehabilitation, which includes employment, to a
married daughter of affected family is violative of Articles 14 and 
of the Constitution of India.

Print Page