If it is seen that as per the own information of LIC, the
petitioner was a member of the Trust, as rightly submitted by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, the concept of a fiduciary
relationship would also extend to the relation between the
petitioner and LIC and this being so, the petitioner cannot be
treated as third party, to whom the information sought for in the
application, can be denied.
As regards the other reason for denying the
information to the petitioner, I must say that the principle of
public domain would have no application to the present case,
rather the principle of personal information of a party would have
application to the present case. The petitioner, being a party to
the information and being not possessed with it and the
respondent no.3 being in its possession, the petitioner would be
entitled to receive the information sought for by him. Viewed in
this way, I find that the impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary and
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO.654 of 2015
Shri Rohidas A. Naik,
Versus
Central Information Commission,
CORAM :- S. B. SHUKRE, J.
Date : 13 th January, 2016.
Citation;AIR 2016 Bombay 95
3. The grievance of the petitioner is that the application
filed by the petitioner seeking certified copies of the Trust Deed
dated 29/01/1993 has been wrongly and illegally rejected by the
Public Information Officer i.e. the respondent no.3 and the order
of the rejection has been upheld by the Appellate Authorities i.e.
the respondent nos.1 and 2, without considering the settled
principles of law.
4. It is seen from the first impugned order passed by the
respondent no.3 (page 15 of the paper book) that the information
has been rejected on the ground that the information is held by
the LIC in a fiduciary capacity and also on the ground that the
information relates to personal information, having no connection
whatsoever with any public activity or interest.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 submits
that LIC indeed holds the information in a fiduciary relationship
with the MRF Limited, which has entered into a Trust Deed
between the Company and some of its employees, who have been
shown as Trustees and that on the date, on which the application
under Right to Information was filed by the petitioner, as per the
information received by the LIC from the said Company, the
petitioner had ceased to be Trustee. On the basis of the Trust
Deed, the LIC has only issued a Group Superannuation Policy for
the benefit of the employees of the said Company and, therefore,
LIC stands in a fiduciary relationship with MRF Limited.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the
letter dated 18/10/2012 (page 56), issued by the Manager
(CRM/CPIO of LIC) clearly shows that the petitioner, as per the
records available with LIC in the year 2012, was one of the
members of the Trust. He, therefore, submits that the petitioner,
being one of the Trustees, could not have been deprived of the
copy of the Trust Deed as the so called fiduciary relationship of
LIC, at the most, would also extend to the petitioner.
7. The learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 states
that the letter dated 18/10/2012 cannot be read as referring to
records available in the year 2012. He submits that the sentence
has to be read as a whole and by doing so, it can be seen that what
has been mentioned therein, is the record of the year 1993.
8. A bare perusal of this letter at page no.56 shows that
the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 is
absolutely off the mark. The relevant sentence is to be found
somewhere in the middle of the letter and it reads as under :
“Reply- The names of the Trustees stated in the Trust
Deed dated 29/01/1993, as per our available records is
as under :-
1. Shri George Ninan Chairman
2. Shri A. R. Pai Secretary
3. Shri Dulcidnio Fernandes Member
4. Shri Altaf Khan Member
5. Shri Abel Fernandes Member
6. Shri Cruz Gracias Member
7. Shri Rohidas H. Naik Member”
9. It is clear from the above sentence that the date of
29/01/1993 has been mentioned to be the date of the Trust Deed
and not the date of the available record. In fact, the words,
“available records” have not been qualified by any year or
particular date and, therefore, the words “available records” have
to be construed by reference to the date of the letter at page 56.
The date of the letter being 18/10/2012, it has to be said that the
records, which were available in the year 2012, disclose the
information as given in this letter. In other words, in the year
2012, the petitioner, as per the own record of LIC, was member of
the Trust.
10. If it is seen that as per the own information of LIC, the
petitioner was a member of the Trust, as rightly submitted by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, the concept of a fiduciary
relationship would also extend to the relation between the
petitioner and LIC and this being so, the petitioner cannot be
treated as third party, to whom the information sought for in the
application, can be denied.
11. As regards the other reason for denying the
information to the petitioner, I must say that the principle of
public domain would have no application to the present case,
rather the principle of personal information of a party would have
application to the present case. The petitioner, being a party to
the information and being not possessed with it and the
respondent no.3 being in its possession, the petitioner would be
entitled to receive the information sought for by him. Viewed in
this way, I find that the impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary and
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
12. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition is allowed. The
impugned orders are quashed and set aside. It is directed that the
information sought for by the petitioner in the application dated
01/12/2012 shall be furnished to him within a period of three
weeks from the date of the order. In case, the original Trust Deed
is not available with the respondent nos.2 and 3, these
respondents shall furnish a copy of the document titled as Trust
deed dated 29/01/1993 to the petitioner, with an endorsement that
these respondents do no possess original Trust Deed.
13. Rule is made absolute in these terms.
S. B. SHUKRE, J.
SMA
petitioner was a member of the Trust, as rightly submitted by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, the concept of a fiduciary
relationship would also extend to the relation between the
petitioner and LIC and this being so, the petitioner cannot be
treated as third party, to whom the information sought for in the
application, can be denied.
As regards the other reason for denying the
information to the petitioner, I must say that the principle of
public domain would have no application to the present case,
rather the principle of personal information of a party would have
application to the present case. The petitioner, being a party to
the information and being not possessed with it and the
respondent no.3 being in its possession, the petitioner would be
entitled to receive the information sought for by him. Viewed in
this way, I find that the impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary and
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO.654 of 2015
Shri Rohidas A. Naik,
Versus
Central Information Commission,
CORAM :- S. B. SHUKRE, J.
Date : 13 th January, 2016.
Citation;AIR 2016 Bombay 95
3. The grievance of the petitioner is that the application
filed by the petitioner seeking certified copies of the Trust Deed
dated 29/01/1993 has been wrongly and illegally rejected by the
Public Information Officer i.e. the respondent no.3 and the order
of the rejection has been upheld by the Appellate Authorities i.e.
the respondent nos.1 and 2, without considering the settled
principles of law.
4. It is seen from the first impugned order passed by the
respondent no.3 (page 15 of the paper book) that the information
has been rejected on the ground that the information is held by
the LIC in a fiduciary capacity and also on the ground that the
information relates to personal information, having no connection
whatsoever with any public activity or interest.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 submits
that LIC indeed holds the information in a fiduciary relationship
with the MRF Limited, which has entered into a Trust Deed
between the Company and some of its employees, who have been
shown as Trustees and that on the date, on which the application
under Right to Information was filed by the petitioner, as per the
information received by the LIC from the said Company, the
petitioner had ceased to be Trustee. On the basis of the Trust
Deed, the LIC has only issued a Group Superannuation Policy for
the benefit of the employees of the said Company and, therefore,
LIC stands in a fiduciary relationship with MRF Limited.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the
letter dated 18/10/2012 (page 56), issued by the Manager
(CRM/CPIO of LIC) clearly shows that the petitioner, as per the
records available with LIC in the year 2012, was one of the
members of the Trust. He, therefore, submits that the petitioner,
being one of the Trustees, could not have been deprived of the
copy of the Trust Deed as the so called fiduciary relationship of
LIC, at the most, would also extend to the petitioner.
7. The learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 states
that the letter dated 18/10/2012 cannot be read as referring to
records available in the year 2012. He submits that the sentence
has to be read as a whole and by doing so, it can be seen that what
has been mentioned therein, is the record of the year 1993.
8. A bare perusal of this letter at page no.56 shows that
the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 is
absolutely off the mark. The relevant sentence is to be found
somewhere in the middle of the letter and it reads as under :
“Reply- The names of the Trustees stated in the Trust
Deed dated 29/01/1993, as per our available records is
as under :-
1. Shri George Ninan Chairman
2. Shri A. R. Pai Secretary
3. Shri Dulcidnio Fernandes Member
4. Shri Altaf Khan Member
5. Shri Abel Fernandes Member
6. Shri Cruz Gracias Member
7. Shri Rohidas H. Naik Member”
9. It is clear from the above sentence that the date of
29/01/1993 has been mentioned to be the date of the Trust Deed
and not the date of the available record. In fact, the words,
“available records” have not been qualified by any year or
particular date and, therefore, the words “available records” have
to be construed by reference to the date of the letter at page 56.
The date of the letter being 18/10/2012, it has to be said that the
records, which were available in the year 2012, disclose the
information as given in this letter. In other words, in the year
2012, the petitioner, as per the own record of LIC, was member of
the Trust.
10. If it is seen that as per the own information of LIC, the
petitioner was a member of the Trust, as rightly submitted by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, the concept of a fiduciary
relationship would also extend to the relation between the
petitioner and LIC and this being so, the petitioner cannot be
treated as third party, to whom the information sought for in the
application, can be denied.
11. As regards the other reason for denying the
information to the petitioner, I must say that the principle of
public domain would have no application to the present case,
rather the principle of personal information of a party would have
application to the present case. The petitioner, being a party to
the information and being not possessed with it and the
respondent no.3 being in its possession, the petitioner would be
entitled to receive the information sought for by him. Viewed in
this way, I find that the impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary and
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
12. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition is allowed. The
impugned orders are quashed and set aside. It is directed that the
information sought for by the petitioner in the application dated
01/12/2012 shall be furnished to him within a period of three
weeks from the date of the order. In case, the original Trust Deed
is not available with the respondent nos.2 and 3, these
respondents shall furnish a copy of the document titled as Trust
deed dated 29/01/1993 to the petitioner, with an endorsement that
these respondents do no possess original Trust Deed.
13. Rule is made absolute in these terms.
S. B. SHUKRE, J.
SMA
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