No.46 of 2015 the Petitioner Nos.3 and 4 being the sister and brother-in-law
of the Petitioner No.1 had filed an application for anticipatory
bail. The said application was dismissed on the ground that no offence
was registered against them. Suffice is to say that the registration of
offence is not a sine qua non for entertaining an application for
anticipatory bail. The only requirement is a reasonable apprehension
of arrest in a nonbailable offence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1252 OF 2015
Bharat Devdan Salvi
v/s.
The State of Maharashtra
CORAM : RANJIT MORE &
SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, JJ.
Date of Pronouncement: 20th January, 2016
Citation; 2016 ALLMR(CRI)1239
2. This is a petition filed under article 226 of the constitution
r/w section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the
C.R. No.46 of 2015 registered with Bhosari Police Station, Pune, for the
offences punishable under sections 376 and 417 r/w. 34 of the IPC.
3. The brief facts necessary to decide this petition are as
under:
The Respondent No.2 who was to marry the Petitioner No.1
had lodged the FIR dated 15.2.2015 alleging that on 9.12.2014, the
Petitioner No.1 had sexual intercourse with her against her will and
without her consent. The Respondent No.2 further alleged that
subsequently the Petitioner No.1 and his family members called off the
marriage and thereby cheated her.
4. Ms. Kshitija Sarangi, the learned counsel for the Petitioners has
submitted that the FIR does not disclose offence under section 375 or
415 IPC. She has submitted that the marriage was called off in view of
the lack of compatibility between the Petitioner No.1 and the
Respondent No.2. She has further submitted that the Petitioner Nos.2
to 7 being the family members of the Petitioner No.1 were present at
the time of finalising the marriage and they are not involved in
commission of any offence as alleged. The learned counsel for the
Petitioners has submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not disclose
any offence and continuation of the proceedings will be abuse of
process of law.
5. Mr. Shinde, the learned APP has submitted that the material
on record prima facie shows the involvement of the Petitioner No.1.
He fairly concedes that the material on record does not show the
involvement of the Petitioner Nos.2 to 7 in commission of the offence
under section 376 or 417 of the IPC.
6. Mr. Satyavrat Joshi, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2
has submitted that the Petitioner No.1 had sexual intercourse with the
Respondent No.2 under a false promise of marriage. He has further
submitted that by calling off the marriage, the Petitioner No.1 and his
family members have cheated the Respondent No.2.
7. We have perused the records and considered the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioners, the learned
counsel for the Respondent No.2 and the learned APP for the
Respondent No.1State.
8. The legal principles in regard to quashing of first information
report had been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of
Haryana & Ors. V/s. Bhajanlal & Ors. 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 335 and
several other subsequent decisions. Recently in Rishipal Singh Vs.
State of U.P. & Anr (2014) 7 SCC 215 the Apex Court while considering
the scope and ambit of section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has held that
“A bare perusal of Section 482 Cr.P.C. makes it crystal clear
that the object of exercise of power under this section is to
prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of justice.
There are no hard and fast rules that can be laid down for the
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction, but exercising the
same is an exception, but not a rule of law. It is no doubt true
that there can be no straight jacket formula nor defined
parameters to enable a Court to invoke or exercise its inherent
powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. The Courts have to be very circumspect while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
9. The Apex Court after considering the previous pronouncements
has reiterated the guidelines with regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts
under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
“What emerges from the above judgments is that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the tests
to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted
allegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the
case. The Courts have to see whether the continuation of the
complaint amounts to abuse of process of law and whether
continuation of the criminal proceeding results in miscarriage
of justice or when the Court comes to a conclusion that
quashing these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice, then the Court can exercise the power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. While exercising the power under the provision, the
Courts have to only look at the uncontroverted allegation in the
complaint whether prima facie discloses an offence or not, but
it should not convert itself to that of a trial Court and dwell into
the disputed questions of fact.”
10. The present case needs to be examined in the backdrop of the
above mentioned principles. A plain reading of the FIR reveals that
the Respondent No.2 was to marry the Petitioner No.1, who is
otherwise related to her. Their engagement ceremony was held on
12.9.2014 in presence of their respective family members including
the Petitioner Nos.3 and 4, the sister and brotherinlaw and the
Petitioner Nos.5, 6 and 7, the maternal uncles and aunt of the
Petitioner No.1.
11. The Respondent No.2 had alleged that on 2.12.2014 she had
visited her cousin at Pune. On 9.12.2014 she visited the Petitioner
No.2, her would be motherinlaw, at Pune. The Petitioner No.2
persuaded her to wait till the Petitioner No.1 returned home from the
work place. The Petitioner No.1 came home at about 9.00 p.m. and
since it was late, the Petitioner No.2 advised the Respondent No.2 to
stay over. The Respondent No.2 has alleged that on the same night
when she was going to the room of her motherinlaw to sleep, the
Petitioner No.1 took her to his room and had sexual intercourse with
her against her wish and despite her resistance by assuring her that
they would be marrying soon. She has stated that the Petitioner No.1
threatened to call off the marriage if she disclosed the incident to
anyone.
12. The Respondent No.2 has further alleged that since the
Petitioners avoided finalising the wedding date, she went to his work
place on 24.01.2015 and questioned him about the same. There was
an altercation between her and the Petitioner No.1 over the said issue.
On 10.02.2015, the uncle of the Petitioner No.1 called her and her
parents to Chisban village to fix the wedding date. However, instead
of fixing the wedding date, they called off the marriage in view of the
incident of 24.1.2015. The Respondent No. 2 claimed that petitioners
have cheated her and her family by calling off the marriage without
any reason. Based on these allegations the aforestated crime has been
registered against above Petitioners for offences punishable under
sections 376 and 417 of the IPC.
13. It may be mentioned that to constitute an offence of 'rape' as
defined under section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, the act must be
covered by any of the six clauses of section 375 of the Indian Penal
Code. In order to constitute rape under the first and second clause of
Section 375, which are relevant for the purpose of this case, sexual
intercourse has to be against the will and without the consent of the
woman. In State Of U.P vs Chhotey Lal (2011) 2 SCC 550 the Apex
Court has held that:
“The expressions `against her will' and `without her
consent' may overlap sometimes but surely the two
expressions in clause First and clause Secondly have different
connotation and dimension. The expression `against her
will' would ordinarily mean that the intercourse was done
by a man with a woman despite her resistance and
opposition. On the other hand, the expression `without her
consent' would comprehend an act of reason accompanied
by deliberation.
… In State of H.P. v. In State of H.P. v. Mango Ram3 , a 3
Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with the aspect of
`consent' for the purposes of Section 375 IPC held at page
230 of the Report as under:
"Submission of the body under the fear of terror cannot be
construed as a consented sexual act. Consent for the purpose
of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only
after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of
the significance and moral quality of the act but after
having fully exercised the choice between resistance assent.
Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only
on a careful study of all relevant circumstances." and, the
expression `without her consent' would comprehend an act
of reason accompanied by deliberation.”
14. The averments in the FIR need to be examined in the backdrop of
the above legal position. The Respondent no.2 was engaged to the
petitioner no.1. A plain reading of the FIR reveals on the relevant
night, when the Respondent no. 2 had visited the Petitioner No.1 at his
residence at Pune, the petitioner no. 1 had tried to get intimate with
her. When she resisted and told him that it was not appropriate, the
petitioner no.1 told her that they would soon be getting married. She
has alleged that despite her resistance, the petitioner no.1 had forcible
sexual intercourse with her against her will. She has stated that when
she cried, the petitioner no.1 threatened to call off the marriage if she
disclosed the incident to any one.
15. The allegations in the FIR prima facie indicate that the
respondent no.2 had not consented to and was not willing to enter into
a physical relationship, despite which the petitioner no.1 had forcible
sexual intercourse with the Respondent no.2 against her wishes. The
medical evidence is also prima facie suggestive of sexual intercourse.
The allegations prime facie constitutes 'rape' under Clause 1 and 2 of
sec.375. The question whether it was a case of passive submission
under psychological pressure or whether it was a result of tacit consent
are the questions which will have to be finally decided on analysis of
evidence. Suffice it to state that quashing the FIR in respect of the
offence under Section 376 against the petitioner no.1 at this stage
would amount to rejecting the accusation made by the respondent no.2
without giving her any opportunity to prove the said allegations.
Hence, the prosecution for the offence punishable under Section 376 of
IPC cannot be quashed qua the petitioner no.1.
16. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner Nos. 2 to 7 are the
family members of the Petitioner No.1. There are no allegations in the
FIR that these Petitioners had either aided or abetted the Petitioner
No.1 in commission of offence under section 376 of the IPC. The only
allegation against these Petitioners is that they had called off the
marriage between the Petitioner No.1 and the Respondent No.2 and
had thereby cheated the Respondent No.2. It is in the light of these
allegations the offence under section 417 r/w. 34 of the IPC has been
registered against the Petitioner No.1 and his family members.
17. “Cheating” is defined under Section 415 of the IPC which reads
as under:
“Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver
any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally
induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he were not
so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat” .
18. The Honourable Supreme Court in G.V.Rao v. L.H.V.Prasad
(2000) page 693 has held as under:
“As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While
in the first part, the person must "dishonestly" or
"fraudulently" induce the complainant to deliver any
property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do
a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement
must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the
inducement should be intentional. As observed by this
Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney vs. State of
Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 = 1956 Crl.L.J. 1611 =
1956 SCR 483, a guilty intention is an essential
ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore,
to secure conviction of a person for the offence of
cheating, "mens rea" on the part of that person, must be
established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad vs.
State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 = 1954 Cr.L.J.
1806, that in order to constitute the offence of cheating,
the intention to deceive should be in existence at the
time when the inducement was offered. Thus, so far as
second part of Section 415 is concerned, "property", at
no stage, is involved. Here it is the doing of an act or
omission to do an act by the complainant, as a result of
intentional inducement by the accused, which is
material. Such inducement should result in the doing of
an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the
person concerned should have suffered or was likely to
suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or
property”
19. In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint are that the
petitioner no.1 had sexual intercourse with the respondent no.2
against her wishes, by stating that they would be marrying soon and
later the petitioner no.1 and his family viz. petitioner nos.2 to 7 called
off the marriage and thereby cheated the respondent no.2. The FIR
reveals that the imputations of cheating are made only because the
Petitioners had called off the marriage.
20. In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar (2000) 4
SCC 168 the Apex Court has held that:
“in determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the
distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the
accused at the time to inducement which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the
sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction,
that is the time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the
offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to
show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
time of making the promise”.
21. In the instant case, the FIR reveals that the marriage of the
Petitioner No.1 and the Respondent No.2 was finalised by their parents
and other family members and their engagement ceremony was held
on 12.9.2014. The FIR does not indicate that the Petitioner No.1 from
the very inception did not have intention to marry the respondent
no.2. The FIR does not indicate that the Petitioner No.1 had obtained
the consent of the Respondent No.2 and had induced her into entering
into a physical relationship by making a false promise of marriage
without having intention or inclination to marry her. The fact that the
Petitioner No.1 subsequently refused to marry her would not lead to an
inference that from the very inception the Petitioner No.1 did not
intend to marrying her.
22. The records reveal that the marriage of the Petitioner No.1 and
the Respondent no.2 was called off after the incident of 24.1.2015
when the Respondent No.2 had visited the workplace of the Petitioner
No.1 and quarreled with him over non finalizing of the date of the
marriage. A mere breach of promise of marriage or calling off the
marriage due to non compatibility or for any such reason would not
per se constitute an offence under section 415 of the IPC, particularly
when the FIR does not state that the Petitioner No.1 and his family
members had deceived the Respondent No.2 or intentionally induced
her to do any such act which was likely to cause damage or harm to
the respondent no.2.
23. The allegations made in the FIR therefore, do not attract the
ingredient of section 415 of the IPC and consequently do not constitute
offence punishable under section 417 of the IPC. This being the case,
the petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the offence punishable under
section 417 r/w. 34 of the IPC.
24. At this stage, we would like to state that upon registration of C.R.
No.46 of 2015 the Petitioner Nos.3 and 4 being the sister and brotherinlaw
of the Petitioner No.1 had filed an application for anticipatory
bail. The said application was dismissed on the ground that no offence
was registered against them. Suffice is to say that the registration of
offence is not a sine qua non for entertaining an application for
anticipatory bail. The only requirement is a reasonable apprehension
of arrest in a nonbailable offence.
25. Be that as it may, upon dismissal of the said application for
anticipatory bail, these two petitioners were arrested on 7.6.2015. They
had filed an application for regular bail on 9.6.2015 being Bail
Application No.1917 of 2015 before the learned Additional Sessions
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Judge, Pune. By order dated 17th June, 2015, this Court had directed
the learned Sessions Judge to dispose of the said application as early as
possible and possibly on 19.6.2015 itself. Said order was not complied
with. Considering the fact that the FIR did not disclose any offence
against these two Petitioners, who are Doctor by profession, this Court
by order dated 24th June, 2015 ordered to release them on bail.
26. It is pertinent to note that though the offence was registered
under section 376 and 417 IPC, the FIR does not spell out any
allegations of rape against the petitioner Nos.3 and 4. The Investigating
Officer has stated in her affidavit that on 4.04.2015 she had received an
application from the Respondent no.2 alleging that the petitioners no.3
and 4 had threatened her and that she apprehends threat to her life. It
may be mentioned that no crime has been registered against these
petitioners for threatening the Respondent no.2. These petitioners were
implicated in the crime only on the allegation that they had influenced
the petitioner no.1 in calling off the marriage and had thereby
committed an offence of cheating punishable under section 417 of the
IPC. Based on these allegations, these petitioners were arrested on
8.06.2015.
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27. It is pertinent to note that the offence under section 417 is
bailable and is punishable with imprisonment for one year, or fine or
both, despite which these two petitioners were arrested and remanded
to custody from time to time. Needless to state that the power of
arrest as well as the power to remand cannot be exercised in a casual
manner.
28. In Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 260,
the Apex Court has emphasized that:
“No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer
to do so. The existence of the powers to arrest is one thing. The
justification for the exercise of it is quite another . The police
officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to
do so. Arrest and detention in police lockup of a person can
cause incalculable harm to the reputation and selfesteem of a
person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner or on a mere
allegation of commission of an offence made against a person .
It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of
protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in
his own interest that no arrest should be made without a
reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as the
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genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable
belief both as to the person's complicity and even so as to the
need to effect arrest. Denying a person his liberty is a serious
matter.”
29. In the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8
SCC 273, the Apex Court after considering the scope of Section 41 of
Cr.P.C. has held as under:
“7.1. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it
is evident that a person accused of offence punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may be less than
seven years or which may extend to seven years with or
without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only
on its satisfaction that such person had committed the
offence punishable as aforesaid. Police officer before
arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such
arrest is necessary to prevent such person from
committing any further offence; or for proper
investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from
causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or
tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to
prevent such person from making any inducement, threat
or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the Court or the police officer; or
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unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the
court whenever required cannot be ensured. These are the
conclusions, which one may reach based on facts. Law
mandates the police officer to state the facts and record
the reasons in writing which led him to come to a
conclusion covered by any of the provisions aforesaid,
while making such arrest. Law further requires the police
officers to record the reasons in writing for not making
the arrest. In pith and core, the police office before arrest
must put a question to himself, why arrest? Is it really
required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will
achieve? It is only after these questions are addressed and
one or the other conditions as enumerated above is
satisfied, the power of arrest needs to be exercised. In
fine, before arrest first the police officers should have
reason to believe on the basis of information and
material that the accused has committed the offence.
Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied
further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more
purposes envisaged by subclauses
(a) to (e) of clause (1) of Section 41 of Cr.PC.”
30. Upon considering the scope of Section 41A of Cr.P.C. and while
emphasizing the need to ensure that the police officers do not arrest
the accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention
casually and mechanically the Apex Court has given following
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directions:
“……11.1. All the State Government to instruct its
police officers not to automatically arrest when the case
under Section 498A of IPC is registered, but to satisfy
themselves about the necessity for arrest under the
parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41
Cr.P.C.
11.2. All police officers be provided with a check list
containing specified sub clauses under Section 41(1)(b)
(ii);
11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly
filed and furnish the reasons and materials which
necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the
accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
11.4. The Magistrate while authorising detention of the
accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police
officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its
satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be
forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the
date of the institution of the case with a copy to the
Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent
of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in
writing;
11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of
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Cr.PC be served on the accused within two weeks from the
date of institution of the case, which may be extended by
the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons
to be recorded in writing;
11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid
shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned
liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to
be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before
High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11.8. Authorising detention without recording reasons
as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be
liable for departmental action by the appropriate High
Court.
12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall
not only apply to the cases under Section 498A of the I.P.C.
or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in
hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may be less than
seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether
with or without fine.”
31. Reverting to the present case, though the Investigating officer has
stated in the affidavit that the guidelines as laid down by the Apex
Court in the arrest of Accused were followed at the time of arrest, a
perusal of the case diary reveals that the directions in Arnesh Kumar
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(supra) have not been followed. The concerned investigating officer
had arrested the petitioners no.3 and 4 without ascertaining their
complicity in the offence. Though the offence was bailable, these
petitioners were produced before the Magistrate and remand was
sought for “the purpose of ascertaining the reason for calling off the
marriage, for verifying whether the other relatives were involved, to
verify whether these petitioners were involved in cheating any other
person and for arresting the coaccused Annasaheb Jadhav”. The
records reveal that the learned magistrate had also mechanically
remanded them to custody from time to time without even ascertaining
the nature of the allegations against these petitioners.
32. The petitioners no.3 and 4 had filed the bail application before
the sessions court on 9.6.2015. The learned Sessions Judge had called
for the say of the prosecution on 19.6.2015. By order dated
17.06.2015 the learned Judge was directed to dispose of the
application on 19.06.2015 itself. The learned Judge did not dispose
of the application and adjourned the same to 22.6.2015. On
24.06.2015 the learned counsel for the petitioners made a statement
that on 19.6.2015 the counsel for the petitioners and the learned APP
were present in the court and despite the request to hear the bail
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application, the learned Judge was reluctant to hear the application
and had adjourned the hearing to 22.06.2015. It was further stated
that the counsel for the petitioners had appeared before the court on
22.06.2015 and that she was informed that the bail application would
be heard in the afternoon session. However, by 12 p.m. she was
informed that the learned Judge had proceeded on leave on medical
grounds and the hearing of the bail application was further adjourned.
In view of the above statement, this court by order dated 24.6.2015
ordered to release the petitioners on bail. The Principal District
Sessions Judge, Pune was directed to submit the report to this court.
33. We have perused the report and the explanation tendered by the
learned Judge, and the same in our view is not satisfactory. The bail
application was filed on 09.06.2015 and was opposed on the same
grounds as stated in the remand application. The learned Judge failed
to consider that there were no allegations of rape against these
petitioners and the only allegation were of offence punishable under
Section 417 IPC. The learned Judge had adjourned the hearing on
19.6.2015, merely on the statement of the APP that the offence was of
serious nature. Despite the direction to dispose of the bail application
on 19.06.2015, and despite the offence being bailable offence, the
failure of the learned Judge to dispose of the application expeditiously
has also resulted in illegal detention of the petitioners in custody from
7
th June, 2015 to 24th June, 2015.
34. It is indeed a matter of great concern that despite the offence
being bailable, the Investigating agency, the Judicial Magistrate as well
as the Sessions Court were responsible for detaining the aforesaid
petitioners in custody from 7.6.2015 to 24.6.2015 in total
contravention of the directions of the Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar
(supra) and in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner
nos.3 and 4.
35. Hence we deem it fit to direct an enquiry agianst the errant police
officers, as well as the concerned judicial officers, in accordance with
the directions of the Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar (para 11.7 and 11.8.
supra). The petitioner nos.3 and 4 are at liberty to file appropriate
proceedings for compensation, if they so desire.
36. Under the circumstances and in view of discussion supra, we pass
the following order:
(i) The petition is partly allowed, with costs of Rs.50,000/
to be paid to the petitioner nos.3 and 4.
(ii) The C.R.No.46 of 2015 registered at Bhosari Police
Station, Pune, is quashed qua the Petitioner Nos.2 to 7 and
quashed qua the petitioner no.1 only in respect of the
offence under section 417 r/w 34 of the IPC.
(iii) The registry is directed to forward copy of this order to
the Commissioner of Police, Pune. The Commissioner of
Police, Pune to enquire into the matter of illegal detention
and to fix the responsibility and to take disciplinary action
against the erring police officers.
(iv) The respondent no.1 shall recover the costs of
Rs.50,000/ from the erring police officers.
(vi The inquiry and action taken report be filed before this
court within four months from the date of receipt of this
order.
(vi) A copy of this order be forwarded to the Registrar
General, High Court, to be placed before the Honourable The
Chief Justice, Bombay High Court.
(ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.) (RANJIT MORE, J.)
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